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Prospective technology assessment in the Anthropocene: A transition toward a culture of sustainability

Martin Möller and Rainer Grießhammer

https://doi.org/10.1177/20530196221095700

Abstract

In the Anthropocene, humankind has become a quasi-geological force. Both the rapid development as well as the depth of intervention of new technologies result in far-reaching and irreversible anthropogenic changes in the Earth’s natural system. However, early and development-accompanying evaluation of technologies are not yet common sense. Against this background, this review article aims to compile the current state of knowledge with regard to the early sustainability assessment of technologies and to classify this status quo with respect to the key challenges of the Anthropocene. To that end, the paper initially outlines major existing definitions and framings of the term of sustainability. Key milestones, concepts and instruments with regard to the development of sustainability assessment and technology assessment (TA) methodologies are also presented. Based on this overview, the energy sector is used as an example to discuss how mirroring ongoing transformation processes can contribute to the further development of the TA framework in order to ensure an agile, goal-oriented, and future-proof assessment system.

Introduction

For the first time in history, human development is characterized by a coupling of technological, social and geological processes. In this new geological epoch of the Anthropocene (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000), humankind has become a quasi-geological force that profoundly and irreversibly alters the functioning of the Earth’s natural system (Potsdam Memorandum, 2007).

The main reasons for this extraordinarily high range of human activity are the exponential increase in the world’s population, production and consumption, as well as an increasing acceleration of industrial processes. New technologies are being developed that enable a particular high sectoral depth of intervention as well as a fast marketing of products and applications. As a result, they impose significant pressure on a wide range of sectors to change and adapt to the speed of innovation. Ultimately, society as a whole is urged to react to the impacts generated by the new technologies. A prominent example of a technology with such a high level of intervention is additive manufacturing. Also known as 3D printing, additive manufacturing is seen as a key technology for digitalization due to their production flexibility, the possibilities for function integration and product individualization. Beyond acceleration of innovation times, however, their use also allows for a reduction in component weight and thus a reduction in operating costs, which can promote resource-efficient manufacturing (Bierdel et al., 2019). However, additive manufacturing can create new consumption incentives due to faster product cycles and poses risks to new producers by shifting work and related hazardous substance risks to residential environments (Umweltbundesamt, 2018).

Both the rapid development as well as the depth of intervention of new technologies and materials result in anthropogenic changes in Earth system processes that can otherwise only be caused by meteorite impacts, continental drift and cyclical fluctuations in the Sun-Earth constellation. For example, the effects on the Earth’s nitrogen cycle are particularly serious. Through the ability to synthesize artificial nitrogen compounds by means of the Haber Bosch process, humans have managed to feed 48% of the global population. With increases in fertilizer usage, however, the nitrogen cycle has been pushed far beyond sustainability and nitrate pollution being responsible for increasing dead zones in coastal areas. Furthermore, due to the use of fossil fuels and intensive agriculture, CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere have reached a level last approached about 3 to 5 million years ago, a period when global average surface temperature is estimated to have been about 2°C–3.5°C higher than in the pre-industrial period (NAS and Royal Society, 2020).

The harmful effects of the technologies on the biosphere are fueled by the fact that technological developments are usually faster than political and technical countermeasures. Moreover, in many cases, technical countermeasures still focus on efficiency improvement strategies, less hazardous substitutions of substances as well as end-of-pipe cleaning technologies. While this approach has yielded some success in the past, it also entails the risk of rebound effects.

Against this background, there is an increasing need for comprehensive approaches to analysis and solutions. Hence, the following key questions arise how to deal with the challenges regarding the prospective assessment of technologies in the era of the Anthropocene:

Firstly, which applications of technologies are beneficial with respect to a sustainable development, and which ones we should rather abandon?

Secondly, which methodological approach can be used to assess and influence the development of new technologies right from the beginning and with sufficient certainty of direction?

Thirdly, who is responsible and competent to perform the evaluation on the sustainability performance of technologies and to make corresponding decisions concerning their future roadmap?

Ultimately, how can we transform technosphere and society to a culture of sustainability, in other words: “Can humanity adapt to itself?” (Toussaint et al., 2012)

In order to elaborate viable answers to these fundamental questions, this paper aims to review existing definitions of sustainability as well as approaches of sustainability assessment of technologies and associated tools within the era of the Anthropocene. Hence, it first addresses the issue of framing the term of sustainability in the era of the Anthropocene (section 2). Based on a brief overview in section 3 how sustainability assessment methodologies evolved in the past, major milestones and concepts with regard to the technology assessment (TA) framework are described in section 4, with particular focus on the concept of prospective TA. In section 5, we use the energy sector as an example to discuss how mirroring ongoing transformation processes in major areas of need can contribute to the further development of the TA framework. Finally, section 6 is dedicated to conclusions and outlook.

Sustainability in the Anthropocene

Sustainability is a delicate term. Its inflationary use in politics, science and society has rendered it increasingly arbitrary and often blurs the view of its core meaning. Sustainability as a concept was introduced more than 300 years ago by chief miner Hans-Carl von Carlowitz on the occasion of a serious raw material crisis: Wood, at that time the most important raw material for ore mining, had become noticeably scarce and without appropriate countermeasures, the operation of smelting furnaces and consequently silver production would not have been further possible within a foreseeable future. Driven by these economic requirements, von Carlowitz proposed a new principle of forest management, which envisaged taking only as much wood from the forests in a given period of time as could grow back again in the same period (Töpfer, 2013von Carlowitz, 1713).

In the discussions about the scarcity of natural resources in the 1970s (cf. Meadows et al., 1972), the concept of sustainability was taken up again and experienced a renaissance through its further development in terms of content. Environmental and social aspects of sustainability have been placed more and more in the foreground. Hence, sustainability has increasingly been understood as a major global transformation process (Grießhammer and Brohmann, 2015; see also section 5), which is reflected in particular in the term of a “sustainable development.” Another milestone in the framing of sustainability as a concept with normative relevance has been achieved in the World Commission on Environment and Development. In its report, the so-called “Brundtland Report,” the commission defines sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987: without page). With this definition, the aspects of intra– and intergenerational equity were introduced and particularly emphasized in the sustainability debate. Furthermore, the “Brundtland Report” frames sustainable development as a necessary transformation process of economy and society as it points out that:

“Sustainable development is not a fixed state of harmony, but rather a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are made consistent with future as well as present needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987: without page).

Since the 1990s, the debate on how intergenerational justice is to be achieved has been dominated by two diverging perceptions of the concept of sustainability, referred to as “strong sustainability” and “weak sustainability”:

Strong sustainability postulates to preserve the entire natural capital of the Earth. Human capital and natural capital are perceived to be complementary, but not interchangeable. This means that humans, as users of nature, may live only from the “interest” of the natural capital. Any consumption of non-renewable resources would therefore be ruled out, and renewable resources could only be used within their regeneration rate (Som et al., 2009).

Weak sustainability calls only for preserving of the Earth’s total anthropogenic and natural capital. Accordingly, humanity could reduce natural capital to any degree if it was substituted in return by anthropogenic capital with the same economic value (Solow, 1986).

At the UN Conference on Environment and Development at Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the concept of sustainable development was recognized as an internationally guiding principle. The underlying idea was that economic efficiency, social justice and the safeguarding of the natural basis of life are interests that are equally important for survival and complement each other. Although 27 fundamental principles for sustainable development are enshrined in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (United Nations, 1992), for more than 10 years no concrete sustainability goals and indicators existed that would have been suitable in particular for the sustainability assessment of products and technologies.

With the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, the member states of the United Nations for the first time agreed upon a universal catalog of fixed time-specific targets. These 17 SDGs (see Figure 1) and the corresponding 169 targets can be considered as the interdisciplinary normative basis of sustainability research, covering all three dimensions of sustainable development, that is, environmental, economic, and social aspects (United Nations, 2015).

Figure 1. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda.Source: UNDP (2016).

The 2030 Agenda is universal in scope, which means that it commits all countries to contribute toward a comprehensive effort for global sustainability in all its dimensions while ensuring equity, peace and security. Furthermore, with its central, transformative promise “leave no one behind,” it is based on the principle to take on board even the weakest and most vulnerable. Hence, it seeks to eradicate poverty in all its forms as well as to combat discrimination and rising inequalities within and amongst countries (BMUV, 2022SDGF, 2016United Nations, 2021).

