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Prospective technology assessment in the Anthropocene: A transition toward a culture of sustainability

Martin Möller and Rainer Grießhammer

https://doi.org/10.1177/20530196221095700

Abstract

In the Anthropocene, humankind has become a quasi-geological force. Both the rapid development as well as the depth of intervention of new technologies result in far-reaching and irreversible anthropogenic changes in the Earth’s natural system. However, early and development-accompanying evaluation of technologies are not yet common sense. Against this background, this review article aims to compile the current state of knowledge with regard to the early sustainability assessment of technologies and to classify this status quo with respect to the key challenges of the Anthropocene. To that end, the paper initially outlines major existing definitions and framings of the term of sustainability. Key milestones, concepts and instruments with regard to the development of sustainability assessment and technology assessment (TA) methodologies are also presented. Based on this overview, the energy sector is used as an example to discuss how mirroring ongoing transformation processes can contribute to the further development of the TA framework in order to ensure an agile, goal-oriented, and future-proof assessment system.

Introduction

For the first time in history, human development is characterized by a coupling of technological, social and geological processes. In this new geological epoch of the Anthropocene (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000), humankind has become a quasi-geological force that profoundly and irreversibly alters the functioning of the Earth’s natural system (Potsdam Memorandum, 2007).

The main reasons for this extraordinarily high range of human activity are the exponential increase in the world’s population, production and consumption, as well as an increasing acceleration of industrial processes. New technologies are being developed that enable a particular high sectoral depth of intervention as well as a fast marketing of products and applications. As a result, they impose significant pressure on a wide range of sectors to change and adapt to the speed of innovation. Ultimately, society as a whole is urged to react to the impacts generated by the new technologies. A prominent example of a technology with such a high level of intervention is additive manufacturing. Also known as 3D printing, additive manufacturing is seen as a key technology for digitalization due to their production flexibility, the possibilities for function integration and product individualization. Beyond acceleration of innovation times, however, their use also allows for a reduction in component weight and thus a reduction in operating costs, which can promote resource-efficient manufacturing (Bierdel et al., 2019). However, additive manufacturing can create new consumption incentives due to faster product cycles and poses risks to new producers by shifting work and related hazardous substance risks to residential environments (Umweltbundesamt, 2018).

Both the rapid development as well as the depth of intervention of new technologies and materials result in anthropogenic changes in Earth system processes that can otherwise only be caused by meteorite impacts, continental drift and cyclical fluctuations in the Sun-Earth constellation. For example, the effects on the Earth’s nitrogen cycle are particularly serious. Through the ability to synthesize artificial nitrogen compounds by means of the Haber Bosch process, humans have managed to feed 48% of the global population. With increases in fertilizer usage, however, the nitrogen cycle has been pushed far beyond sustainability and nitrate pollution being responsible for increasing dead zones in coastal areas. Furthermore, due to the use of fossil fuels and intensive agriculture, CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere have reached a level last approached about 3 to 5 million years ago, a period when global average surface temperature is estimated to have been about 2°C–3.5°C higher than in the pre-industrial period (NAS and Royal Society, 2020).

The harmful effects of the technologies on the biosphere are fueled by the fact that technological developments are usually faster than political and technical countermeasures. Moreover, in many cases, technical countermeasures still focus on efficiency improvement strategies, less hazardous substitutions of substances as well as end-of-pipe cleaning technologies. While this approach has yielded some success in the past, it also entails the risk of rebound effects.

Against this background, there is an increasing need for comprehensive approaches to analysis and solutions. Hence, the following key questions arise how to deal with the challenges regarding the prospective assessment of technologies in the era of the Anthropocene:

Firstly, which applications of technologies are beneficial with respect to a sustainable development, and which ones we should rather abandon?

Secondly, which methodological approach can be used to assess and influence the development of new technologies right from the beginning and with sufficient certainty of direction?

Thirdly, who is responsible and competent to perform the evaluation on the sustainability performance of technologies and to make corresponding decisions concerning their future roadmap?

Ultimately, how can we transform technosphere and society to a culture of sustainability, in other words: “Can humanity adapt to itself?” (Toussaint et al., 2012)

In order to elaborate viable answers to these fundamental questions, this paper aims to review existing definitions of sustainability as well as approaches of sustainability assessment of technologies and associated tools within the era of the Anthropocene. Hence, it first addresses the issue of framing the term of sustainability in the era of the Anthropocene (section 2). Based on a brief overview in section 3 how sustainability assessment methodologies evolved in the past, major milestones and concepts with regard to the technology assessment (TA) framework are described in section 4, with particular focus on the concept of prospective TA. In section 5, we use the energy sector as an example to discuss how mirroring ongoing transformation processes in major areas of need can contribute to the further development of the TA framework. Finally, section 6 is dedicated to conclusions and outlook.

Sustainability in the Anthropocene

Sustainability is a delicate term. Its inflationary use in politics, science and society has rendered it increasingly arbitrary and often blurs the view of its core meaning. Sustainability as a concept was introduced more than 300 years ago by chief miner Hans-Carl von Carlowitz on the occasion of a serious raw material crisis: Wood, at that time the most important raw material for ore mining, had become noticeably scarce and without appropriate countermeasures, the operation of smelting furnaces and consequently silver production would not have been further possible within a foreseeable future. Driven by these economic requirements, von Carlowitz proposed a new principle of forest management, which envisaged taking only as much wood from the forests in a given period of time as could grow back again in the same period (Töpfer, 2013von Carlowitz, 1713).

In the discussions about the scarcity of natural resources in the 1970s (cf. Meadows et al., 1972), the concept of sustainability was taken up again and experienced a renaissance through its further development in terms of content. Environmental and social aspects of sustainability have been placed more and more in the foreground. Hence, sustainability has increasingly been understood as a major global transformation process (Grießhammer and Brohmann, 2015; see also section 5), which is reflected in particular in the term of a “sustainable development.” Another milestone in the framing of sustainability as a concept with normative relevance has been achieved in the World Commission on Environment and Development. In its report, the so-called “Brundtland Report,” the commission defines sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987: without page). With this definition, the aspects of intra– and intergenerational equity were introduced and particularly emphasized in the sustainability debate. Furthermore, the “Brundtland Report” frames sustainable development as a necessary transformation process of economy and society as it points out that:

“Sustainable development is not a fixed state of harmony, but rather a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are made consistent with future as well as present needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987: without page).

Since the 1990s, the debate on how intergenerational justice is to be achieved has been dominated by two diverging perceptions of the concept of sustainability, referred to as “strong sustainability” and “weak sustainability”:

Strong sustainability postulates to preserve the entire natural capital of the Earth. Human capital and natural capital are perceived to be complementary, but not interchangeable. This means that humans, as users of nature, may live only from the “interest” of the natural capital. Any consumption of non-renewable resources would therefore be ruled out, and renewable resources could only be used within their regeneration rate (Som et al., 2009).

Weak sustainability calls only for preserving of the Earth’s total anthropogenic and natural capital. Accordingly, humanity could reduce natural capital to any degree if it was substituted in return by anthropogenic capital with the same economic value (Solow, 1986).

At the UN Conference on Environment and Development at Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the concept of sustainable development was recognized as an internationally guiding principle. The underlying idea was that economic efficiency, social justice and the safeguarding of the natural basis of life are interests that are equally important for survival and complement each other. Although 27 fundamental principles for sustainable development are enshrined in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (United Nations, 1992), for more than 10 years no concrete sustainability goals and indicators existed that would have been suitable in particular for the sustainability assessment of products and technologies.

With the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, the member states of the United Nations for the first time agreed upon a universal catalog of fixed time-specific targets. These 17 SDGs (see Figure 1) and the corresponding 169 targets can be considered as the interdisciplinary normative basis of sustainability research, covering all three dimensions of sustainable development, that is, environmental, economic, and social aspects (United Nations, 2015).

Figure 1. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda.Source: UNDP (2016).

The 2030 Agenda is universal in scope, which means that it commits all countries to contribute toward a comprehensive effort for global sustainability in all its dimensions while ensuring equity, peace and security. Furthermore, with its central, transformative promise “leave no one behind,” it is based on the principle to take on board even the weakest and most vulnerable. Hence, it seeks to eradicate poverty in all its forms as well as to combat discrimination and rising inequalities within and amongst countries (BMUV, 2022SDGF, 2016United Nations, 2021).

As a major specification of the 2030 Agenda, the concept of Planetary Boundaries focusses on the environmental dimension of sustainability. This approach put forward by Rockström et al. (2009) echoes the concept of “strong sustainability” (see above) and has been updated and extended by Steffen et al. (2015). At its core, it identifies nine global biophysical processes, whose significant changes can lead to conditions on Earth that are no longer considered a “safe operating space for humanity.” According to Steffen et al. (2015), several of the global biophysical processes are already beyond an uncertainty range with a high risk of dangerous changes on the planetary scale. These include the integrity of the biosphere (expressed as genetic diversity) and biogeochemical material flows, especially nitrogen and phosphorus. Others (e.g. climate change and land use change) are considered to be in an area of high uncertainty with an increasing risk of dangerous changes.

In 2016, Rockström and Sukhdev presented a new way of framing the SDGs of the 2030 Agenda. According to the concept of “strong sustainability” they argued that economies and societies should be perceived as embedded parts of the biosphere (Stockholm Resilience Center, 2016). This perspective is illustrated by the so-called “Wedding Cake” model (see Figure 2) and challenges the predominant understanding expressed by the “Three Pillars” model of sustainability (cf. Barbier, 1987) that environmental, economic and social development can be regarded as separate parts. Hence, the “Wedding Cake” model of sustainability can be understood as a combination of the 2030 Agenda and the concept of Planetary Boundaries since it calls for a transition toward a world logic where the economy serves society so that both economy and society can evolve within the “safe operating space” of the planet.

Figure 2. The “Wedding Cake” model of sustainability.Source: Azote for Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University.

The link between SDGs and Planetary Boundaries is of paramount importance in the age of the Anthropocene. Even though the SDGs have been lauded for amplifying the global development agenda by including environmental, social and economic concerns, the 2030 Agenda remains committed to a growth-oriented development that potentially conflicts with keeping human development within the Planetary Boundaries as defined by Rockström et al. (2009). A striking example of the growth-oriented concept can be found in SDG target 8.1, which requires to “sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7% gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries” (United Nations, 2015). Against this background, substantial changes toward more sufficient consumption patterns that help to remain within the Earth’s environmental carrying capacity need to be established and promoted by setting corresponding political framework conditions (Fischer and Grießhammer, 2013).

Evolvement of sustainability assessment methodologies

The scientific methodology for assessing the sustainability of technologies, material or products is far less developed than the debate on sustainable development and sustainable consumption would suggest. However, initial approaches in this respect were developed by the Öko-Institut as early as 1987 (Öko-Institut, 1987). The concept of the Produktlinienanalyse (English “product line analysis”), representing a pioneering step in the development of methods for life cycle-based analyses, made it possible to record the environmental, economic, and social impacts of products along the whole product line.

Nevertheless, at the end of the 1990ies, the product-related Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) became established and standardized on the international level, representing a methodology which assesses only the environmental impacts of a product over its entire life-cycle. The decisive standards of LCA are ISO 14040 (2006) and ISO 14044 (2006), which have become widely applied. These international standards essentially describe the process of conducting LCAs, examining the impact of a product from “cradle to grave.” Particular attention is paid in ISO 14040 and ISO 14044 to the scoping of a LCA study, with concrete requirements on the choice of the system boundaries, the functional unit (i.e. the quantified performance of the investigated product system for use as a reference unit) and the data quality requirements. In addition, the performance of a critical review by an independent third party is envisaged as a quality assurance step.

Sustainability assessments, however, did not advance until the 2000s, with the detailed method descriptions PROSA (Product Sustainability Assessment) by the Öko-Institut (Grießhammer et al., 2007) and SEE-Balance (Socio-Eco-Efficiency Analysis) by the chemical company BASF (Kicherer, 2005Saling, 2016). Even for the sub-methods of Life Cycle Costing (Swarr et al., 2011) and Social Life Cycle Assessment (Grießhammer et al., 2006UNEP-SETAC Life Cycle Initiative, 2009), method descriptions were presented comparatively late. There are also proposals to combine the three sub-methods of Life Cycle Assessment, Life Cycle Costing and Social Life Cycle Assessment to form the Life Cycle Sustainability Assessment (LCSA) (Feifel et al., 2010Finkbeiner, 2011). However, in contrast to PROSA, the aim is not to analyze and evaluate needs and the realized product benefits, even though meeting basic needs through products is one of the central demands of Agenda 21. Whereas initially the sustainability of only relatively simple products such as food, textiles, or detergents had been assessed, in recent years the sustainability performance of complex products such as notebooks (Manhart and Grießhammer, 2006) and telecommunications services (Prakash et al., 2016) as well as emerging technologies and materials (Möller et al., 2012) has also been analyzed.

