Cultivating agro-ecology to harvest positive social impact

Agroecology advances environmental sustainability and revitalizes the economy and culture of rural communities. How does it achieve this? 

alt-img-positive-society

Javier Pardo Torregrosa

Can a crop represent action for change? Or a cow, grazing, an instrument against climate change? In a world where fields are often reduced to statistics, chemicals or massive harvests, there is another way to farm. It is not only about eliminating pesticides and rendering the soil fertile once more, but connecting ancestral knowledge with science, countryside with culture, production with dignity. And also with flavors!

Change in the agro-food sector toward production that is respectful to the environment has become fundamental in achieving climate neutrality and a more sustainable world. Ecological agriculture contributes a much deeper and more integrated view of how to do this, with its own implications and needs.

What will I read in this article?

What is agro-ecology and why is it key to a sustainable future?

But what exactly is agro-ecology? According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, agro-ecology is a way of connecting traditional and scientific knowledge with the aim of producing food in a more sustainable way. It is based on, says the FAO, the three pillars of sustainable development, so that, through the economic, social and environmental aspects, countries can increase their food production at the same time they protect the environment and promote social inclusion. In other words, as a practice, agro-ecology pursues the optimization and stabilization of production through less-polluting techniques, biodiversity conservation and the protection of animal well-being. But, also, through social movement, it aims to improve social justice, nourish rural identity and culture, and reinforce the economic viability of rural areas.

Agro-ecology pursues the optimization and stabilization of production through less-polluting techniques, biodiversity conservation and the protection of animal well-being

Biological control to chemical-free farming

Food systems face enormous challenges, from soil degradation to biodiversity loss and the climate crisis. Agro-ecology is not just the most viable option, but also the most urgent. More than a technique, it is a way of thinking and relating to the land, a view combining tradition, science and innovation to produce food sustainably, respecting ecosystems and those who live in them.

For agro-ecology to begin to become a reality, we need to forget all kinds of pesticides, herbicides and chemical and synthetic fertilizers, and control infestations biologically. Europe, for example, has spent years introducing the parasitic wasp Encarsia formosa into greenhouses for tomatoes and peppers, with the aim of controlling whitefly populations while significantly reducing the use of chemical pesticides.

Although the emphasis is often on applying innovative techniques, sometimes it is enough to look back to the past. We can achieve soil regeneration, for example, by using traditional historical and cultural practices such as organic fertilizers and incorporating livestock into the farming cycle. Or find the response in respecting nature’s cycles and its inherent way of doing things. This way we can imitate natural ecosystems through a seasonal crop and varied natural environment integrating autochthonous trees, plants and animals, which helps in the capture of carbon and, simultaneously, biodiversity conservation.

Although the emphasis is often on applying innovative techniques, sometimes it is enough to look back to the past

Technology and agro-ecology, an alliance for sustainable farming

Agro-ecology also requires us to steer technological and scientific advances toward better efficiencies in farming, always maintaining a position of respect toward nature. This is what the project, AgriBIT, financed by European funds, aims to do. Its researchers have developed a series of services using AI-based precision technologies for remote, real-time detection of plagues and bacterial infections in crops such as industrial tomatoes, using satellites and ground-based sensors. These kind of technologies can also serve systems for monitoring, harvesting, irrigation and soil regeneration. Also key is the implementation of solar photovoltaic systems and wind turbine generators, and the use of biomass derived from farming and livestock waste, to increase energy independence and reduce carbon emissions.

Social and economic benefits of agro-ecology

But the agro-ecological movement is not limited to a series of farming techniques focused exclusively on caring for the environment, it also pursues economic, social and cultural benefits.person in crop field

Agro-ecology results in better soil fertility and increased regularity in production, as well as diversifying the risk in cultivating different foods. It contributes to economic dynamism and job creation in rural communities, and involves civil society in the re-activation of areas.

One inspiring example of agro-ecology as an engine of social change is the Agroecology Action Research Network (AARN) in Australia. The network connects researchers, farmers and educators to promote the transformation of food and agricultural systems in the country through the co-creation of knowledge and the implementation of agro-ecological practices adapted to local needs.

Among the specific initiatives developed include so-called Agro-ecology Farmer Field Schools, spaces where farmers demonstrate and validate the techniques they are using to manage plagues, diversify crops and reduce synthetic inputs. The network also explores new research fields, such as the organic management of disease, agriculture without ploughing, and carbon sequestration on farmland.

The role of the community

Often when we fill the basket full of shopping, we ask ourselves why some products are so expensive. Meanwhile, small farmers are complaining that sometimes they are forced to sell below the cost of production. Agro-ecology looks for mechanisms to improve direct sales to consumers and consumer groups, as well as establish principles underpinning better balance in supply chains. It also calls on communities to buy locally directly from the farmer or small shops, also reducing pollution from transport. In Spain, the project Roots: Women, Agro-ecology and Local Consumption, for example, seeks to establish producer networks that come together to distribute their products, generating short distribution channels, organizing eco-markets with producers, and certification marks for participants. The program also takes into account the special role of women in rural areas.

What is the role of creative industries in the Anthropocene? An argument for planetary cultural policy

Miikka Pyykkönen a, Christiaan De Beukelaer bc

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2025.101971

Under a Creative Commons license

Open access

Highlights

•International policy discourses on culture and sustainability are anthropocentric, economic growth-oriented and methodologically nationalist, and international cultural policy organisations and documents, such as United Nations resolution on the International Year of Creative Economy for Sustainable Development 2021, have been impotent in intertwining culture with ecological sustainability.

Economy for Sustainable Development 2021 is analyzed as an examplar of this anthropocentric and economist discourse.

•The ideological underpinnings of cultural policy are the primary reason why culture has not been seriously recognized in international sustainability policies. A profound shift away from anthropocentric worldviews, growth-oriented ideologies, and methodologically nationalist frameworks is needed.

•This ‘new’ understanding of culture in international cultural policies have to cover nature and ecology and see humans and their culture as part of larger ecosystemic framework. Incorporating such a view in public policy requires a new kind of “planetary cultural policy”.

Abstract

Many artistic expressions call for cultural, social and political change. Though the policy environments in which they emerge remain predominantly wedded to a consumption-driven creative economy. In doing so, they tacitly endorse a methodologically nationalist perspective on artistic expression, trade in creative goods and services, and cultural identity. By using the United Nations resolution on the International Year of Creative Economy for Sustainable Development 2021 as a case in point, we argue that the language of this document, which reflects the current hegemonic discourse of creative economy, misses its target when claiming to promote sustainability because it is (1) anthropocentric, (2) growth-focused and (3) methodologically nationalist. Through a discourse analysis of this particular UN resolution, we demonstrate the multiple and conflicting connections between culture and sustainability through the perspective of planetary well-being. The main target of our criticism is the anthropocentric nature of sustainability discourses, but also their unreserved promotion of perpetual economic growth. In response, we articulate the need for a profound cultural shift from anthropocentric worldviews, growth-oriented ideologies, and methodologically nationalist frameworks to enable environmentally engaged cultural policies and citizens.

Keywords

Creative economy; Climate crisis; Anthropocentrism; Methodological nationalism; Cosmopolitanism; Planetary well-being

1. Introduction: the tension between planet, people and culture

In November 2019, the 74th session of the United Nations General Assembly declared that 2021 would be the International Year of Creative Economy for Sustainable Development. The idea of the theme year was formulated in discussions between United Nations (UN) agencies, including UN-Habitat, UNESCO and UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; recently rebranded as UN Trade & Development), which also consulted representatives of pro-creative economy organisations such as the OECD and the Asia-Europe Foundation. Indonesia drafted the resolution text, which was then presented to a group of representatives of 27 countries from all inhabited continents. The final and published version of the resolution is a consensus of these multi-layered discussions. Rather than being a final result that every involved state can fully rally behind, in practice a “consensus” text is precisely one containing conflicts. It is through the subtleties of phrasing that consenting parties ensure that all other parties can recognise their red lines, pet peeves, and concerns in the text, without (seemingly) ceding too much ground. A consensus is therefore not a strong joint position, but merely a position that no one strongly objects to.

Much like other United Nations documents, the resolution commits loyalty to the background organisations and their policies and programmes, as well as the international organisations and their branches that work on the topics of the resolution:

Recalling the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which states that the organization, as part of its purposes and functions, will maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge by encouraging cooperation among the nations in all branches of intellectual activity, and noting the report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on culture and sustainable development, in which it is stated that cultural and creative industries should be part of economic growth strategies […] Welcoming the efforts of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Development Programme, the International Labour Organization, the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and other entities of the United Nations system to promote the creative economy for sustainable development. (United Nations, 2019, 2, emphasis added)

The resolution is, therefore, not so much a visionary document but largely a reflection of past initiatives and interventions. The document is thus a palimpsest through which decades of ideas and initiatives filter through.

The key argument of the resolution is that the creative industries can, should and do promote sustainable and innovation-based economic growth. The resolution mainstreams culture in and for sustainability by defining culture above all through its economic significance and national scope: “[The resolution] encourages all to observe the year in accordance with national priorities to raise awareness, promote cooperation and networking, encourage sharing best practices and experiences, enhance human resource capacity, promote an enabling environment at all levels as well as tackle the challenges of the creative economy” (UNCTAD, 2021). UNCTAD led the implementation of the theme year policies and activities in consultation with UNESCO and other relevant UN agencies.

Despite the triumphant tone of the resolution, culture plays a minor role in policies for sustainable development (Duxbury et al., 2017). If anything, it plays a contradictory role: art and culture can certainly play a positive part, but the creative industries have an enormous environmental impact that needs to be addressed (Miller, 2018). This is partly because of how the sector operates, but also because of the sponsorship connections many arts institutions maintain with fossil fuel producers, airlines and car manufacturers (Evans, 2015).

Our article builds on the following streams and debates in cultural policy: the dominant discourses and trends in international cultural policies, the economisation of cultural policies, the position of creative economies and industries in national economies, and, most of all, the meaning and position of culture in policies and politics for an ecologically sustainable world, that is, the rethinking of the human/culture and nature relationship. Brkldly, and eventually, the focus of our article is on the relation between cultural policy and cosmopolitan citizenship and identity, we posit that a new kind of human actorship in the era of climate crisis, one that includes the idea of human beings as members of the planetary community/entity. This is because we think we need more critical use of comprehensive research and policy concepts cultural policies. Such concepts still remain disconnected from the commonplace understandings of sustainability in cultural policy, as we explain in this paper. We use concepts such as the planetary well-being approach (Kortetmäki et al., 2021Brundtland Commission, 1987down-to-earth approach, which combine ecological, social, cultural and economic perspectives, allowing us to transcend the afore-mentioned tensions and dualisms. (A) They allow us to move towards a more robust and permanent approach when it comes to human and cultural actions – be they economic, anthropocentric or related to identity/citizenship – within natural ecosystems. (B) They enable us to rethink what culture should mean to become a key concept in the manifold efforts for sustainable futures. (C) We can use them to break the local/national-global dualism and reconstruct cosmopolitan or cosmopolitical (Beck, 2016) approaches.

This article thus explores how international policy documents frame culture, creative economy and culture’s role in sustainability. We look, in particular, at the documents and narratives proposed by United Nations Agencies, because they and their sub-actors pursue trendsetting in terms of what national, regional and local cultural policies focus on, and how culture should or could be approached (Pirnes, 2008). We are aware that there are local cultural policies and practices, which include critical and eco-sensitive features (see e.g. Bell et al., 2011Gross & Wilson, 2020Perry & Symons, 2019) and which potentially could be scaled at least to national level policies and practices, but to study them and their potential impacts is a topic for another article. Nevertheless, one of the key issues in international cultural policies on sustainability in the near-future is to change the orientation radically from one-sided economism towards discursive formulation and facilitation of ecological and non-anthropocentric ‘sustainable culture’. Part of this should be the rebuilding these policies more bottom-up than before in the sense that local ecological, planetary and non-capitalist forms of cultural production would get more attention in them.

The overall question this article sets out to answer is thus: Do the hegemonic creative economy and climate change discourses of international cultural and sustainability policies recognise the urgent need to rethink the human/nature and culture/nature relations? This is particularly relevant as climate change itself is a tricky concept that can be characterised as a “hyperobject” (Morton, 2013) or as an “event” (Tavory & Wagner-Pacifici, 2022). The main target of our criticism is the anthropocentric nature of the resolution and its unreserved promotion of perpetual economic growth, which are fundamentally incompatible with ecological sustainability (Hickel & Kallis, 2020Jackson, 2021Raworth, 2017) and “organismal needs”, as we explain below (Kortetmäki et al., 2021). By using the above concepts, we try to articulate the need for a profound cultural shift from anthropocentric, growth-oriented ideologies and methodologically nationalist frameworks to enable environmentally engaged cultural policies.

2. Data, methods and theory

Through a discourse analysis of the resolution, we demonstrate the multiple and conflicting connections between culture and sustainability through the perspective of planetary well-being and other relevant current social scientific theories.

Our primary data consists of a single document: the resolution on the International Year of Creative Economy for Sustainable Development (United Nations, 2019), which declared 2021 to be that year, to be led and implemented by UNCTAD and Indonesia. This decision – together with the more general policy discursive and organisational history – has influenced the way the relation of creativity and sustainability is understood in the Resolution as UNCTAD unexceptionally defines it with the strong economy association (see e.g. UNCTAD, 2022) and Indonesian creative policies have also a long tradition of linking it to economic growth (De Beukelaer, 2021).

The resolution is exemplary of how a cultural policy commonly connects culture and creativity to sustainable development. As we explore in section “The context of the resolution” the document under scrutiny is a political culmination of two decades of UN inter-agency work on the issue. It is an apt summary of the issues addressed, and given its limited length it exposes the discursive shortcuts inherent to the discourse – which often remain buried in verbose reports. The document is exemplary in its message and useful in its brevity, even if it offers a simplified conceptualisation of the creative economy. However, the resolution is not norm-setting. It rather reflects existing norms and concerns. Like many such United Nations documents, it offers (almost by definition) a consensus text of how states see a certain issue.

Due to the importance of this history and context, we have also looked beyond this single document by engaging with other recent documents of international organisations to describe more comprehensively the current hegemonic discourse on cultural sustainability and its construction over time in the field of international cultural policies (see below).

We use rhetorical discourse analysis as our method for analysing the resolution. It means that we concentrate on “textual practices” (Fairclough, 1995, 185): how certain kinds of words and expressions are used to construct certain kinds of definitions of culture and sustainability and to convince the reader of their validity (cf. Johnstone & Eisenhart, 2008). We also pay attention to other levels of discursive formation by shedding light on the organisational roles and practices that influence the messages of the resolution and their value in international and national cultural policies (cf. Pyykkönen, 2012). Before the actual discourse analysis, we provide a theoretically-driven content analysis of the resolution to initially clarify its key ways of speaking about culture and sustainability in the light of our theoretical framework.

We use multiple theories and theoretical perspectives to interpret the results and further discuss our findings. The first theoretical perspective focuses on the cultural economy (e.g., Throsby, 2010) and the idea of a so-called value-based economy (Klamer, 2017), which aim to emphasise the role of culture in orthodox economic thinking. The second theoretical perspective concentrates on recent social scientific and anthropological theories that attempt to rethink and reformulate the human/culture/nature relations. Here our aim is to show how the definitions of culture and sustainability – under the umbrella of the creative economy discourse – tend to be growth-centred, anthropocentric and methodologically nationalistic (Beck, 20062016Latour, 2018Malm, 2018). The third theoretical perspective focuses on planetary well-being, which to our understanding further directs the criticism at the conventional culture and sustainability nexus by suggesting orientations and practices that intertwine culture – and policies concerning it – with our planetary existence and identity in a novel way (Kortetmäki et al., 2021). Besides planetary well-being, we rely on Tim Jackson’s (20092021) ideas on prosperity and post-growth to put practical flesh on the theoretical bones of the necessary change.

Building on these theoretical and conceptual foundations, we strive for a new conceptualisation of “planetary cultural policy”, which consists of such policy discourses and practices on heritage, arts, creative work and identity in which nature and culture are seen as part of the same systemic totality, and the intrinsic and other values of cultural activities are determined based on how they promote ecological sustainability.

3. The hegemonic discourses of culture and sustainability

Sustainability and culture have been discussed in the national and international cultural policy contexts for over 20 years from various perspectives: What does “culture” stand for in culture and sustainability? What is the role of culture among the pillars of social, economic, and ecological sustainability? What is cultural sustainability? And, above all, how should cultural policies tackle sustainability issues? Due to the diversity of interests, intentions, expectations, discourses and related practices, sustainability does not have any single form in cultural policies. Similarly, researchers argue that culture has remained too vague to be a pragmatic policy issue, confined to the margins of national and international policies for sustainability (e.g., Sabatini, 2019Soini & Dessein, 2016). Others claim that proponents of cultural sustainability have not managed to intertwine culture with the other pillars of sustainability, especially ecological sustainability, which has diluted the significance of culture in sustainability policies (e.g., Kagan, 2011). For instance, culture is not explicitly mentioned in any of the titles of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations, 2018Vlassis, 2015).

As a reaction – less openly expressed – to this vagueness and marginalisation of culture in global sustainability policies, key international cultural policy agencies such as UNESCO and UNCTAD have embraced the economisation of culture (De Beukelaer & Spence, 2019Garner & O’Connor, 2019Pyykkönen, 2012).Despite some voices that have tried to expand the hegemonic economic reductionism of value (‘economism’) in more or less liberal societies by emphasising the social and educational values of cultural expressions (e.g., Klamer, 2017; Throsby, 2010), the research on this move has been ontologically uncritical the “economy”. The issue of how culture should contribute to sustainability – especially to its ecological dimension, which we consider the most critical and significant one – in this intertwinement has also remained almost unstudied in realpolitik.

This economism in the culture and sustainability discourse – and the general understanding of culture’s value – is underpinned by widely shared and ideologised significations of the capitalist market economy. In particular, the neoclassical theories of economic growth (Solow, 1999), Schumpeterian ideas on innovation, creativity and entrepreneurialism (Schumpeter, 1942; see also Potts, 2009) and related political ideas and trends (e.g., Hautamäki, 2010) have had a tremendous but thus far under-researched impact on cultural policies. These ideologies have created and strengthened a global discourse according to which the wealth and well-being of the world, nations and people are dependent on increasing productivity and economic growth. Through education, consumerism and national financial and economic policies, for instance, and through being entwined with the globalising knowledges and practices of capitalist production, these principles and their logics have become naturalised presumptions in our societies and cultures (Jackson, 20092021). According to some current researchers of philosophy, environmental sociology and politics, capitalist market economism has intertwined with two cornerstones of our Western culture: anthropocentrism and methodological nationalism (Beck, 2006Malm, 2018). Latour (2018) argues that the cultural mindset stemming from this hinders us from thinking of ourselves and our actions – practical, discursive, political etc. – as “terrestrial”, as being part of the earth and its ecosystems when acting both locally and globally.