As a major specification of the 2030 Agenda, the concept of Planetary Boundaries focusses on the environmental dimension of sustainability. This approach put forward by Rockström et al. (2009) echoes the concept of “strong sustainability” (see above) and has been updated and extended by Steffen et al. (2015). At its core, it identifies nine global biophysical processes, whose significant changes can lead to conditions on Earth that are no longer considered a “safe operating space for humanity.” According to Steffen et al. (2015), several of the global biophysical processes are already beyond an uncertainty range with a high risk of dangerous changes on the planetary scale. These include the integrity of the biosphere (expressed as genetic diversity) and biogeochemical material flows, especially nitrogen and phosphorus. Others (e.g. climate change and land use change) are considered to be in an area of high uncertainty with an increasing risk of dangerous changes.

In 2016, Rockström and Sukhdev presented a new way of framing the SDGs of the 2030 Agenda. According to the concept of “strong sustainability” they argued that economies and societies should be perceived as embedded parts of the biosphere (Stockholm Resilience Center, 2016). This perspective is illustrated by the so-called “Wedding Cake” model (see Figure 2) and challenges the predominant understanding expressed by the “Three Pillars” model of sustainability (cf. Barbier, 1987) that environmental, economic and social development can be regarded as separate parts. Hence, the “Wedding Cake” model of sustainability can be understood as a combination of the 2030 Agenda and the concept of Planetary Boundaries since it calls for a transition toward a world logic where the economy serves society so that both economy and society can evolve within the “safe operating space” of the planet.

Figure 2. The “Wedding Cake” model of sustainability.Source: Azote for Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University.

The link between SDGs and Planetary Boundaries is of paramount importance in the age of the Anthropocene. Even though the SDGs have been lauded for amplifying the global development agenda by including environmental, social and economic concerns, the 2030 Agenda remains committed to a growth-oriented development that potentially conflicts with keeping human development within the Planetary Boundaries as defined by Rockström et al. (2009). A striking example of the growth-oriented concept can be found in SDG target 8.1, which requires to “sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7% gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries” (United Nations, 2015). Against this background, substantial changes toward more sufficient consumption patterns that help to remain within the Earth’s environmental carrying capacity need to be established and promoted by setting corresponding political framework conditions (Fischer and Grießhammer, 2013).

Evolvement of sustainability assessment methodologies

The scientific methodology for assessing the sustainability of technologies, material or products is far less developed than the debate on sustainable development and sustainable consumption would suggest. However, initial approaches in this respect were developed by the Öko-Institut as early as 1987 (Öko-Institut, 1987). The concept of the Produktlinienanalyse (English “product line analysis”), representing a pioneering step in the development of methods for life cycle-based analyses, made it possible to record the environmental, economic, and social impacts of products along the whole product line.

Nevertheless, at the end of the 1990ies, the product-related Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) became established and standardized on the international level, representing a methodology which assesses only the environmental impacts of a product over its entire life-cycle. The decisive standards of LCA are ISO 14040 (2006) and ISO 14044 (2006), which have become widely applied. These international standards essentially describe the process of conducting LCAs, examining the impact of a product from “cradle to grave.” Particular attention is paid in ISO 14040 and ISO 14044 to the scoping of a LCA study, with concrete requirements on the choice of the system boundaries, the functional unit (i.e. the quantified performance of the investigated product system for use as a reference unit) and the data quality requirements. In addition, the performance of a critical review by an independent third party is envisaged as a quality assurance step.

Sustainability assessments, however, did not advance until the 2000s, with the detailed method descriptions PROSA (Product Sustainability Assessment) by the Öko-Institut (Grießhammer et al., 2007) and SEE-Balance (Socio-Eco-Efficiency Analysis) by the chemical company BASF (Kicherer, 2005Saling, 2016). Even for the sub-methods of Life Cycle Costing (Swarr et al., 2011) and Social Life Cycle Assessment (Grießhammer et al., 2006UNEP-SETAC Life Cycle Initiative, 2009), method descriptions were presented comparatively late. There are also proposals to combine the three sub-methods of Life Cycle Assessment, Life Cycle Costing and Social Life Cycle Assessment to form the Life Cycle Sustainability Assessment (LCSA) (Feifel et al., 2010Finkbeiner, 2011). However, in contrast to PROSA, the aim is not to analyze and evaluate needs and the realized product benefits, even though meeting basic needs through products is one of the central demands of Agenda 21. Whereas initially the sustainability of only relatively simple products such as food, textiles, or detergents had been assessed, in recent years the sustainability performance of complex products such as notebooks (Manhart and Grießhammer, 2006) and telecommunications services (Prakash et al., 2016) as well as emerging technologies and materials (Möller et al., 2012) has also been analyzed.

For many years, the comparatively open or specific selection of indicators for conducting sustainability assessment case studies was justified by the lack of a relevant normative framework as well as a generally accepted set of indicators. With the adoption of the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda in 2015, this has fundamentally changed (cf. section 2). In addition to its 17 SDGs and 169 targets, the 2030 Agenda provides a globally accepted system of indicators for measuring the SDGs. However, only a few dozen of the 169 targets explicitly refer to products and companies. In a recently completed research project (Eberle et al., 2021) funded by the German Federal Ministry on Education and Research a method was developed which provided for a reasoned restriction to those indicators to the achievement of which products, services and companies can actually contribute. By means of the method, it is possible for the first time to measure the contribution to the achievement of the SDGs at the level of products and services and thus to establish a link between LCA and SLCA results and the 2030 Agenda (Eberle and Wenzig, 2020). To complete the assessment, an in-depth analysis of societal benefits according to Möller et al. (2021a) can be supplemented, which is also based on the 2030 Agenda. In this way, additional benefit aspects of the products and services considered beyond their core benefits can be identified with a view to the SDGs.

As our experience from practice has shown, for the sustainability assessment of any object of investigation, the respective functionality is of utmost importance and must therefore be considered and defined in detail. In this context, a careful definition of the functional unit as defined in ISO 14040 and ISO 14044 is considered to be essential. In addition, a detailed analysis of the various benefit aspects of the studied object is recommended. Against this background, there is no technology, material or product that is sustainable per se. Only the way a technology, material or product is handled and used over its whole life-cycle may be more or less sustainable. Therefore, their sustainability performance always has to be analyzed and evaluated in the context of the intended application and with regard to a possible contribution to a sustainable development. Absolute statements such as “sustainable plastics,” often combined with the addition “due to recyclability,” must therefore be rated very critically. Recyclability, which is often regarded as synonymous with sustainability in the marketing of materials, depends on available recycling infrastructure, which typically only exists in the materials sector where it is economically viable.

Another important lesson learned from several decades of sustainability assessment is that assessment systems have changed and evolved significantly in the past. As sustainability assessment has been driven by emerging environmental risks, further developments in the normative framework and societal developments, the assessment methodology had to evolve as well. Notable examples of additions to the assessment methodology with respect to the environmental dimension of sustainability are the issues of greenhouse effect and ozone depletion in the 1980s and the microplastic problem in the recent past. It can be assumed that the aforementioned drivers will continue to influence sustainability assessment in the future. For a future-proof sustainability assessment methodology, it is therefore essential that newly emerging risks can be identified at an early stage. This calls for a flexible and adaptive assessment framework as well as an interdisciplinary exchange, especially between natural and social sciences (Möller et al., 2021b).

Evolvement of technology assessment

Roughly in the second half of the 20th century, undesirable side effects of progress in science and technology increasingly manifested themselves in the form of risks and concrete damaging events and thus found their way into the collective consciousness of society. The almost ubiquitous emergence of persistent pollutants like the pesticide DDT (Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) in the environment and the risks of nuclear power can be regarded as particularly controversial examples in this respect (Carson, 1962Grunwald, 2019). Accordingly, the appearance of these phenomena is considered to mark the beginning of the Anthropocene era. As a result, a consensus previously largely in place, which equated scientific and technological progress with social progress, was increasingly questioned. Against this background, researchers were more and more confronted with the challenge of reflecting not only on the possible consequences of science-based technologies, but also on the epistemological foundations of their own actions (Kollek and Döring, 2012).

Consequently, the concept of TA became established in the 1960s, particularly in the United States, with early studies focusing on the issue of environmental pollution, but also issues like the supersonic transport, and ethics of genetic screening (Banta, 2009). One of the basic motivations of TA is to deal with possible short- and long-term consequences of scientific and technological progress (e.g. societal, economic, ethical, and legal impacts) as early and comprehensively as possible, in order to enable formative interventions (Grunwald, 20102019). The ultimate goal of early TA studies was to provide policy makers as primary target group with information on policy alternatives (Banta, 2009).