For many years, the comparatively open or specific selection of indicators for conducting sustainability assessment case studies was justified by the lack of a relevant normative framework as well as a generally accepted set of indicators. With the adoption of the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda in 2015, this has fundamentally changed (cf. section 2). In addition to its 17 SDGs and 169 targets, the 2030 Agenda provides a globally accepted system of indicators for measuring the SDGs. However, only a few dozen of the 169 targets explicitly refer to products and companies. In a recently completed research project (Eberle et al., 2021) funded by the German Federal Ministry on Education and Research a method was developed which provided for a reasoned restriction to those indicators to the achievement of which products, services and companies can actually contribute. By means of the method, it is possible for the first time to measure the contribution to the achievement of the SDGs at the level of products and services and thus to establish a link between LCA and SLCA results and the 2030 Agenda (Eberle and Wenzig, 2020). To complete the assessment, an in-depth analysis of societal benefits according to Möller et al. (2021a) can be supplemented, which is also based on the 2030 Agenda. In this way, additional benefit aspects of the products and services considered beyond their core benefits can be identified with a view to the SDGs.

As our experience from practice has shown, for the sustainability assessment of any object of investigation, the respective functionality is of utmost importance and must therefore be considered and defined in detail. In this context, a careful definition of the functional unit as defined in ISO 14040 and ISO 14044 is considered to be essential. In addition, a detailed analysis of the various benefit aspects of the studied object is recommended. Against this background, there is no technology, material or product that is sustainable per se. Only the way a technology, material or product is handled and used over its whole life-cycle may be more or less sustainable. Therefore, their sustainability performance always has to be analyzed and evaluated in the context of the intended application and with regard to a possible contribution to a sustainable development. Absolute statements such as “sustainable plastics,” often combined with the addition “due to recyclability,” must therefore be rated very critically. Recyclability, which is often regarded as synonymous with sustainability in the marketing of materials, depends on available recycling infrastructure, which typically only exists in the materials sector where it is economically viable.

Another important lesson learned from several decades of sustainability assessment is that assessment systems have changed and evolved significantly in the past. As sustainability assessment has been driven by emerging environmental risks, further developments in the normative framework and societal developments, the assessment methodology had to evolve as well. Notable examples of additions to the assessment methodology with respect to the environmental dimension of sustainability are the issues of greenhouse effect and ozone depletion in the 1980s and the microplastic problem in the recent past. It can be assumed that the aforementioned drivers will continue to influence sustainability assessment in the future. For a future-proof sustainability assessment methodology, it is therefore essential that newly emerging risks can be identified at an early stage. This calls for a flexible and adaptive assessment framework as well as an interdisciplinary exchange, especially between natural and social sciences (Möller et al., 2021b).

Evolvement of technology assessment

Roughly in the second half of the 20th century, undesirable side effects of progress in science and technology increasingly manifested themselves in the form of risks and concrete damaging events and thus found their way into the collective consciousness of society. The almost ubiquitous emergence of persistent pollutants like the pesticide DDT (Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) in the environment and the risks of nuclear power can be regarded as particularly controversial examples in this respect (Carson, 1962Grunwald, 2019). Accordingly, the appearance of these phenomena is considered to mark the beginning of the Anthropocene era. As a result, a consensus previously largely in place, which equated scientific and technological progress with social progress, was increasingly questioned. Against this background, researchers were more and more confronted with the challenge of reflecting not only on the possible consequences of science-based technologies, but also on the epistemological foundations of their own actions (Kollek and Döring, 2012).

Consequently, the concept of TA became established in the 1960s, particularly in the United States, with early studies focusing on the issue of environmental pollution, but also issues like the supersonic transport, and ethics of genetic screening (Banta, 2009). One of the basic motivations of TA is to deal with possible short- and long-term consequences of scientific and technological progress (e.g. societal, economic, ethical, and legal impacts) as early and comprehensively as possible, in order to enable formative interventions (Grunwald, 20102019). The ultimate goal of early TA studies was to provide policy makers as primary target group with information on policy alternatives (Banta, 2009).

One of the key challenges for TA relates to the question of how to respond to emerging technologies, that is novel technologies that are still at an early stage of their development. Especially in the case of basic research-oriented R&D work, the new developments are characterized by low technology readiness levels (cf. Mankins, 1995), that is the R&D results are still relatively far away from entering the market in the form of tangible products. The relatively low maturity of the technologies results in a very limited availability of quantitative data on subsequent product specifications and potential environmental impacts. On the other hand, addressing sustainability aspects at such an early stage in the innovation process basically offers an excellent window of opportunity to avoid possible weaknesses with regard to sustainable development and to identify existing strengths. This situation is often referred as the Collingridge Dilemma (Collingridge, 1980): In the infancy of an emerging technology, the potential to influence its properties is particularly high, but the knowledge about its sustainability impacts is comparatively low. Later on, the understanding on the consequences of an emerging technology is expected to increase, yet the possibilities for shaping its design may already be significantly reduced by already existing path dependencies (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Dependencies between the maturity of a technology, the knowledge about environmental, health safety and social (EHS/S) impacts as well as the ability to prevent corresponding risks.Source: Köhler and Som (2014).

Against this background, an ideal period for the assessment and eco-design of emerging technologies would be during the innovation stages of “applied technology development” or “product design.” In these stages, the ability to prevent sustainability risks is still relatively high (cf. curve with solid line in Figure 3) and, at the same time, the quantity and quality of data required for a sustainability assessment are increasing significantly. However, a sustainability assessment in the stage of “basic science and material research” is well before this ideal period.

Basically, the dilemma outlined by Collingridge presupposes a fundamental separation between cognition and action as well as between science and technology. With the emergence of the concept of “technosciences,” however, this hypothesis has been increasingly challenged since about the mid-1980s by postulating a constitutive relationship between science and technology (Haraway, 1997Hottois, 1984Latour, 1987). Hence, the characteristic feature of technosciences is a far-reaching convergence of science and technology on all levels of action and effect, of materiality and culture (Kastenhofer, 2010).

The concept of technosciences has been adopted by anthropologists, philosophers and sociologists in science and technology studies as well as in the field of philosophy of science (e.g. Hacking, 1983Nordmann, 2006Pickering, 1992). Other TA concepts attach less emphasis to the intertwining of science, technology and society, but rather aim to start TA as early as possible. These include the “constructive Technology Assessment” developed by Schot and Rip (1997), which does not focus primarily on the possible consequences of a technology but aims to assist in shaping its design, development and implementation process. In this context, it was also proposed that a “real-time assessment” should accompany technology development from the outset and integrate social science issues as well as policy and governance aspects at a very early stage (Guston and Sarewitz, 2002).

Nevertheless, the concept of technosciences generated important impulses to scrutinize and reconsider some of the central assumptions underlying many existing TA concepts. In this context, Liebert and Schmidt (2010) point out that the goals and purposes of innovation processes, which are often clearly articulated and recognizable in the context of technosciences, offer the possibility of unlocking knowledge about the respective technology development. Hence, they challenge the assumption of general knowledge deficits as stipulated by the Collingridge Dilemma. Furthermore, they argue that technosciences are usually developed and applied by many different actors. In this respect, the fiction of a control of technology (especially by political actors) as advocated in early TA concepts will increasingly shift to a paradigm of collaborative design.

Consequently, TA should be framed as a “Prospective Technology Assessment” (ProTA) and initiate phases of science- and technology-related reflection as early as possible:

“ProTA aims to shape technologies by shaping the goals, intentions and attitudes from the perspective of the anticipated consequences and realistic potentials” (Liebert and Schmidt, 2010: 114).

According to Liebert and Schmidt (2010), ProTA requires a normative framework that can be derived from the history of philosophical reflection. Concerning the underlying ethical criteria, two antagonistic principles are outlined: The “heuristics of fear” (Jonas, 1979) and the “principle of hope” (Bloch, 1959), which in combination serve as a mindset for shaping emerging technologies as well as technoscience as a whole and that entails four different types of orientation: human, social, environmental as well as future orientation.

Furthermore, ProTA is also strongly perceived as a participatory approach. In contrast to an observation from an external perspective (as practiced in earlier TA concepts), ProTA should become part of a of self-reflection and self-criticism among scientists and engineers within the R&D stage itself that also includes the perspective of societal and political actors (Fisher et al., 2006Liebert and Schmidt, 2010).

Discussion

As the evolutionary history of TA has shown, an early assessment of technologies and their impacts on environment and society is possible in principle. Despite of the epistemic limitations caused by the Collingridge Dilemma, the concept of ProTA provides a participatory and incremental self-reflection process that facilitates data acquisition even during the early stages of R&D and thus enables the shaping of technologies throughout the innovation process. One of the most important features of ProTA is a well-defined normative framework. Yet Liebert and Schmidt developed the associated criteria several years before the establishment of the 2030 Agenda. With its 17 SDGs and the 169 SDG targets, however, substantial opportunities have been created to concretize the normative framework of TA, especially with respect to a sustainable development. Hence, by referencing to the 2030 Agenda, a comprehensive sustainability assessment of technologies has become possible (Eberle et al., 2021Möller et al., 2021a). Even more than that, with the 2030 Agenda representing a globally accepted framework that all United Nation member states have committed themselves, sustainability assessment of technologies has become an obligation.

In order to ensure goal-oriented and future-proof assessments, TA methodology needs to be able to recognize changes regarding its assessment criteria at an early stage, as already pointed out in section 3. For early detection, the investigation of existing and predicted transformation processes plays an important role in this context.

Transformations can lead to structural paradigmatic changes at all levels of society, for example in culture, value attitudes, technologies, production, consumption, infrastructures and politics. The corresponding processes take place co-evolutionarily, simultaneously or with a time lag in different areas or sectors, and can significantly influence, strengthen or weaken each other. The decisive factor for a transformation is that those processes become more and more condensed over time and, in the sense of a paradigm shift, lead to fundamental irreversible changes in the prevailing system. Transformations can be unplanned or intentional, they can take several decades and proceed at very different speeds (Grießhammer and Brohmann, 2015).

In contrast to the non-targeted transformations of the past (such as the first and second industrial revolution), it is now presumed that intentional transformations (e.g. the “Energiewende,” i.e. the transition of the energy system in Germany) can be significantly influenced and accelerated in a desired direction, but nevertheless not controlled in detail. This assumption is based on the recently available knowledge and experience of complex control, governance and strategy approaches (Grießhammer and Brohmann, 2015). The fundamental possibility of influencing or even controlling transitions is expressed by the term “transition management” (Kemp and Loorbach, 2006).

For understanding transition management, a multi-level perspective is fundamental. Accordingly, three different levels exist in each system under consideration, referred to as niches, regime, and landscape, with interactions between these levels (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Multi-level perspective of transition management (Grießhammer and Brohmann, 2015; modified based on Geels, 2002).

At the level of the prevailing regime, Grießhammer and Brohmann (2015) distinguish eight fields of action or sub-systems of society in which transformative innovations and initiatives can influence each other or proceed in a co-evolutionary manner. These eight fields of action are defined as follows:

Values and models: normative orientations such as values, socially or legally formulated goals, guiding principles or ideas for society as a whole or for individual areas of need (e.g. “Limits to Growth” according to Meadows et al., 1972);

Behaviors and lifestyles: individual and society-wide shared (consumption) actions, everyday practices and habits, which can often deviate significantly from values and consciousness (e.g. dietary habits);

Social and temporal structures: social and culturally determining structures (such as different gender roles or demographic shifts) as well as temporal factors (such as the duration of the transformation, windows of opportunities or diffusion processes of innovations);

Physical infrastructures: permanent material structures that influence or even dominate the action spaces for groups of actors (e.g. road network);

Markets and financial systems: market structures (e.g. degree of concentration, globalization) and market processes such as supply, demand and prices of goods and services;

Technologies, products, and services: individual products and services as well as overarching technologies that can act as a key driver of transformations;

Research, education, and knowledge: science, research and development in practice as well as their institutional constitution, appropriate educational measures at various levels as well as knowledge stocks required for transformations;

Policies and institutions: control instruments such as commandments and prohibitions, financial incentives or informational instruments, as well as the associated institutional and organizational framework (e.g. state bodies, competencies, separation of powers, course of the democratic process and legal framework).

The analysis of the determining factors of a transformation process and their possible impact on the method of sustainability assessment of technologies shall be exemplified by the transformation in the energy sector representing an area of need where general principles for the sustainability assessment of technologies have already been formulated (cf. Grunwald and Rösch, 2011). The following table summarizes the findings from this exercise and provides an overview of the determining factors for the fields of action in the energy sector. In this respect, it has to be noted that the scope of the investigation refers to the specific situation in Germany.