Over time, the principles of capitalist production and market economy have also become normalised in cultural policies that guide the creative and cultural industries (McGuigan, 2015), particularly after key international players such as UNESCO and UNCTAD have adopted them as norms (De Beukelaer & Spence, 2019Pyykkönen, 2012). In the case of UNESCO, it has meant the culmination of its long “struggle” to justify the significance of culture and cultural diversity by creating such a numerical and measurable framework discourse for them. This framework resonates positively with both the dominant rationalities of global politics and the interests of nation states and their “methodological nationalism”. UNCTAD has helped popularise the “creative economy” discourse since 2004. UNCTAD’s ostensible goal is to enhance the prosperity and wealth of the poorest countries by facilitating access to global markets for their products. Both UNCESCO and UNCTAD implicitly ground their work on anthropocentrism: the ideas and the actions they support are from humans, for humans. Nature is an instrument of their creative expressions and economic efforts.

One might argue that this particular resolution – and the work of the United Nations in general – is already “planetary” or “universal”. We disagree, because United Nations agencies are intergovernmental forums that serve to find a common ground among nations through multilateral processes (De Beukelaer & Vlassis, 2019), not to foster an overarching set of principles that serve humanity or the planet – let alone the “universe” – as a whole. Hence, the discourse we criticise is inter-national at best, whereas what we call for is a fundamental shift in the normative foundations of global governance, by prioritising the planetary above the (inter)national. In our approach and in the context of this analysis, planetarism means that in global cultural policy, in addition to human values and well-being – and against the dominant emphasis on economic value – the values ​​and well-being of the environment has to be seriously and thoroughly considered, and to reconsider the concept of culture and to rescale it so that it intertwines with the nature and not detaches from it, as has been mostly typical for the hegemonic narrative of modernism (Koistinen et al., 2024Kortetmäki et al., 2021; see also Latour, 2017). Alasuutari (2016) argues that policy discourses across most domains have become “synchronised”, not through coercion, but through the voluntary creation of epistemic communities. In this discourse making and identicalisation the supranational organisations, such as UN and EU, are significant players due to their legal and legitimate grounds to determine the dissemination of ideas and discourses to international and intranational policymaking. These kinds of organisations take a clear step forward on putting the ecological sustainability as the first and main goal of the cultural policies. They thus actually, though not inherently, act as an ‘obligatory passage point’ for planetarisation of cultural policies. Signs of this can be already found from the documents such as New European Bauhaus (European Commission, 2021) and Pact for the Future (United Nations, 2024), and some related policy initiatives. How these changes take place in practice, is always an empirical question and a topic of deep discussion and observation beyond the scope of this article, where our focus is on global cultural policymaking discourses.

Research debates have been more diverse than the policy discussions, especially the dominant policy discourses. Among the best-known research publications on culture and sustainability are those originating in the research network “Investigating Cultural Sustainability” (which was active 2011–2015), which brought together more than 50 European researchers. One of the key findings of this collaborative research is that culture can function for, in and as sustainable development (Dessein et al., 2015Soini & Birkeland, 2014). Consequently, if cultural policy wants to broaden its scope of influence, it should opt to focus on the “for” sustainable development perspective because it allows the development of the sustainability of cultural expressions as well as the use of the cultural sphere and policies to enhance other aspects of sustainability, especially the ecological one (Duxbury et al., 2017). One of the key perspectives in policy reports and research papers on culture and sustainability is that they strive for “mainstreaming culture” by explaining it and its meanings next to the other pillars of sustainability. In our view, this, however, involves the “risk” that analyses merely concentrate on explaining the value of different kinds of cultural expressions and thus usually justify the economic determination of culture (e.g., Sabatini, 2019).

While some of the above-mentioned studies briefly suggest that the interrelatedness of biological and cultural forms of diversity should be enhanced in the culture and sustainability discourse/praxis (see, e.g., Dessein et al., 2015), we try to critically renew and complement them. We argue that the “mainstreaming of culture” should not be realised on an “anything goes” or economic basis, but rather by binding culture strongly and explicitly to the planetary and ecological aspects of sustainability. This does not only concern economism, but applies to anthropocentrism and methodological nationalism as well: the “planetary mainstreaming of culture” should consider principles, solutions and identities/citizen-subjectivities broader than national and human ones – ones that are both cosmopolitical and ecosystemic (see also Beck, 2006Malm, 2018).

4. The context of the resolution

The concept of sustainable development was introduced in 1987 by the “Brundtland Commission”, formally known as the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission, 1987). It first defined “sustainable development” in its report Our Common Future. This document aimed to respond to the environmental threat of global warming and the need to raise the living standards of those in so-called developing countries as well as to ensure a focus on economic growth, which was seen as one of the key indicators of economically sustainable development. Culture was not an explicit topic in the report, although many of its themes were related to it. When culture was first explicated as an issue of sustainability in international cultural policy during the UNESCO Decade of Culture and Development (1988–1997), it was connected to socioeconomic dimensions. Culture was seen as a root and a driving force of economic development and social improvement in so-called developing countries (WCCD, 1995). As we already referred, this stance has been predominant in UNCTAD’s and UNESCO’s recent approaches on culture and sustainability.

UNCTAD has been instrumental in framing culture in and for sustainability, especially in so-called developing countries. UNCTAD has been greatly involved in the international creative economy policy discourses since 2004, which also marked their beginning globally. Its programmes and documents have framed culture and sustainability to describe the broader discursive practice that is indelibly linked to the resolution and its overwhelmingly economic tone. UNCTAD uses programmes and reports to turn its rich datasets on trade in creative goods and services into analyses and trends. The best known is the Creative Economy Programme, dating back to 2004 (see, e.g., UNCTAD, 2022). The programme’s main purpose is to generate “economic information through a trade lens, to understand past trends and project into the future and to promote data-led understanding of trade in creative goods and services, intellectual property, ideas and imagination” (ibid.). At its core are the so-called Creative Economy Mandates (see ibid.), one of which is the resolution we are studying here. The mandates are based on the research and policy analyses that UNCTAD produces with its partners. The central ones for UNCTAD’s meaning making are creative industry reports such as Creative Industry 4.0: Towards a New Globalized Creative Economy (UNCTAD, 2022), which aims to argue not only that the creative economy is crucial for national and global economies, but also that the creative industries can actually be key drivers of the technological change and, thus, the large-scale economic and livelihood changes of the near future.

UNESCO, whose mandate explicitly covers culture, is another key actor in defining culture in, for and as sustainability. Since the afore-mentioned Brundtland Commission (1987) report, it has explicitly discussed sustainability as a key issue to enhance through its policies. UNESCO’s declarations and conventions – such as Our Creative Diversity (WCCD, 1995), Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Heritage (UNESCO, 2001) and the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO, 2005) – have outlined UNESCO’s arguments on the need to secure a sustainable future and apply culture in it. One might even say that UNESCO has been the prima driver of novel significations and contexts for culture within the framework of sustainability (cf. Dessein et al., 2015, 45, 51). The 2005 UNESCO Convention is a useful starting point for analysing the organisation’s rationale on culture and sustainability as it stresses the economic significance of cultural expressions and the construction of strong cultural industries (De Beukelaer et al., 2015Garner & O’Connor, 2019Pyykkönen, 2012).

UNESCO’s work is not only about making meanings, but also consists of collecting and analysing worldwide data on culture and sustainability. On the basis of this knowledge, it launches and participates in projects that promote culture in and for sustainability, such as the International Year of Creative Economy for Sustainable Development. UNESCO worked hard to get culture included in the Sustainable Development Goals (Soini & Birkeland, 2014) but was not successful as none of the original 17 SDGs focus exclusively on culture (United Nations, 2018). However, there are official post-SDG explanations about how culture nonetheless is “at the heart of SDGs” (Hosagrahar, 2017), and what nations and local advocates should do to pay attention to culture when trying to follow the SDGs (UCLG, 2021). After a few years of active campaigning, culture was finally explicitly noted in four of what are called SDG targets in the revised version of the goals (United Nations, 2019).

It is not only the UN or its agencies that have intertwined culture and sustainability with the economy in recent international policies. Both the OECD and the G20 have recently published reports that are very much in line with the principles and objectives of UNCTAD and the resolution we analyse here. Although the OECD pays attention to the creative economy’s potential in enhancing environmental sustainability in its note for Italy’s 2021 G20 presidency (OECD, 2021), the paper includes parts that openly favour culture’s role for economic growth (e.g., ibid., 12). The text-level discursive similarity between the G20’s (2021) Creative Economy 2030 policy brief and UNCTAD’s recent statements is striking: “Before COVID-19 hit, the global creative economy was growing rapidly in many regions. This momentum should not be lost in the wake of the pandemic; rather, greater investment needs to flow to the creative industries that have the potential to make localised and high impact, and help us shift to a new sustainable economy” (ibid., 9–10). This is not surprising as representatives of UNCTAD and other pro-creative economy organisations (e.g., the Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre and the Global Project Culture and Creative Industries) have participated in writing the G20’s policy brief. The World Bank & UNESCO (2021), too, greatly participates in the economist discourse making through its publication Cities, Culture, Creativity: Leveraging Culture and Creativity for Sustainable Urban Development and Inclusive Growth, jointly produced with UNESCO: “Cultural and creative industries are key drivers of the creative economy and represent important sources of employment, economic growth, and innovation, thus contributing to city competitiveness and sustainability” (ibid., 2).

5. The resolution

The resolution is an exemplary and nearly caricatural account of the discourse surrounding the “creative economy”. Ecological sustainability is almost completely absent from the resolution, and when it is mentioned, it is subordinated to capitalist economic objectives. In our analysis of the resolution, we found three interlinked categories through/in which the significations of culture are constituted: (i) Anthropocentrism; (ii) Economic Determinism; and (iii) Methodological Nationalism. Through our analysis, we argue that these discourses are problematic in terms of ecological sustainability, post-Anthropocene subjectivities, and notions of planetary well-being and prosperity (cf. Jackson, 2009Kortetmäki et al., 2021Latour, 2018).

5.1. Anthropocentrism

In general, anthropocentrism refers to a human-centred worldview and morality: humans are the only rational and truly meaning-making species and hence the key agents of the world; they are the ones who can, through work and reuse, dominate objects that originally belonged to nature; they can own and assume control over nature due to their supreme capabilities; and the value of nature is determined by its value for humans so that nature does not have an intrinsic value (Barry & Frankland, 2002). Though this raises questions of what the Anthropocene means. Commonly, it’s a shorthand for the idea “that modern human activity is large relative to the basic processes of planetary functioning, and therefore that human social, economic, and political decisions have become entangled in a web of planetary feedbacks (Malhi, 2016). Though it risks masking the deeply unequal and inequitable distribution of human influences and consequences on this way of looking at “our” era (Malm & Hornborg, 2014).

What is emblematic of anthropocentrism is that humans are either consciously or unconsciously defined and valued against nature and its actors such as animals. This is a typical text-level ‘regularity’ (see Foucault, 1972) and order in the whole centrism discourse. On the other hand, in ecocentrism and biocentrism, for instance, nature and its well-being are observed against humans. This discursive order derives from the nature/culture division, one of the major narratives in Western thought. This binarism is indeed one of the most problematic aspects of the “centrisms” in terms of ecological sustainability because it separates humans and nature from each other per se (Boddice, 2011).

As we have already claimed, conventional cultural policy understands culture as a merely human issue and makes the human the subject of and subject to cultural policy and its share of rights, actorships, beneficiaries and, in the end, the bios itself. Most studies and documents on cultural sustainability do not really pay attention to the position and role of nature or natural agents. We can take a key UN text as an example: although the UN Sustainable Development Goals address the sustainability of the environment in multiple ways and dimensions, they mostly focus on the human perspective, and the non-human aspects of sustainability are considered only if they instrumentally contribute to the human aspects (see also Dryzek, 2005, 157). The resolution also highlights the centrality of humans within its proposed approach to linking culture and sustainability:

Recognizing the role of the creative economy in creating full and productive employment and decent work, supporting entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, encouraging the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, stimulating innovation, empowering people, promoting social inclusion, and reducing poverty […]

Highlighting that the creative economy encourages creativity and innovation in attaining inclusive, equitable and sustainable growth and development, while facilitating life transitions and supporting women, youth, migrants and older persons, as well as empowering people in vulnerable situations […]

Stressing that the creative economy can contribute to the three dimensions of sustainable development and the achievement of the 2030 Agenda, including by fostering economic growth and innovation, eradicating poverty, creating full and productive employment and decent work for all, improving the quality of life and empowerment of women and young people. (United Nations, 2019, 3)

As illustrated by these excerpts, anthropocentrism stands in a logical relation to economic goals. Creative economic practices serve humans and human development without reflecting the ecological limits of these actions. Superficially, it seems that everything is in order: if the functioning of the creative economy is secured and supported, it will improve the well-being and actorship of all humans. However, we argue that this thinly veiled anthropocentrism undermines the ultimate aims of the resolution itself as well as all the other major cultural policy documents that deal with sustainability. If we want to strive for true sustainability – at the pace necessary to prevent the massive environmental crisis we are facing at the moment – we should “focus on the systems and processes that support life, well-being, and biodiversity at different spatial scales” (Kortetmäki et al., 2021, 2).

Most commonly, anthropocentrism is not an explicit point of departure or a goal. However, policy documents and research have been criticised for their “human-centred sustainability” (e.g., Lepeley, 2019): despite their good intentions, they are too much oriented to human agents and undermine the role of humans as part of broader systems and networks that also include non-human actors; all cultural and human actions have ecological and ecosystemic impacts on the planetary future (Kortetmäki et al., 2021Latour, 2018Malm, 2018).

The resolution is a model example of this human-centred sustainability. Although it does not explicitly mention anthropocentrism, its discussion of sustainability is limited to human needs and well-being, especially from the perspective of prosperity and economic growth. The more moral and principled sections are also human-centred: when important values and goals (human rights, human creativity and ideas, gender equality, peace) are listed, no reference is made to environmental issues, except for a loose mentioning of sustainable lifestyle. However, what overemphasises the resolution’s anthropocentrism above all is that there is no explicit recognition of planetary wellbeing, not even the term “ecological sustainability”.

5.2. Economic determinism

As the title of the resolution already indicates, the economy is its main theme. The resolution lists ways in which the cultural and creative industries (CCIs) can enhance economic growth – without, however, specifying whether it means the growth of national economies or that of private businesses – and in which the economic growth brought by the CCIs fosters social values and goals such as “empowerment for all”, “eradicating poverty”, “decent work for all” and “empowerment of women and young people”, as the following excerpts illustrate:

Recognizing the need to promote sustained and inclusive economic growth, foster innovation and provide opportunities, benefits and empowerment for all and respect for all human rights […]

[N]oting the report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on culture and sustainable development, in which it is stated that cultural and creative industries should be part of economic growth strategies […]

Recognizing the ongoing need to support developing countries and countries with economies in transition in diversifying production and exports, including in new sustainable growth areas, including creative industries. Emphasizing the resilient growth in international trade in creative industries, including the trade of creative goods and services, and its contribution to the global economy, and recognizing the economic and cultural values of the creative economy. (United Nations, 2019, 1–2)

Economic significance is a relatively new perspective in international cultural policy discourses: while the focus on the economic value of culture was mainly criticised until the 1980s due to the instrumentality, recuperation and alienation of arts, culture, creativity and passion (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002, 94–136; Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007McGuigan, 2015). Bilton (2007), among others, argues that in the 1990s, experts, consultants and researchers started to speak positively about the economic value and meanings of arts and culture. Gradually, this perspective was taken up in cultural policies and by their key spokespersons such as administrators, educators and consultants, and finally by cultural actors and professionals as well. The current discourse on the economic side of culture is neutral or even downright positive about and in favour of the commodification of cultural products. This view on the cultural industries has spread in recent years together with the increasingly prevalent talk about the “creative industries”. Bilton describes the conceptual evolution from cultural industries to creative industries as follows:

The term “cultural industries” indicates that creativity grows out of a specific cultural context and emphasizes the cultural content of ideas, values and traditions. The term “creative industries” emphasizes the novelty of ideas and products and places creativity in a context of individual talent, innovation and productivity. (Bilton, 2007, 164)

This shift resonates with larger structural developments: the discursive transition from cultural industries to creative industries started in the 1990s along with the shifts in the capitalist market economy and its business structures and economic, labour and social policies. Whereas the traditional material industries weakened in so-called Western countries, the developing immaterial and digital information economy needed concepts like creativity, innovation and information and related practices to an extensive extent. Cultural policies and cultural policy researchers seized the moment and boldly defined arts and culture as the core of the emerging creative economy and designated it as a key economic growth sector. Creative industry/economy is a vaguer concept than cultural industry/economy, but its benefit is its broader scope and association with other – economically more important – industries and sectors. Through “creative industry” or “cultural and creative industries”, it is possible to raise the broad economic importance of arts and culture – at least rhetorically (Garnham, 2005).

The “economy” in creative economy refers to the organisation and the work of structures, institutions, groups and individuals concerning the production, distribution, exchange and consumption of goods and services that are defined creative and cultural. In this context, a product is therefore one that results from creativity – whether individually, collectively or industrially contributed – and is meant to be sold in the market, and its market value is at least partially based on the creativity used in its production (Throsby, 2010).

This economism is criticised because of its instrumental character, and because it endangers the intrinsic value of culture (e.g., Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002, 94–136; McGuigan, 2015). Recently, critical attention has focused more on the factors of precarious working conditions and the exploitation of the passion and creativity of creative workers (e.g., Gielen, 2015McRobbie, 2016). Less thought has been given to the fact that whether material or immaterial, the production of creative goods for economic growth is indelibly against the fundamentals of ecological sustainability (De Beukelaer, 2019a). However, there is a growing body of research literature theorising alternative forms of cultural economy (e.g. Clammer, 2016, 65–90; Conill et al., 2012Maurer, 2008Vanolo, 2012; see more about his later in this section). These studies share a justification of non-capitalist values for the cultural production and work and the exploration of post-capitalist practices of cultural sector and production (e.g. commoning). While many of them take a critical stance towards the capitalist economic growth, very few of them observe the issue from the point of view of ecological values or practices, the radically different relation of culture and nature (i.e. ecologically sustainable culture and non-antropocentric cultural subjectivity), and how these alternative paradigms are – or should be – considered in cultural policies. Increasingly, research includes perspectives on how culture and nature can be merged on the conceptual level of the cultural policies, and how culture can be approached foundational in the de- and post-growth economies and their national and local practical applications (Banks & Oakley, 2024McCartney et al., 2023Pyykkönen, 2024).