One of the key challenges for TA relates to the question of how to respond to emerging technologies, that is novel technologies that are still at an early stage of their development. Especially in the case of basic research-oriented R&D work, the new developments are characterized by low technology readiness levels (cf. Mankins, 1995), that is the R&D results are still relatively far away from entering the market in the form of tangible products. The relatively low maturity of the technologies results in a very limited availability of quantitative data on subsequent product specifications and potential environmental impacts. On the other hand, addressing sustainability aspects at such an early stage in the innovation process basically offers an excellent window of opportunity to avoid possible weaknesses with regard to sustainable development and to identify existing strengths. This situation is often referred as the Collingridge Dilemma (Collingridge, 1980): In the infancy of an emerging technology, the potential to influence its properties is particularly high, but the knowledge about its sustainability impacts is comparatively low. Later on, the understanding on the consequences of an emerging technology is expected to increase, yet the possibilities for shaping its design may already be significantly reduced by already existing path dependencies (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Dependencies between the maturity of a technology, the knowledge about environmental, health safety and social (EHS/S) impacts as well as the ability to prevent corresponding risks.Source: Köhler and Som (2014).

Against this background, an ideal period for the assessment and eco-design of emerging technologies would be during the innovation stages of “applied technology development” or “product design.” In these stages, the ability to prevent sustainability risks is still relatively high (cf. curve with solid line in Figure 3) and, at the same time, the quantity and quality of data required for a sustainability assessment are increasing significantly. However, a sustainability assessment in the stage of “basic science and material research” is well before this ideal period.

Basically, the dilemma outlined by Collingridge presupposes a fundamental separation between cognition and action as well as between science and technology. With the emergence of the concept of “technosciences,” however, this hypothesis has been increasingly challenged since about the mid-1980s by postulating a constitutive relationship between science and technology (Haraway, 1997Hottois, 1984Latour, 1987). Hence, the characteristic feature of technosciences is a far-reaching convergence of science and technology on all levels of action and effect, of materiality and culture (Kastenhofer, 2010).

The concept of technosciences has been adopted by anthropologists, philosophers and sociologists in science and technology studies as well as in the field of philosophy of science (e.g. Hacking, 1983Nordmann, 2006Pickering, 1992). Other TA concepts attach less emphasis to the intertwining of science, technology and society, but rather aim to start TA as early as possible. These include the “constructive Technology Assessment” developed by Schot and Rip (1997), which does not focus primarily on the possible consequences of a technology but aims to assist in shaping its design, development and implementation process. In this context, it was also proposed that a “real-time assessment” should accompany technology development from the outset and integrate social science issues as well as policy and governance aspects at a very early stage (Guston and Sarewitz, 2002).

Nevertheless, the concept of technosciences generated important impulses to scrutinize and reconsider some of the central assumptions underlying many existing TA concepts. In this context, Liebert and Schmidt (2010) point out that the goals and purposes of innovation processes, which are often clearly articulated and recognizable in the context of technosciences, offer the possibility of unlocking knowledge about the respective technology development. Hence, they challenge the assumption of general knowledge deficits as stipulated by the Collingridge Dilemma. Furthermore, they argue that technosciences are usually developed and applied by many different actors. In this respect, the fiction of a control of technology (especially by political actors) as advocated in early TA concepts will increasingly shift to a paradigm of collaborative design.

Consequently, TA should be framed as a “Prospective Technology Assessment” (ProTA) and initiate phases of science- and technology-related reflection as early as possible:

“ProTA aims to shape technologies by shaping the goals, intentions and attitudes from the perspective of the anticipated consequences and realistic potentials” (Liebert and Schmidt, 2010: 114).

According to Liebert and Schmidt (2010), ProTA requires a normative framework that can be derived from the history of philosophical reflection. Concerning the underlying ethical criteria, two antagonistic principles are outlined: The “heuristics of fear” (Jonas, 1979) and the “principle of hope” (Bloch, 1959), which in combination serve as a mindset for shaping emerging technologies as well as technoscience as a whole and that entails four different types of orientation: human, social, environmental as well as future orientation.

Furthermore, ProTA is also strongly perceived as a participatory approach. In contrast to an observation from an external perspective (as practiced in earlier TA concepts), ProTA should become part of a of self-reflection and self-criticism among scientists and engineers within the R&D stage itself that also includes the perspective of societal and political actors (Fisher et al., 2006Liebert and Schmidt, 2010).

Discussion

As the evolutionary history of TA has shown, an early assessment of technologies and their impacts on environment and society is possible in principle. Despite of the epistemic limitations caused by the Collingridge Dilemma, the concept of ProTA provides a participatory and incremental self-reflection process that facilitates data acquisition even during the early stages of R&D and thus enables the shaping of technologies throughout the innovation process. One of the most important features of ProTA is a well-defined normative framework. Yet Liebert and Schmidt developed the associated criteria several years before the establishment of the 2030 Agenda. With its 17 SDGs and the 169 SDG targets, however, substantial opportunities have been created to concretize the normative framework of TA, especially with respect to a sustainable development. Hence, by referencing to the 2030 Agenda, a comprehensive sustainability assessment of technologies has become possible (Eberle et al., 2021Möller et al., 2021a). Even more than that, with the 2030 Agenda representing a globally accepted framework that all United Nation member states have committed themselves, sustainability assessment of technologies has become an obligation.

In order to ensure goal-oriented and future-proof assessments, TA methodology needs to be able to recognize changes regarding its assessment criteria at an early stage, as already pointed out in section 3. For early detection, the investigation of existing and predicted transformation processes plays an important role in this context.

Transformations can lead to structural paradigmatic changes at all levels of society, for example in culture, value attitudes, technologies, production, consumption, infrastructures and politics. The corresponding processes take place co-evolutionarily, simultaneously or with a time lag in different areas or sectors, and can significantly influence, strengthen or weaken each other. The decisive factor for a transformation is that those processes become more and more condensed over time and, in the sense of a paradigm shift, lead to fundamental irreversible changes in the prevailing system. Transformations can be unplanned or intentional, they can take several decades and proceed at very different speeds (Grießhammer and Brohmann, 2015).

In contrast to the non-targeted transformations of the past (such as the first and second industrial revolution), it is now presumed that intentional transformations (e.g. the “Energiewende,” i.e. the transition of the energy system in Germany) can be significantly influenced and accelerated in a desired direction, but nevertheless not controlled in detail. This assumption is based on the recently available knowledge and experience of complex control, governance and strategy approaches (Grießhammer and Brohmann, 2015). The fundamental possibility of influencing or even controlling transitions is expressed by the term “transition management” (Kemp and Loorbach, 2006).

For understanding transition management, a multi-level perspective is fundamental. Accordingly, three different levels exist in each system under consideration, referred to as niches, regime, and landscape, with interactions between these levels (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Multi-level perspective of transition management (Grießhammer and Brohmann, 2015; modified based on Geels, 2002).

At the level of the prevailing regime, Grießhammer and Brohmann (2015) distinguish eight fields of action or sub-systems of society in which transformative innovations and initiatives can influence each other or proceed in a co-evolutionary manner. These eight fields of action are defined as follows:

Values and models: normative orientations such as values, socially or legally formulated goals, guiding principles or ideas for society as a whole or for individual areas of need (e.g. “Limits to Growth” according to Meadows et al., 1972);

Behaviors and lifestyles: individual and society-wide shared (consumption) actions, everyday practices and habits, which can often deviate significantly from values and consciousness (e.g. dietary habits);

Social and temporal structures: social and culturally determining structures (such as different gender roles or demographic shifts) as well as temporal factors (such as the duration of the transformation, windows of opportunities or diffusion processes of innovations);

Physical infrastructures: permanent material structures that influence or even dominate the action spaces for groups of actors (e.g. road network);

Markets and financial systems: market structures (e.g. degree of concentration, globalization) and market processes such as supply, demand and prices of goods and services;

Technologies, products, and services: individual products and services as well as overarching technologies that can act as a key driver of transformations;

Research, education, and knowledge: science, research and development in practice as well as their institutional constitution, appropriate educational measures at various levels as well as knowledge stocks required for transformations;

Policies and institutions: control instruments such as commandments and prohibitions, financial incentives or informational instruments, as well as the associated institutional and organizational framework (e.g. state bodies, competencies, separation of powers, course of the democratic process and legal framework).