Many of the identified determining factors for the fields of action are transformation processes themselves. Digitalization, for example, is coupling the energy transition with the ongoing industrial revolution in information and communication technologies. Furthermore, the transition of the energy sector influences the energy supply for the transport system as well as for the building stock, and vice versa. The parallel transformations can influence, support, or hinder each other. For example, electromobility generates a higher demand for renewable electricity; on the other hand, the batteries installed in cars provide a storage option for electricity. In this context, it is also important to consider the various and partly rivaling innovations emerging from niches (cf. Figure 4). These include e-cars, for example, but also fuel cell cars and e-bikes as a fundamental alternative. The same is applicable for phenomena at the level of the greater landscape: The efforts of an increasing number of companies to achieve climate neutrality play an eminently important role here, as the demand for renewably generated energy will continue to grow significantly. However, the current consequences and long-term effects of the Corona pandemic could lead to significant energy savings through a reduction in air travel, at least in the short to medium term.

The concept of ProTA is currently implemented in the Cluster of Excellence “Living, Adaptive and Energy-autonomous Materials Systems” (livMatS) funded by the German Research Foundation. The vision of this cluster is to develop novel, bioinspired materials systems, which adapt autonomously to their environment and harvest clean energy from it. The research and development work in livMatS aims to provide innovative solutions for various applications, particularly in the field of energy technologies. Sustainability, psychological acceptance and ethical approval form essential claims of the work done in livMatS. Therefore, prospective reflection of the sustainability aspects as well as research into consumer acceptance and social relevance of the developed material systems form an integral part of livMatS work right from the very beginning (livMatS, 2022).

The prospective TA of the technologies and materials to be developed in the livMatS cluster is designed as a tiered approach called TAPAS (Tiered Approach for Prospective Assessment of Benefits and Challenges). The ultimate goal is the design of a new development-integrated sustainability assessment framework that starts with interactive early tools on a qualitative basis (e.g. questionnaires and prospective chemicals assessment) and also covers quantitative case studies. Development-integrated assessment entails that the methodology both encourages and enables the innovators themselves to carry out assessments on sustainability, ethics and consumer issues as part of the innovation process (Möller et al., 2021c).

With regard to the livMatS materials, the ongoing transformation in the energy sector has considerable influence on the potential application fields: In their efforts to become climate-neutral, companies will make much greater efforts to harness previously unused (waste) energy. Energy harvesting in industrial processes as well as in the mobility sector and in buildings will consequently gain considerably in importance and may become common practice. For example, due to progress in digitalization, there will be more and more sensors at peripheral locations requiring power supply. Moreover, prosumers may also find it attractive in the future to feed harvested energy of their own solar systems into the grid, especially at times of high energy prices.

For the methodology of the prospective sustainability assessment, however, no fundamentally new issues can be identified on the basis of the available findings, which could not be captured by the existing toolbox. This can be justified with a closer look to the relevant technological approaches (digitalization, hydrogen technology, energy harvesting) presented in Table 1, as their respective designs do not reveal any radically new materials and process configurations. This assessment, however, needs to be subject to continuous review as the new material systems mature. Furthermore, it should be noted that for sustainability assessments in living labs and citizen science projects, instruments are required that provide meaningful and consistent results even when used by laypersons. In this context, a tiered approach as described in section 4 is also expected to be beneficial.Table 1. Determining factors for the fields of action in the energy sector.

Fields of actionDetermining factors in the energy sector in Germany
Values and models“Energiewende” (English: “energy transition”) mission statement with a focus on renewable energies (Krause et al., 1980)
Rejection of nuclear energy by a vast majority of the German population (Statista, 2021)
Fridays for Future activities and demonstrations push debate about climate change and renewable energy back to the forefront of the political agenda (Marquardt, 2020)
Behaviors and lifestylesProsumer movement leads to a constantly increasing number of consumers who simultaneously consume electricity and supply it to the grid, for example via an own photovoltaic system (Agora Energiewende, 2017BMWi, 2016)
Social and temporal structuresFukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 as a major window of opportunity for the nuclear phase-out (Bernardi et al., 2018)
Increase in the share of smaller households with a specifically higher electricity demand (Umweltbundesamt, 2020)
Flexible and time-dependent pricing structures (e.g. variable electricity prices) and process conversions in industry and commerce (operating energy-intensive processes during the day instead of previously at night) foster load management (Agora Energiewende, 2017)
Physical infrastructuresDigitalization enables the networking of electricity generators and consumers, for example, through smart meter gateways, that is, intelligent metering systems consisting of a communication unit and a digital electricity meter (Agora Energiewende, 2017BMWi, 20162017)
Coupling of the electricity sector with the building, mobility and various industrial sectors, turning (renewably generated) electricity into the most important energy source (Agora Energiewende, 2017BMWi, 2017)
Markets and financial systemsDecentralization of power generation (formerly a few large fossil-based power plants to currently several million small and large renewable energy plants) creates new market players and enables new business models (Agora Energiewende, 2017)
Strong cost degression in electricity generation from renewable sources (e.g. by 90% regarding photovoltaics) enables an energy system based on solar and wind power (Agora Energiewende, 2017)
Technologies, products and servicesNew energy storage systems (especially “green” hydrogen technology) for intermediate storage of electricity from renewable sources (Matthes et al., 2020)
Efficiency increase in the use of electricity both at industrial plants and in household appliances (Agora Energiewende, 2017)
Energy harvesting technologies enable the use of previously dissipated photonic energy, thermal energy or kinetic energy (Fraunhofer, 2018)
Research, education and knowledgeLiving labs and citizen science projects explore sustainable energy technologies (e.g. hydrogen technology) under real conditions and on an industrial scale (BMWi, 2020)
Policies and institutionsLiberalization of the electricity market since the 1990ies enables a flexible and efficient response to volatile power generation from renewable energy sources (DENA, 2021)
 Substantial financial incentives for renewable energy generation through the Renewable Energy Sources Act since 2000 (EEG, 2021)
 Nuclear phase-out (by 2022) and coal phase-out (by 2038), that is political decision by the German federal government to stop operating nuclear power plants (Bundesregierung, 20112021)

Source: Own compilation.

Conclusions and outlook

In light of the findings and the results of the previous sections, the four fundamental questions from the introduction will be revisited and answered as far as possible.

With regard to the first question, it could be demonstrated that universal and absolute statements on the sustainability of technologies are just as misleading as they are for materials or products. Possible contributions to a sustainable development can only be discovered in a case-by-case analysis of the entire product-line and in the context of the functionality and benefits of the object under investigation.

Secondly, an early and prospective assessment of sustainability of technologies requires a flexible and tiered approach. In this respect, we reference the TAPAS framework that aims to establish a new tiered development-integrated assessment methodology within the livMatS Cluster of Excellence. To enable assessments at an early stage and with sufficient certainty of direction, TAPAS starts with interactive early tools (e.g. questionnaires and prospective chemicals assessment) which are incrementally underpinned with quantitative case studies in an iterative process. In order to ensure an agile, goal-oriented and future-proof evaluation system, TAPAS also includes a careful reflection of ongoing transformation processes in application sectors (e.g. the energy sector) that are relevant to the technology. The prospective mirroring of the determinants of transformation processes of related areas of need as described in section 5 aims to provide a further feature for the continuous refinement of the TA framework, especially with regard to ProTA.

As of third, the assessment of the sustainability performance of technologies should include much greater involvement of those actors who are particularly good at overseeing and influencing the innovation process—the innovators themselves. To ensure sufficient feedback with society, science has to open up to the public and the participation of society in the sense of transdisciplinary research. In this respect, initial assessments of the technology developers need to be discussed in real laboratories, that is, open-innovation environments that focus on cooperation between science and the public in an experimental environment. Hence, suggestions from society should in return become part of the innovation process (Möller et al., 2021b).

Ultimately, in order to give humankind a chance to adapt to itself (Toussaint et al., 2012), technology and society need to co-evolve. Global agreements on normative goals such as the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda form a good starting point in this respect. For a culture of sustainability, however, policy should promote cooperation between actors for societally desirable transformation processes to a much greater extent. Equally important is a “greening” of ongoing transformations that are not induced by environmental policy (Grießhammer and Brohmann, 2015). The need to foster cooperation can be illustrated by the example of the energy transition: Driving forces for the “Energiewende” can already be found in all stakeholder groups, that is in civil society and governmental actors, but also in science and companies. Unfortunately, however, these players in many cases still act independently of each other. Instead, earlier and greater involvement of business and industry in ongoing transformation processes, support for new business models, and greater international cooperation would be needed.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany’s Excellence Strategy – EXC-2193/1 – 390951807.

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The Anthropocene as framed by the far right

Dan BaileyJoe Turner

Homeland’, borders, and business-as-usual

Framing the environmental crisis

It has long been accepted amongst various communities of academics that both political ideas and discourses matter in framing political issues, rendering actors and phenomena visible or invisible, and shaping political outcomes.1 A pertinent example of this is the phrase ‘Anthropocene’ – used to denote a new geological era in which human activity has significant impacts on planetary ecosystems – but which is itself contestable for the phenomena it captures and elides. Some have put forward the alternative term of ‘capitalocene’ to reflect the understanding that the primary driving force of ecological change in this era is not human activity per se, but the capitalist systems which continue to drive resource extraction, greenhouse gas emissions, and rising inequalities.2

“The far right discourse on the ecological crisis has historically been to deny its existence”

The ecological crisis is subject to a series of political discourses which each imperfectly capture the complex myriad of social, economic, and technological dynamics that are degrading planetary ecosystems. These discourses shape the public understanding of the environmental crisis and the appropriate strategies for its resolution, with each discourse purveyed by distinctive but evolving political factions and social forces.3,4

The far right discourse on the ecological crisis has historically been to deny its existence.5,6 This denial has taken many forms, but most commonly the science of ecological degradation has been disavowed and this has been matched by the refusal to accept any national responsibility for addressing the unfolding global ecological catastrophe. Customarily, the scientific evidence has been pronounced as a conspiracy designed to benefit ‘globalist elites’ or a plot to undermine national sovereignty through the ratification of multilateral agreements. This has served to bolster resistance to effective environmental policies.

However, this environmental discourse is no longer as central to the far right movement as it was in the 2000s and 2010s. Increasingly, climate science is tacitly accepted, but the finger of blame is being disingenuously pointed towards the far right’s traditional enemies.

The shifting environmental discourses of the European far right

As environmental issues have risen up the political agenda (becoming salient to younger voters in particular), far right parties have seemingly shifted away from denialism of the science. This shift has not led to a recognition of the need for a just economic transformation or, indeed, any political action commensurate to the scale and character of the environmental crisis. Instead, the increasing (albeit belated) recognition of environmental issues (primarily those which exist within national borders) has been fused with an anti-immigration agenda to create a new invidious framing of environmental politics. The emerging discourse, which we have conceptualised as ‘ecobordering’ elsewhere,7 is characterised by climate nationalism and seeks to depict immigration (of which migration from the Global South is made hyper-visible) as a threat to local and national environments.

This discourse takes two primary forms. First, it aims to politicise the environmental impacts of ‘mass immigration’ from the Global South, while depoliticising the impacts of ‘natives’. This includes linking ‘mass immigration’ with rising demand for natural resources and local environmental problems such as the pollution resulting from greater traffic and consumption. Immigration, it is suggested, is to blame for such problems, which were not issues of concern for local areas prior to multiculturalism.

At the same time, this narrative stokes fears that mass immigration will lead to population growth amongst non-white communities which will exacerbate these local environmental issues further and deplete finite natural resources, in what could be termed ‘racialised Malthusianism’. This was particularly exhibited by the British National Party (BNP),8 the National Rally,9 the Swiss People’s Party,10 Vlaams Belang,11 and Alternative for Deutschland.12 The Swiss People’s Party repeatedly claimed that it is the bulwark against “the greatest environmental killer, overpopulation… by urging people to limit immigration”,13 while the British National Party adopted the same Malthusian logic that it “is the ONLY party to recognise that overpopulation – whose primary driver is immigration, as revealed by the government’s own figures – is the cause of the destruction of our environment”.14

“The depiction of Global South migrants is juxtaposed with the depiction of ‘natives’ as responsible stewards of their ‘homeland’”

The second form this discourse takes is the depiction of Global South migrants as environmental hazards, with no personal aptitude for managing natural resources due to a lack of belonging to, or lack of financial or emotion investment in, local areas. This has been most strongly exhibited by far right parties such as Golden Dawn,15 the National Rally,16 the BNP,17 the Swiss People’s Party,18 and Vox.19 This has included the disparagement and scapegoating of migrants in numerous ways, such as littering, causing forest fires, the inhumane treatment of animals, and the destruction of ‘indigenous wildlife’ amongst other environmental offences.