In this context, we neither buy into the doxa of economic growth, nor do we dogmatically defend degrowth: we remain growth-agnostic. Our key objective is to stop using economic turnover as a proxy for other goals, such as those concerning creativity, culture and environment, because they cannot be captured by this proxy (cf. van den Bergh, 2010). The obvious alternative would be to set policy objectives that do not explicitly build on growth. The macro-economic outcome could be growth or degrowth, but this ought to be secondary to stated objectives, which in our case relate to both formulating non-econocentric and non-anthropocentric international cultural policies (especially when speaking about culture and sustainability) and – through national and local policies – paving way for the ecologically sustainable cultural productions instead of capitalist cultural industries. These are important goals both for changing the mentalities and practices (i.e. immaterial and material “consumer cultures”) of our societies and recognizing the crucial place of labour-intensive jobs in post-growth economies (cf. Jackson, 2021).

The growth and intensification of creative production – and even the maintenance of the current level – will require unsustainable amounts of resources such as raw materials, energy, transportation and devices (Jackson, 2009; see also De Beukelaer, 2019). Meanwhile, research shows that it is possible for all humans to live within planetary boundaries and above social thresholds – that is, within the “doughnut” or the “safe operating space for humanity” – though not without radically rebalancing consumption patterns between rich and poor people (Hickel, 2019O’Neill et al., 2018; see also Gibson-Graham et al., 2013Gupta et al., 2024) while also addressing the colonial root causes of planetary plunder (Agyeman et al., 2003Jackson, 2009Kortetmäki et al., 2021Malm, 2018Rockström et al., 2009). The change requires the broad and effective adoption of post-growth thinking, attitudes and their implementation in economic and social practices, which in addition to greener production and massively less consumption of material goods has to include practices of equal and inclusive social work and health-care, and democratisation of decision-making processes and citizen-involvement in governance (Gibson-Graham et al., 2013Gupta et al., 2024Kortetmäki et al., 2021Raworth, 2017).

If we approach cultural production mainly from the perspective of profit making and economic growth, it is most certainly connected – at least indirectly – to such forms of capitalist production that are anti-ecological per se. As the citations at the beginning of this section suggest, two main discursive lines can be distinguished here: the resolution tries to prove again and again (a) how the creative and cultural industries serve the economic growth of nations, and (b) how cultural and economic values (incl. technological and industrial innovations) are intertwined without any challenges. As mentioned, economic determinism and anthropocentrism converge in the resolution: a greater and well-functioning creative economy – and economic growth in general – is assumed to serve the interests of all humans. The ecological and environmental consequences of the creative economy are secondary concerns at best. In addition to being linked to the other aspects, the economy also determines them in the resolution; humans and their relations and subjectivities are valued, signified, and represented within the economic frame.

5.3. Methodological nationalism

While the climate crisis is a quintessentially global issue, cultural policy still relies on and strengthens the idea of nation states at the centre of politics. This is to be expected as the United Nations framework generally doesn’t address the tensions between global challenges and national interests head-on. The resolution reaffirms this state of affairs and, as mentioned above, blends it seamlessly with the capitalist market economisation of culture:

Recommitting to sustaining and supporting developing countries’ economies to transition progressively to higher productivity through high-value-added sectors, by promoting diversification, technological upgrading, research and innovation, including the creation of quality, decent and productive jobs, including through the promotion of cultural and creative industries, sustainable tourism, performing arts and heritage conservation activities, among others […]

Acknowledging that innovation is essential for harnessing the economic potential of each nation and the importance of supporting mass entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, which create new momentum for economic growth and job creation and expand opportunities for all, including women and youth […]

Stressing the importance of appropriate national policies aimed at promoting the diversity of cultural expression and advancing creativity for sustainable development. (United Nations, 2019, 2–3)

This kind of approach can be called “methodological nationalism”. It means the tendency of actors to assume that “the nation-state is the natural social and political form of the modern world” (Wimmer & Schiller, 2002, emphasis in original). In other words, it is a historically constructed post-Westphalian notion according to which nations and nation states are sovereign actors in solving political challenges and problems. Beck (2016) has criticised the concept in the context of current international politics concerning global problems. He claims that acute “cosmopoliticised” risks such as the climate crisis could give rise to “emancipatory catastrophism” – new normative horizons of common goods and a cosmopolitan outlook – if only we would be politically able to move beyond methodological nationalism. In the 21st century, not only the major challenges but also the “spaces of action” have become cosmopolitised. Beck’s view is that we can tackle these risks only with global political structures and policies, and by rethinking political agency from the level of the state to that of citizen-subjects. Emancipatory catastrophism could at best lead us to a new political approach of “methodological cosmopolitanism”. Latour (2018) makes a similar claim: we need to create political approaches and policies that are not grounded in national or global interests, but instead the earth. We globally need to learn new ways to live on and with the earth, and this is what cosmopolitan politics and agencies must be about.

How, then, does methodological nationalism appear in the resolution? As we can see from the citations at the beginning of this section, nation states are the ones that primarily benefit from the economic growth produced by the CCIs. They not only profit their economies, but also their nations in terms of prosperity, welfare and equality. Moreover, nation states and their national policies are the key actors of the resolution. It depends on them how all the economic and societal improvements generated by the creative economy will take place. The above contextualisation is not problematic only from the perspective of cultural sustainability and its basic values such as cultural diversity, but especially in terms of ecological sustainability, which is not national in its character.

6. Conclusions: towards a new planetary cultural policy

The United Nations promote the idea that the creative economy, through its constituent creative industries, will contribute to the transition towards sustainable development. However, the resolution on the International Year of Creative Economy for Sustainable Development 2021 we have examined as a key exemplar of these efforts fails to convince that the claims it makes will indeed materialise. Though it would not be useful to argue that if only United Nations agencies would change their tune, we’d be able to shift away from the kinds of ideas embedded in this Resolution. Indeed, if the document were more radical and progressive, it would not be representative of dominant international organisations’ and states’ views and interests, and it would likely not gain much traction because it would not align with dominant discourses in these organisations or responsible state ministries – and most importantly, among consultants (De Beukelaer & Vlassis, 2019). However, the “non-progressiveness” and lack of radical views might well exist also because of the politics behind the documents and the power imbalances between the contributing actors, which impact the outcomes of the political negotiations and disputes. As known, some parties – e.g. strong and powerful nation states or international organisations – do have more say than others in the resolution making processes..

While it is necessary to throw everything but the kitchen sink at the climate crisis, it can be counterproductive to make assertions without a shred of evidence. To make matters worse, the resolution makes gratuitous claims that fly in the face of empirical evidence, as we have illustrated above. The resolution stumbles over several pitfalls.

First, we have shown that the resolution fails to define a clear and realistic target (i.e., what should be “sustainable”). This may seem self-evident, but the term has become such a catch-all for anything from the grossest forms of corporate greenwashing to the most genuinely committed actions. For the term to have any meaning, it needs to be defined unambiguously. This should include an articulation of whether it means environmental, social and cultural sustainability – or merely one of them – and a clear dissociation from the hegemonic growth-oriented economist view. The definition also needs to be pragmatic in the sense that it recognizes existing and outlines new broader political projects and their tools to challenge the current capitalist and anthropocentric political order of culture. One solution would be to start seriously thinking about culture and sustainability in relation to the post-growth “safe operating space” and “doughnut economy” (Raworth, 2017; cf. Jackson, 2009), in that they offer more practical narratives and are clearer on what is needed and what can’t be exceeded.

Second, the resolution’s objectives and methods remain entirely captured within the doxa of “green growth”. This is not the, but merely a blueprint for climate action – and perhaps not the most credible one at that (Hickel & Kallis, 2019). As “green growth” remains the dominant framework for policies, explicitly recognising it as one among many competing visions of the future is all-important when working at the intersection between art, culture and creativity in relation to climate futures.

Third, both UNCTAD and UNESCO remain fixed on their respective raisons d’être, without addressing the systemic challenge we face. This results in an impoverished articulation of what the future should be, which remains tone-deaf to the real challenge that underpins the climate crisis: how to ensure life in dignity and prosperity without wrecking the planet. In sum, the resolution we have studied is fundamentally incompatible with ecological sustainability and the “organismal needs” (i.e. basic need that must be satisfied for an organism [human, animal, plant etc.] to realise its typical and special way and characteristics of life) of planetary well-being (Kortetmäki et al., 2021).

Notwithstanding our above criticisms of the resolution, the potential of art, culture and creativity to help confront the climate crisis is real. Its strength lies in a commitment to global environmental citizenship, which puts the planet before economic and anthropocentric or narrowly defined national, ethnic or religious group interests (Duxbury et al., 2017).1 It should help to address global issues with a cosmopolitan sensibility (De Beukelaer, 2019b). What we propose thus inherently challenges the normative foundations and horizons of public policy. Beyond shifting the normative ground on which policymaking builds, we would argue that it also requires a new political economy of creative work, which focuses on degrowth, revaluing craft and setting up a universal basic income. This should help lay the groundwork for a post-consumer society, in which the dignity and well-being of people and the planet take precedence over shareholder value.

Our suggestions might sound like wishful thinking. Which they are. Though so are the expected outcomes of the approaches suggested in the Resolution text. Policy texts inherently are wishful thinking. Contrary to this consensus-document, we believe that our suggested approach, “our” wishful thinking if you will, is more constructive. Which kind of “wishful thinking” one entertains is not just a mirage; it is helpful in offering both a semblance of a way out of this mess and a positive story that can garner public and political support. We are now at a point where the creative economy, as characterised in the Resolution, does neither.

In sum, our key argument is that the relation of culture and environment should be radically re-evaluated and re-defined when speaking and acting about sustainability and culture. Simply repackaging the creative industry policies of the past two decades as “sustainable” does little but further delay the much-needed rethinking of the future we want. To do that, we need a new kind of “planetary cultural policy” in which decision-making on culture always takes into account the environment, ecological sustainability and planetary boundaries per se. In addition, it must ideologically and conceptually understand culture as part of nature and vice versa. Finally, cultural policies should acknowledge that everything that human beings as cultural actors do has serious and true ecological implications, which also makes it a question of citizenship, identity and subjectivity. This would definitely confuse the already blurred boundaries of cultural policy as an administrative sector even more, but we think that it is an “obligatory passage point” (Callon, 1986) – i.e., the point of access to the irreversibly new understanding of relation between culture and sustainability that all key actors have to recognize and “go through”, if they want to participate in the process – if we really want to see culture as an important factor in sustainability policies and practices.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Miikka Pyykkönen: Writing – original draft. Christiaan De Beukelaer: Writing – original draft.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

References

Cited by (0)

Dr. Miikka Pyykkönen is a Professor on Cultural Policy in the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, Finland. He teaches bachelor and master students in the study programme Cultures, Communities and Change, and doctoral students in Cultural Policy doctoral studies. He is also a docent in Sociology at the University of Helsinki. His current research areas are cultural policy, international cultural policy, culture and sustainability, economization of culture, entrepreneurship and history of ethnopolitics.

Dr. Christiaan De Beukelaer is a Senior Lecturer in Culture & Climate at the University of Melbourne and a Global Horizons Senior Fellow at the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study. He was previously a Marie Skłodowska-Curie – FIAS-FP COFUND Fellow in Necessary Utopias at Iméra, the Institute for Advanced Study at Aix-Marseille Université. His primary research project is Shipping in the Oceanic Commons: Regulation and Prefiguration (ClimateWorks Foundation). His most recent book Trade Winds: A Voyage to a Sustainable Future for Shipping, published by Manchester University Press, is also available in French translation as Cargo à Voile: Une Aventure Militante pour un Transport Maritime Durable, published by Éditions Apogée. He is a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society.1

We do recognise that citizenship is always grounded in the lives of people, which are spatially and temporally bound. This offers up a further challenge of finding a space that connects the “planetary” and the individual, through multiple levels of social entanglement and political engagement.

© 2025 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.

Post-growth: the science of wellbeing within planetary boundaries

Prof Giorgos Kallis, PhDa,b georgios.kallis@uab.cat ∙ Prof Jason Hickel, PhDa,b,c ∙ Prof Daniel W O’Neill, PhDd,e ∙ Prof Tim Jackson, PhDf ∙ Prof Peter A Victor, PhDg ∙ Kate Raworth, MSch ∙ Prof Juliet B Schor, PhDi ∙ Prof Julia K Steinberger, PhDj ∙ Prof Diana Ürge-Vorsatz, PhDk

Summary

There are increasing concerns that continued economic growth in high-income countries might not be environmentally sustainable, socially beneficial, or economically achievable. In this Review, we explore the rapidly advancing field of post-growth research, which has evolved in response to these concerns. The central idea of post-growth is to replace the goal of increasing GDP with the goal of improving human wellbeing within planetary boundaries. Key advances discussed in this Review include: the development of ecological macroeconomic models that test policies for managing without growth; understanding and reducing the growth dependencies that tie social welfare to increasing GDP in the current economy; and characterising the policies and provisioning systems that would allow resource use to be reduced while improving human wellbeing. Despite recent advances in post-growth research, important questions remain, such as the politics of transition, and transformations in the relationship between the Global North and the Global South.

Introduction

How can contemporary societies enhance human wellbeing in the absence of economic growth? This question is the foundational scientific issue for the emerging research agenda on post-growth,1 motivated by the tight coupling of growth in gross domestic product (GDP) and environmental damage,2 the declining marginal benefits of income for human wellbeing,3 and the social and political risks of economic slowdowns.4 Post-growth refers to societies that do not pursue GDP growth as an objective, and which are able to meet human needs in an equitable way without growth while staying within their fair share of planetary boundaries.

Post-growth research can be seen as part of sustainability science that is influenced by—but not constrained within—ecological economics, drawing from different traditions and contributing to the construction of a new economics that brings interdisciplinary (eg, ecological, anthropological, historical, sociological, and political) insights into our understandings of how human provisioning works. Post-growth emphasises independence from—or prosperity without5—growth, and serves as an umbrella term encompassing research in Doughnut and wellbeing economics, steady-state economics, and degrowth. Doughnut and wellbeing economics call for the satisfaction of basic human needs and high wellbeing within planetary boundaries, whereas steady-state economics emphasises the need to stabilise societies’ resource use at a relatively low, sustainable level. Doughnut, wellbeing, and steady-state economics generally position their proposals within the current capitalist system, whereas degrowth is critical of the possibilities of an egalitarian slowdown within capitalism given that capitalist competition is structurally geared towards growth. Degrowth therefore emphasises the need for a planned, democratic transformation of the economic system to drastically reduce ecological impact and inequality and improve wellbeing. Degrowth, similarly to steady-state economics, regards a lower GDP as a probable outcome of efforts to substantially reduce resource use.6 Reducing GDP is not a goal of these approaches, however,5 but, it is seen as something that economies need to be made resilient to. The Doughnut and wellbeing approaches are more agnostic about GDP growth, but still view it as a poor measure of progress. Post-growth is plural and open to all these perspectives. All approaches converge on the need for qualitative improvement without relying on quantitative growth, and on selectively decreasing the production of less necessary and more damaging goods and services, while increasing beneficial ones.

There is a large literature on post-growth and increasing interest in the concept as indicated by articles in prominent scientific journals,7–9 reports in international media,10 and substantial new funding for post-growth research.11–14 To our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive review of the field. Unlike recent systematic reviews of degrowth, for example,15–17 which quantify emerging themes and gaps in the literature, our Review is an expert overview, written by leaders in the post-growth field, each specialised in one of its various branches. We have identified what we deem to be the most important recent contributions, without being constrained by the conventions of a narrower systematic review (ie, looking only at articles where the term post-growth appears in the title or body of the article), to include the theoretical and empirical evidence that is relevant to post-growth claims. First, we explain how post-growth research has evolved within planetary sustainability science, engaging with ongoing debates about ecological, social, and economic limits to growth. Second, we provide an overview of controversies, advances, and breakthroughs in the field in the past 5 years and identify remaining knowledge gaps.

Ecological, social, and economic limits to growth

Resource limits

The year 2022 marked the 50th anniversary of Limits to Growth, a report that first posed the question of whether there are limits related to the Earth system that could put constraints on industrial development. The report was based on a system dynamics model (World3) that was parameterised with data from 1900 to 1970, and simulated scenarios for population, food, non-renewable resources, pollution, industrial output, and services to the year 2100.18 In the Standard Run of the model, which assumed the continuation of historical decision-making, the result is overshoot and collapse (figure 1). In this scenario, as industrial capital grows, it consumes a larger and larger share of the resource flow, until resource depletion leads to the collapse of the industrial base, followed by the collapse of everything that is dependent on it—services, the food supply, and ultimately, the human population.17

Figure 1 Four different scenarios of the original Limits to Growth model in comparison to actual dataShow full captionFigure viewer

Limits to Growth triggered a long and heated debate,23 which remains unsettled.24 Many economists suggested that high prices for scarce resources could result in technological innovation and resource substitution. The assumption that technology grows exponentially, and at a rate sufficient to offset the drag from resource depletion, allows growth to continue without limit.25 The decline of commodity prices in the 20th century, and especially in the 1980s, when the debate about Limits to Growth took place (figure 2), was seen as a repudiation of the Limits to Growth hypothesis and a confirmation of the power of technology to offset resource scarcity.25

Figure 2 Commodity price indices, 1960–2022Show full captionFigure viewer

The Standard Run of the Limits to Growth model, however, did not suggest scarcities before the 2010s. Given the cumulative nature of compound growth, the hypothesis was that seeming abundance would at some point turn quickly into scarcity.18 Increasing resource prices since the 2000s (figure 2), coupled with economic shocks, have brought back concerns that resource scarcities might indeed limit growth.27 Other system dynamics models built on World3 suggest peaks and scarcities for various critical metals in the second half of the 21st century.28,29 However, these models, similarly to the original World3 and all future-oriented models, run the risk of underestimating unpredictable technological breakthroughs that might be incentivised by higher resource prices.

From resource limits to planetary boundaries

Scientists have also sought to assess the validity of the Limits to Growth model by looking at how well it fits historical trends since its publication.20,21 Previous studies21,30 have explored how the various runs of the Limits to Growth model compare with actual trends and suggest that the world is most closely tracking the Double Resources scenario,18 which differs from the Standard Run in its assumption that the initial stock of non-renewable resources is twice as large as the Standard Run resource stock (figure 1). In this scenario, collapse occurs later and is driven not by scarcity of non-renewable resources (ie, a source limit), as in the Standard Run, but by persistent pollution and its impact on ecosystem stability (ie, a sink limit, otherwise known as a regenerative capacity limit). The Double Resources scenario arguably aligns more closely with the current understanding of the most pressing environmental limits facing humanity. For example, climate change is a much greater concern now than running out of fossil fuels31 (interestingly, the original Limits to Growth report did refer to the possibility of climate change as a form of persistent pollution). The replication of trends in the relatively stable 1970–2020 period, nonetheless, does not imply by any means that collapse will occur by a specific date.32 The Limits to Growth model was never intended to make exact predictions, but to explore the system’s overall behavioural tendencies. Moreover, as the Limits to Growth modellers suggested, less attention should be given to the model’s behaviour past the peak as the process of approaching limits will instigate a change in the system’s structure.