The analysis of the determining factors of a transformation process and their possible impact on the method of sustainability assessment of technologies shall be exemplified by the transformation in the energy sector representing an area of need where general principles for the sustainability assessment of technologies have already been formulated (cf. Grunwald and Rösch, 2011). The following table summarizes the findings from this exercise and provides an overview of the determining factors for the fields of action in the energy sector. In this respect, it has to be noted that the scope of the investigation refers to the specific situation in Germany.

Many of the identified determining factors for the fields of action are transformation processes themselves. Digitalization, for example, is coupling the energy transition with the ongoing industrial revolution in information and communication technologies. Furthermore, the transition of the energy sector influences the energy supply for the transport system as well as for the building stock, and vice versa. The parallel transformations can influence, support, or hinder each other. For example, electromobility generates a higher demand for renewable electricity; on the other hand, the batteries installed in cars provide a storage option for electricity. In this context, it is also important to consider the various and partly rivaling innovations emerging from niches (cf. Figure 4). These include e-cars, for example, but also fuel cell cars and e-bikes as a fundamental alternative. The same is applicable for phenomena at the level of the greater landscape: The efforts of an increasing number of companies to achieve climate neutrality play an eminently important role here, as the demand for renewably generated energy will continue to grow significantly. However, the current consequences and long-term effects of the Corona pandemic could lead to significant energy savings through a reduction in air travel, at least in the short to medium term.

The concept of ProTA is currently implemented in the Cluster of Excellence “Living, Adaptive and Energy-autonomous Materials Systems” (livMatS) funded by the German Research Foundation. The vision of this cluster is to develop novel, bioinspired materials systems, which adapt autonomously to their environment and harvest clean energy from it. The research and development work in livMatS aims to provide innovative solutions for various applications, particularly in the field of energy technologies. Sustainability, psychological acceptance and ethical approval form essential claims of the work done in livMatS. Therefore, prospective reflection of the sustainability aspects as well as research into consumer acceptance and social relevance of the developed material systems form an integral part of livMatS work right from the very beginning (livMatS, 2022).

The prospective TA of the technologies and materials to be developed in the livMatS cluster is designed as a tiered approach called TAPAS (Tiered Approach for Prospective Assessment of Benefits and Challenges). The ultimate goal is the design of a new development-integrated sustainability assessment framework that starts with interactive early tools on a qualitative basis (e.g. questionnaires and prospective chemicals assessment) and also covers quantitative case studies. Development-integrated assessment entails that the methodology both encourages and enables the innovators themselves to carry out assessments on sustainability, ethics and consumer issues as part of the innovation process (Möller et al., 2021c).

With regard to the livMatS materials, the ongoing transformation in the energy sector has considerable influence on the potential application fields: In their efforts to become climate-neutral, companies will make much greater efforts to harness previously unused (waste) energy. Energy harvesting in industrial processes as well as in the mobility sector and in buildings will consequently gain considerably in importance and may become common practice. For example, due to progress in digitalization, there will be more and more sensors at peripheral locations requiring power supply. Moreover, prosumers may also find it attractive in the future to feed harvested energy of their own solar systems into the grid, especially at times of high energy prices.

For the methodology of the prospective sustainability assessment, however, no fundamentally new issues can be identified on the basis of the available findings, which could not be captured by the existing toolbox. This can be justified with a closer look to the relevant technological approaches (digitalization, hydrogen technology, energy harvesting) presented in Table 1, as their respective designs do not reveal any radically new materials and process configurations. This assessment, however, needs to be subject to continuous review as the new material systems mature. Furthermore, it should be noted that for sustainability assessments in living labs and citizen science projects, instruments are required that provide meaningful and consistent results even when used by laypersons. In this context, a tiered approach as described in section 4 is also expected to be beneficial.Table 1. Determining factors for the fields of action in the energy sector.

Fields of actionDetermining factors in the energy sector in Germany
Values and models“Energiewende” (English: “energy transition”) mission statement with a focus on renewable energies (Krause et al., 1980)
Rejection of nuclear energy by a vast majority of the German population (Statista, 2021)
Fridays for Future activities and demonstrations push debate about climate change and renewable energy back to the forefront of the political agenda (Marquardt, 2020)
Behaviors and lifestylesProsumer movement leads to a constantly increasing number of consumers who simultaneously consume electricity and supply it to the grid, for example via an own photovoltaic system (Agora Energiewende, 2017BMWi, 2016)
Social and temporal structuresFukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 as a major window of opportunity for the nuclear phase-out (Bernardi et al., 2018)
Increase in the share of smaller households with a specifically higher electricity demand (Umweltbundesamt, 2020)
Flexible and time-dependent pricing structures (e.g. variable electricity prices) and process conversions in industry and commerce (operating energy-intensive processes during the day instead of previously at night) foster load management (Agora Energiewende, 2017)
Physical infrastructuresDigitalization enables the networking of electricity generators and consumers, for example, through smart meter gateways, that is, intelligent metering systems consisting of a communication unit and a digital electricity meter (Agora Energiewende, 2017BMWi, 20162017)
Coupling of the electricity sector with the building, mobility and various industrial sectors, turning (renewably generated) electricity into the most important energy source (Agora Energiewende, 2017BMWi, 2017)
Markets and financial systemsDecentralization of power generation (formerly a few large fossil-based power plants to currently several million small and large renewable energy plants) creates new market players and enables new business models (Agora Energiewende, 2017)
Strong cost degression in electricity generation from renewable sources (e.g. by 90% regarding photovoltaics) enables an energy system based on solar and wind power (Agora Energiewende, 2017)
Technologies, products and servicesNew energy storage systems (especially “green” hydrogen technology) for intermediate storage of electricity from renewable sources (Matthes et al., 2020)
Efficiency increase in the use of electricity both at industrial plants and in household appliances (Agora Energiewende, 2017)
Energy harvesting technologies enable the use of previously dissipated photonic energy, thermal energy or kinetic energy (Fraunhofer, 2018)
Research, education and knowledgeLiving labs and citizen science projects explore sustainable energy technologies (e.g. hydrogen technology) under real conditions and on an industrial scale (BMWi, 2020)
Policies and institutionsLiberalization of the electricity market since the 1990ies enables a flexible and efficient response to volatile power generation from renewable energy sources (DENA, 2021)
 Substantial financial incentives for renewable energy generation through the Renewable Energy Sources Act since 2000 (EEG, 2021)
 Nuclear phase-out (by 2022) and coal phase-out (by 2038), that is political decision by the German federal government to stop operating nuclear power plants (Bundesregierung, 20112021)

Source: Own compilation.

Conclusions and outlook

In light of the findings and the results of the previous sections, the four fundamental questions from the introduction will be revisited and answered as far as possible.

With regard to the first question, it could be demonstrated that universal and absolute statements on the sustainability of technologies are just as misleading as they are for materials or products. Possible contributions to a sustainable development can only be discovered in a case-by-case analysis of the entire product-line and in the context of the functionality and benefits of the object under investigation.

Secondly, an early and prospective assessment of sustainability of technologies requires a flexible and tiered approach. In this respect, we reference the TAPAS framework that aims to establish a new tiered development-integrated assessment methodology within the livMatS Cluster of Excellence. To enable assessments at an early stage and with sufficient certainty of direction, TAPAS starts with interactive early tools (e.g. questionnaires and prospective chemicals assessment) which are incrementally underpinned with quantitative case studies in an iterative process. In order to ensure an agile, goal-oriented and future-proof evaluation system, TAPAS also includes a careful reflection of ongoing transformation processes in application sectors (e.g. the energy sector) that are relevant to the technology. The prospective mirroring of the determinants of transformation processes of related areas of need as described in section 5 aims to provide a further feature for the continuous refinement of the TA framework, especially with regard to ProTA.

As of third, the assessment of the sustainability performance of technologies should include much greater involvement of those actors who are particularly good at overseeing and influencing the innovation process—the innovators themselves. To ensure sufficient feedback with society, science has to open up to the public and the participation of society in the sense of transdisciplinary research. In this respect, initial assessments of the technology developers need to be discussed in real laboratories, that is, open-innovation environments that focus on cooperation between science and the public in an experimental environment. Hence, suggestions from society should in return become part of the innovation process (Möller et al., 2021b).