“The purported threat posed by immigration and migrants… seeks to vindicate the notion that border policies are key forms of statecraft for the protection of the environment”

The lack of belonging is key to understanding this portrayal; as Le Pen explicitly put it: “environmentalism [is] the natural child of patriotism, because it’s the natural child of rootedness… if you’re a nomad, you’re not an environmentalist… Those who are nomadic… do not care about the environment; they have no homeland”.20 The depiction of Global South migrants is juxtaposed with the depiction of ‘natives’ as responsible stewards of their ‘homeland’ and adept stewards of their ‘little platoons’ (to invoke the eco-fascist and Burkean logics which this framing draws upon). This typically entails glorifying the historic stewardship of pastoral national citizens (such as farmers21 or foresters22) and the proclaiming the sound management of domestic natural resources by ‘natives’23 over the ‘homeland’.24,25 The National Front and Golden Dawn have even established wings of their movements called ‘New Ecology’26 and ‘Green Wing’27 designed to protect “family, nature and race”28 and “the cradle of our race”29 respectively.

Both of these discursive traits have since been identified more recently in Marine Le Pen’s recent presidential campaign in which she obtained 41.5 per cent of the vote. Dubbed ‘patriotic ecology’ by her followers, the fallacious depictions of culprits and saviours in the environmental crisis have become normalised in French politics to the extent that they are echoed by rival conservative politicians.

The purported threat posed by immigration and migrants to previously ‘pure’ and ‘sustainable’ spaces of European nature seeks to vindicate the notion that border policies are key forms of statecraft for the protection of the environment. As a senior figure in Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, Jordan Bardella, declared in 2019: “borders are the environment’s greatest ally… it is through them that we will save the planet”.30

A shift away from climate denialism, but at what cost?

The potential electoral potency of fusing border securitisation and climate issues – however fallaciously – underlines the importance of recognising and challenging these discourses. Should the ascendant far right in Europe gain any further power, or have further influence on traditionally conservative political parties, this discourse could more forcefully shape public understandings of the environmental crisis and the strategies for its resolution in the future.

“To ignore the root causes of the ecological crisis at this juncture would be catastrophic for the natural world”

This would be catastrophic on two fronts. On the one hand, the discourse prescribes a form of statecraft centred on border security rather than systemic economic transformation, which represents an apocryphal programme of environmental protection. It does so by focusing narrowly on ‘national’ nature (peripheralising global issues) and obscuring the material economic drivers of ecological degradation (such as the heavily polluting energy and aviation industries, for which Global North populations are primarily culpable). To ignore the root causes of the ecological crisis at this juncture would be catastrophic for the natural world, but that is precisely what this political framing inculcates.

Just as importantly, ecobordering seeks to inflict further structural violence on those who those exploited at the peripheries of the global economy. The nationalistic framing emerges at a time when immigration is rising because of climate change, and the discourse thus seeks to diagnose the symptoms of ecological degradation as the causes of it. There is already evidence that the rise of the far right strengthens political resistance to climate migration,31 and this framing serves to justify this resistance from an environmental perspective. At a global scale, these framings threaten to rationalise a de facto climate apartheid; with Global North populations and elites in the Global South enjoying the spoils of an environmentally deleterious global economy, while poorer Global South populations become confined to increasingly uninhabitable areas facing escalating risks of climate shocks and deteriorating health conditions.

The meaning and practical implications of climate justice will become an increasingly hot topic in the Anthropocene. Challenging the depictions of culprits and saviours purveyed by far right figures is only an initial step to preventing injustices mounting further.32 Recognising the historical constitution of the global economy and the inequalities and vulnerabilities resulting from it underlines the injustices of far right framings and the need for progressive actors to advance more transformative approaches.33 Progressive responses to the rise of the far right in the Anthropocene requires formulating and advancing notions of a just transition which accounts for the movement of people affected by climate change as well as other less privileged groupings in society.34 This will require far more progressive forms of statecraft which are a world away from those advocated in the framings of the far right.

Biographies

  • Dan Bailey is a senior lecturer in international political economy at Manchester Metropolitan University. His is interested in the evolving and complex interactions between the global economy, climate change, the objectives and strategies of political institutions, and the ideas and discourses that shape public understandings of the ecological crisis and sustainability transitions. He has authored a series of academic publications and policy reports on topics relating to these interactions.
  • Joe Turner is a lecturer in international politics at the University of York. His interdisciplinary examines how border regimes in post-imperial states like Britain are structured by imperial and colonial histories and hierarchies of human value. He recently published the book Migration Studies and Colonialism with Lucy Mayblin.

Three Scenarios for the Future of Education in the Anthropocene

April 12, 2020 Updated:January 7, 2026 16 Mins Read

By Kathleen Kesson

We have entered the Anthropocene — a new era in geological history — a phase of planetary development in which human impacts on the Earth may cause or have caused irreversible damage. We are witness to “the great acceleration” in which geothermal, biological, ecological, and atmospheric changes threaten to bring about irreparable changes in the planetary ecosystem, and by extension, our social and economic systems. Every day brings news of wildfires, drought, floods, conflicts, hurricanes, locusts, extinctions, and the latest, a Coronavirus pandemic, which has managed to shut down many of the global systems we rely on for survival.

Humans (GR: ánthrōpos) have been blamed for the tragic despoliation of our Earth. It is not humans in general, however, but a specific human civilization that has driven the processes of resource extraction, labor exploitation, capital accumulation, and what we can only call “ecocide.” While historically, empires have come and gone and laid waste in countless ways to people and planet, the current modern era of industrialization/capitalism, paralleling a centuries-long narrative of conquest, genocide, plunder, slave labor, and economic imperialism has created the conditions of this new age that some scholars suggest we more rightly call the “Capitalocene” (see Moore, 2016).

Given the climate and other ecological crises, the rise of authoritarian/totalitarian governments, and the general breakdown of multiple systems, there is an urgent need to create new, nimble configurations of communities, ecologies, and learning centres to respond to the uncertain and rapidly changing environment.  The education (not necessarily “schooling”) of young people is at the heart of the future; it is only through education that a “new human” might emerge, capable of enacting the mindset and behaviors that might create a livable world. Education alone, however, absent substantial changes in culture, thinking and behavior, is incapable of bringing about the fundamental changes necessary to survival.

I offer here three scenarios for the future of education, each of them tied to various components of a dominant governing ideology. Each Scenario is accompanied by structuring metaphors as well as a dominant “binding quality.” The notion of a binding quality comes to us from an ancient Indic episteme; it is said that consciousness and matter operate in three fundamental modes: sattva (sentient), rajah (mutative), and tamah (static), collectively known as gunas in Sanskrit.  Understanding the gunas is a complex philosophical matter; I use them here metaphorically, to describe the predominant energy of each Scenario. I have drawn largely on the comprehensive projections of P.R. Sarkar (1992; 1999) for the vision of the future portrayed in Scenario 3, though it must be said that the various components of this vision are emerging from multifarious directions and under different appellations at the present time.

Futures thinking is an uncertain art. It is likely that the future of humanity will include dimensions of each Scenario; in fact, the present moment contains all of them, though Scenario 2 dominates because of the globalization of the economy and hegemonic forms of culture.  I believe, however, that the survivability of humanity is dependent on learning the lessons of the multiple current crises we face, and figuring out how to navigate through complexity, chaos and the general breakdown of systems to facilitate the self-organized, positive evolutionary outcomes highlighted in Scenario 3.

An important caveat: When considering the “Big Picture,” generalizations are unavoidable.  These scenarios are mapped in very broad strokes, and we must remember that the map is not the territory.  Details, diversities, exceptions, and contradictions certainly need to be taken into consideration.

Scenario 1

Regression/Devolution

I start with the grimmest of the forecasts, in order to disabuse us of the modernist notion that history is an inevitable trajectory of progress, of increasing individual freedom and rights, of economic growth, constantly improved standards of living, and the capacity of positivist reason and logical thinking to solve all human problems. As in the aftermath of the Roman Empire or perhaps more vividly, in modern dystopian films, societies can deteriorate rather swiftly.

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In European history, the years between 500-1250 AD are usually considered the “Dark Ages.” After the fall of the Roman Empire, and due to many factors including ineffective leadership, economic failures, internal struggles for power, external invasions, and yes — climate change — the western territories of the Roman Empire entered a long period of decline. Historians disagree on many of the details, though there is a general consensus that it was a period of breakdown and change of the social and economic infrastructures.  Schools were closed, and illiteracy spread. Travel and trade were restricted, epidemics wiped out huge populations, and conflict was prevalent.

While our modern era may seem to have little to do with the European Medieval period, it’s altogether possible that we (at least in the “West”) are living through the deterioration of an empire begun in the European colonial period and culminating in late capitalism and the economic imperialism that is an essential component of the globalized economy. This world-historical empire has been engaged in endless wars throughout its reign, has deep internal fractures and multiple external pressures, not least from other empires.  Most important, as noted above, the bio-systems upon which life depends, and upon which so much of its wealth was created, are deteriorating.

In times of collective stress such as the current pandemic, it is tempting to withdraw, to retreat from the forward flow of life and pull into individual and social cocoons, burrow into the past. That tendency is currently exacerbated by the pandemic related strictures to isolate, to distance ourselves from the social world. Should these tendencies persist after the disease is brought under control, we could see a “devolution.” In such a regressive move, we are likely to see rising xenophobia, racism, religious prejudice, sexism, strong borders, and ever-increasing economic inequality.

Scenarios and metaphorsWorldview/PhilosophyPowerSocial/economic organizationEcologicalperspectiveKnowledgeEducation InstitutionsSpirituality
Regression/Devolution Binding quality: Tamah (static) Contraction, decay, degeneration, ignorance, death and inertia.    Pre-Humanist submersion in forces thought to be beyond human control. Recycling of medieval ontologies and philosophies. People concerned with their own immediate land, clan, family and social group.Power/over-exerted through superstition and propagation of false ideas; patriarchal structures control behavior, social life, and education.Provincial, feudal, mostly dispersed rural populations.  Centralization of (weak) control in urban centres. Subsistence economy for the masses; wealth flows upward—vast inequalities.Nature as a force to be feared. Attempts to exert dominion over nature. The exploitation of natural resources benefits the few.Past knowledge valued over experimental, new knowledge. Knowledge distribution restricted as a form of social control.Knowledge production concentrated in centres of power.Private teachers/schools for the wealthy. Survival skills adequate for the general population. Traditional/orthodox/dogmatic; power centralized in the clergy.Metaphysical beliefs grounded in irrationality and superstition—emphasis on domination and control of thought. 

Scenario 2

Status quo/Business as usual

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Thinking optimistically, we’re unlikely to sink into the miasma of Medieval Europe, but young people who have not lived through a Depression, or an epidemic, or a war on their own territory cannot be blamed for fearing that this is the “end of the world as we know it.” This pandemic, however, and the economic dislocations, the social isolation, the fear and uncertainty that it has brought, while perhaps not the apocalypse much fear, may be a harbinger of the future. It is human nature to want to “get back to normal” following a crisis of great magnitude, to restore a sense of equilibrium and stability. But what if “normal” forms of social, economic, and ecological behaviors are themselves at the root of the crisis? Astute observers of our current modernist trajectories, including a majority of the scientific community, warn us that we are now living through a transition period, which, depending on collective decisions we make in this next decade, have the potential to transform the conditions of life as we know it on Planet Earth, and not for the better. If we continue the rate of petroleum extraction, fossil fuel burning, deforestation, unrestrained consumption, pollution, and so much more, it is clear that humanity is in for a century of increasingly deadly wildfires, droughts, floods, ocean acidification, pandemics, rising sea levels, and massive extinctions on a scale heretofore unimagined. If current power relations persist, and we do not affect a deep reordering of our economic system, power structures, worldview and ways of thinking, if we merely tinker with existing conditions while hoping to achieve what could only be a “false equilibrium,” elites will prosper while our life systems continue to degrade and masses of people suffer. The kind of thinking that has created the multi-faceted crises we face is unlikely to help us solve them, but humans may not, in this Scenario, demonstrate the will or the capacity to radically transform their thinking and their behaviors, or challenge the existing power structure.