The past decade has seen a shift in sustainability science from questions of resource scarcity to those of global change and limits, through the study of planetary boundaries that provide a “safe operating space for humanity”.33 Anthropogenic pressures now exceed six of the nine identified planetary boundaries—those related to carbon emissions, biodiversity loss, land-system change, freshwater change, biogeochemical flows, and novel pollutants.34–36 Natural scientists have linked Earth system trends to socioeconomic trends, including economic growth, illustrating the “Great Acceleration” of ecological impacts and population and economic growth.37 Some economists, by contrast, have argued that as economies get richer, after a specific point in development, their impact on the environment is likely to decrease (ie, the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis).38 The new consensus in the empirical literature, however, is that although some local pollutants, such as sulphur dioxide, have fallen in high-income countries, typically due to better policy, this does not hold for greenhouse gas emissions, material use, or other global ecological impacts.38

A separate discussion concerns whether crossing planetary boundaries will limit growth. There are two contending perspectives on this question. In William Nordhaus’s DICE model, for example, the reference scenario projected that a 4·3°C increase in global temperature by 2100 would lead to only a 4·3% loss in output compared with baseline projections, in a global economy that is 7·8 times larger than in 2015.39 However, such projections excluded uncertain, abrupt, and non-linear changes in the Earth system, and underestimated climate damages by relying on current correlations between regional temperature and regional GDP as a proxy for the economic impact of global warming.40 Newer studies suggest much higher economic costs of climate change than previously estimated—with existing warming already locking in a 19% income per capita loss within the next 26 years,41 whereas each additional 1°C rise in temperature costs the world 12% in GDP losses.42 Given the uncertainties involved in such estimations, and the problems with reducing all ecosystem and wellbeing losses due to climate change to a GDP figure, an alternative approach, which many sustainability scientists have adopted, is to take planetary boundaries as a precautionary objective, and then ask whether it is possible to return to or stay inside planetary boundaries with continued economic growth.43

The decoupling controversy

Much of the research on reconciling economic growth with planetary boundaries has been framed as a question of whether it is possible to achieve green growth—ie, to decouple GDP from carbon emissions and material use (the latter because it is strongly linked to environmental pressures and biodiversity loss).44,45 This literature distinguishes between relative decoupling, which is a decline in the material or carbon intensity of GDP, where GDP grows faster than material use and emissions; absolute decoupling, which is when GDP grows while material use and emissions decline; and sufficient absolute decoupling or genuine green growth, which is when GDP grows while material use and emissions decline enough to keep the economy within planetary boundaries.46

Cross-national evidence indicates that GDP remains coupled to resource use as measured by material footprint (ie, accounting for the biomass, minerals, metals, and fossil fuels required to support the final consumption of goods and services).47 This finding holds across material categories and most regions, with some exceptions, such as decreasing fossil fuel use in some European countries.47 The consensus from recent reviews and meta-analyses is that while relative decoupling of GDP from material use is common, there is no evidence of sustained absolute decoupling.2,48 Moreover, modelled projections indicate that at the global scale, absolute decoupling is unlikely to occur even with optimistic assumptions about technology.49

Why are resources and GDP so tightly coupled? A first explanation focuses on the so-called rebound effect—the hypothesis that technological improvements in resource efficiency do not necessarily yield reduced resource use because declining costs lead to increased demand.50 A study of 57 cases of materials and modern artefacts, for example, found no evidence of dematerialisation,51 and economy-wide energy rebounds of 78–101% have been observed in the USA, the UK, and some European countries.52 Another explanation focuses on the material intensity of services, structural change, and international trade. A global empirical analysis found that all sectors of the economy are roughly equivalent in terms of their climate, land, and water impacts due to the embedded resource requirements of services and the fact that incomes earned in the service sector are partly spent on material goods.53 Cross-border research indicates that as high-income economies grow and shift towards services, they increasingly offshore agricultural and industrial production and rely on imports47 (eg, for agriculture, the Global North net-imports embodied land and biomass from the Global South54). Domestic material extraction might therefore decline, but total material footprint—which accounts for materials embodied in trade—continues to increase.47 These explanations are in line with the ecological economics view of the engine of the economy being energy, materials, and human labour.55

With carbon emissions, the picture is more complex, since substitution with cleaner energy is possible. In the period 2005–15, absolute decoupling of GDP from emissions occurred in several high-income countries, even accounting for trade (ie, consumption-based emissions).56 However, this time period was one of historically low growth for many of these nations (figure 3), suggesting that while decoupling is possible, the rate of growth still matters, and the lower it is, the more feasible absolute decoupling becomes. In the USA, for instance, the 2008 recession was an important cause of emissions reduction,57 complicating arguments about green growth. A 2018 study found that Sweden, Denmark, and Finland have achieved sufficient decoupling,46 but critics have noted that this assessment uses the 2°C carbon budget instead of a 1·5°C budget and ignores consumption-based emissions.58 The speed of reduction is also not sufficient from a fairness perspective if one accounts for the higher mitigation responsibilities of countries that historically have been high emitters of greenhouse gases.58,59 Even the best performing nations, such as the UK and Sweden, are not on track to meet Paris Agreement objectives, as a fair distribution of the global carbon budget would require them to reduce emissions by 10% and 12% each year, respectively, which is double their existing policy commitments.60

Figure 3 Growth rate in real GDP per capita, 1960–2020, for different regions and countriesShow full captionFigure viewer

Despite this uncertainty about the prospects of sufficient decoupling, green growth remains a standard feature of the climate mitigation scenarios for 1·5°C and 2°C that are modelled using conventional integrated assessment models and reviewed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).61,62 These scenarios reconcile economic growth with climate goals by relying on hypothetical large-scale negative emissions technologies with CO2 removal schemes developed in the future, unprecedented energy efficiency improvements, or both.63 These scenarios also ignore climate impacts on the economy and society.64 Several studies raise questions about the risks of relying on untested negative emissions technologies65 and about the historically unprecedented rates of GDP–energy decoupling in low-energy scenarios.52 Five new studies show how reductions in aggregate output make achieving climate objectives easier, without having to rely on possibly unrealistic assumptions about technological change.66–70

If the standard green growth argument is that growth can continue while ecological pressures are reduced to sustainable levels, a stronger claim is that greening the economy can itself be an engine of growth. Several economic models show that investments in green infrastructure and climate mitigation might have a multiplier effect that increases growth in countries with economic slack.71–73 The short-run stimulus effects of a clean energy transition, however, should be distinguished from possible second-order, or longer-run effects.74 There are open questions concerning whether green investments crowd out other, more productive (in terms of GDP) investments,75 or whether stranded fossil fuel assets might cause financial shocks that impact GDP negatively.72 Models show that if clean energies depend on dirty inputs for their production, technological innovation does not suffice to both sustain growth and reduce emissions.76 There are ongoing debates regarding the social and environmental impacts of a clean energy transition,77–79 its implications in terms of the net energy left for other societal uses,79,80 and the emissions that this transition will involve.79 A related argument is that a decline in energy return on energy investment—ie, the ratio between the amount of energy produced and the amount of energy used to produce that energy, therefore a proxy of a net energy surplus—will negatively impact growth81 and that if it falls below a certain minimum ratio, growth might altogether become impossible.82 However, concerns that a shift to renewables could precipitate such a scenario are probably misplaced, as renewables have comparable, if not higher, energy return on energy investment than fossil fuels, when energy returns are measured at the point of use.83,84

In summary, there is little agreement as to whether sufficient absolute decoupling is feasible. One can note a schism on this question between mainstream and ecological economics, and green growth versus post-growth approaches in sustainability science. Although green growth is theoretically possible, and inadequate progress in the past is no proof of future impossibility, the post-growth field suggests taking a precautionary approach, given the historical record and the rapid narrowing of the window to prevent ecological breakdown.85 Post-growth, it should be emphasised, does not state that decoupling economic activity from emissions and getting to net zero emissions is impossible, just that it is made harder by economic growth. For energy and material use, which can only be reduced and never brought to zero, the necessary reductions are easier to achieve with post-growth.

Human wellbeing and social limits to growth

A second motivation behind post-growth research, dating back to the same era as Limits to Growth, is the observation that above a certain level of income, GDP growth does not improve human wellbeing.86 The social limits hypothesis holds that there is a limit to the extent that growth improves subjective wellbeing, because humans adapt to higher levels of income,87 and compare themselves to others who are also getting richer,88 or because additional production goes towards zero-sum status goods.89 The social cost hypothesis is that above a certain level of GDP, the costs of growth (eg, congestion, pollution, mental health, social upheaval) might offset its wellbeing benefits.90 Growth is said to become uneconomic.91

One line of evidence supporting the social limits hypothesis is the much-debated Easterlin paradox, in which self-reported happiness is found to vary directly with income, both between and within nations, but over time the growth of income is not significantly related to the growth of happiness.92 This finding has been challenged93 and it seems that the empirical relationship between growth and happiness depends on the set of countries, the length of period, and the type of wellbeing that is measured.94 Moreover, although income and happiness appear to be related during decreases in GDP, this relationship does not apply during GDP increases.95 New studies that have inspired post-growth research have shown that countries with full employment policies, strong social safety nets, and decommodified public services exhibit increased life satisfaction88,96 and that human relations have a much stronger effect on personal wellbeing than income.97

Research on wellbeing has shown that a wide range of indicators of social outcomes show diminishing returns as GDP per person increases.95 These indicators include the first seven Sustainable Development Goals (no poverty, zero hunger, good health, quality education, gender equity, safe water, and sufficient energy), which, under existing arrangements, are achieved at a GDP of around $15 000 per person (measured in 2011 US purchasing power parity dollars).98 Improvements in social outcomes have been found to be driven primarily by factors other than income, such as public health programmes and other public services.99–101

Tentative support for the social cost thesis comes from research on alternative indicators to GDP.102 The Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), for example, is a more comprehensive metric of progress that, in contrast to GDP, distinguishes between damaging and beneficial activity.3 A meta-analysis of 17 countries finds a general pattern of levelling-off of GPI, and a decoupling of GPI from GDP.3 Globally, GPI per capita peaked in 1978 and has since not increased beyond about $7000 per capita (measured in 2005 US$).

Even if growth above a certain level of income does not improve wellbeing, this does not imply that negative growth benefits wellbeing. The negative effects of recessions on happiness are well established;88 however, positive trends in social outcomes have been observed during some recessions,103 and they have been linked to social bonds104 and public health systems.105 Given concerns with growth linked to overshooting planetary boundaries and fatally undermining human long-term wellbeing, post-growth research asks under which social conditions and with what types of policies could high levels of wellbeing be sustained at low levels of output and resource use.106 In contrast to the utility maximisation approach that underpins GDP, post-growth conceptualises human wellbeing in terms of a wide range of subjective and objective measures of wellbeing, with a focus on satisfying basic needs.106,107

Stagnation and economic limits to growth

Another question is whether growth will continue in economies that have already reached high levels of GDP. High-income countries, such as the USA, Japan, and Italy, are showing signs of declining growth rates or even stagnation.108,109 Per capita GDP growth rates have decreased in these countries over the past 60 years, with a more modest slowdown in the global economy (figure 3).

Economists have sought to explain this trend in several ways. One interpretation is that marginal returns decline as an economy grows and becomes more complex.110 Endogenous growth models, however, claim that knowledge and new ideas can provide increasing returns to capital investment in infrastructure or education that offset diminishing returns.111 New empirical evidence suggests that productivity in research and innovation might be declining, with implications for economic growth.112 Many economists now think that there is a stagnation trend in high-income countries, with explanations focusing either on demand-side and investment-related factors,113,114 or supply-side factors (eg, demographics, education, distribution, energy, and debt).109,115 For the latter, energy is found to account for only a small share of the drag on growth, but this argument assumes that the effect of energy on GDP is small given the small share of energy-related expenditures in total GDP. If energy were to become scarce, which is possible, albeit far from certain, this relationship could change, given that when energy is scarce, it can impose strong constraints on growth.116 During large oil shocks, for example, output growth can substantially fall.117

Whereas an economic slowdown has traditionally been seen as a problem,118 a few recent contributions approach it as the outcome of economic success: high-income countries have reached historically unprecedented levels of output and wealth, and stagnation is the effect of desired developments, such as lower voluntary fertility rates or a shift from manufacturing to services.108 Other studies, however, show that the shift of high-income countries to services has been based on an unequal exchange of labour with low-income and middle-income countries, such that high living standards in the former are subsidised by underpaid agricultural and industrial labour in the latter.54,119

Whatever the underlying reason or one’s attitude toward it, an economic slowdown could prove to be environmentally beneficial.120 Economic research has shown that the desired (or optimal) rate of consumption growth might decline to close to zero if (environmental) risks associated with new technologies and people’s preferences for safety are taken into account.121 From a post-growth perspective, the problem then is not that growth might be coming to an end, but rather that, given that economic and political systems are dependent on growth for their stability,5 stagnation under capitalism poses substantial risks to institutional stability.4 How to prosper without growth therefore becomes a crucial question.5

Post-growth research

Over the past 5 years, research under the labels of post-growth,1 degrowth,122 Doughnut economics,43 wellbeing economics,123 and steady-state economics91 has started sharpening the questions that need to be answered if the goal of prosperity without growth is to be achieved.

Post-growth models and policies

An absence of growth in existing economies can trigger unemployment, inequality, and debt accumulation, as factors that are linked to social instability and diminished wellbeing.4,5 Recent research has explored the conditions under which such outcomes could be averted. An important methodological advance has been the development of several new ecological macroeconomic models.124 These models differ from the original Limits to Growth model by integrating economic and financial variables. Unlike conventional macroeconomic models, which apply an optimisation framework with a single goal (eg, utility, and hence GDP growth), ecological macroeconomic models typically have multiple non-substitutable goals (eg, sustainability, equity, and human wellbeing).125 Models simplify and quantify a complex reality, allowing a range of possibilities to be explored, based on what-if scenarios. However, quantification might miss more qualitative, ambiguous, and context-specific elements that are better captured by mixed, or qualitative approaches, such as case-studies or ethnographies, which are also part of the interdisciplinary toolkit of post-growth research.

Two particularly important ecological macroeconomic models developed to test the possibility of post-growth interventions and trajectories are LowGrow SFC (calibrated with data for Canada126) and Eurogreen (calibrated with data for France127). Different policy measures and assumptions produce different outcomes, but it is notable that scenarios from these two models and countries share some core tendencies (figure 4). In both models, lower growth paths lead to much better climate outcomes. Moreover, good social outcomes are possible when the right policies are implemented. Working-time reduction and a shift from capital-intensive to labour-intensive sectors maintain employment without growth, while a job guarantee (Eurogreen) and additional transfer payments (LowGrow SFC) reduce inequality. Sustainable scenarios combine technology, policy-driven investment strategies, and redistribution in ways that slow growth and environmental impact without compromising wellbeing. Public debt increases, although not to unsustainable levels, whereas household debt declines (figure 4).

Figure 4 Simulating the post-growth transition: case studies from Canada and FranceShow full captionFigure viewer

Reducing working time is crucial in these scenarios because it reduces unemployment, which is the effect of increasing labour productivity in the context of lower or declining growth.5,128 In addition, studies at different scales (national, state, and household) and over time (from the 1990s to the present) show that working time is positively correlated with carbon emissions,129,130 although to date, robust causal models have not been estimated and there is continued debate about the efficacy of working-time reduction as a strategy for climate mitigation.131 Ongoing global trials involving a four-day workweek might provide further insights on such questions.

Carbon and resource taxes are also used in these models. Previous studies provide additional evidence on the utility of these interventions. For example, fuel taxes lead firms to innovate more in clean (and less in dirty) technologies,132 although the transition can be slow unless taxes are combined with heavy research subsidies.133 Questions remain regarding the distributive consequences of carbon taxes134 and their political acceptability.135 Some researchers suggest that redistributive tax designs, such as carbon dividends,136 and inclusive decision-making processes might improve acceptance.137 However, as concluded by a notable economist,138 given political obstacles, “carbon pricing alone at politically plausible levels is unlikely to be particularly effective in reducing emissions from the oil and gas used in the transportation, commercial, and residential sectors [and] economists need to look elsewhere for efficient climate policies”.

Several other policies for a post-growth transition have been proposed, and recent efforts have attempted to synthesise these into coherent packages (table).139 Some of these policies might be compatible with growth, but in the post-growth literature, the objective is to secure good social outcomes (eg, employment and decent living standards) in the absence of growth, and to restructure the economy to be greener, healthier, and more equitable.139 Core proposals include universal basic services (including health care), an unconditional income, a job guarantee, and working-time reductions. Although more research is needed, many of these policies have already been applied in practice, including within controlled experiments. For example, there is growing evidence on the positive social effects of basic income-like cash transfers to economically vulnerable groups.140 There is evidence also that productivity-led working-time reductions can improve environmental outcomes141 and that intensified labour productivity, with no reduction in working time, negatively affects workers’ wellbeing and damages long-term productivity.142 Finally, there is sufficient evidence that universal basic services are directly linked to strong social outcomes. Data from 153 countries show that an increase in public health expenditure is associated with a decrease in both child and adult mortality.143 Data from 193 countries show that universal health coverage is associated with increased life expectancy at birth and increased healthy life expectancy.144 Concerns abound about how to pay for such social policies in a post-growth scenario, and how to do this while also controlling inflation. These are currently being addressed by proponents of these policies through Modern Monetary Theory and public money finance (table).