Ultimately, in order to give humankind a chance to adapt to itself (Toussaint et al., 2012), technology and society need to co-evolve. Global agreements on normative goals such as the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda form a good starting point in this respect. For a culture of sustainability, however, policy should promote cooperation between actors for societally desirable transformation processes to a much greater extent. Equally important is a “greening” of ongoing transformations that are not induced by environmental policy (Grießhammer and Brohmann, 2015). The need to foster cooperation can be illustrated by the example of the energy transition: Driving forces for the “Energiewende” can already be found in all stakeholder groups, that is in civil society and governmental actors, but also in science and companies. Unfortunately, however, these players in many cases still act independently of each other. Instead, earlier and greater involvement of business and industry in ongoing transformation processes, support for new business models, and greater international cooperation would be needed.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany’s Excellence Strategy – EXC-2193/1 – 390951807.

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Football and Climate Change

Dr James Jackson

Sustainable Consumption Institute (SCI) The University of Manchester James.jackson-2@manchester.ac.uk

Dr Mark Doidge

Sport for Climate Action and Nature group Loughborough University m.doidge@lboro.ac.uk

Dr Oscar Berglund

Cabot Institute for the Environment University of Bristol Oscar.berglund@bristol.ac.uk12

Jennifer Amann & Samuel Toscano (postgraduate researchers)

Introduction

The relationship between football and climate change has become increasingly significant. Recent reports highlight the environmental impact of football, especially in the context of the 2026 FIFA World Cup. This tournament is expected to be the most polluting ever, due to the vast distances teams and fans will travel and the involvement of major polluters like Aramco as sponsors. These impacts are not accidental but are politically produced, as outlined in this report.

Historical Context and Growth

Football’s spread and growth have always been linked to the expansion of carbon-intensive industries. The sport, while now a significant industry, primarily serves a cultural role in promoting and embedding these industries. According to the World Trade Organization, football contributed $200 billion to global GDP in 2022, a small fraction of the world’s total GDP, but its cultural influence is unmatched. The sport’s global reach surpasses even that of religion, music, or film.

Historically, football grew alongside industrialization in Europe, particularly in Britain. The Factory Act of 1850 allowed workers Saturday afternoons off, leading to the tradition of 3 pm kick-offs. Industrialization enabled larger crowds and broader competitions, and football spread from England to industrial regions across Europe and Latin America. Many early clubs were founded by British industrialists and had strong ties to local industries. After World War II, football became more professionalized, with clubs often linked to major industries, such as Juventus with Fiat and Wolfsburg with Volkswagen.

Globalization and Commercialization

The 1990s marked a period of globalization for football, with the creation of the Champions League and the Premier League. This era saw increased investment from fossil fuel interests and a concentration of elite clubs in major cities. The expansion of competitions, such as the Champions League and the World Cup, has led to more games, more travel, and greater resource consumption, further increasing football’s carbon footprint.

There is a tension between football’s sustainability efforts and the growth pursued by governing bodies like FIFA. While some argue that expanding competitions increases inclusivity, critics contend that the primary motivation is financial gain, often benefiting fossil fuel sponsors. The construction of new stadiums and infrastructure for major tournaments also contributes significantly to environmental degradation.

Sustainability Challenges

Sustainability managers in football clubs often face the challenge of balancing environmental initiatives with commercial realities. Clubs tend to focus on increasing revenues rather than minimizing costs, making it difficult to prioritize sustainability unless it can be framed as revenue-generating. The costs of climate change, such as flooding or heat stress, are often overlooked in favor of short-term financial considerations.

Sportswashing and Fossil Fuel Influence

Football has become central to the petrostate strategy of sportswashing, where fossil fuel interests use the sport to maintain cultural dominance and legitimacy. Sponsorships, ownership of clubs, and major events in petrostates embed fossil fuels within football culture, making it harder to imagine the sport without them. This strategy differs from greenwashing, as it seeks to normalize fossil fuel involvement rather than merely improve public perception.

FIFA’s partnerships with fossil fuel companies and its willingness to host events in petrostates raise questions about its commitment to sustainability. The organization’s sustainability strategies often align closely with the interests of host nations, undermining its credibility as an independent governing body.

Policy Recommendations

The report makes several policy recommendations to address football’s destructive relationship with climate change:

  1. Stop hosting events in petrostates: FIFA should avoid awarding major tournaments to countries with strong fossil fuel interests, focusing instead on nations that would benefit more from development opportunities.
  2. Restrict fossil fuel ownership: UEFA should limit the ownership of clubs by petrostates and fossil fuel companies to reduce their influence over the sport.
  3. Focus on costs as well as revenue: Clubs should consider the long-term costs of climate change and prioritize sustainability initiatives, even if they require upfront investment.
  4. Fan representation on boards: Fans should have a voice in club decision-making, especially regarding sustainability, through democratically elected organizations rather than commercial mechanisms like fan tokens.
  5. Ban fossil fuel advertisements: Sponsorships from fossil fuel companies should be prohibited, similar to bans on tobacco advertising, to reduce their cultural influence.
  6. Fund adaptation for grassroots football: Financial support should be provided to grassroots football to help adapt to the impacts of climate change, following the example of UEFA’s Climate Fund.
  7. Embed sustainability managers: Sustainability managers should be fully integrated into club operations and involved in all major decisions, not just as a formality.
  8. Stop expanding competitions: Football’s governing bodies should halt the expansion of competitions and focus on optimizing schedules to reduce environmental impact and improve player welfare.
  9. Encourage player activism: Players should be empowered to speak out on sustainability issues and organize collectively through unions and associations.

Conclusion

Football’s environmental impact is deeply rooted in its historical and political context. Addressing these challenges requires systemic changes at all levels of the sport, from governance and sponsorship to grassroots participation and fan engagement. By implementing these recommendations, football can begin to break its destructive relationship with climate change and move towards a more sustainable future.

The Anthropocene as framed by the far right

Dan BaileyJoe Turner

Homeland’, borders, and business-as-usual

Framing the environmental crisis

It has long been accepted amongst various communities of academics that both political ideas and discourses matter in framing political issues, rendering actors and phenomena visible or invisible, and shaping political outcomes.1 A pertinent example of this is the phrase ‘Anthropocene’ – used to denote a new geological era in which human activity has significant impacts on planetary ecosystems – but which is itself contestable for the phenomena it captures and elides. Some have put forward the alternative term of ‘capitalocene’ to reflect the understanding that the primary driving force of ecological change in this era is not human activity per se, but the capitalist systems which continue to drive resource extraction, greenhouse gas emissions, and rising inequalities.2

“The far right discourse on the ecological crisis has historically been to deny its existence”

The ecological crisis is subject to a series of political discourses which each imperfectly capture the complex myriad of social, economic, and technological dynamics that are degrading planetary ecosystems. These discourses shape the public understanding of the environmental crisis and the appropriate strategies for its resolution, with each discourse purveyed by distinctive but evolving political factions and social forces.3,4

The far right discourse on the ecological crisis has historically been to deny its existence.5,6 This denial has taken many forms, but most commonly the science of ecological degradation has been disavowed and this has been matched by the refusal to accept any national responsibility for addressing the unfolding global ecological catastrophe. Customarily, the scientific evidence has been pronounced as a conspiracy designed to benefit ‘globalist elites’ or a plot to undermine national sovereignty through the ratification of multilateral agreements. This has served to bolster resistance to effective environmental policies.

However, this environmental discourse is no longer as central to the far right movement as it was in the 2000s and 2010s. Increasingly, climate science is tacitly accepted, but the finger of blame is being disingenuously pointed towards the far right’s traditional enemies.

The shifting environmental discourses of the European far right

As environmental issues have risen up the political agenda (becoming salient to younger voters in particular), far right parties have seemingly shifted away from denialism of the science. This shift has not led to a recognition of the need for a just economic transformation or, indeed, any political action commensurate to the scale and character of the environmental crisis. Instead, the increasing (albeit belated) recognition of environmental issues (primarily those which exist within national borders) has been fused with an anti-immigration agenda to create a new invidious framing of environmental politics. The emerging discourse, which we have conceptualised as ‘ecobordering’ elsewhere,7 is characterised by climate nationalism and seeks to depict immigration (of which migration from the Global South is made hyper-visible) as a threat to local and national environments.

This discourse takes two primary forms. First, it aims to politicise the environmental impacts of ‘mass immigration’ from the Global South, while depoliticising the impacts of ‘natives’. This includes linking ‘mass immigration’ with rising demand for natural resources and local environmental problems such as the pollution resulting from greater traffic and consumption. Immigration, it is suggested, is to blame for such problems, which were not issues of concern for local areas prior to multiculturalism.