Scenarios and metaphorsWorldviewPowerSocial/economic organizationEcologicalperspectiveKnowledgeEducation InstitutionsSpirituality
Status quo/ Business as usual Binding quality:Rajah (mutative) Pulsation, change, growth, movement, restlessness and activity.    Secular. Mainstream rejection of spirituality based on widespread materialistic worldview. Man is seen as the pinnacle of creation. Humanistic emphasis on individualism, independence, personal autonomy.Power/over-exerted through economic domination and hegemonic media; Power/with only mythology of democratic capitalism. Dramatic concentration of wealth; oligarchical rule.Increasing inequalities. The illusion of a relatively prosperous (if shrinking) “middle class” sustains myths of growth and progress.Humans are seen as separate from nature (dualism). Nature understood as a resource to be exploited for profit.Conventional, hierarchically organized. Positivist thinking dominates. Scientific and technological advances are double-edged (i.e. air travel creates mobility + air pollution, greenhouse gases and rapid spread of disease). Sifting and sorting mechanisms maintain inequities of race, ethnicity, gender, and social class.Increasing concentration of influence over standards and curriculum in the interest of global economic competition. Higher education commodified, fewer young people have access. Western forms of education spread globally, resulting in loss of languages, local cultures and epistemes.Mostly secular. Fundamentalisms operate at the fringe, often with major impacts on systems (re 9/11). Commodified “new age” practices amongst middle classes are oriented towards individual well-being.

Scenario 3

Evolution/Revolution

 The current crisis has brought into sharp relief the injustice and unsustainability of socio-economic systems that value profits over human needs and the well-being of the planet. It is possible that this moment in time could signal the “great awakening,” the tipping point that pushes us into creative new ways of thinking about what it means to be human and how we should live our lives. What if the present moment were a space of “liminality” — a moment between what has been and what will be? A space between the ‘what was’ and the ‘next.’ A space of transition, a season of waiting, during which we collectively question where we have been and where we are going.  A space in which we reconceptualize the entire edifice – the mental and the material structures that have brought us to the current crossroads in our evolution.

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In Scenario 3, we find the courage to design and implement new economic structures that serve the welfare of the whole of humanity, not just the elite few. We begin to understand our essential embeddedness in nature and explore how to cultivate relations of harmony and reciprocity with the “more-than-human-others” with whom we share the planet. And perhaps most important, we overcome the false notion that matter and spirit occupy independent realms, separated by an impassable abyss. We begin to understand that the purpose of life is not the mere accumulation of material goods, or the acquisition of political power, or even the development of a brilliant intellect, but the unification of body, mind and spirit in the quest for spiritual enlightenment.

Unlike the “tinkering” referred to in Scenario 2, Scenario 3 represents a radical paradigm shift, an evolutionary transformation of consciousness, values, and human behavior. Education has a core role to play in that it is young people who will carry the present into the future.  A philosophy of Neohumanism (Sarkar, 1999), in which we reconsider the fundamentals — the nature of human beings, the nature of knowing, what we value, and how we are to live — asks us to rethink the purposes of education. Rather than educate so that a tiny sliver of people rise to the top of the global income chain, a Neohumanist education would prepare all people for the art of living well on a fragile and sacred planet. It would emphasize not just academic achievement and high test scores, but shift the focus to fostering compassion, community, empathy, imagination, insight, friendship, creativity, communication, justice, practicality, pleasure, courage, humor, wisdom, introspection, transcendence, ethics, service, and the ability to live well within the carrying capacity of our ecosystems. It would tear down the walls that have separated school and community and invite local and intergenerational knowledge and traditional ways of knowing into conversation with modern empirical science and technological know-how. Importantly, Neohumanism would welcome our inner lives into education and foster multiple epistemologies (embodied knowing, intuitional knowing, narrative knowing, aesthetic knowing, mythic knowing). Adults and young people together would plant gardens and reinvigorate forests, clean up our waterways, and regenerate the soil. We would “rewild” our children and ourselves so that we might begin to understand the vital part we all play in a living web of interconnection, a web that encompasses not just humans, but the eight million other species with whom we share the planet. Only with such an educational process might we “elevate humanism to universalism, the cult of love for all created beings of this universe” (Sarkar, 1999, p. 7).

Scenarios and metaphorsWorldviewPowerSocial/ economic organizationEcologicalKnowledgeEducation InstitutionsSpirituality
Evolution/Revolution Binding quality: Sattva (sentient) Awareness, purity, happiness, sensitivity, expansion and lightness.Human life an integrated whole encompassing the material and spiritual worlds. Neohumanism: the liberation of the intellect and the expansion of mind. Emphasis on interdependence of all species. Resilient local cultures, universal, inclusive outlooks. Power/with radical democracy, people organized to resist domination. Co-creation of new systems that serve the whole. Gender partnership,  full inclusion. Moral leadership based in service replaces corruption and self-interest. Cooperative global governance regulates international affairs. Progressive Utilization Theory (PROUT) — Social equality fostered through worker’s cooperatives, caps on wealth accumulation, food sovereignty, the gift and sharing economy, the rights of all people for a decent job, housing, food, health care and education, and the protection of biodiversity and natural habitats. (see Sarkar, 1992).Deep connection and sense of interrelatedness of all species; humans learn to live in balance with the ecosystem and practice  reciprocity. All     living beings accorded moral standing and rights.Integration of modern science/technology and ancient wisdom and indigenous perspectives. Epistemological pluralism. Elimination of dogma.Knowledge balanced between introversial and extroversial. Schools take on new role as centers of resource, connections, healing, community building, mentorship. Self-organizing learning groups form around real life problems and issues. Eco-versities. Decolonizing pedagogies.Transformative, new understanding of human potential and the cosmic dimensions of individual life. Pragmatism and contemplative practice exist in mutual harmony (subjective approach/objective adjustment); intuition and rationality complement each other.

Scenario 3 is not a pipe dream.  In this present crisis, multitudes of people are acting selflessly to care for others and serve the greater good. Heroic health workers are struggling to mitigate suffering without adequate resources. Teachers are working to reinvent schooling so that children might stay connected to their peers and engaged in learning.  Regular folk creating mutual aid societies, ensuring that those who are sick, disabled, or elderly are not forgotten. In many places, small organic farms are beginning to supply much of the local food. Young people are inclined towards egalitarian socio-economic formations, and they are willing to challenge the status quo and struggle for the future of their planet. People the world over are awakening to spiritual wisdom.  We are making the road by walking.

 The world right now is in a state of chaos – a “far-from-equilibrium” state.  Chaos is unpredictable and destabilizing, and small inputs can have huge effects, illustrated by the compelling image of the fluttering wings of the butterfly in the Amazon, causing a cyclone in China.

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But chaos theory also teaches us that systems re-organize, often in surprising new ways.  A far-from-equilibrium state is a liminal space; liminality is described by one author as “the sacred space where the old world is able to fall apart, and a bigger world is revealed.” (Rohr, 1999). Will we find the courage to allow this dissolution, in order to make way for the world we hope to create?  Or will we eagerly seek the status quo, business as usual, or worse, regress into barbarism? I believe that we are in the thick of what may come to be understood as the “great transition” – the death of an old era and the birth of the new. Such a birth is not accomplished painlessly, but with extraordinary labor. Those of us who share the values of Scenario 3, who hold a Neohumanist vision of human potential and a social vision of a just, ecological and joyful Earth home (PROUT) share a responsibility to be midwives to this birth. Systems demand that we evolve and adapt. The butterfly effect reminds us that small actions can have big impacts.  Our small collective actions, mindfully taken, could have important collective impacts, so let us proceed with Scenario 3 as consciously and compassionately as we can.

About the Author

Kathleen Kesson is Professor Emerita, LIU-Brooklyn, and is the former Director of the John Dewey Project on Progressive Education at the University of Vermont and Director of Education at Goddard College. She currently lives in Barre, Vermont and is actively engaged in the work to make Vermont schools more equitable, sustainable, and joyful. Her latest book is Unschooling in Paradise.  You can read other writings by her as well as an excerpt from this book at https://www.kathleenkesson.com

References:

Moore, J. (2016). Anthropocene or capital scene? Nature, history, and the crisis of capitalism. Oakland, CA: PM Press.

Rohr, R. (1999). Everything belongs: The gift of contemplative prayer—  The Crossroad Publishing Company.

Sarkar, P.R. (1992). Proutist Economics: Discourses on economic liberation. Kolkata, India: Ananda Marga Pracaraka Samgha

Sarkar, P.R. (1999). The liberation of intellect: Neo-Humanism. 4th edition. Ananda Nagar; Kolkata: Ananda Marga Publications.

Beyond the absence of war: Pathways to peace in the Anthropocene

In a world increasingly defined by climate disruption, biodiversity loss, rising inequality and the accelerating risks of AI and emerging technologies, The Club of Rome is calling for a fundamental rethinking of what peace means today. Its new paper, Planetary Peace for Human Security: Responses to Existential Risks in the Anthropocene, introduces a bold new paradigm, one that moves beyond the outdated notion of peace as merely the absence of war.

With 56 armed conflicts currently active, global military spending exceeding $2.3 trillion and the escalating threats of AI-driven warfare and climate collapse, the report asserts that traditional, war-centric models of peace are dangerously obsolete. In many cases, the very systems designed to promote peace instead reinforce entrenched power imbalances and exacerbate tensions.

At the heart of the report lies the concept of planetary peace, a dynamic, regenerative force rooted in justice, sustainability and global cooperation. Rather than addressing the symptoms of insecurity, this vision targets its structural causes: ecological degradation, extractive and exploitative economic systems, technological misuse and the enduring legacies of colonialism.

“Planetary peace invites us to redefine security for a world of deep interdependence,” says Paul Shrivastava, co-author and co-president of The Club of Rome. “It’s about creating the conditions for people, communities and ecosystems to thrive, not just survive. This is an opportunity to replace fear with trust, competition with collaboration and extraction with regeneration.”

The report positions peace as an active, systems-based process that centres the wellbeing of people, planet and future generations. It calls for long-term global cooperation that prioritises regeneration over depletion, equity over domination and collective flourishing over individual gain.

This vision also emphasises the essential roles of youth leadership, intergenerational dialogue and the integration of diverse knowledge systems, including science, indigenous wisdom and systems thinking, in shaping sustainable and peaceful futures.

“Planetary peace is not just about avoiding conflict,” adds co-author and Secretary General of The Club of Rome, Carlos Álvarez Pereira. “It’s about creating the conditions for people and planet to flourish together, through just economies, inclusive governance and a renewed relationship with the Earth.” 

The report argues that the current peace architecture, largely shaped by a few dominant powers in the post-World War II era, is no longer fit for purpose. A post-hegemonic, pluriversal future is needed, one that embraces diverse worldviews, rebalances global power structures and cultivates harmony between humanity and nature.

The report Planetary Peace for Human Security: Responses to Existential Risks in the Anthropocene provides suggestions for how to catalyse holistic transformation across economic, political, cultural and technological systems in service of planetary peace, and the authors invite governments, civil society, business, academia and young people to join this initiative to co-create a world where peace is not only possible, but essential.

Momentum is already building through collaborations with partners such as the Elders for Peace, the World Academy of Art and Science and Kyung Hee University. These alliances bring together expertise in peace diplomacy, education and systems thinking, reflecting a shared commitment to tackling existential risks and creating the conditions for a regenerative, peaceful future.

Download the report

Impacts of agrisolar co-location on the food–energy–water nexus and economic security

Nature Sustainability volume 8, pages 702–713 (2025)

Abstract

Understanding how solar PV installations affect the landscape and its critical resources is crucial to achieve sustainable net-zero energy production. To enhance this understanding, we investigate the consequences of converting agricultural fields to solar photovoltaic installations, which we refer to as ‘agrisolar’ co-location. We present a food, energy, water and economic impact analysis of agricultural output offset by agrisolar co-location for 925 arrays (2.53 GWp covering 3,930 ha) spanning the California Central Valley. We find that agrisolar co-location displaces food production but increases economic security and water sustainability for farmers. Given the unprecedented pace of solar PV expansion globally, these results highlight the need for a deeper understanding of the multifaceted outcomes of agricultural and solar PV co-location decisions.

Main

Climate change threatens our finite food, energy and water (FEW) resources. To address these threats by transitioning towards net-zero carbon emissions energy systems, new energy installations should be designed while considering effects on the complete FEW nexus. The rapid expansion of solar photovoltaic (PV) electricity generation is a key part of the solution that will need to grow more than tenfold in the United States (US) by 2050 to meet net-zero goals1. However, solar PV expansion presents threats to agricultural production due to its land-use intensity and potential in croplands2. A considerable portion of ground-mounted solar PV facilities in the US are installed in agricultural settings3,4,5. Yet regions with high solar breakthrough, such as the California Central Valley (CCV), are often among the most valuable and productive agricultural land in the US3,5,6. It is not yet clear how the current solar PV landscape affects agricultural security, much less under 2050 net-zero expansion. Here we quantify both the agricultural offsets of solar PV land-use change and the decision-making processes behind these transitions for existing solar PV arrays in agriculture.