 DescriptionAdvocates’ case forConcerns or points of debate
Universal basic incomeA monthly income guaranteed to all residents for life, without any requirementCompensates for unpaid care work; reduces inequalities; enables people to engage in non-wage creative activities; decouples survival from employment; removes stigma and bureaucracy associated with conventional benefit systemsIf funded by tax on income or resources, universal basic income might create a dependency on growth to fund it; it might suppress wages or increase rents, as business owners pay less and property owners charge more in the knowledge that workers receive the basic income; environmental pressure might rebound if income is spent on material consumption
Working-time reductionReduction of statutory hours of work per week or yearEnsures high employment in the absence of growth; confers wellbeing and health benefits; reduces environmental pressures; redistributes productivity gains to labourMight reduce purchasing power for workers if hourly pay remains constant (this is not the case, however, for proposals for working time reduction with constant monthly wage); might result in rebounding environmental impacts if free time is used in resource-intensive ways; might increase unemployment if rising labour costs encourage firms to adopt labour-saving strategies
Universal basic servicesGuaranteed access to health care, education, housing, transit, food, and care services for all, without (or with only partly) having to pay for themSecures minimum conditions for decent living regardless of fluctuations in aggregate output; reduces poverty; redistributes access to services; reduces inequalitiesAccess to some services (eg, food and housing) might need means-testing, which can create stigma and could create incentives for people to remain insecure to retain access to these services
Job guaranteeAll residents are guaranteed access to training and employment in essential public worksEliminates involuntary unemployment; reduces poverty and exclusion; can be used to direct labour toward socially and environmentally beneficial activities; can be used to set good labour standards and wages across the whole economyLimited public ownership of means of production constrains the possibility of redirecting the economy through public works; in some countries, the state might have insufficient legitimacy to restructure the economy and it might be unpopular to work for the state; higher wages could prompt labour-saving strategies by capital; higher wages could stimulate more growth
Maximum incomeA maximum permissible total income or a maximum wage differential within an organisation, or society as a wholeLimits inequalities; reduces the excess purchasing power of the rich; reduces unnecessary production and consumption; reduces ecological impactsTax evasion; outmigration of high-paid professionals
Wealth taxProgressive annual tax on asset holdings above a certain thresholdReduces inequalities; distributes wealth more equitably; can be used to fund social and ecological policiesTax evasion; wealth and capital flight
Public moneyCreation of money by the state to spend on social and environmental initiatives; credit policy and taxation are used to reduce excess demand to control inflationIncreases fiscal possibilities; facilitates debt-free money that does not require growth to be repaidPower can be misused to pay for socially and environmentally detrimental projects; might be politically difficult to tax money out of circulation to reduce inflation
Replacing GDPReplace GDP with wellbeing and sustainability indicatorsRemoves distorting role of GDP, which is a poor measure of wellbeing; directs policy to wellbeing and sustainability goalsAbsence of powerful epistemic community to support alternative indicators; GDP accounting entrenched in institutional structures
Cap and adaptCap and phase out fossil fuels, rationing fossil fuel use per countryDirect reduction of emissions; equitable sharing of mitigationMonitoring and enforcement; unlikely to reach more binding international agreement
Green New DealPublic investment programme on the order of 5% of GDP to achieve a just climate transition, coupled with social policiesFast mobilisation of resources for climate mitigation; social justice and reduction of inequalitiesCost, and pressure for growth to pay back investments; environmental injustice against regions where raw materials are extracted from
Carbon taxes or dividendsTax carbon (including on imported goods) and return revenue as a universal dividendIncentivises a shift away from carbon-intensive activities; avoids distributional consequences and conflictNeeds to be very high to have a real effect; few substitution possibilities for many carbon-intensive activities; has lost political momentum

Table

Post-growth-oriented policies

A summary of the main arguments made by advocates of these policies, alongside their most pertinent critiques. Advocates have defended proposals against such critiques; we see these debates as open and marking frontiers for new research.

A core social and economic question concerns the dynamics of inequality in the absence of growth. This question is motivated by Thomas Piketty’s thesis that when GDP growth is lower than the real rate of return to capital (which has historically been around 5%), a greater share of national income can accumulate in the hands of wealth holders.145,146 Data from the USA, China, France, and the UK show rising top income and wealth shares since the 1980s, but with substantial variations due to different country-specific policies and institutions.147 Notably, in Piketty’s dataset, inequalities historically increased after the 1980s in a period when economies did grow, and the great reduction in inequalities in the 20th century was the side-effect of the two wars and the destruction of wealth, as well as the redistributive policies that were brought about by the wars. In low-growth or zero-growth environments, policies that reduce returns to capital (eg, by taxing wealth or by promoting worker ownership) and policies that support a shift to labour-intensive industries (eg, education or health care) can prevent inequality from increasing.145,146 Independently of growth rates, the role of strong trade unions is also crucial in reducing inequalities.148

Beyond economic policy-oriented research, researchers have also sought to conceptualise what post-growth would look like in various domains of life: from innovation149 and urban planning150 to fashion151 or leisure.152 These studies follow a more qualitative approach, often based on case-studies, offering rich hypotheses about cultural, social, and political arrangements that could allow societies to prosper without growth in different contexts.

Growth dependencies

Under existing economic arrangements, growth is regarded as necessary to increase employment, reduce inequalities, and raise tax revenue to pay for public services. How can these growth dependencies be reduced? For instance, how can welfare systems (eg, pensions, education, and health care) be sustained without growth? Researchers have proposed that specific policies can achieve these objectives (table). The difficulty associated with modelling such changes lies in the inability to calibrate them using historical experience. Two approaches have been taken to address this problem. One is to analyse case studies in which individual nations (eg, Japan) have had to manage long-term stagnation.153 The other is to deconstruct the mechanics of growth dependency for particular sectors of the welfare state and generate different institutional possibilities for welfare without growth.154,155

The relationship between social spending and GDP is arguably an important source of growth dependencies. As research on the UK social care sector shows, population ageing and increasing productivity in other sectors that raise the cost of care services, coupled with a privatisation and financialisation of the sector that makes short profits necessary, renders constant growth an imperative for social care providers. But this growth crucially depends on power relations, since there are alternative options for financing care services other than through growth in revenue, yet these are limited by vested interests linked to the privatised organisation of the care sector.155 How to pay for social services without growth is an important question, and a research agenda is now opening on the possibilities of public finance and credit regulation to redirect labour and resources where they are most needed without relying on growth.156

Debates persist about whether capitalist economies have inherent growth imperatives—ie, mechanisms that require growth to keep the economy functioning and that are difficult for individuals, firms, or nation states to circumvent.157 Studies have argued that under conditions of technological innovation, firms are under pressure to accumulate capital to avoid being driven out of business by competitors.157 Debt with interest might also compel growth, at least in the case of private or external debts, although models find that positive interest rates are compatible with non-growing economies if all profits from interest are distributed to households.158 A study of ten historical cases concluded that interest-bearing loans have been problematic in past non-growing and slow-growing economies, and have occasionally been dealt with by cancelling debts or banning compound interest.159

Although post-growth policy frameworks are fairly well developed, there has been less focus on the politics that can make such radical policies possible. One line of research looks at the factors that lock in growth-oriented policies and thus leave little room for alternatives. Historians and social scientists have sought to explain the origins of the political hegemony of growth:160 the dominance of the pursuit of GDP growth as a political objective. Growth might not be an economic imperative in the abstract, this literature suggests, but rather a political imperative, locked in by power relations, institutions, and accounting systems geared towards its pursuit.161 The contemporary preoccupation with GDP first emerged as a response to the need of governments to manage economic production during the Great Depression and the Second World War, whereas growth-targeting became entrenched during the Cold War, linked to the arms race between the two blocs.161 An iterative process between accounting and targeting, and the institutions geared towards the measurement and pursuit of GDP, gradually made growth appear as a natural and unquestionable objective.162 But the success of growth, as a political objective, stems from its function, which was to appease and deflect distributional conflict, becoming a core factor of state legitimacy and political stability.163 Political theorists now debate the effects that an end of growth might have on the legitimacy and stability of liberal democracies.4,164 However, some scholars argue that while a shift to authoritarianism is a strong possibility, social conflict might also, under conditions that remain to be studied, open up paths to deeper and more direct forms of democracy.122

Whereas these accounts suggest that a post-growth transition might be politically difficult for structural reasons, other studies point to promising political possibilities. Survey research shows that most Europeans are in favour of post-growth,165 most scientists (especially climate scientists) are either agnostic towards growth or favourably inclined towards degrowth,166 and interviews with elected members of the European Parliament find a strong current of post-growth ideas among left and green politicians.167 Research on the German Parliament, however, finds that political discourse and practice around growth remains unresponsive to politicians’ individual convictions, because of growth’s entrenched role as a political option to mitigate distributional conflict.168 Promising avenues open when the problem is framed as one of limited resilience due to growth-dependence, and with specific solutions that respond to immediate challenges of stability169 or when prioritising wellbeing rather than averting environmental loss.170

Although there is a vibrant literature on the ways social movements could act as political agents of post-growth,171–173 less attention has been paid to the geopolitical implications of post-growth scenarios, and the risks first movers might face, such as capital flight or a decline in geopolitical power. As with the climate clubs proposed by economists,174 there might be possibilities for post-growth clubs, where nations collaborate around a shared set of post-growth policies and impose penalties on non-participants. The Wellbeing Economy Governments partnership (including Scotland, Iceland, New Zealand, Wales, Finland, and Canada) and the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty (a sort of international agreement on an equitable downscaling of a damaging industry, now signed by many countries), can be seen as steps in this direction.123,175

Living well within limits

Post-growth research on resource use and human wellbeing grapples with two big questions: can wellbeing be achieved at lower levels of resource use than what characterises high-income countries today? And if so, would this allow humanity as a whole to stay within planetary boundaries?

Post-growth research explores both subjective and objective measures of wellbeing, and recent empirical studies agree on two important points. First, there is substantial variation in the levels of resource use and carbon emissions at which good social outcomes are currently secured,176,177 with several middle-income countries achieving social outcomes that match or exceed those of high-income countries.178 Second, there are currently no countries that achieve good social outcomes while staying within their fair share of planetary boundaries (figure 5)—although some, such as Costa Rica, come close.180

Figure 5 Number of social thresholds achieved versus number of biophysical boundaries transgressed for 92 countries in 2015, scaled by per capita GDPShow full captionFigure viewer

Empirical research points therefore to an important conundrum. On the one hand, high-income countries achieve high levels of human wellbeing but significantly overshoot their fair share of planetary boundaries.181,182 The level of resource use of these high-income countries cannot be universalised.177 On the other hand, despite a decline in the amount of energy required to achieve human development goals,183 modelling decent living standards for all within planetary boundaries shows that, under existing conditions, there is very little room for excess or for inequality.184

This research has led to a shift of attention towards alternative provisioning systems and the types of distributional dynamics that could radically change current relationships between resource use and human wellbeing.185 Provisioning systems refer to both physical systems (eg, infrastructure and technology) and social systems (eg, markets, government institutions, and culture). Research shows that by increasing beneficial provisioning factors (eg, public services, income equality, and democratic quality) and reducing other detrimental factors (eg, economic growth beyond moderate levels of affluence), human needs can be met at much lower levels of energy use.186 There is also well established, but in need of updating, empirical evidence that many low-income countries that implement public provisioning systems achieve better health outcomes than much wealthier economies that do not.187 Moreover, the first global decent living energy modelling effort calculates that human needs can be met at a good standard for 10 billion people with levels of energy use that are compatible with 1·5°C.188 A recent review of industrial transformation models and scenarios found that combined supply-side and demand-side measures could reduce current economy-wide material use by 56%, energy use by 40–60%, and greenhouse gas emissions by 70% to net zero.189

North–South dynamics in a post-growth context

In the post-growth literature, there is general agreement that low-income countries should achieve social outcomes similar to those that high-income countries presently enjoy, and should increase production as necessary to achieve these outcomes.7,91 However, the need for resource use contraction and convergence within the world economy raises questions about necessary changes to the structure of the world economy. A core question is how development and resource use in low-income countries links to development and resource use in high-income countries.

Ecological economists have approached this question using environmentally extended input–output data and have found that growth in high-income countries relies on a large net appropriation of materials, energy, land, and labour from the Global South, embodied in traded goods.54,190 World-system scholars in turn have argued that this unequal exchange occurs because richer states are able to leverage their financial and geopolitical power to organise production in the Global South toward supplying global commodity chains, while depressing the prices of labour and resources in the Global South.54,191 This process drains countries in the Global South of their productive capacities that could be used instead to provide for local human needs and achieve development objectives more directly.54,191 This analysis runs counter to dominant narratives in development economics and mainstream policy discourses. However, if this literature is correct, post-growth in high-income countries might be beneficial for low-income countries, to the extent that it reduces or eliminates an unfair appropriation of resources.171,172

However, to the extent that low-income countries have come to depend on exports to high-income countries to maintain employment and service debts,192 post-growth transitions and demand reduction in the latter could have damaging effects in the former, in the absence of policy interventions. The literature on monetary sovereignty193 and industrial policy194 could be helpful in offering insights into how governments in low-income countries can reduce reliance on foreign currency, and mobilise resources, labour, and production around human needs and national development objectives.

Another angle through which questions of human development and growth have been approached is through the literature on post-development and needs-oriented development, which have emerged from the Global South, and which argue that growth should not be pursued as an objective in itself; rather, the focus should be on social outcomes, following local models of human development and wellbeing, rather than a universal Global North growth model.195,196 This literature builds on a long history of growth-critical ideas in some Global South countries, such as India and Bhutan,197 or experiences in countries, such as Tanzania, Iran, and Haiti.198

Lessons learned and knowledge gaps

Independent of what one thinks about the sustainability or desirability of economic growth, given that the world finds itself in a situation of slowing growth coupled with intensifying ecological breakdown, the emerging post-growth research described here asks important questions and offers tentative answers that can help prepare societies for an unstable future.

Post-growth research has established a new generation of national ecological macroeconomic models that make it possible to explore questions of stability and wellbeing without growth, while evaluating in a systemic way the effects of alternative social and economic policies. These models indicate that there are stable post-growth pathways that can allow high-income countries to achieve both social and environmental objectives. Yet these models could still be improved in four ways.

First, there is a need to expand the range of environmental and wellbeing indicators considered.199 Recent extensions include material flows and the ecological footprint.200 It would also be useful to explore whether post-growth scenarios would have positive or negative effects on other environmental variables, such as biodiversity, land-use, and water, or to model broader social measures, such as health and life satisfaction. Second, there is a need to adjust and calibrate the models for geographical and economic contexts other than those of Europe and North America, evaluating alternative development policies and stability questions relevant for Global South economies. Third, national-level models need to be improved to capture international relations and dynamics, accounting for trade, capital, and currency flows—factors that might complicate post-growth scenarios in a single country. And finally, there is a need to extend the national economy approach to global climate economy models that connect to and improve on existing Integrated Assessment Models, so that post-growth mitigation scenarios can be modelled for the IPCC.63 One should expect important developments in all of these fronts in the next 5 years given substantial resources devoted by the EU to related research.11–14

As this Review has shown, there is accumulating evidence on policies that could secure wellbeing without growth in high-income countries (eg, universal access to essential goods and services, working-time reduction, and carbon and wealth taxes). Approaching the question of stability as a problem of growth dependency has helped to identify the institutional factors that link stability to growth, and the alternatives that might break such dependencies. Given that at present no countries are enacting post-growth agendas, small-scale experimentation, such as with basic incomes and working-time reduction, offers a controlled setting for reproducible knowledge, though experimentation must be scaled up and extended to other policies. One interesting direction is participatory action research, such as the Doughnut Economics Action Labs, where stakeholders and members of the public develop post-growth programmes for their cities.201 Stakeholder approaches could also be used for diagnosing and addressing growth dependencies through policy labs. However, there is still a gap concerning policies suitable for Global South contexts and the global institutional arrangements necessary to end unequal exchange between the Global North and the Global South.

There have also been important developments, as noted above, in understanding the factors that allow social outcomes to be decoupled from GDP, such as robust public services and safety nets, income equality, and democratic quality.186 And beyond general contract and converge scenarios between high-income countries and low-income countries, there is a need for sector-by-sector and region-by-region analysis of human needs and resource transformations.

Finally, the question of politics emerges as an important research frontier. Whereas science is advancing on the questions of desired pathways, provisioning systems, and policies for a post-growth economy, we still know little about the politics that could make post-growth transitions possible in reality. A particular blind spot concerns geopolitical relations, and how changes in international governance and world orders open up, or close down, opportunities for post-growth and sovereign development.

Scientific interest in the questions addressed in this Review has increased over the past several years—the IPCC has extended discussions through its Sixth Assessment Report85 and the European Research Council13,14 and the European Commission have supported new research.11,12 Whereas post-growth research has been developed primarily within sustainability science and ecological economics, there are important insights on questions of stability and wellbeing to be offered by many other disciplines. Bringing disciplines together, developing new trans-disciplinary concepts, and integrating empirical studies with theoretical frameworks and models could provide valuable insights into how societies can achieve high wellbeing without economic growth, and within planetary boundaries.

Contributors

GK led the conceptualisation and writing of this Review and compiled the table. JH contributed to conceptualisation and led the writing of the sections on planetary boundaries, wellbeing, and development. DWO, TJ, PAV, KR, JBS, JKS, and DÜ-V contributed to writing this Review. DWO carried out the analysis of the Limits to Growth scenarios and created figures 1, 3, and 5; TJ created figure 2; and PV created figure 4. The data used to prepare the visuals are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

Declaration of interests

GK, JH, and JKS acknowledge support by the European Research Council funding for the REAL project (grant number 101071647). GK and JH’s work is also supported by the María de Maeztu Unit of Excellence (CEX2019–374 000940-M) grant from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. DWO acknowleges support by the EU in the framework of the Horizon Europe Research and Innovation Programme under grant agreement numbers 101094211 (ToBe) and 101137914 (MAPS). TJ and PAV

References

For reference list go here

Planetary Health

Reimagine fire science for the anthropocene 

Jacquelyn K Shuman, Jennifer K Balch, Rebecca T Barnes, Philip E Higuera, Christopher I Roos, Dylan W Schwilk, E Natasha Stavros, Tirtha Banerjee, Megan M Bela, Jacob Bendix … Show more

PNAS Nexus, Volume 1, Issue 3, July 2022, https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgac115

Abstract

Fire is an integral component of ecosystems globally and a tool that humans have harnessed for millennia. Altered fire regimes are a fundamental cause and consequence of global change, impacting people and the biophysical systems on which they depend. As part of the newly emerging Anthropocene, marked by human-caused climate change and radical changes to ecosystems, fire danger is increasing, and fires are having increasingly devastating impacts on human health, infrastructure, and ecosystem services. Increasing fire danger is a vexing problem that requires deep transdisciplinary, trans-sector, and inclusive partnerships to address. Here, we outline barriers and opportunities in the next generation of fire science and provide guidance for investment in future research. We synthesize insights needed to better address the long-standing challenges of innovation across disciplines to (i) promote coordinated research efforts; (ii) embrace different ways of knowing and knowledge generation; (iii) promote exploration of fundamental science; (iv) capitalize on the “firehose” of data for societal benefit; and (v) integrate human and natural systems into models across multiple scales. Fire science is thus at a critical transitional moment. We need to shift from observation and modeled representations of varying components of climate, people, vegetation, and fire to more integrative and predictive approaches that support pathways toward mitigating and adapting to our increasingly flammable world, including the utilization of fire for human safety and benefit. Only through overcoming institutional silos and accessing knowledge across diverse communities can we effectively undertake research that improves outcomes in our more fiery future.

wildfireclimate changeresiliencewildland–urban interfacesocial–ecological systems

Issue Section:

 Perspectives

Editor: Karen E Nelson

Significance Statement

Fires can be both useful to and supportive of human values, safe communities and ecosystems, and threatening to lives and livelihoods. Climate change, fire suppression, and living closer to the wildland–urban interface have helped create a global wildfire crisis. There is an urgent, ethical need to live more sustainably with fire. Applying existing scientific knowledge to support communities in addressing the wildfire crisis remains challenging. Fire has historically been studied from distinct disciplines, as an ecological process, a human hazard, or an engineering challenge. In isolation, connections among human and non-human aspects of fire are lost. We describe five ways to re-envision fire science and stimulate discovery that help communities better navigate our fiery future.