At the same time, this narrative stokes fears that mass immigration will lead to population growth amongst non-white communities which will exacerbate these local environmental issues further and deplete finite natural resources, in what could be termed ‘racialised Malthusianism’. This was particularly exhibited by the British National Party (BNP),8 the National Rally,9 the Swiss People’s Party,10 Vlaams Belang,11 and Alternative for Deutschland.12 The Swiss People’s Party repeatedly claimed that it is the bulwark against “the greatest environmental killer, overpopulation… by urging people to limit immigration”,13 while the British National Party adopted the same Malthusian logic that it “is the ONLY party to recognise that overpopulation – whose primary driver is immigration, as revealed by the government’s own figures – is the cause of the destruction of our environment”.14

“The depiction of Global South migrants is juxtaposed with the depiction of ‘natives’ as responsible stewards of their ‘homeland’”

The second form this discourse takes is the depiction of Global South migrants as environmental hazards, with no personal aptitude for managing natural resources due to a lack of belonging to, or lack of financial or emotion investment in, local areas. This has been most strongly exhibited by far right parties such as Golden Dawn,15 the National Rally,16 the BNP,17 the Swiss People’s Party,18 and Vox.19 This has included the disparagement and scapegoating of migrants in numerous ways, such as littering, causing forest fires, the inhumane treatment of animals, and the destruction of ‘indigenous wildlife’ amongst other environmental offences.

“The purported threat posed by immigration and migrants… seeks to vindicate the notion that border policies are key forms of statecraft for the protection of the environment”

The lack of belonging is key to understanding this portrayal; as Le Pen explicitly put it: “environmentalism [is] the natural child of patriotism, because it’s the natural child of rootedness… if you’re a nomad, you’re not an environmentalist… Those who are nomadic… do not care about the environment; they have no homeland”.20 The depiction of Global South migrants is juxtaposed with the depiction of ‘natives’ as responsible stewards of their ‘homeland’ and adept stewards of their ‘little platoons’ (to invoke the eco-fascist and Burkean logics which this framing draws upon). This typically entails glorifying the historic stewardship of pastoral national citizens (such as farmers21 or foresters22) and the proclaiming the sound management of domestic natural resources by ‘natives’23 over the ‘homeland’.24,25 The National Front and Golden Dawn have even established wings of their movements called ‘New Ecology’26 and ‘Green Wing’27 designed to protect “family, nature and race”28 and “the cradle of our race”29 respectively.

Both of these discursive traits have since been identified more recently in Marine Le Pen’s recent presidential campaign in which she obtained 41.5 per cent of the vote. Dubbed ‘patriotic ecology’ by her followers, the fallacious depictions of culprits and saviours in the environmental crisis have become normalised in French politics to the extent that they are echoed by rival conservative politicians.

The purported threat posed by immigration and migrants to previously ‘pure’ and ‘sustainable’ spaces of European nature seeks to vindicate the notion that border policies are key forms of statecraft for the protection of the environment. As a senior figure in Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, Jordan Bardella, declared in 2019: “borders are the environment’s greatest ally… it is through them that we will save the planet”.30

A shift away from climate denialism, but at what cost?

The potential electoral potency of fusing border securitisation and climate issues – however fallaciously – underlines the importance of recognising and challenging these discourses. Should the ascendant far right in Europe gain any further power, or have further influence on traditionally conservative political parties, this discourse could more forcefully shape public understandings of the environmental crisis and the strategies for its resolution in the future.

“To ignore the root causes of the ecological crisis at this juncture would be catastrophic for the natural world”

This would be catastrophic on two fronts. On the one hand, the discourse prescribes a form of statecraft centred on border security rather than systemic economic transformation, which represents an apocryphal programme of environmental protection. It does so by focusing narrowly on ‘national’ nature (peripheralising global issues) and obscuring the material economic drivers of ecological degradation (such as the heavily polluting energy and aviation industries, for which Global North populations are primarily culpable). To ignore the root causes of the ecological crisis at this juncture would be catastrophic for the natural world, but that is precisely what this political framing inculcates.

Just as importantly, ecobordering seeks to inflict further structural violence on those who those exploited at the peripheries of the global economy. The nationalistic framing emerges at a time when immigration is rising because of climate change, and the discourse thus seeks to diagnose the symptoms of ecological degradation as the causes of it. There is already evidence that the rise of the far right strengthens political resistance to climate migration,31 and this framing serves to justify this resistance from an environmental perspective. At a global scale, these framings threaten to rationalise a de facto climate apartheid; with Global North populations and elites in the Global South enjoying the spoils of an environmentally deleterious global economy, while poorer Global South populations become confined to increasingly uninhabitable areas facing escalating risks of climate shocks and deteriorating health conditions.

The meaning and practical implications of climate justice will become an increasingly hot topic in the Anthropocene. Challenging the depictions of culprits and saviours purveyed by far right figures is only an initial step to preventing injustices mounting further.32 Recognising the historical constitution of the global economy and the inequalities and vulnerabilities resulting from it underlines the injustices of far right framings and the need for progressive actors to advance more transformative approaches.33 Progressive responses to the rise of the far right in the Anthropocene requires formulating and advancing notions of a just transition which accounts for the movement of people affected by climate change as well as other less privileged groupings in society.34 This will require far more progressive forms of statecraft which are a world away from those advocated in the framings of the far right.

Biographies

  • Dan Bailey is a senior lecturer in international political economy at Manchester Metropolitan University. His is interested in the evolving and complex interactions between the global economy, climate change, the objectives and strategies of political institutions, and the ideas and discourses that shape public understandings of the ecological crisis and sustainability transitions. He has authored a series of academic publications and policy reports on topics relating to these interactions.
  • Joe Turner is a lecturer in international politics at the University of York. His interdisciplinary examines how border regimes in post-imperial states like Britain are structured by imperial and colonial histories and hierarchies of human value. He recently published the book Migration Studies and Colonialism with Lucy Mayblin.

Three Scenarios for the Future of Education in the Anthropocene

April 12, 2020 Updated:January 7, 2026 16 Mins Read

By Kathleen Kesson

We have entered the Anthropocene — a new era in geological history — a phase of planetary development in which human impacts on the Earth may cause or have caused irreversible damage. We are witness to “the great acceleration” in which geothermal, biological, ecological, and atmospheric changes threaten to bring about irreparable changes in the planetary ecosystem, and by extension, our social and economic systems. Every day brings news of wildfires, drought, floods, conflicts, hurricanes, locusts, extinctions, and the latest, a Coronavirus pandemic, which has managed to shut down many of the global systems we rely on for survival.

Humans (GR: ánthrōpos) have been blamed for the tragic despoliation of our Earth. It is not humans in general, however, but a specific human civilization that has driven the processes of resource extraction, labor exploitation, capital accumulation, and what we can only call “ecocide.” While historically, empires have come and gone and laid waste in countless ways to people and planet, the current modern era of industrialization/capitalism, paralleling a centuries-long narrative of conquest, genocide, plunder, slave labor, and economic imperialism has created the conditions of this new age that some scholars suggest we more rightly call the “Capitalocene” (see Moore, 2016).

Given the climate and other ecological crises, the rise of authoritarian/totalitarian governments, and the general breakdown of multiple systems, there is an urgent need to create new, nimble configurations of communities, ecologies, and learning centres to respond to the uncertain and rapidly changing environment.  The education (not necessarily “schooling”) of young people is at the heart of the future; it is only through education that a “new human” might emerge, capable of enacting the mindset and behaviors that might create a livable world. Education alone, however, absent substantial changes in culture, thinking and behavior, is incapable of bringing about the fundamental changes necessary to survival.

I offer here three scenarios for the future of education, each of them tied to various components of a dominant governing ideology. Each Scenario is accompanied by structuring metaphors as well as a dominant “binding quality.” The notion of a binding quality comes to us from an ancient Indic episteme; it is said that consciousness and matter operate in three fundamental modes: sattva (sentient), rajah (mutative), and tamah (static), collectively known as gunas in Sanskrit.  Understanding the gunas is a complex philosophical matter; I use them here metaphorically, to describe the predominant energy of each Scenario. I have drawn largely on the comprehensive projections of P.R. Sarkar (1992; 1999) for the vision of the future portrayed in Scenario 3, though it must be said that the various components of this vision are emerging from multifarious directions and under different appellations at the present time.