Competition between solar PV and agricultural land uses has led to various co-location methods where installations are sited, designed and managed to optimize landscape productivity across a wide range of ecological and anthropogenic services7. This approach differs from conventional solar PV deployment, which is often installed and managed primarily for electricity output and reduced maintenance7. Emerging concepts such as techno-ecological synergies (TES)8 and more recently, ecovoltaics7, encompass a wide range of co-location strategies enabling renewable energy installations to serve multiple productive ecosystem services. Agricultural production and solar PV can be laterally integrated (agrisolar co-location)9 or directly share land and photons via vertical integration (agrivoltaic co-location)10,11.

Agrivoltaic co-location involves the direct integration of solar and agriculture (crops or grazing) or ecosystem services (pollinator habitat, native vegetation) within the boundaries of solar infrastructure11. The earliest technical standardization, originating from Germany, specifies that this can occur under or between system rows, but not adjacent to, while agricultural yield losses are reduced to less than one-third of reference (without solar PV) yields10. Effective agrivoltaic management can improve agricultural yield, microclimate regulation, soil moisture retention, nutrient cycling and farmer profitability, while enhancing public acceptance12,13,14,15. Thus, agrivoltaic co-location can address the agricultural competition concerns created by solar PV expansion.

The term agrisolar is more broadly defined (modified from SolarPower Europe9), as the integration and co-management of solar photovoltaics, agriculture and ecosystem services within agroenergy landscapes, explicitly considering the trade-offs and co-benefits of agricultural, environmental and socio-economic objectives. Thus defined, agrisolar practices align with TES and ecovoltaic principles and encompass both coincident (‘agrivoltaic co-location’) and adjacent co-location where agricultural land is replaced (hereafter ‘agrisolar co-location’)11,16. However, replacing agricultural land with solar PV (‘adjacent agrisolar’) without implementing agrivoltaic management has historically been considered conventional solar and thus excluded from co-location research because agricultural production is ceased on site10. There is some evidence, however, that converting portions of agricultural fields to solar PV in water-stressed regions can also provide water and economic benefits that enhance agricultural security despite food production losses17,18. Adjacent agrisolar replacement appears to be the dominant practice, with recent work showing that there have been relatively few documented agrivoltaic installations compared to total solar PV deployment in agriculture in the CCV5,19. Because agrisolar practices are understudied relative to literature on other forms of co-location14,20, there is a need to assess regional resource outcomes for most existing solar PV installations and consequences for lost food production without agrivoltaic management. Conceptual examples of solar PV co-location are shown in Fig. 1.

figure 1
Fig. 1: Conceptual diagram of trade-offs and co-benefits with agrisolar, agrivoltaic and ecovoltaic co-location.

We argue that by enhancing water, energy and economic security, transitioning farm fields to solar PV installations can be considered adjacent agrisolar management in water-stressed regions. Here security is the capacity of a farmer to maintain or improve their financial well-being, operational resilience and access to essential resources, such as water and energy, while preserving the integrity and future of their agricultural practices. We assess the FEW security effects of these agrisolar PV installations across the CCV through 2018 and estimate the economic potential of those arrays throughout a 25-year operational-phase lifespan. We compute landowner cash flow including net energy metering (NEM) for commercial-scale PV installations and land leases for larger utility-scale arrays. All resource and economic effects are referenced to a counterfactual business-as-usual scenario with no solar PV installation, assuming continued agricultural production and operation on the same plot of land. The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the lifespan FEW and economic impacts of existing agrisolar arrays in the CCV. Rather than projecting future installations or policies, we report on the existing agrisolar placement, design and policy practices to inform future practices on a per-hectare basis, tailored to regional needs. We also highlight the need for, and opportunities within, additional research into agrisolar practices.

Results

Commercial- and utility-scale agrisolar arrays in CCV

We assembled a comprehensive dataset of agriculturally co-located solar PV installations within the CCV through 2018. We identified 925 solar PV arrays installed between 2008 and 2018, with an estimated capacity of 2,524 MWp on 3,930 ha of recently converted agricultural land. The estimated array capacity of each individual array ranged from 19 kWp to 97 MWp. A temporal synthesis of the input solar PV dataset, separated by array scale, is shown in Fig. 2b,c. The smaller commercial-scale arrays are roughly twice as common, yet account for one-tenth of the installed capacity and converted land area of utility-scale arrays. Note that commercial-scale arrays are predominantly fixed axis, whereas utility-scale arrays are more frequently single-axis tracking systems. There are also notable peaks in the number of installations for both array scales in 2016, potentially in response to the NEM 2.0 legislation timeline21. While there is some spatial clustering of converted crop types (Fig. 2a), converted crops were widely distributed across the CCV.

figure 2
Fig. 2: Study area and characterization of ground-mounted agrisolar PV installations.

Offset food and nutritional production

The 925 agriculturally co-located arrays displaced 3,930 ha of cropland, which is ~0.10% of the CCV active agricultural land22. In the baseline scenario (Methods provide scenario details), nutritional loss was 0.16 trillion kcal (Tkcal) and 1.41 Tkcal foregone by commercial- and utility-scale arrays, respectively (Fig. 3). The total, 1.57 Tkcal, is equivalent to the caloric intake of ~86,000 people for 25 years (solar lifespan), assuming a 2,000 kcal d–1 diet. The nutritional footprint of commercial-scale arrays (−21.2 million kcal (Mkcal) ha–1 yr–1) was greater than utility-scale arrays (−15.6 Mkcal ha–1 yr–1) and the total impact was primarily composed of grain (58%), orchard crops (21%) and vegetables (10%). Utility-scale arrays displaced the nutritional value of grain (60%) hay/pasture (16%) and vegetables (10%). Note that for displaced kcal production of hay/pasture, contribution was negligible despite dominating the converted area due to inefficient caloric conversion to human nutrition for feed and silage crops. Resource footprint, total lifespan impact and crop contribution is shown in Fig. 3. Cumulative resource impacts across the region through time are available in Supplementary Fig. 1.

figure 3
Fig. 3: Lifespan land use, food loss, electricity production and potential irrigation electricity offset and potential water conservation with agrisolar co-location in California’s Central Valley.

Electricity production and consumption

We modelled the annual electricity generation for each array and offset irrigation electricity demand. Total cumulative electricity generation for these identified arrays by 2042 was projected to be 10 TWh for commercial-scale arrays and 113 TWh for utility-scale arrays. The potential electricity saved by not irrigating converted land was 11 GWh and 146 GWh for commercial- and utility-scale arrays, respectively. Note that this was three orders of magnitude less than the total electricity generation. For reference, the total lifespan impact of electricity production and potential irrigation electricity offset ( ~ 124 TWh) could power ~466,000 US households for 25 years (assuming 10.6 MWh yr–1 per household).

Changes in water use

Most (74%) agriculturally co-located arrays in the CCV replaced irrigated croplands. On the basis of the business-as-usual change in total water-use budget (considering irrigation water-use offset and operation and maintenance—O&M water use), we estimate that agrisolar co-location in the region would reduce water use by 5.46 thousand m3 ha–1 yr–1 (total: 42.1 million m3) and 6.02 thousand m3 ha–1 yr–1 (total: 544 million m3) over the 25-year period for commercial- and utility-scale arrays, respectively. This could supply ~27 million people with drinking water (assuming 2.4 liters per person per day) or irrigate 3,000 hectares of orchards for 25 years. O&M water use on previously irrigated land was ~eight times less than irrigated crops—if offset irrigation water were conserved rather than redistributed. Irrigated crops that contributed the most to the offset irrigation water use were orchards (29%), hay/pasture (28%) and grain (27%) for commercial-scale installations and grain (37%), hay/pasture 31%), cotton (15%) for utility-scale installations.

Agricultural landowner cash flow

Adjacent agrisolar co-location is more profitable than the baseline agriculture-only scenario, regardless of how landowners are compensated (Fig. 4). For commercial-scale arrays, agrisolar landowners experience early losses from installation expenditure (−US$53,000 ha–1 yr–1). However, the lifespan cash flow was dominated by NEM, offset electricity costs and surplus generation sold back to the grid, resulting in a net positive economic footprint of US$124,000 ha–1 yr–1, 25 times greater returns than lost food revenue (−US$4,920 ha–1 yr–1). The resulting economic payback period was 5.2 years (best- and worst-case payback in 2.9 and 8.9 years respectively; Supplementary Fig. 2).

figure 4
Fig. 4: Lifespan economic footprint of commercial- and utility-scale agrisolar co-location.

The net economic footprint for utility-scale agrisolar landowners (US$2,690 ha–1 yr–1) was 46 times less than the commercial-scale footprint (Fig. 4b). In contrast to commercial-scale arrays, utility-scale agrisolar landowners were not responsible for installation or O&M costs but still lost food revenue (−US$3,330 ha–1 yr–1) and were only compensated by land lease (US$1,940 ha–1 yr–1) and offset operational (US$3,830 ha–1 yr–1) and irrigation water-use costs (US$220 ha–1 yr–1). In the worst-case scenario, the total budget was negative (−US$432 ha–1 yr–1), suggesting that some landowners could lose revenue. There was no payback period for utility-scale agrisolar landowners because the net economic budget was always positive (baseline and best-case scenario) or always negative (worst-case scenario). Cumulative economic impacts across the region in Supplementary Fig. 3.

On average, estimated foregone farm operation costs exceeded forgone food revenue (Fig. 4). While this may be affected by reporting differences in agricultural revenue and farm operation cost sources, agricultural margins are known to be small, or negative, for certain croplands (for example, pastureland), with margins likely to decrease further under future climate change and water availability scenarios23. For commercial-scale installations, cutting farm operation costs in half (highly conservative) resulted in a longer economic payback period of just a month. Cutting offset farm operation costs in half for utility-scale installations did not affect economic payback or the always-positive baseline and best-case budget.

Discussion

The effect of agrisolar co-location on food production

We found that displacing agricultural land with solar PV locally reduced crop production ( ~ 1.57 Tkcal), which may affect county- and state-level food flows. Fortunately, on national and global scales, food production occurs within a market where reduced production in one location creates price signals that can stimulate production elsewhere. For example, high demand and increased irrigation pumping costs in the CCV have resulted in higher prices received for specialty orchard crops. Thus, farmers have elected to switch from cereal and grain crops to specialty crops24. Solar PV is also far more energy dense per unit of land than growing crops to produce biofuels18—a practice common across large swaths of agricultural farmland in the US and elsewhere. We show that conversion of feed, silage and biofuel croplands provides high irrigation water-use offsets while minimizing nutritional impacts due to the low or non-existent caloric conversion efficiencies of these crops (Fig. 3). Though, considering food waste and a lack of crop-specific nutritional-quality knowledge, we cannot evaluate end-point impacts of reported foregone kcal (calories) on human diets and health25.

California produces 99% of many of the nation’s specialty fruit and nut orchard crops (for example, almonds, walnuts, peaches, olives)26. Fields producing these crops were commonly converted to solar PV (270 ha of orchard crops), and it may be difficult to shift production of these crops to other locations due to their intensive water footprint, climate sensitivity and time to production27,28. Altering global supply of these crops could lead to food price increases similar to biofuel land-use changes29 with agricultural markets taking time to compensate30. We found that these nutritionally dense, valuable and operationally costly crops are more commonly replaced by commercial-scale rather than utility-scale installations, resulting in a higher nutritional footprint at the site scale (Fig. 3). However, due to their smaller arrays size (Fig. 2), these arrays have a lower regional lifespan nutritional impact. The total solar PV area we consider (the area covered by panels and space between them) does not account for total cropland transformation by all solar energy infrastructure. Thus, total cropland area converted and associated caloric losses may be underestimated by up to 25%. We conducted a sensitivity analysis on this potential area bias for all area-based metrics and discuss the details of this underestimate in Supplementary Discussion.

Global food needs are projected to double by 205031,32. To meet these needs, yield per unit area must increase, agricultural land area under production must increase and/or food waste and inefficiency must be reduced. Reducing waste is feasible but requires a considerable change in dietary preferences33 and supply chain pathways34. Yield increases alone are unlikely to meet these needs31 and half of global habitable land is already agricultural35. Cultivated lands are facing additional pressures due to soil quality deterioration, aridification, water availability, urban growth and threats to global biodiversity that will be exacerbated under a changing climate36,37,38,39. Given these pressures on arable land, cropland selection for future agrisolar co-location, both commercial- and utility-scale, should be assessed at local, regional, national and international scales to maintain food availability and security.