Introduction

Fire is a long-standing natural disturbance and a fundamental component of ecosystems globally (1). Fire is also an integral part of human existence (2), used by people to manage landscapes for millennia (3). As such, fire—or broadly biomass burning—can take on many forms: fires managed for human benefit or ecosystem health include prescribed or cultural burning, and response management beyond suppression; fires viewed as an immediate threat to human values are typically suppressed, and under increasingly extreme conditions have an increased chance of escaping suppression efforts. Fires can be ignited intentionally (e.g. prescribed or cultural burning and arson) or unintentionally (e.g. accidental human-caused or lightning-caused). They can happen in the wildlands and into human developed areas as in the wildland–urban interface (WUI). In the Anthropocene (The Anthropocene currently has no formal status in the Divisions of Geologic Time. https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2018/3054/fs20183054.pdf), the current era characterized by the profound influence of human impacts on planetary processes and the global environment (4), fires from lightning and unplanned human-related ignitions (including arson; henceforthreferenced as wildfires)  result in increasingly negative impacts on economic (e.g. loss of structures and communities), public health (e.g. loss of life, air pollution, and water and soil contamination), and ecological aspects of society (e.g. shifts in vegetation and carbon storage) (5).

Recent decades have seen a substantial increase globally in the length of fire seasons (6), the time of year when conditions are conducive to sustain fire spread, increased area burned in many regions, and projected increases in human exposure and sensitivity to fire disasters (7–11). Fire seasons are occurring months earlier in Arctic and boreal regions (12). In the western United States, the area burned in the 21st century has nearly doubled compared to the late 20th century, enabled by warmer and drier conditions from anthropogenic climate change, resulting in dry, flammable vegetation (13). Fire activity in the 21st century is increasingly exceeding the range of historical variability characterizing boreal (14) and Rocky Mountain subalpine (15) forest ecosystems for millennia. Unprecedented fires in the Pantanal tropical wetland in South America (16) and ongoing peatland fires across tropical Asia (17) exemplify the global scope of recent fire extremes.

Shifts in wildfire patterns can come with increasingly negative human and ecological impacts. Globally, dangerous smoke levels are more common as a result of wildfires (9101819). The 2019 to 2020 Australian wildfire season produced fires that were larger, more intense, and more numerous than in the historical record (20), injecting the largest amount of smoke into the stratosphere observed in the satellite era (2122) and impacting water supplies for millions of residents (23). While extreme fire events capture public attention and forest fire emissions continue to rise (2425), the ongoing decline of burned-area across some fire-dependent ecosystems might have equally large social and environmental impacts. Global burned area has decreased by approximately 25% over the last two decades, with the strongest decreases observed across fire-dependent tropical savanna ecosystems and attributed to human interactions (26). Decreases across these systems are important, as maintaining diverse wildfire patterns can be essential for biodiversity or achieving conservation goals (27).

Humans are fundamental drivers of changing wildfire activity via climate change, fire suppression, land development, and population growth (2628–30). Human-driven climate change is aggravating fire danger across western North America (133132), Europe (3334), and Australia (35). Exacerbated by this increasing fire danger from heavy fuel loads and greater flammability from drought and tree mortality, human-caused ignitions increased wildfire occurrence and extended fire seasons within parts of the United States (28), and it is these human-caused wildfires that are most destructive to homes and property (36). Concurrent with these challenges is a growing recognition that Indigenous peoples have been living with fire as an essential Earth-system process (30). Although some Indigenous societies have lived in relatively low-density communities, others have lived at scales analogous to the modern wildland-urban interface for centuries, making Indigenous fire lessons relevant for the sustainability of post-industrial communities as well (e.g. (37)).

As wildfire danger increases, we are only beginning to understand longer-term postfire impacts. These include regeneration failure of vegetation (3839), changes to biodiversity through interactions with climate change, land use and biotic invasions (27), landslides and debris flows (40), contaminated water and soil (2341), and exposure to hazardous air quality for days to weeks in regions that can extend thousands of kilometers from smoke sources (9101942). Increasing wildfire activity and associated negative impacts are expected to continue over the 21st century, as greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise (74344).

The rapid pace of changing fire activity globally is a significant challenge to the scientific community, in both understanding and communicating change. Even the metrics we use to quantify “fire” come up short in many instances. For example, total area burned and ecological fire severity are useful for characterizing some key dimensions of fire, but often do not capture negative human impacts. For example, the 2021 Marshall Fire in Colorado, United States, was less than 2,500 hectares, but was more destructive, in terms of structures lost, than the two largest wildfires in recorded Colorado history, each of which burned approximately 80,000 hectares. The 2018 Mati Fire in Greece burned only 1,276 hectares, but destroyed or damaged 3,000 homes and was the second-deadliest weather-related disaster in Greece (11). While evidence suggests increasing aridity will lead to more burning (7324345), the 2021 Marshall Fire and 2018 Mati Fire remind us that area burned is a poor indicator of the negative impacts of wildfires on the built environment.

Given the shifts in wildfire activity and its increasingly devastating impacts, the need to fund research and adopt policy to address fire-related challenges continues to grow. These challenges may be best addressed with coordinated proactive and collective governance through engagement of scientists, managers, policy-makers, and citizens (23). A recent United Nations’ report recognized extreme wildfires as a globally relevant crisis, highlighting the scope of this challenge (46). To address this crisis we need to recast how we study fire as an inherently transdisciplinary, convergent research domain to find solutions that cross academic, managerial, and social boundaries. As society urgently looks for strategies to mitigate the impacts of wildfires, the scientific community must deliver a coherent understanding of the diverse causes, impacts, management paths, and likely future of fire on Earth that considers the integrated relationships between humans and fire. Humans are not only affected by fire, but are also fundamental to its behavior and impact through our changes to the biosphere and our values, behaviors, and conceptions of risk.

The challenge of understanding the integrated role of humans and fire during the Anthropocene is an opportunity to catalyze the next generation of scientists and scientific discovery. It requires funding that develops collaborative, transdisciplinary science, dissolves disciplinary boundaries, and aligns research goals across traditional academic fields and ways of knowing. This represents an opportunity to build scientific practices that are respectful and inclusive of all, by creating spaces to share and co-produce knowledge between and among all stakeholders. Such practice demands multi-scale data collection and analysis to develop models that test our understanding, support safer communities, and provide long-term projections. By reinventing the training of scientists to reflect this transdisciplinary, multi-stakeholder, and data-driven approach, we can help revolutionize community practices and provide information needed by communities to be able to better live with fire—in all its forms—in our increasingly flammable world.

Here we identify five key challenges as a call to action to advance the study of fire as a fundamental aspect of life on Earth (Fig. 1).

  1. Integrate across disciplines by promoting coordination among physical, biological, and social sciences.
  2. Embrace different ways of knowing and knowledge generation to identify resilience pathways.
  3. Use fire as a lens to address fundamental science questions.
  4. Capitalize on the “firehose” of data to support community values.
  5. Develop coupled models that include human dimensions to better anticipate future fire.

We need a proactive fire research agenda to support human values and create safe communities as impacts from lightning and unplanned human-caused wildfires increase in the Anthropocene. Such an agenda will span multiple disciplines and translate understanding to application while answering fundamental science questions, incorporating diverse and inclusive partnerships for knowledge coproduction, capitalizing on the wealth of new and existing data, and developing models that integrate human dimensions and values.

Fig. 1.

We need a proactive fire research agenda to support human values and create safe communities as impacts from lightning and unplanned human-caused wildfires increase in the Anthropocene. Such an agenda will span multiple disciplines and translate understanding to application while answering fundamental science questions, incorporating diverse and inclusive partnerships for knowledge coproduction, capitalizing on the wealth of new and existing data, and developing models that integrate human dimensions and values.

Open in new tabDownload slide

These challenges are a synthesis of discussions of a group of mainly US-based researchers at the National Science Foundation’s Wildfire in the Biosphere workshop. The challenges of fire science extend beyond national borders, and our hope is that funding agencies, land stewards, and the larger fire science research community will join to address them. Within each call-to-action challenge we describe the nature of the challenge, address the social impacts, identify fundamental scientific advances necessary, and propose pathways to consider across communities as we address our place in a more fiery future (Table S1, Supplementary Material). Acting on these challenges will assist in better addressing the immediate impacts of fire, as well as postfire impacts (e.g. landslides and vegetation shifts). The focus on immediate needs is not meant to undermine the importance of longer-term impacts of fires, which in many ways are less understood, rather to highlight their urgency.

Discussion

1: Challenge: Integrate across disciplines by promoting coordination among physical, biological, and social sciences

Wildfire is a biophysical and social phenomenon, and thus its causes and societal impacts cannot be understood through any single disciplinary lens.

While studied for over a century, wildland fire science often remains siloed within disciplines such as forestry, ecology, anthropology, economics, engineering, atmospheric chemistry, physics, geosciences, and risk management. Within each silo, scientists often exclusively focus on fire from a specific perspective—fires as a human hazard, fire as a management tool, or fire as an ecological process. Collectively, we have deep knowledge about specific pieces of fire science; however, to move fire science forward and answer fundamental questions about drivers and impacts of fire, we must break out of traditional silos (e.g. institutional type, research focus, and academic vs. management) (47) to a more holistic and integrated approach across social (48), physical, and biological sciences, and including Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) (49) (see Challenge 2).

Fire affects every part of the Earth system: the atmosphere, biosphere, hydrosphere, and lithosphere and plays a critical role in local to global water, carbon, nutrient, and climatic cycles by mediating the transfer of mass and energy at potentially large scales and in discrete pulses. Ecosystems and fire regimes are changing; we need to be prepared to anticipate tipping points and abrupt transitions to novel or alternative states. To fully understand the causes and consequences of shifting fire regimes, we must accept fire as a process with feedbacks between social and ecological systems while increasing respect among diverse communities (e.g. (50)). Rethinking collaborations across disciplines provides opportunities to determine shared values and goals (51) as well as new modes of practice that dismantle inequitable and exclusionary aspects of our disciplines (52). Team dynamics are particularly important in multidisciplinary collaborations given the varied experiences, expertise, and discipline-specific language used by team members. In many cases, these differences, in addition to the historical and systematic inequities within STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) fields (e.g. (5354)) have kept disciplines siloed and some groups excluded (55).

We need to build upon the adaptive, integrated knowledge, and “use-inspired” approaches, such as those put forth by Kyker-Snowman et al. (56) and Wall et al. (57), by including empiricists, modelers, practitioners, and domain experts from broad disciplines where they are involved at every stage of data collection, idea development, and model integration. In this approach, the two-way exchange of ideas is emphasized in order to effectively incorporate domain expertise and knowledge into models of systems that can not only improve understanding, but eventually move toward forecasting capability (see Challenge 5).

2: Challenge: Embrace different ways of knowing and knowledge generation to identify resilience pathways

Fire is an intrinsic part of what makes humans human, such that all humans from diverse groups and perspectives can provide valuable insights; thus co-produced knowledge is a prerequisite to innovation in fire science.

Given the urgent need to reduce wildfire disaster losses and to promote pathways to live sustainably with fire, it is critical to integrate knowledge from across disciplinary, organization, and community boundaries (58). Knowledge coproduction offers a model that identifies and produces science needed to drive change (59) through iterative, sustained engagement with key stakeholders (60). Specifically, development of mitigation tools and strategies enables social–ecological systems to transform from a resistance mindset to a resilience mindset (61).

There exist millennia of knowledge by Indigenous peoples of Tribal Nations that hold Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) of ancient burning practices (62–66) used to maintain healthy ecosystems. Indigenous and non-Indigenous place-based societies, such as traditional fire practitioners in Europe and elsewhere, have used fire to safeguard communities, promote desired resources, and support cultural lifeways for centuries to millennia (374967–72). Working together, scientists from diverse cultural perspectives can co-define resilience across ecocultural landscapes (73), using this knowledge to identify perspectives of resilience to wildfire (7274). Our fire science community needs to work with diverse communities to determine what is valuable, generating needed information on risk scenarios and potential resilience pathways in the face of a changing climate, while upholding data principles that respect Tribal sovereignty and intellectual property (75).

We must accept fire as a social–ecological phenomenon that operates across multiple scales in space and time: fire acutely affects ecosystems, humans, and the biosphere; fire is a selective pressure and driver of ecological change; and humans, including various management practices, influence fire behavior and impacts. We need to understand where vulnerable communities are before wildfires occur, to build better, create defensible spaces around homes, reduce unintended human ignitions (e.g, downed power lines), and promote Indigenous management strategies and prescribed burning practices where they could mitigate disaster risk (37). Returning fire to landscapes and developing a culture of fire tailored to specific settings is increasingly seen as the most effective path forward. We repeatedly converged on the need for “sustainable” strategies for human communities to coexist with fire and smoke to become more aligned with TEK. Our authorship group, however, reflective of STEM disciplines more broadly, consists of non-Indigenous scientists. This situation emphasizes the need to prioritize collaboration with Indigenous scientists and community partners in developing ways to adapt to fire in a changing world.

It is critical to recognize the human role in using fire in the environment, and bring that into our understanding of adapting management for a more firey world. In turn, this can inform development of coupled models (see Challenge 5) representing fire as a human–biophysical phenomenon and can be used for management. To do so, we need to understand different value systems and develop metrics through co-production, thus collectively defining what success looks like for all stakeholders. This perspective provides scientific support for adaptive management and policy in the face of continuing human-caused change, including climate change. The resist–accept–direct (RAD) framework is explicitly designed to guide management through ecological transformations (76), a scenario increasingly likely with unprecedented climate change and enabled by fire. Because fire can catalyze social and ecological transformations, the RAD framework will be particularly useful for coming decades. Applying decision frameworks such as RAD requires incorporating human values, perceptions, and dynamism into fire management, within and beyond natural sciences (5177). Thus, the process itself offers potential for transdisciplinary innovation and inclusion of different ways of knowing (e.g. TEK) by requiring interdisciplinary engagement, including paleo scientists, ecologists, traditional knowledge holders, cultural anthropologists, archeologists, remote sensing experts, modelers, policy scientists, and community and government partners.

In addition to working across disciplines, we need to be aware of extant systems of oppression inherent in Western science (78). The lack of diversity among knowledge contributors in co-produced science and among scientists themselves fundamentally limits innovation, applicability, as well as being fundamentally unjust (79). Furthermore, as fire is a global ecosystem process, the research community should reflect a similar breadth in perspectives (80). However, fire science, not unlike many STEM fields, has problems with representation across all axes of identity, including gender, race, ethnicity, LGBTQA+, and disability (e.g. 81). For example, the majority of our authorship group work at US institutions, likely limiting the scope of our discussions. To change course, we need to interrogate our own practices and limit opportunities for bias. Providing clarity and transparency about and throughout decision-making processes (e.g. grants, job postings, and publications), training reviewers about bias, requiring the use of rubrics for all evaluations, and anonymizing application materials whenever possible, are all effective strategies to reduce gender and racial bias (82). Given the importance of representation, as a community we need to elevate a diverse group of role models (83), e.g. highlighting notable accomplishments of women-identifying fire scientists (84). To embrace diverse knowledge requires explicit consideration of equity in stakeholder participation and fire science recruitment and training from underrepresented backgrounds.

3: Challenge: Use fire as a lens to address fundamental science questions

We should use fire to answer fundamental scientific questions within and across physical, biological, and social sciences.

Fire is a ubiquitous and pervasive phenomenon, historically studied and tested in natural philosophy and scientific disciplines (85). It is also an ancient phenomenon with strong impacts on the Earth system and society across scales. Thus, fire is an excellent subject for asking basic questions in physical, biological, and social sciences. Here, we present three fundamental science areas that use fire to understand change: (a) ecology and evolutionary biology; (b) the evolution of Homo sapiens; and (c) social dynamics.

Fire is a catalyst for advances in ecology and evolutionary biology, providing a lens to examine how life organizes across scales and how organismal, biochemical, and physiological traits and fire-related strategies evolve. Consequently, fire ecology provides a framework for predicting effects of dramatic environmental changes on ecosystem function and biodiversity across spatial and temporal scales (2786), especially where fire may have previously not been present or has been absent for extended periods (e.g. (87)). Research is needed that targets the synergy of theoretical, experimental, and modeling approaches exploring the fundamental evolutionary processes of how organisms and communities function in dynamic and diverse fire environments. Fire allows researchers to investigate the fundamental and relative roles of traits and strategies across plant, animal, and microbial communities (27), and evaluate the influence of smoke on the function of airborne microbial communities (88), photosynthesis (89), and aquatic systems (90). A focus on fire has advanced evolutionary theory through the understanding of the evolution of plant traits and subsequent influence on the fire regime and selective environment, i.e. feedbacks (91). Fire–vegetation feedbacks may have driven the diversification and spread of flowering plants in the Cretaceous era (9293). This hypothesis builds upon processes observed at shorter time scales (e.g. the grass–fire cycle; (94)) and suggests flowering plants fueled fire that opened space in gymnosperm-dominated forests. This functional diversity can be parameterized into land surface models (see Challenge 5) by using phylogenetic lineage-based functional types to characterize vegetation, and could enhance the ecological realism of these models (95). Critically needed is an understanding of the reciprocal effects of fire and organismal life history characteristics and functional traits that characterize Earth’s fire regimes.

Fire provides an important lens through which we interpret major processes in human evolution. For example, the pyrophilic primate hypothesis (96) leverages observations from primatology (97) and functional generalization from other fire-forager species (98) to suggest that fire was critical for the evolution of larger-brained and big-bodied Homo erectus in sub-Saharan Africa by 1.9 million years ago. These populations relied upon fire-created environments and may have expanded burned areas from natural fire starts, all without the ability to start fires on their own. Fire-starting became a staple technology around 400,000 years ago (99), after which human ancestors could use fire in fundamentally new ways, including to further change their own selective environment (100). For example, at least some Neandertal (H. sapiens neandertalensis) groups in Europe used fire to intentionally change their local environment more than 100,000 years ago (101), and Middle Stone Age people (H. sapiens sapiens) in east Africa may have done the same shortly thereafter (3).