Futures thinking is an uncertain art. It is likely that the future of humanity will include dimensions of each Scenario; in fact, the present moment contains all of them, though Scenario 2 dominates because of the globalization of the economy and hegemonic forms of culture.  I believe, however, that the survivability of humanity is dependent on learning the lessons of the multiple current crises we face, and figuring out how to navigate through complexity, chaos and the general breakdown of systems to facilitate the self-organized, positive evolutionary outcomes highlighted in Scenario 3.

An important caveat: When considering the “Big Picture,” generalizations are unavoidable.  These scenarios are mapped in very broad strokes, and we must remember that the map is not the territory.  Details, diversities, exceptions, and contradictions certainly need to be taken into consideration.

Scenario 1

Regression/Devolution

I start with the grimmest of the forecasts, in order to disabuse us of the modernist notion that history is an inevitable trajectory of progress, of increasing individual freedom and rights, of economic growth, constantly improved standards of living, and the capacity of positivist reason and logical thinking to solve all human problems. As in the aftermath of the Roman Empire or perhaps more vividly, in modern dystopian films, societies can deteriorate rather swiftly.

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In European history, the years between 500-1250 AD are usually considered the “Dark Ages.” After the fall of the Roman Empire, and due to many factors including ineffective leadership, economic failures, internal struggles for power, external invasions, and yes — climate change — the western territories of the Roman Empire entered a long period of decline. Historians disagree on many of the details, though there is a general consensus that it was a period of breakdown and change of the social and economic infrastructures.  Schools were closed, and illiteracy spread. Travel and trade were restricted, epidemics wiped out huge populations, and conflict was prevalent.

While our modern era may seem to have little to do with the European Medieval period, it’s altogether possible that we (at least in the “West”) are living through the deterioration of an empire begun in the European colonial period and culminating in late capitalism and the economic imperialism that is an essential component of the globalized economy. This world-historical empire has been engaged in endless wars throughout its reign, has deep internal fractures and multiple external pressures, not least from other empires.  Most important, as noted above, the bio-systems upon which life depends, and upon which so much of its wealth was created, are deteriorating.

In times of collective stress such as the current pandemic, it is tempting to withdraw, to retreat from the forward flow of life and pull into individual and social cocoons, burrow into the past. That tendency is currently exacerbated by the pandemic related strictures to isolate, to distance ourselves from the social world. Should these tendencies persist after the disease is brought under control, we could see a “devolution.” In such a regressive move, we are likely to see rising xenophobia, racism, religious prejudice, sexism, strong borders, and ever-increasing economic inequality.

Scenarios and metaphorsWorldview/PhilosophyPowerSocial/economic organizationEcologicalperspectiveKnowledgeEducation InstitutionsSpirituality
Regression/Devolution Binding quality: Tamah (static) Contraction, decay, degeneration, ignorance, death and inertia.    Pre-Humanist submersion in forces thought to be beyond human control. Recycling of medieval ontologies and philosophies. People concerned with their own immediate land, clan, family and social group.Power/over-exerted through superstition and propagation of false ideas; patriarchal structures control behavior, social life, and education.Provincial, feudal, mostly dispersed rural populations.  Centralization of (weak) control in urban centres. Subsistence economy for the masses; wealth flows upward—vast inequalities.Nature as a force to be feared. Attempts to exert dominion over nature. The exploitation of natural resources benefits the few.Past knowledge valued over experimental, new knowledge. Knowledge distribution restricted as a form of social control.Knowledge production concentrated in centres of power.Private teachers/schools for the wealthy. Survival skills adequate for the general population. Traditional/orthodox/dogmatic; power centralized in the clergy.Metaphysical beliefs grounded in irrationality and superstition—emphasis on domination and control of thought. 

Scenario 2

Status quo/Business as usual

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Thinking optimistically, we’re unlikely to sink into the miasma of Medieval Europe, but young people who have not lived through a Depression, or an epidemic, or a war on their own territory cannot be blamed for fearing that this is the “end of the world as we know it.” This pandemic, however, and the economic dislocations, the social isolation, the fear and uncertainty that it has brought, while perhaps not the apocalypse much fear, may be a harbinger of the future. It is human nature to want to “get back to normal” following a crisis of great magnitude, to restore a sense of equilibrium and stability. But what if “normal” forms of social, economic, and ecological behaviors are themselves at the root of the crisis? Astute observers of our current modernist trajectories, including a majority of the scientific community, warn us that we are now living through a transition period, which, depending on collective decisions we make in this next decade, have the potential to transform the conditions of life as we know it on Planet Earth, and not for the better. If we continue the rate of petroleum extraction, fossil fuel burning, deforestation, unrestrained consumption, pollution, and so much more, it is clear that humanity is in for a century of increasingly deadly wildfires, droughts, floods, ocean acidification, pandemics, rising sea levels, and massive extinctions on a scale heretofore unimagined. If current power relations persist, and we do not affect a deep reordering of our economic system, power structures, worldview and ways of thinking, if we merely tinker with existing conditions while hoping to achieve what could only be a “false equilibrium,” elites will prosper while our life systems continue to degrade and masses of people suffer. The kind of thinking that has created the multi-faceted crises we face is unlikely to help us solve them, but humans may not, in this Scenario, demonstrate the will or the capacity to radically transform their thinking and their behaviors, or challenge the existing power structure.

Scenarios and metaphorsWorldviewPowerSocial/economic organizationEcologicalperspectiveKnowledgeEducation InstitutionsSpirituality
Status quo/ Business as usual Binding quality:Rajah (mutative) Pulsation, change, growth, movement, restlessness and activity.    Secular. Mainstream rejection of spirituality based on widespread materialistic worldview. Man is seen as the pinnacle of creation. Humanistic emphasis on individualism, independence, personal autonomy.Power/over-exerted through economic domination and hegemonic media; Power/with only mythology of democratic capitalism. Dramatic concentration of wealth; oligarchical rule.Increasing inequalities. The illusion of a relatively prosperous (if shrinking) “middle class” sustains myths of growth and progress.Humans are seen as separate from nature (dualism). Nature understood as a resource to be exploited for profit.Conventional, hierarchically organized. Positivist thinking dominates. Scientific and technological advances are double-edged (i.e. air travel creates mobility + air pollution, greenhouse gases and rapid spread of disease). Sifting and sorting mechanisms maintain inequities of race, ethnicity, gender, and social class.Increasing concentration of influence over standards and curriculum in the interest of global economic competition. Higher education commodified, fewer young people have access. Western forms of education spread globally, resulting in loss of languages, local cultures and epistemes.Mostly secular. Fundamentalisms operate at the fringe, often with major impacts on systems (re 9/11). Commodified “new age” practices amongst middle classes are oriented towards individual well-being.

Scenario 3

Evolution/Revolution

 The current crisis has brought into sharp relief the injustice and unsustainability of socio-economic systems that value profits over human needs and the well-being of the planet. It is possible that this moment in time could signal the “great awakening,” the tipping point that pushes us into creative new ways of thinking about what it means to be human and how we should live our lives. What if the present moment were a space of “liminality” — a moment between what has been and what will be? A space between the ‘what was’ and the ‘next.’ A space of transition, a season of waiting, during which we collectively question where we have been and where we are going.  A space in which we reconceptualize the entire edifice – the mental and the material structures that have brought us to the current crossroads in our evolution.

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In Scenario 3, we find the courage to design and implement new economic structures that serve the welfare of the whole of humanity, not just the elite few. We begin to understand our essential embeddedness in nature and explore how to cultivate relations of harmony and reciprocity with the “more-than-human-others” with whom we share the planet. And perhaps most important, we overcome the false notion that matter and spirit occupy independent realms, separated by an impassable abyss. We begin to understand that the purpose of life is not the mere accumulation of material goods, or the acquisition of political power, or even the development of a brilliant intellect, but the unification of body, mind and spirit in the quest for spiritual enlightenment.