Water security potential with agrisolar co-location

Here we show that solar PV installations preferentially displace irrigated land in the CCV (3,310 ha and 74% of co-located installations). Displacing this irrigated cropland enhances farmer cash flow while probably reducing overall water use by 5.46 and 6.02 thousand m3 ha–1 yr–1 for commercial- and utility-scale arrays, respectively. The total displaced irrigation water use was eight times the O&M use for those arrays. Thus, installing solar PV in water-scarce regions has substantial potential to reduce water use, which bolsters findings from previous studies17,18,40,41. This analysis does not incorporate the additional hydrologic effects of modifying surface energy and water budgets, including reducing evapotranspiration and the potential for increased groundwater recharge42,43.

Given that the cash flow benefits from utility-scale agrisolar co-location are relatively small, we evaluated how water-use limitations may be a factor in farmland conversion decisions. We hypothesize that fallowing land is largely a consequence of water shortages in the CCV24,40, thus fallowing land proximal to an array (within 100 metres) may indicate an emergent agrisolar practice: intentional fallowing and irrigation water-use offset adjacent to arrays supported by revenue from the array. Each array was coded by the adjacent crop type before and post installation of the array. While we cannot know what landowners would have done with the array acreage absent the installation, this analysis provides evidence of broader land-use trends that might have been driving decisions. The transition of array acreage from before proximal post-installation land use for utility-scale arrays is displayed in Fig. 5.

figure 5
Fig. 5: Land-use change adjacent to utility-scale solar PV installations on previously irrigated cropland in the CCV.

Understanding how economic incentives affect the replacement of valuable cropland with solar PV is essential to inform future energy landscape models and policies. Here we examined the transition to post-solar installation fallowing in adjacent irrigated cropland (Fig. 5). We observed fallowing of adjacent irrigated cropland at 58 utility-scale installations totalling 658 MWp and 968 ha (27% of utility-scale area) composed of 410 ha of grain, 250 ha of hay and pasture, 225 of orchards, grapes and vegetables and 82 ha of cotton and other crops. The direct area of these arrays (968 ha) can be linked to a potential irrigation water-use offset of 195 million m3 over 25 years. If these arrays were on-farm plots of average size, 14,000 ha of fallowed land adjacent to these 58 arrays could displace an additional 120 million m3 of irrigation water use, each year, or 3,000 million m3 over 25 years (Supplementary Methods). Thus, if landowners choose to fallow farmland adjacent to leased land for utility-scale arrays, the water-use reductions are greatly amplified. We discuss several important limitations44 of the Cropland Data Layer (CDL) regarding this analysis in Supplementary Discussion.

Intensely irrigated cropland in the CCV is vulnerable to drought, especially in southern basins that rely heavily on surface-water deliveries due to limited groundwater availability45. The California Budget Act of 2021 provides financial support for fallowing to motivate farmers to reduce water use46. Whereas fallowing land can help mitigate some hydrological problems, removing production can also result in large agricultural revenue losses47. Converting land with solar electricity production, rather than simply fallowing could reduce risks to farmers while enhancing financial security17, especially during periods of extreme drought40. Whereas this has implications for future installations, we show that farmers already appear to be practicing solar fallowing, probably resulting in long-term irrigation water-use reductions.

We acknowledge the potential issues in assuming that foregone irrigation water use due to solar PV installations was conserved rather than redistributed. However, a portion of this potential offset is probably real given three observations: (1) utility-scale installations correlate with newly fallowed land, which was not observed for commercial-scale arrays; (2) the 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA)48 requires water-use reductions by the 2040s and (3) agriculturally co-located solar PV maintains Williamston Act Status under the Solar-Use Easement49 (which has recently been revived50), a California tax incentive common in irrigated lands highly suitable for solar51. In our dataset, 46% of utility-scale installations and 58% of commercial-scale installations were completed after SGMA was enacted (Fig. 2b,c). We also performed a sensitivity analysis where only 50% of irrigation water-use offset was conserved rather than redistributed, which still resulted in an estimated US$9 million and 246 million m3 conserved due to the regional change in water use from just direct area converted (Supplementary Discussion).

Given this potential for water-use offset, solar fallowing for water-use reduction presents an opportunity for incentivized solutions that are already of interest to landowning farmers in the region17. With suitable solar area in the CCV exceeding projected fallowing acreage to comply with SGMA51, implementing agrisolar co-location policies and incentives such as these could promote complementary land uses and enhance public support15.

Achieving economic security across return structures

Regardless of scale and related financial benefits, farmers are switching away from cultivating crops to cultivating electricity. This study empirically demonstrates that both NEM and land-lease incentive structures have been viable frameworks for PV deployment in some of the most valuable cropland in the US6. Critically, we incorporate farm-specific agricultural dynamics across a region (offset farm operation costs, irrigation costs and food revenue) into economic considerations for replacing cropland with solar.

By including these revenues and costs, this study clearly demonstrates the strong economic incentives to replace cropland with commercial-scale arrays (Fig. 4a). Under the grandfathered NEM 1.0 and 2.0 agreements, commercial-scale agrisolar landowners enhanced financial security by 25 times lost food revenue over the lifetime of the array, while simultaneously reducing water use. The resulting total net revenue, US$124,000 ha–1 yr–1, is potentially underestimated because post-lifespan module replacement, resale or continued use is likely, and property values could increase (terminal value) compared to the reference scenario. We also have not considered several programmes, credits and incentives (for example, Rural Energy for America Program) that could enhance net revenue (Supplementary Discussion). However, these returns are not unlimited due to NEM capacity limitations (<1 MWp) and requirements to size the installation below annual on-farm load21.

Renewable energy policy evolves quickly, shifting incentives for new customer generators. Whereas climate change and decreasing water availability in the coming decades23 will probably increase financial motivation to install solar in agriculture, future adoption and the co-benefits reported here will also depend on new business models for grid pricing52. Pricing structures have already and will inevitably continue to change as utilities, regulators and grid customers adapt to distributed renewable generation, avoid curtailment and avoid the utility death spiral52. Although future installations and policy are not the focus of this study, the newest policy, NEM 3.0, substantially reduces compensation for surplus generation and limits options for multiple metered connections53, probably requiring future installations to add battery storage and other measures to maintain similar profitability54. However, this study considers solar arrays that are grandfathered into their respective NEM 1.0 and 2.0 agreements. Additionally, our estimated load contributions suggest that revenue reported here mostly originates from offset demand rather than credit for surplus generation (Supplementary Notes and Supplementary Discussion). The bottom line is that owning solar PV, offsetting annual on-farm electric load and selling surplus electricity back to the utility under NEM 1.0 and 2.0 has increased economic and energy security for farmers with existing arrays and has probably promoted water-use reductions in the region. Importantly, we also assumed that all decisions were made by and returns received by landowning or partial-owning farmers. We do not have access to land-ownership data for the CCV, but nearly 40% of agricultural land in the region is rented or leased55.

Utility-scale land-lease rates alone do not offset lost agricultural revenue. However, including offset farm operation costs results in a substantially lower but still profitable agrisolar economic footprint with no major up-front capital investment (Fig. 4b). In water-scarce regions, particularly where water-use reduction is required, the smaller returns from utility-scale agrisolar practices and potentially related fallowing of land may be more attractive than continued cultivation under water-supply uncertainty17. Thus, without profitable compensation, agrivoltaic practices may not be feasible if offset operational costs and water-use reductions are driving utility-scale agrisolar decision making. We also omit some agricultural dynamics (such as the environmental benefits of carbon reduction), which could reinforce resource and economic security for both commercial- and utility-scale installation (Supplementary Discussion).

Opportunities for agrisolar research

Whereas funding and incentives for co-location research have expanded rapidly in recent years, we advocate extending these to agrisolar co-location. Adjacent agrisolar replacement with barren or unused ground cover still falls short of the full potential of ecovoltaic and agrivoltaic multifunctionality7,9,10,11. However, the regional resource and economic co-benefits of replacing irrigated land in water-stressed regions with solar PV here cannot be ignored. These findings are also immediately relevant to the Protecting Future Farmland Act of 202356, which set out a goal to better understand the multifaceted impacts of installed solar on US agricultural land. We discuss additional placement and management decisions that fall under the umbrella of agrisolar co-location in Supplementary Discussion.

We have shown that the goal of co-location, to enhance synergies between the co-production of agriculture and/or other ecosystem services and net-zero electricity production, is at least partially achievable with agrisolar co-location. Broader agrisolar research may also expose the consequences of not widely adopting agrivoltaics to retain agricultural production and protect food security. Given the ecosystem service benefits reported here, there may be an opportunity to broaden the scope of co-location research and incentives to include agrisolar co-location practices defined here.

Methods

Identifying agrisolar PV arrays across the CCV

We used remotely sensed imagery of existing solar PV arrays and geographic information system (GIS) datasets to develop a comprehensive and publicly available dataset of ground-mounted arrays co-located with agriculture in the CCV through 2018. We extracted all existing non-residential arrays from two geodatabases (Kruitwagen et al.4,57 and Stid et al.5,58) within the bounds of the CCV alluvial boundary59. We removed duplicate arrays and applied temporal segmentation methods described in Stid et al.5 to assign an installation year for Kruitwagen et al.4 arrays. We acquired Kruitwagen et al.4 panel area within array bounds by National Agriculture Imagery Program imagery pixel area with solar PV spectral index ranges suggested in Stid et al.5 and removed commissions (reported array shapes with no panels). We then removed arrays with >70% overlap with building footprints60 to retain only ground-mounted installations. Finally, overlaying historical CDL crop maps with new array shapes, we removed arrays in areas with majority non-agricultural land cover the year before installation (Supplementary Fig. 4 and Supplementary Discussion).

The resulting dataset (925 agrisolar co-located arrays) included 686 ground-mounted arrays from Stid et al.5 plus 239 from Kruitwagen et al.4. For these sites, we calculated array peak capacity (kWp) by61:

(1)

where  is the total direct area of PV panels in m2,  is the average efficiency of installed PV modules during the array installation year62 (Supplementary Fig. 5) and  is the irradiance at standard test conditions (kW m–2). Arrays were split into ‘Commercial-’ (<1 MWp) and ‘Utility-’ (≥1 MWp) scale arrays following the California Public Utility Commission NEM capacity guidelines63.

Scenario summary and assumptions

We computed annual FEW resource and economic values for each ground-mounted agrisolar PV array identified across the CCV for four scenarios: (1) reference, business as usual with no solar PV installation and continued agricultural production on the same plot of land, (2) baseline, agrisolar PV installation with moderate assumptions related to each component of the analysis, (3) worst case, PV installation with high negative and low positive effects for each component, (4) best case, similar but opposite of the worst-case scenario. We compare baseline to the reference scenario to estimate the most likely FEW and economic effects and use the differences between best- and worst-case scenarios to estimate uncertainty. Supplementary Tables 2 and 3 provide an overview of scenarios for each resource and Supplementary Tables 4 and 5 for baseline agrisolar lifespan FEW resource and economic value outcomes, respectively.

Identified arrays were installed between 2008 and 2018 and were assumed to have a 25-year lifespan for arrays due to performance, warranties, module degradation and standards for electrical equipment64,65. We assumed that land-use change effects ceased following 25 years of operation to simplify assumptions about module replacement, resale or continued use. We then summarized the FEW and economic effects of all arrays across the CCV and divided our temporal analysis into three phases: (1) addition (2008–2018) where arrays were arrays were being installed across the CCV, (2) constant (2019–2032) with no array additions but all arrays installed by 2018 are operating and maintained and (3) removal (2032–2042), where arrays are removed after 25 years of operation.

We performed several sensitivity analyses to address limitations in the available data and methods and to show how changes in future policy (NEM) could affect incentives displayed here. Sensitivity analysis included the capacity cut-off between commercial- and utility-scale (5 MW), solar PV lifespan (15 and 50 years), nominal discount rate (3%, 7% and 10%), solar PV direct area bias (proportional direct to total infrastructure area and a uniform perimeter buffer) and irrigation redistribution (assuming 50% of irrigation water-use offset is redistributed rather than conserved), all else equal (Supplementary Discussion and Supplementary Tables 620). We discuss additional assumptions and limitations in Supplementary Discussion.

Displaced crop and food production

Replacing fields (or portions thereof) with solar PV arrays affects crop production by (1) lost production of food, fibre and fuels and (2) reduced revenue from crop sales. We simplify the complex effects of lost production and include solely the foregone calories through both direct and indirect human consumption, which is justified because CCV crop production is largely oriented towards food crops. Future analyses could evaluate the lost fibre (primarily via cotton) or fuel (via biofuel refining) production.