Fire illuminates social dynamics and can be a lens through which we examine fundamental issues in human societies, and even the dynamics of gendered knowledge (102). Specifically, fire questions convenient assumptions about population density and human–environmental impacts. For example, small populations of Maori hunter–gatherers irreversibly transformed non-fire-adapted South Island New Zealand plant communities when they arrived in the 13th century CE (103104), whereas large populations of Native American farmers at densities comparable to the modern WUI subtly changed patch size, burn area, and fire–climate relations in fire adapted pine forests over the past millennium (37). Similarly, in an ethnographic context much Aboriginal burning is done by women (105) and male uses of fire tend to have different purposes (106) with potential implications for varied social and environmental pressures on gendered fire uses, goals, and outcomes.

Answering fundamental fire science questions about evolutionary biology and the dynamics of human societies could help illuminate the role of humans in cross-scale pyrogeography. This is especially important in the Anthropocene as species, communities, and ecosystems arising from millennial-scale evolutionary processes respond to new disturbance regimes and novel ecosystem responses (107). Moreover, with increasing extreme fire behavior in many regions (161735108), human societies must learn to live more sustainably with fire in the modern context (109). Fire is a catalyst for exploring fundamental questions and highlights the need for interagency fire-specific funding programs to support basic science. The direct benefits to society of fire research are well-acknowledged, but fire scientists are not organized as a broad community to argue for coordinated efforts to support basic science. Current fire-focused funding sources are usually limited to narrowly applied projects, while funders of basic science treat fire as a niche area. The result is duplicated efforts and competition for limited funds instead of coordination across an integrated fire science community.

4: Challenge: Capitalize on the “firehose” of data to support community values

We need funding to harness the data revolution and aid our understanding of fire.

The volume, type, and use of data now available to study fire in the biosphere is greater than ever before—a metaphorical “firehose” delivering vast amounts of information. Multidisciplinary science campaigns to study fire behavior and emissions are data intensive and essential for improving applications from local, regional, to global scales (e.g. ABoVE (110), MOYA (111), FASMEE (112), FIREX-AQ (113), MOYA/ZWAMPS (114), and WE-CAN (115)). Observation networks supported by the US National Science Foundation (e.g. NEON, National Ecological Observatory Network, 116) and the Smithsonian sponsored ForestGEO plots (117118) are uniquely valuable for the duration and intensity of data collection. Additionally, there are dozens of public satellites, and even more private ones, orbiting the planet collecting remote-sensing data related to pre-, active, and post-fire conditions and effects, thereby facilitating geospatial analysis from local, to regional, and global scales (119120). Terabases of genome-level molecular data on organisms spanning from microbes to plants and animals are readily generated (121). Finally, laboratory, field, and incident data exist like never before, where in the past there was limited availability.

While these data exist, there are challenges with the spatial and temporal frequency and coverage and duration of observations. Airborne flight campaigns cover a limited domain in space and time, while geostationary satellites provide high temporal resolution with relatively coarse spatial resolution and polar orbiting satellites provide higher spatial resolution, but lower temporal resolution. These tradeoffs in resolution and coverage lead to different data sources providing conflicting estimates of burned area (122123). We need investment in laboratory and field infrastructure for studying fire across a range of scales and scenarios (124) and continued work comparing and accounting for biases across existing data streams. We must develop infrastructure and support personnel to collect real-time observation data on prescribed or cultural fires (125) and wildfires in both wildlands and the wildland-urban interface across scales: from the scale of flames (i.e. centimeters and seconds) to airshed (kilometers and hours), to fire regimes (regions and decades).

Furthermore, many measures of fire processes and impacts are inferred from static datasets (126), while fires and their effects are inherently dynamic; collecting observations that capture these dynamics, such as the response of wind during a fire event, would greatly reduce uncertainties in forecasting the impacts of fire on social–ecological systems. For fast-paced, local processes like fire behavior and the movement of water and smoke, we need more high frequency observations from laboratory and field-based studies, such as the role of flame-generated buoyancy in fire spread (127), to update empirical relationships, some established by decades-old research and still used in models (128129). For centennial- to multi-millennial processes covering regions and continents, we need paleoclimate and paleoecological data sets that cover the variation in fire regimes (e.g. low severity vs. high severity) across ecoregions (130131).

We need technologies that collect data relevant for better understanding fire impacts on ecosystems and humans. New technology (e.g. ground-, air-, and space-borne lidars, radars, [hyperspectral] spectrometers, and [multispectral] radiometers) would enable measurements to help characterize surface and atmospheric structure and chemistry and better understand human land cover and land use in conjunction with fire impacts on air and water quality, ecosystems, and energy balance. We must use molecular techniques to capture the direct and indirect effects of soil heating on soil organic matter composition (132), belowground biological communities (133134), organism physiology (135), and ecosystem function processes (136). Finally, laboratory work can help better understand the mechanisms of heat transfer (137138), firebrand ember generation, behavior and transport (139140), atmospheric emissions (141), and transformation of fire plumes (115).

One challenge is that these data are not well-integrated for studying fire disturbance, as many were not specifically designed to examine the causes or effects of fire within an integrated social–ecological construct. For example, the use of diverse sets of multi-scale (tree, patch, local, and regional landscape) and multi-proxy records (pollen and charcoal, tree-ring fire scars, tree cohort analysis, inventories, photographic imagery, surveys, and simulation modeling) can be used to determine structure, tree-species composition and fire regimes (72142), and departures from historical ranges of variability (15143). However, this type of integrated historical data across a spatiotemporal continuum is not readily accessible to fire scientists, policy-makers, and communities. Current capabilities of remote sensing measurements of vegetation properties (144) are also not easily ingested as relevant information for more traditional fire models (145). Finally, there is limited access to global datasets of research-quality event-based data (24146–149), which is necessary to advance the understanding of human and biophysical processes of fire.

Many of these data are housed in disciplinary databases, such as the International Multiproxy Paleofire Database (150), which can be challenging for nonspecialists to access and use. We need to compile and merge these diverse data across spatial (m2 to Earth System) and temporal (milli-seconds to millennia) scales to support integration across disciplines, research groups, and agencies. Previous work provides an extensible framework for co-aligned airborne and field sampling to support ecological, microbiological, biogeochemical, and hydrological studies (112151). This work can be used to inform integration and coordination of data collection across platforms (field and remotely sensed), scales (flame to airshed), and systems (atmosphere, vegetation, soil, and geophysical), to establish a network that will produce long-term, open-access, and multi-disciplinary datasets related to fire science. This effort requires a reevaluation of how we collect data, ensuring we do so in ways that address key societal needs (e.g. aiding in human adaptability and maintenance of biodiversity). It highlights the need to coordinate across laboratory, field, and model-based research in designing future campaigns to develop, not only a common platform, but also a common language and coordinated data management across disciplines. Standardized data collection (e.g. observables, units, and so on) and protocols for quality control, archiving, and curation will be essential to merge existing datasets (90) and create new ones.

In support of increased utility, we need to establish and use common metadata standards and a community of practice for open algorithms and code, informed by the FAIR data principles making data and code Findable on the web, digitally Accessible, Interoperable among different computing systems, and thus Reusable for later analyses (152), and data literacy communities such as PyOpenSci (https://www.pyopensci.org/) and ROpenSci (https://ropensci.org/). Implementation of FAIR principles are complemented by the CARE (Collective benefit, Authority to control, Responsibility, and Ethics) principles that protect Indigenous sovereignty and intellectual property (75). This requires not only building coordination among federal agencies, but also with state, local, and Tribal governments and institutions. Such a community of practice, exemplary of ICON (Integrated, Collaborative, Open, Networked) science principles and practices (153), would facilitate more frequent collaborations across disciplines and lead to convergent research and data-intensive scientific discovery.

By compiling and merging diverse datasets, we can remove barriers to searching, discovering, and accessing information across disciplines, thereby accelerating scientific discovery to understand drivers and impacts of fire, helping support the development of more fire-resilient communities. There is considerable potential to harness this data revolution and explore cross-disciplinary research in the form of biomimicry adapted from long-term parallels from flora, fauna, and Indigenous peoples’ responses to fire (154), management planning with Potential Operational Delineations (PODs; (155)), and digital twins (156) that use coupled models including human dimensions (see Challenge 5) to adapt and test historical parallels and potential solutions for human communities and broader social–ecological systems.

5: Challenge: Develop coupled models that include human dimensions to better anticipate future fire

To better anticipate future fire activity and its impacts on and feedback with social–ecological systems, we must develop coupled models that integrate human- and non-human dimensions.

We need modeling frameworks that better represent fire in a social–ecological system, and that can be applied across multiple spatial and temporal scales spanning wildland–rural–urban gradients (81120). Such frameworks should capture differences between managed and unmanaged fire as they relate to: preceding conditions, ignition sources (28), fire behavior and effects on ecosystems, humans, and the biosphere. Making this distinction between managed and unmanaged fire in modeling is essential to characterizing changes in the natural system due to the influence from human behavior (26). Fire has been a primary human tool in ecosystem management (30), and thus unraveling the variability in human–fire interactions over space and time (see Challenges 2 and 3) is necessary for understanding fire in the biosphere (263069). There are multiple types of models that can benefit from better accounting for human interactions.

First, an improved forecasting system is needed to project both managed (e.g. prescribed burn and wildfire response) and unmanaged (i.e. wildfire) fire spread and smoke behavior, transport, and transformation (112). This can aid society’s strategic and managed response to fire in terms of community resilience (4774). Models of fire behavior and effects span spatial and temporal scales, but fundamental to each is the consideration of fuels, vegetation, and emissions. We must work to capture fuel heterogeneity, including the physiological dynamics that influence vegetation fuel loading (157), fuel moisture (158159), and the flammability of live and dead vegetation (160161). Fuel moisture and its variation in space and time have the capacity to alter fire behavior (162) and ecosystem vulnerability to wildfire (163). Currently, most models do not capture both these types of fuels and plant physiological dynamics, despite both influencing fire behavior, effects, and subsequently land surface recovery. Several wildfire propagation models exist ranging from empirical to process-based (127164), but they either entirely focus on wildlands (112164) or pertain to limited aspects to wildfire behavior in communities focusing on interactions among a group of structures (165) and not on the heterogeneous landscapes of the wildland-urban interface (166167). We are making significant advances in capturing the impacts of fire on winds during an event (164) as well as on local weather conditions (168169), which both have the capacity to alter fire behavior and path. Advances in analytical approaches are making it possible to model community vulnerability (170) and risk (171) from a fire propagation perspective while accounting for the interaction between structures (172). However, to date, we do not have consensus on a model to assess the survivability of individual structures from wildfire events, as available urban fire spread models are not designed for these communities and underestimate the fire spread rate in most cases (172). Developing such models is vital for determining how to manage wildfire risk at the community level.

Second, land surface models, which simulate the terrestrial energy, water, and carbon cycle, often represent fire occurrence and impacts, but omit key aspects or are parameterized in a simple manner (173). As such, there is a need to develop fire models within land surface models that integrate fire behavior and effects representative of the social–ecological environment within which humans interact with fires and subsequently influence impacts to terrestrial energy, water, and carbon cycles. The current generation of fire-enabled land surface models demonstrate that a lot of uncertainty is due to how the human impact on fires is currently characterized, and exemplifies the need for a better representation of human dimensions within global fire models (174–177). Relationships between people and fire are driven by interactions between the social environment in which humans act (e.g. livelihood system, land tenure, and land use), the physical environment (e.g. background fire regime, landscape patterns, and land management legacies), and the policy sphere. The current generation of fire-enabled land surface models are not able to represent fire in this social–ecological environment, and thus struggle to capture both historical changes in global fire occurrence (26), as well as how these changes have impacted ecosystems and society with sufficient regional variability in the timing and type of human impacts on fires (174175). Additionally, current land surface models do not represent mixed fuel types between natural vegetation, managed land, and the built-environment, which influence fire spread, characteristics, and impact directly. Land surface models rarely include the effects of fire on organic matter (i.e. pyrogenic organic matter production (178), or the nonlinear effects of repeated burning on soil carbon stocks (179)). As this likely plays an important role in the net carbon balance of wildfires (178), these omissions may amount to oversights in estimates of the impact of fires on carbon stocks (180). While land surface models often include simplified postfire vegetation dynamics for seed dispersal and tree seedling establishment, competition during succession, formation of large woody debris, and decomposition (e.g. (157181)), they exclude the influence humans have on these processes through land management.

Third, fire-enabled Earth system models, which seek to simulate the dynamic interactions and feedbacks between the atmosphere, oceans, cryosphere, lithosphere, and land surface (as such incorporate land surface models), use a simplistic representation of fire simulating aggregate burned area rather than the spread and perimeters of individual fires (182). This is a challenge for projecting the broad-scale impacts of fire on ecosystem resilience and functioning, because the temporal and spatial patterns of fire that vary as a function of managed vs. unmanaged fire, underpin whether and how ecosystems recover (183184). This further affects smoke emission speciation, formation, and behavior of greenhouse gases, aerosols, and secondary pollutants that affect the climate system (185186) through the absorption and scattering of solar radiation and land surface albedo changes. Our limited understanding is due in part to challenges related to representing this complexity and the resulting processes and impacts within and across interacting model grid cells.

There is a need for the infrastructure to implement and nest models across multiple scales, linking from fine to coarse temporal and spatial scales and including a two-way coupling to allow interaction between models. This would, for example, allow Earth system models to better capture changing vegetation and fuels through time, as modeled in land surface models; this in turn would help modelers capture finer-scale dynamics such as interactions between fire and weather and human interactions with individual fire events (e.g. suppression efforts). Reducing uncertainties across scales provides an opportunity to use data-assimilation to benchmark against multiple types of data at sites, for various scales, fires (prescribed/cultural and wild), and under variable conditions (see Challenge 4). Advanced analytics in machine learning and artificial intelligence can help ease computational complexity (187–189) in such an integrated framework.

Nested, coupled modeling frameworks that integrate across physical, biological, and social systems will not only enhance our understanding of the connections, interactions, and feedbacks among fire, humans, and the Earth system, but also enable adaptation and resilience planning if we create metrics to gauge the response of social–ecological systems to fire (e.g. (126190)). These metrics would include fire impacts on ecosystem services, human health, ecosystem health, and sustainable financing through policies on fire suppression, air and water quality, and infrastructure stability. Recent progress in understanding the characteristics of western United States community archetypes, their associated adaptation pathways, and the properties of fire-adapted communities (191192) should be explored across a diverse set of communities and used to inform such metrics.

Metrics for risk and resilience would need to be incorporated in these nested, coupled models that include human dimensions so that projections before, during, and after a fire could allow for informed decision-making. Risk includes not only the hazard, or potential hazard, of fire, but the exposure (directly by flame or indirectly from smoke) and vulnerability, as susceptibility, to be negatively impacted by the hazard; all of which are different for managed vs. unmanaged fire (20108143). Using models to quantify risk could, for example, guide planned management shifts from fire suppression to increased use of prescribed burning as an essential component for managing natural resources (143193194), but is currently challenging to implement due to smoke effects (195). Next-generation, integrated human–fire models are necessary to help managers both locally, those who use prescribed fire near communities (125196), and regionally or nationally, those who report emissions. While such a comprehensive framework would address the specific needs of different stakeholders and policy-makers, it would also be accessible and broadly comprehensible to the general public (e.g. fire paths forecast), similar to existing national warning systems for hurricanes and tornadoes. A focus on community resilience to wildfires expands the definition of risk beyond human impact to consider ecological and biological risk more holistically, as well as their role in a coupled social–ecological system. Integrating human behavior and decision dynamics into a nested modeling framework would allow for another dimension of feedback and interactions. Thus, integration of data and processes across scales within a nested, coupled modeling framework that incorporates human dimensions creates opportunities to both improve understanding of the dynamics that shape fire-prone systems and to better prepare society for a more resilient future with increased fire danger.

Conclusion

Now in the emerging era of the Anthropocene, where climate change and decoupling of historical land management have collided, society needs large-scale investment in the next generation of fire science to help us live more sustainably in our increasingly flammable world. Fire is a complex phenomenon that has profound effects on all elements of the biosphere and impacts human activities on a range of spatial and temporal scales. We need a proactive fire research agenda. Fire science has been reactive in that it responds to agency opportunities and conducts research in response to past fires. It is essential that we transition from this reactive stance to proactively thinking about tomorrow’s needs by acknowledging and anticipating future fire activity. This next generation of fire science will require significant new investment for a center that synthesizes across disciplines (Challenge 1), is diverse and inclusive (Challenge 2), innovative (Challenge 3), and data-driven (Challenge 4), while integrating coupled models that consider human dimensions and values (Challenge 5 ) (Fig. 1Table S1, Supplementary Material).

One cause of current fragmentation within the United States is the narrow focus of major funding sources. Funding currently targets short-term goals, on small, single-Principal Investigator-led research, usually aimed at one aspect of fire science; it should target a holistic reimagination of our relationship with fire entirely, across academic, managerial, and social boundaries. This will create a broader and deeper understanding of the multifaceted nature of fire, with less focus on case studies and more focus on case integration. International projects funded by the European Commission have implemented a multi- and interdisciplinary approach, but can still be improved. Support for applied research will be most effective by aiming at both short- and long-term applications and solutions. There are active and prominent discussions on the need to fund fire science across government, local, and Indigenous entities that are all vested in understanding fire. These investments will be critical to advancing our ability to generate new insights into how we live more sustainably with fire. Fire will continue to have enormous societal and ecological impacts, and accelerate feedbacks with climate change over the coming decades. Understanding, mitigating, and managing those impacts will require addressing the presented five challenges to inform how we serve environmental and social justice by sustainably living and interacting with fire in our natural world.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors thank Kathy Bogan with CIRES Communications for the figure design and creation, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.

Funding

This material is based upon work supported by the National Center for Atmospheric Research, which is a major facility sponsored by the US National Science Foundation (NSF) under Cooperative Agreement No. 1852977. This manuscript is a product of discussions at the Wildfire in the Biosphere workshop held in May 2021 funded by the NSF through a contract to KnowInnovation. J.K.S. was supported as part of the Next Generation Ecosystem Experiments – Tropics, funded by the US Department of Energy, the Office of Science, the Office of Biological and Environmental Research, and by the NASA Arctic Boreal Vulnerability Experiment grant 80NSSC19M0107. R.T.B. was supported by the NSF grant DEB-1942068. P.E.H. was supported by the NSF grant DEB-1655121. J.K.B. and E.N.S. were supported by CIRES, the University of Colorado Boulder.