Unlike the “tinkering” referred to in Scenario 2, Scenario 3 represents a radical paradigm shift, an evolutionary transformation of consciousness, values, and human behavior. Education has a core role to play in that it is young people who will carry the present into the future.  A philosophy of Neohumanism (Sarkar, 1999), in which we reconsider the fundamentals — the nature of human beings, the nature of knowing, what we value, and how we are to live — asks us to rethink the purposes of education. Rather than educate so that a tiny sliver of people rise to the top of the global income chain, a Neohumanist education would prepare all people for the art of living well on a fragile and sacred planet. It would emphasize not just academic achievement and high test scores, but shift the focus to fostering compassion, community, empathy, imagination, insight, friendship, creativity, communication, justice, practicality, pleasure, courage, humor, wisdom, introspection, transcendence, ethics, service, and the ability to live well within the carrying capacity of our ecosystems. It would tear down the walls that have separated school and community and invite local and intergenerational knowledge and traditional ways of knowing into conversation with modern empirical science and technological know-how. Importantly, Neohumanism would welcome our inner lives into education and foster multiple epistemologies (embodied knowing, intuitional knowing, narrative knowing, aesthetic knowing, mythic knowing). Adults and young people together would plant gardens and reinvigorate forests, clean up our waterways, and regenerate the soil. We would “rewild” our children and ourselves so that we might begin to understand the vital part we all play in a living web of interconnection, a web that encompasses not just humans, but the eight million other species with whom we share the planet. Only with such an educational process might we “elevate humanism to universalism, the cult of love for all created beings of this universe” (Sarkar, 1999, p. 7).

Scenarios and metaphorsWorldviewPowerSocial/ economic organizationEcologicalKnowledgeEducation InstitutionsSpirituality
Evolution/Revolution Binding quality: Sattva (sentient) Awareness, purity, happiness, sensitivity, expansion and lightness.Human life an integrated whole encompassing the material and spiritual worlds. Neohumanism: the liberation of the intellect and the expansion of mind. Emphasis on interdependence of all species. Resilient local cultures, universal, inclusive outlooks. Power/with radical democracy, people organized to resist domination. Co-creation of new systems that serve the whole. Gender partnership,  full inclusion. Moral leadership based in service replaces corruption and self-interest. Cooperative global governance regulates international affairs. Progressive Utilization Theory (PROUT) — Social equality fostered through worker’s cooperatives, caps on wealth accumulation, food sovereignty, the gift and sharing economy, the rights of all people for a decent job, housing, food, health care and education, and the protection of biodiversity and natural habitats. (see Sarkar, 1992).Deep connection and sense of interrelatedness of all species; humans learn to live in balance with the ecosystem and practice  reciprocity. All     living beings accorded moral standing and rights.Integration of modern science/technology and ancient wisdom and indigenous perspectives. Epistemological pluralism. Elimination of dogma.Knowledge balanced between introversial and extroversial. Schools take on new role as centers of resource, connections, healing, community building, mentorship. Self-organizing learning groups form around real life problems and issues. Eco-versities. Decolonizing pedagogies.Transformative, new understanding of human potential and the cosmic dimensions of individual life. Pragmatism and contemplative practice exist in mutual harmony (subjective approach/objective adjustment); intuition and rationality complement each other.

Scenario 3 is not a pipe dream.  In this present crisis, multitudes of people are acting selflessly to care for others and serve the greater good. Heroic health workers are struggling to mitigate suffering without adequate resources. Teachers are working to reinvent schooling so that children might stay connected to their peers and engaged in learning.  Regular folk creating mutual aid societies, ensuring that those who are sick, disabled, or elderly are not forgotten. In many places, small organic farms are beginning to supply much of the local food. Young people are inclined towards egalitarian socio-economic formations, and they are willing to challenge the status quo and struggle for the future of their planet. People the world over are awakening to spiritual wisdom.  We are making the road by walking.

 The world right now is in a state of chaos – a “far-from-equilibrium” state.  Chaos is unpredictable and destabilizing, and small inputs can have huge effects, illustrated by the compelling image of the fluttering wings of the butterfly in the Amazon, causing a cyclone in China.

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But chaos theory also teaches us that systems re-organize, often in surprising new ways.  A far-from-equilibrium state is a liminal space; liminality is described by one author as “the sacred space where the old world is able to fall apart, and a bigger world is revealed.” (Rohr, 1999). Will we find the courage to allow this dissolution, in order to make way for the world we hope to create?  Or will we eagerly seek the status quo, business as usual, or worse, regress into barbarism? I believe that we are in the thick of what may come to be understood as the “great transition” – the death of an old era and the birth of the new. Such a birth is not accomplished painlessly, but with extraordinary labor. Those of us who share the values of Scenario 3, who hold a Neohumanist vision of human potential and a social vision of a just, ecological and joyful Earth home (PROUT) share a responsibility to be midwives to this birth. Systems demand that we evolve and adapt. The butterfly effect reminds us that small actions can have big impacts.  Our small collective actions, mindfully taken, could have important collective impacts, so let us proceed with Scenario 3 as consciously and compassionately as we can.

About the Author

Kathleen Kesson is Professor Emerita, LIU-Brooklyn, and is the former Director of the John Dewey Project on Progressive Education at the University of Vermont and Director of Education at Goddard College. She currently lives in Barre, Vermont and is actively engaged in the work to make Vermont schools more equitable, sustainable, and joyful. Her latest book is Unschooling in Paradise.  You can read other writings by her as well as an excerpt from this book at https://www.kathleenkesson.com

References:

Moore, J. (2016). Anthropocene or capital scene? Nature, history, and the crisis of capitalism. Oakland, CA: PM Press.

Rohr, R. (1999). Everything belongs: The gift of contemplative prayer—  The Crossroad Publishing Company.

Sarkar, P.R. (1992). Proutist Economics: Discourses on economic liberation. Kolkata, India: Ananda Marga Pracaraka Samgha

Sarkar, P.R. (1999). The liberation of intellect: Neo-Humanism. 4th edition. Ananda Nagar; Kolkata: Ananda Marga Publications.

Beyond the absence of war: Pathways to peace in the Anthropocene

In a world increasingly defined by climate disruption, biodiversity loss, rising inequality and the accelerating risks of AI and emerging technologies, The Club of Rome is calling for a fundamental rethinking of what peace means today. Its new paper, Planetary Peace for Human Security: Responses to Existential Risks in the Anthropocene, introduces a bold new paradigm, one that moves beyond the outdated notion of peace as merely the absence of war.

With 56 armed conflicts currently active, global military spending exceeding $2.3 trillion and the escalating threats of AI-driven warfare and climate collapse, the report asserts that traditional, war-centric models of peace are dangerously obsolete. In many cases, the very systems designed to promote peace instead reinforce entrenched power imbalances and exacerbate tensions.

At the heart of the report lies the concept of planetary peace, a dynamic, regenerative force rooted in justice, sustainability and global cooperation. Rather than addressing the symptoms of insecurity, this vision targets its structural causes: ecological degradation, extractive and exploitative economic systems, technological misuse and the enduring legacies of colonialism.

“Planetary peace invites us to redefine security for a world of deep interdependence,” says Paul Shrivastava, co-author and co-president of The Club of Rome. “It’s about creating the conditions for people, communities and ecosystems to thrive, not just survive. This is an opportunity to replace fear with trust, competition with collaboration and extraction with regeneration.”

The report positions peace as an active, systems-based process that centres the wellbeing of people, planet and future generations. It calls for long-term global cooperation that prioritises regeneration over depletion, equity over domination and collective flourishing over individual gain.

This vision also emphasises the essential roles of youth leadership, intergenerational dialogue and the integration of diverse knowledge systems, including science, indigenous wisdom and systems thinking, in shaping sustainable and peaceful futures.

“Planetary peace is not just about avoiding conflict,” adds co-author and Secretary General of The Club of Rome, Carlos Álvarez Pereira. “It’s about creating the conditions for people and planet to flourish together, through just economies, inclusive governance and a renewed relationship with the Earth.” 

The report argues that the current peace architecture, largely shaped by a few dominant powers in the post-World War II era, is no longer fit for purpose. A post-hegemonic, pluriversal future is needed, one that embraces diverse worldviews, rebalances global power structures and cultivates harmony between humanity and nature.

The report Planetary Peace for Human Security: Responses to Existential Risks in the Anthropocene provides suggestions for how to catalyse holistic transformation across economic, political, cultural and technological systems in service of planetary peace, and the authors invite governments, civil society, business, academia and young people to join this initiative to co-create a world where peace is not only possible, but essential.

Momentum is already building through collaborations with partners such as the Elders for Peace, the World Academy of Art and Science and Kyung Hee University. These alliances bring together expertise in peace diplomacy, education and systems thinking, reflecting a shared commitment to tackling existential risks and creating the conditions for a regenerative, peaceful future.

Download the report