We evaluated the economic and food production effects of displaced crops through a crop-specific opportunity cost assessment of land-use change, incorporating actual reported; yields, revenue, caloric density and regionally constrained caloric conversion efficiencies for feed/silage and seed oil crops. All crop type information was derived from the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) CDL22 for the array area in both prior- and post-installation years (Supplementary Fig. 4 and Supplementary Methods provide the adjacent fallowed land analysis). Each array was assigned a majority previous crop from the spatially weighted means of crop types within the array area for the five years before the installation.

We converted all eligible crop types to kcal (also called calorie) for human consumption after Heller et al.25. Foregone food production ( in kcal) following PV installation was then defined for each array as:

(2)

where  is in kcal kg–1,  is in kg m–2 and  of each array in m2. Crop-specific caloric density data (kcal kg–1) were derived from the USDA FoodData Central April 2022 release66. FoodData food descriptions and nutrient data were joined and CDL specific crop groupings were made through a workflow described in Supplementary Fig. 6. Crop-specific yield data (kg m–2) were derived from the USDA NASS Agricultural Yield Surveys67. State-level (California) yield data were processed similarly, with missing crop data filled based on national average yields. We used caloric conversion efficiencies for feed, silage or oil crop to account for crop production that humans do not directly consume.

For each array, we calculated annual revenue of forgone crop production in real (inflation adjusted) dollars, calculated by:

(3)

where  is in US$ kg–1,  is in kg m–2 and  of each array in m2. We used the annual ‘price received’ for all crops in the USDA NASS Monthly Agricultural Prices Report for 2008 through 201868. For the baseline case, we assumed that food prices will scale directly with electricity prices through 2042 given that they respond to similar inflationary forces69. Supplementary Fig. 6 and Supplementary Methods provide a more complete workflow including best- and worst-case scenario assumptions.

Change in irrigation water use and cost savings

Irrigation water use can only be offset by agrisolar co-location if the prior land use was irrigated. The presence of irrigation was inferred from the Landsat-based Irrigation Dataset (LanID) map for the year before installation70,71 (Supplementary Fig. 4). If the array area contained irrigated pixels, then we assumed the cropland area and all respective crops within the rotation were irrigated.

We calculated the total forgone irrigation water use ( in m3) by:

(4)

where  in m is the crop-specific irrigation depth,  in m3 is the annual county-level irrigation water-use estimate and  in m3 is the county-level irrigation water-use estimate for the respective survey year irrigation depths.

We estimated annual crop-specific county-level irrigated depths from survey and climate datasets for each array. Crop-specific irrigation depths () were taken from the 2013 USDA Farm and Ranch Survey72 and 2018 Irrigation and Water Management Survey73, and logical crop groupings were applied (for example, almonds, pistachios, pecans, oranges and peaches were considered orchard crops). Because irrigation depths depend on the total precipitation in each survey year, we used multilinear regression to build annual county-level irrigation water-use estimates () from five-year US Geological Survey (USGS) water use74, gridMET growing season average precipitation75, with year as a dummy variable to incorporate temporal changes in irrigation technologies and practices. For the installation phase (2008 to 2018), these depths varied based on historical climate and survey data, whereas the projection phases (constant and removal) used a scenario-dependent moderate, wet (worst-case, least water savings) or dry (best case, most water savings) year estimate from the historical record (discussed in Supplementary Methods).

Assigning an economic value to water use is difficult and varies based on the temporally changing supply and demand76. We calculated the economic value of the change in water use (Water in real US$) to the farmer by:

(5)

where  (m3) is the offset irrigation water use for the co-located crop minus O&M projected water use,  (MWh m–3) is the irrigation electricity required to irrigate the co-located crop given local depth to water and drawdown estimates from McCarthy et al.77,  (US$ MWh–1) is the utility-specific (commercial-scale) or regional average (utility-scale) annual price of electricity based on the electricity returns and modelled electricity generation described in Supplementary Methods and  is a CCV-wide average water right contract rate of ~ US$0.03 m–3 (ref. 78). Here we assume that water (and thus energy) otherwise used for irrigation was truly foregone and not redistributed elsewhere within or outside the farm. Change in O&M water use was based on Klise et al.79 reported values, described in Supplementary Methods.

Electricity production, offset and revenue

Installing solar PV in fields has three benefits: (1) production of electricity by the newly installed solar PV array, (2) reduction in energy demand due to reduced water use and field activities and (3) revenue generation via net energy metering (NEM) or land lease. Here we assume that on-farm electricity demand is dominated by electricity used for irrigation and ignore offset energy (embodied) used for fuel.

We modelled electricity generation for each array using the pvlib python module developed by SANDIA National Laboratory80. Weather file inputs for pvlib were downloaded from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) National Solar Radiation Database81. We also estimated annual on-farm load to differentiate offset electricity use and surplus generation. Not only is electricity generated by the arrays, but electricity consumption is foregone for each array due to not irrigating the array area. The annual change in electricity consumption due to water use ( in GWh) is calculated by:

(6)

where  is the county-level rates for irrigation electricity demand in GWh m–3 and  is the change in water use in m3 from equation (5). County-level electricity requirements to irrigate were calculated using irrigation electricity demand methods described in McCarthy et al.77 modified with a CCV-specific depth to water (piezometric surface) product for the spring (pre-growing season) of 201882.

Revenue from electricity generation was calculated separately for each array depending on array size and the installation year. Commercial-scale arrays (<1 MW) were assumed to operate under an NEM 1.0 if installed before 2017 and NEM 2.0 if installed later, which allows for interconnection to offset on-farm load and compensation for surplus electricity generation (Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Table 21). Thus, for commercial-scale arrays, annual cash flow from solar PV (NEM in US$) is calculated as:

(7)

where  is real US$ saved by offsetting annual on-farm electric load and  is real US$ earned by surplus PV electricity generation sold to the utility under NEM guidelines. Both  and  are estimated based on pvlib modelled electricity generation and valued at the historical utility-specific energy charge retail rates. Historical energy charges are available either through utility reports83,84,85 or the US Utility Rate Database via OpenEI86. We made several assumptions that resulted in omission of fixed charges including transmission and interconnection costs from the analysis. Details about electricity rates and omitted charges are summarized in Supplementary Methods.

For utility-scale arrays (≥1 MW), annual revenue from agrisolar co-location (Lease in US$) was assumed to be given by:

(8)

where Lease is the economic value estimated to be paid to the farmer by the utility for leasing their land in US$ m–2 and Area of each array in m2.

We assumed commercial-scale arrays installed before 2017 were grandfathered into NEM 1.0 guidelines for the duration of their lifespan. However, arrays installed in 2017 and 2018 fall under NEM 2.0 guidelines which include a US$0.03 kWh–1 non-bypassable charge removed from 21,87,88. Annual on-farm operational load was estimated and distributed across the year based on reported California agricultural contingency profiles89 and Census of Agriculture county-level average farm sizes90,91,92 (Supplementary Figs. 7 and 8 and Supplementary Methods). With distributed hourly load estimations and modelled solar PV electricity generation, we delineated electricity and revenue contributing to annual load () from surplus electricity and revenue that would have been sold back to the grid and credited via NEM ().

Future electricity revenue was projected using 2018 conditions (contribution to annual load, to surplus) and energy charge rates, modelled electricity production described above (includes degradation, pre-inverter, inverter efficiency and soiling losses) and projected changes in the price of electricity. The Annual Energy Outlook report by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) provides real electricity price projections annually between 2018 and 2050 for ‘Commercial End-Use Price’93. This annual rate of change was used to estimate projected deviations from 2018 energy charges (2018 US$ kWh–1) during the constant and removal phases (2019–2042), with projected solar PV generation including discussed losses.

We used solar land consultant and industry reports for solar land-lease () rates that ranged from US$750 ha–1 yr–1 to US$4,950 ha–1 yr–1, with high-value land averaging IS$2,450 ha–1 yr–1 in the CCV94,95. Comparable lease rates (~US$2,500 to US$5,000 ha–1 yr–1) were reported by developers in the CCV region17 and used in a solar PV and biomass trade-off study in Germany18 (~US$1,000 to US$2,950 ha–1 yr–1).

Array installation and O&M costs

Historical installation costs (Installation) were taken from the commercial-scale PV installation prices reported in the Annual Tracking the Sun report where reported prices are those paid by the PV system owner before incentives62. The baseline scenario is the median installation price, whereas the best- and worst-case scenarios are the 20th and 80th percentile installation costs, respectively. These reported values are calculated using NREL’s bottom-up cost model and are national averages using average values across all states. Installation cost was not discounted, as it represents the initial investment for commercial-scale installations at day zero. All future cash flows, profits and costs are compared to this initial investment. We also included the 30% Solar Investment Tax Credit in the Installation for commercial-scale arrays96. The system bounds of this impact analysis were installation through the operational or product-use phase. We, therefore, did not assume removal expenses or altered property value (terminal value) to remove uncertainty in decision making at the end of the 25-year array lifespan.

Historically reported and modelled O&M values (pre-2020) range from US$0 kWp–1 yr–1 (best case) to US$40 kWp–1 yr–1 (worst case) with an average (baseline) of US$18 kWp–1 yr–1 (refs. 97,98). Projected O&M costs were based on modelled commercial-scale PV lifetime O&M cost to capital expenditure cost ratios from historical and industry data that provided scenarios varying on research and development differences (conservative, moderate, advanced). The annual reported values are provided from 2020 to 2050 for fixed O&M costs including: asset management, insurance products, site security, cleaning, vegetation removal and component failure and are detailed in the Annual Technology Baseline report by NREL97, which are largely derived from the annual NREL Solar PV Cost Benchmark reports.

Farm operation costs

Business-as-usual farm operation costs (Operation) were derived from the ‘Total Operating Costs Per Acre to Produce’ reported in UC Davis Agricultural and Resource Economics Cost and Return Studies99. We removed operational costs to ‘Irrigate’ from the total because we estimate that as a function of electricity requirements and water rights (described in ‘Change in irrigation water use and cost savings’) while retaining ‘Irrigation Labour’ as this was not included in our irrigation cost assessment. Best- and worst-case scenarios for farm operation costs coincided with yield scenarios described in ‘Displaced crop and food production’.

Discounted cash flow for agrisolar co-location

For each commercial-scale array in the CCV, we computed the annual real cash flow as:

(9)

and for each utility-scale array as:

(10)

where Commercial is the real return in 2018 US$ for commercial-arrays (<1 MWp) and Utility is the real return in 2018 US$ for utility-scale arrays (≥1 MWp). Each of the terms on the right-hand side of these equations are defined in the sections above.

We then computed real annual discounted cash flow () for each array to estimate the total lifetime value of each array. The  at any given year n is calculated for each array by:

(11)

where  is the real annual cash flow at year n (either Commercial or Utility as relevant for each array) and  is the real discount rate without an expected rate of inflation (i) from the nominal discount rate () calculated using the Fisher equation100:

(12)

Vartiainen et al.101 clearly communicates this method in solar PV economic studies and discusses the importance of discount rate (in their case, weighted average cost of capital) selection. For i, we use 3%, which is roughly the average producer price index (PPI) and consumer price index (CPI) (3.4% and 2.4%, respectively) between 2000 and 2022 and comparable to other solar PV economic studies101,102. We use a 5% 103 and perform a sensitivity analysis using 3%, 7% and 10%  and discuss discount rates used in literature in Supplementary Discussion. Separately from the sensitivity analysis for , we also calculated our best-case and worst-case scenarios for each array.

All prices were adjusted to 2018 US dollars for calculation of real cash flow terms in equations (11) and (9). We adjusted consumer electricity prices and installation costs for inflation to real 2018 US$ using the US Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index for All Urban Customers104. We adjusted all production-based profits and costs (all other resources) using US Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Index for All Commodities105.

Reporting summary

Further information on research design is available in the Nature Portfolio Reporting Summary linked to this article.

Data availability

The datasets and outputs generated in the current study are publicly available via Zenodo at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10023293 (ref. 106) with all source data referenced in the published article and in its Supplementary Information files.

Code availability

The code used to generate and analyse the datasets reported here are hosted via GitHub at https://github.com/stidjaco/FEWLS_tool and are available via Zenodo at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10023281 (ref. 107).

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the USDA National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA) INFEWS grant number 2018-67003-27406. We credit additional support from the USDA NIFA Agriculture and Food Research Initiative Competitive grant number 2021-68012-35923 and the Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences at Michigan State University. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the USDA or Michigan State University. We are grateful to B. McGill for bringing the vision of agrisolar co-location to life through her artistic conceptual depiction.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USAJacob T. Stid, Anthony D. Kendall & Jeremy Rapp
  2. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USASiddharth Shukla & Annick Anctil
  3. Department of Sustainable Earth System Sciences, School of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, The University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USADavid W. Hyndman
  4. Biological Systems Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USARobert P. Anex