Authors’ Contributions

All authors—J.K.S., J.K.B., R.T.B, P.E.H, C.I.R, D.W.S, E.N.S., T.B., M.M.B., J.B., Sa.B., So.B., K.D.B, P.B., R.E.B, B.B, D.C., L.M.V.C., M.E.C., K.M.C., S.C., M.L.C., J.C.I., E.C., J.D.C., A.C., K.T.D., A.D., F.D., M.D, L.M.E., S.F., C.H.G., M.H., E.J.H, W.D.H., S.H., B.J.H., A.H., T.H., M.D.H, N.T.I., M.J., C.J., A.K.P., L.N.K., J.K., B.K., M.A.K., P.L., J.L., S.M.L.S., M.L., H.M., E.M., T.M., J.L.M., D.B.M, R.S.M., J.R.M, W.K.M., R.C.N., D.N., H.M.P., A.P., B.P., K.R., A.V.R., M.S., Fe.S., Fa.S., J.O.S., A.S.S., A.M.S.S., A.J.S., C.S., T.S., A.D.S., M.W.T., A.T., A.T.T., M.T., J.M.V., Y.W., T.W., S.Y., and X.Z. designed and performed the research; and J.K.S, J.K.B., R.T.B, P.E.H, C.I.R, D.W.S, and E.N.S. wrote the paper.

Data Availability

All data is included in the manuscript and/or supporting information.

Notes

Competing Interest: The authors declare no competing interest.

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Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of National Academy of Sciences 2022.

This work is written by (a) US Government employee(s) and is in the public domain in the US.

Our future in the Anthropocene biosphere

Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed an interconnected and tightly coupled globalized world in rapid change. This article sets the scientific stage for understanding and responding to such change for global sustainability and resilient societies. We provide a systemic overview of the current situation where people and nature are dynamically intertwined and embedded in the biosphere, placing shocks and extreme events as part of this dynamic; humanity has become the major force in shaping the future of the Earth system as a whole; and the scale and pace of the human dimension have caused climate change, rapid loss of biodiversity, growing inequalities, and loss of resilience to deal with uncertainty and surprise. Taken together, human actions are challenging the biosphere foundation for a prosperous development of civilizations. The Anthropocene reality—of rising system-wide turbulence—calls for transformative change towards sustainable futures. Emerging technologies, social innovations, broader shifts in cultural repertoires, as well as a diverse portfolio of active stewardship of human actions in support of a resilient biosphere are highlighted as essential parts of such transformations.

Introduction

Humans are the dominant force of change on the planet, giving rise to a new epoch referred to as the Anthropocene. This new epoch has profound meaning for humanity and one that we are only beginning to fully comprehend. We now know that society needs to be viewed as part of the biosphere, not separate from it. Depending on the collective actions of humanity, future conditions could be either beneficial or hostile for human life and wellbeing in the Anthropocene biosphere. Whether humanity has the collective wisdom to navigate the Anthropocene to sustain a livable biosphere for people and civilizations, as well as for the rest of life with which we share the planet, is the most formidable challenge facing humanity.

This article provides a systemic overview of the Anthropocene biosphere, a biosphere shaped by human actions. It is structured around the core themes of the first Nobel Prize Summit—Our Planet, Our Future, namely climate change and biodiversity loss, inequality and global sustainability, and science, technology, and innovation to enable societal transformations while anticipating and reducing potential harms. These interconnected themes are framed in the context of the biosphere and the Earth system foundation for global sustainability, emphasizing that people and nature are deeply intertwined. Scientific evidence makes clear that both climate change and biodiversity loss are symptoms of the great acceleration of human actions into the Anthropocene, rather than independent phenomena, and that they interact, and interact with social, economic, and cultural development. It emphasizes that efficiency through simplification of our global production ecosystem challenges biosphere resilience in times when resilience is needed more than ever, as a critical asset of flexibility and insurance, for navigating rising turbulence, extreme events, and the profound uncertainty of the Anthropocene. This implies that not only will it be critical to curb human-induced climate change but also to enhance the regenerative capacity of the biosphere, and its diversity, to support and sustain societal development, to collaborate with the planet that is our home, and collaborate in a socially just and sustainable manner. This is the focus of the last part of this article on biosphere stewardship for prosperity. We stress that prosperity and wellbeing for present and future generations will require mobilization, innovation, and narratives of societal transformations that connect development to stewardship of human actions as part of our life-supporting biosphere.

The biosphere and the earth system foundation

Embedded in the biosphere

The Universe is immense, estimates suggest at least two trillion galaxies (Conselice et al. 2016). Our galaxy, the Milky Way, holds 100 to 400 billion stars. One of those stars, our sun, has eight planets orbiting it. One of those, planet Earth, has a biosphere, a complex web of life, at its surface. The thickness of this layer is about twenty kilometres (twelve miles). This layer, our biosphere, is the only place where we know life exists. We humans emerged and evolved within the biosphere. Our economies, societies, and cultures are part of it. It is our home.

Across the ocean and the continents, the biosphere integrates all living beings, their diversity, and their relationships. There is a dynamic connection between the living biosphere and the broader Earth system, with the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the lithosphere, the cryosphere, and the climate system. Life in the biosphere is shaped by the global atmospheric circulation, jet streams, atmospheric rivers, water vapour and precipitation patterns, the spread of ice sheets and glaciers, soil formation, upwelling currents of coastlines, the ocean’s global conveyer belt, the distribution of the ozone layer, movements of the tectonic plates, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. Water serves as the bloodstream of the biosphere, and the carbon, nitrogen, and other biogeochemical cycles are essential for all life on Earth (Falkenmark et al. 2019; Steffen et al. 2020). It is the complex adaptive interplay between living organisms, the climate, and broader Earth system processes that has evolved into a resilient biosphere.

The biosphere has existed for about 3.5 billion years. Modern humans (Homo sapiens) have effectively been around in the biosphere for some 250 000 years (Mounier and Lahr 2019). Powered by the sun, the biosphere and the Earth system coevolve with human actions as an integral part of this coevolution (Lenton 2016; Jörgensen et al. 2019). Social conditions, health, culture, democracy, power, justice, inequity, matters of security, and even survival are interwoven with the Earth system and its biosphere in a complex interplay of local, regional, and worldwide interactions and dependencies (Folke et al. 2016).

Belief systems that view humans and nature as separate entities have emerged with economic development, technological change, and cultural evolution. But the fact that humans are living within and dependent upon a resilient biosphere has and will not change. Existing as embedded within the biosphere means that the environment is not something outside the economy or society, or a driver to be accounted for when preferred, but rather the very foundation that civilizations exist within and rely upon (Fig. 1).

figure 1
Fig. 1

A dominant force on earth

The human population reached one billion around 1800. It doubled to two billion around 1930, and doubled again to four billion around 1974. The global population is now approaching 8 billion and is expected to stabilize around 9–11 billion towards the end of this century (UN 2019). During the past century, and especially since the 1950s, there has been an amazing acceleration and expansion of human activities into a converging globalized society, supported by the discovery and use of fossil energy and innovations in social organization, technology, and cultural evolution (Ellis 2015; van der Leeuw 2019). Globalization has helped focus attention on human rights, international relations, and agreements leading to collaboration (Keohane et al. 2009; Rogelj et al. 2016; Bain 2019) and, rather remarkably, it appears, at least so far, to have inhibited large-scale conflict between states that have plagued civilizations from time immemorial. Health and material standards of living for many have improved and more people live longer than at any time in history. Boundaries between developed and developing regions have become blurred, and global economic activity is increasingly dispersed across production networks that connect metropolitan areas around the world (Coe et al. 2004; Liu et al. 2015).

Now, there is ample evidence that the cumulative human culture has expanded to such an extent that it has become a significant global force affecting the operation of the Earth system and its biosphere at the planetary level (Steffen et al. 2018). As a reflection of this unprecedented expansion, a new geological epoch—the Anthropocene, the age of mankind—has been proposed in the Geological Time Scale (AWG 2019).

Work on anthropogenic biomes finds that more than 75% of Earth’s ice-free land is directly altered as a result of human activity, with nearly 90% of terrestrial net primary production and 80% of global tree cover under direct human influence (Ellis and Ramankutty 2008). Similarly, in the ocean, no area is unaffected by human influence and a large fraction (41%) is strongly affected by multiple human impacts (Halpern et al. 2008). For example, oxygen-minimum zones for life and oxygen concentrations in both the open ocean and coastal waters have been declining since at least the middle of the twentieth century, as a consequence of rising nutrient loads from human actions coupled with warmer temperatures (Limburg et al. 2020). Just as on land, there has been a blue acceleration in the ocean, with more than 50% of the vast ocean seabed claimed by nations (Jouffray et al. 2020).

The human dominance is further reflected in the weight of the current human population—10 times the weight of all wild mammals. If we add the weight of livestock for human use and consumption to the human weight, only 4% of the weight of mammals on Earth remain wild mammals. The weight of domesticated birds exceeds that of wild birds by about threefold (Bar-On et al. 2018). The human dimension has become a dominant force in shaping evolution of all species on Earth. Through artificial selection and controlled reproduction of crops, livestock, trees, and microorganisms, through varying levels of harvest pressure and selection, through chemicals and pollution altering life-histories of species, and by sculpting the new habitats that blanket the planet, humans, directly and indirectly, determine the constitution of species that succeed and fail (Jörgensen et al. 2019).

Humans are now primarily an urban species, with about 55% of the population living in urban areas. By mid-century, about 7 out of 10 people are expected to live in cities and towns (UN DESA 2018). In terms of urban land area, this is equivalent to building a city the size of New York City every 8 days (Huang et al. 2019). Urbanization leads to more consumption, and the power relations, inequalities, behaviours, and choices of urban dwellers shape landscapes and seascapes and their diversity around the world (Seto et al. 2012ab). There is growing evidence that urban areas accelerate evolutionary changes for species that play important functional roles in communities and ecosystems (Alberti et al. 2017).

In addition, essential features of the globalized world like physical infrastructure, technological artefacts, novel substances, and associated social and technological networks have been developing extraordinarily fast. The total weight of everything made by humans—from houses and bridges to computers and clothes—is about to exceed the mass of all living things on Earth (Elhacham et al. 2020). The extensive “technosphere” dimension underscores the novelty of the ongoing planetary changes, plays a significant role in shaping global biosphere dynamics, and has already left a deep imprint on the Earth system (Zalasiewicz et al. 2017).

The notion that humanity is external to the biosphere has allowed for models in which technological progress is expected to enable humanity to enjoy ever-growing GDP and thus consumption. This view was comparatively harmless, as long as the biosphere was sufficiently resilient to supply the demands humanity made of it. This is no longer the case, and it has far-reaching implications for contemporary models of economic possibilities that many still work with and draw policy conclusions from (Dasgupta and Ramanathan 2014; Dasgupta 2021).

The intertwined planet of people and nature

The Anthropocene is characterized by a tightly interconnected world operating at high speeds with hyper-efficiency in several dimensions. These dimensions include the globalized food production and distribution system, extensive trade and transport systems, strong connectivity of financial and capital markets, internationalized supply and value chains, widespread movements of people, social innovations, development and exchange of technology, and widespread communication capacities (Helbing 2013) (Fig. 2).

figure 2
Fig. 2

In the Anthropocene biosphere, systems of people and nature are not just linked but intertwined, and intertwined across temporal and spatial scales (Reyers et al. 2018). Local events can escalate into global challenges, and local places are shaped by global dynamics (Adger et al. 2009; Crona et al. 20152016; Liu et al. 2016; Kummu et al. 2020). The tightly coupled human interactions of globalization that allow for the continued flow of information, capital, goods, services, and people, also create global systemic risk (Centeno et al. 2015; Galaz et al. 2017). However, this interplay is not only global between people and societies but co-evolving also with biosphere dynamics shaping the preconditions for human wellbeing and civilizations (Jörgensen et al. 2018; Keys et al. 2019). For example, extreme-weather and geopolitical events, interacting with the dynamics of the food system (Cottrell et al. 2019), can spill over multiple sectors and create synchronous challenges among geographically disconnected areas and rapidly move across countries and regions (Rocha et al. 2018). The rise of antibiotic resistance, the rapid spread of the corona-pandemic, or altered moisture recycling across regions expose the intertwined world. Probabilities and consequences of the changes are not only scale dependent, but also changing over time as a result of human actions, where those actions can either exacerbate or mitigate the likelihood or consequences of a given event.

In the twenty-first century, people and planet are truly interwoven and coevolve, shaping the preconditions for civilizations. Our own future on Earth, as part of the biosphere, is at stake. This new reality has major implications for human wellbeing in the face of climate change, loss of biodiversity, and their interplay, as elaborated in the next section.

Climate change and loss of biodiversity

Contemporary climate change and biodiversity loss are not isolated phenomena but symptoms of the massive expansion of the human dimension into the Anthropocene. The climate system plays a central role for life on Earth. It sets the boundary for our living conditions. The climate system is integral to all other components of the Earth system, through heat exchange in the ocean, albedo dynamics of the ice sheets, carbon sinks in terrestrial ecosystems, cycles of nutrients and pollutants, and climate forcing through evapotranspiration flows in the hydrological cycle and greenhouse pollutants. Together these interactions in the Earth system interplay with the heat exchange from the sun and the return flow back to space, but also in significant ways with biosphere-climate feedbacks that either mitigate or amplify global warming. These global dynamics interact with regional environmental systems (like ENSO or the monsoon system) that have innate patterns of climate variability and also interact with one another via teleconnections (Steffen et al. 2020). The living organisms of the planet’s ecosystems play a significant role in these complex dynamics (Mace et al. 2014).

Now, human-induced global warming alters the capacity of the ocean, forests, and other ecosystems in sequestering about half of the CO2 emissions, as well as storing large amounts of greenhouse gases (GHG) in soils and peatlands (Steffen et al. 2018). Increased emissions of GHG by humans are creating severe climate shocks and extremes already at 1.2° warming compared to pre-industrial levels (WMO 2020). In addition, human homogenization and simplification of landscapes and seascapes cause loss of biosphere resilience, with subsequent erosion of the role of the fabric of nature in generating ecosystem services (Diaz et al. 2018) and serving as insurance to shocks and surprise and to tipping points and regime shifts (Nyström et al. 2019).

Climate change—stronger and faster than predicted

Earth has been oscillating between colder and warmer periods over a million years (the entire Pleistocene), but the average mean temperature has never exceeded 2 °C (interglacial) above or 6 °C below (deep ice age) the pre-industrial temperature on Earth (14 °C), reflecting the importance of feedbacks from the living biosphere as part of regulating the temperature dynamics of the Earth (Willeit et al. 2019) (Fig. 3b).

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Fig. 3

Human-induced global warming is unparalleled. For 98% of the planet’s surface, the warmest period of the past 2000 years occurred in the late twentieth century (Neukom et al. 2019) and has steadily increased into the twenty-first century with the average global temperature for 2015–2020 being the warmest of any equivalent period on record (WMO 2020). Already now at 1.2 °C warming compared to pre-industrial levels, we appear to be moving out of the accommodating Holocene environment that allowed agriculture and complex human societies to develop (Steffen et al. 2018) (Fig. 3a). Already within the coming 50 years, 1 to 3 billion people are projected to experience living conditions that are outside of the climate conditions that have served humanity well over the past 6000 years (Xu et al. 2020).

Currently, some 55% of global anthropogenic emissions causing global warming derive from the production of energy and its use in buildings and transport. The remaining 45% comes from human emissions that arise from the management of land and the production of buildings, vehicles, electronics, clothes, food, packaging, and other goods and materials (Ellen MacArthur Foundation 2019). The food system itself accounts for about 25% of the emissions (Mbow et al. 2019). Human-driven land-use change through agriculture, forestry, and other activities (Lambin and Meyfroidt 2011) causes about 14% of the emissions (Friedlingstein et al. 2020). Cities account for about 70% of CO2 emissions from final energy use and the highest emitting 100 urban areas for 18% of the global carbon footprint (Seto et al. 2014; Moran et al. 2018). About 70% of industrial greenhouse gas emissions are linked to 100 fossil-fuel producing companies (Griffin and Hede 2017). Collectively, the top 10 emitting countries account for three quarters of global GHG emissions, while the bottom 100 countries account for only 3.5% (WRI 2020). As a consequence of the pandemic, global fossil CO2 emission in 2020 decreased by about 7% compared to 2019 (Friedlingstein et al. 2020).

Climate change impacts are hitting people harder and sooner than envisioned a decade ago (Diffenbaugh 2020). This is especially true for extreme events, like heatwaves, droughts, wildfires, extreme precipitation, floods, storms, and variations in their frequency, magnitude, and duration. The distribution and impacts of extreme events are often region specific (Turco et al. 2018; Yin et al. 2018). For example, Europe has experienced several extreme heat waves since 2000 and the number of heat waves, heavy downpours, and major hurricanes, and the strength of these events, has increased in the United States. The risk for wildfires in Australia has increased by at least 30% since 1900 as a result of anthropogenic climate change (van Oldenborgh et al. 2020). The recent years of repeated wildfires in the western U.S. and Canada have had devastating effects (McWethy et al. 2019). Extreme events have the potential to widen existing inequalities within and between countries and regions (UNDP 2019). In particular, synchronous extremes are risky in a globally connected world and may cause disruptions in global food production (Cottrell et al. 2019; Gaupp et al. 2020). Pandemics, like the COVID-19 outbreak and associated health responses, intersect with climate hazards and are exacerbated by the economic crisis and long-standing socioeconomic and racial disparities, both within countries and across regions (Phillips et al. 2020).

Some of these changes will happen continuously and gradually over time, while others take the form of more sudden and surprising change (Cumming and Peterson 2017). In addition, some are to some extent predictable, others more uncertain and unexpected. An analysis of a large database of social-ecological regime shifts (large shifts in the structure and function of social-ecological systems, transitions that may have substantial impacts on human economies and societies), suggests that in the intertwined world one change may lead to another, or that events can co-occur because they simply share the same driver (Rocha et al. 2018). Large-scale transitions can unfold when a series of linked elements are all close to a tipping point, making it easier for one transition to set off the others like a chain reaction or domino effect (Scheffer et al. 2012; Lenton et al. 2019).

With increased warming, humanity risks departing the glacier-interglacial dynamics of the past 2.6 million years (Burke et al. 2018). If efforts to constrain emissions fail, the global average temperature by 2100 is expected to increase 3–5 °C (IPCC 2014) above pre-industrial levels. Although higher global temperatures have occurred in deep geological time, living in a biosphere with a mean annual global temperature exceeding 2 °C of the pre-industrial average (Fig. 3) is largely unknown terrain for humanity and certainly novel terrain for contemporary society.

The climate and the biosphere interplay

The relation between climate and the biosphere is being profoundly altered and reshaped by human action. The total amount of carbon stored in terrestrial ecosystems is huge, almost 60 times larger than the current annual emissions of global GHG (CO2 equivalents, 2017) by humans, and with the major part, about 70% (1500–2400 Gt C) found in soil (Ciais et al. 2013). The ocean holds a much larger carbon pool, at about 38 000 Gt of carbon (Houghton 2007). Thus far, terrestrial and marine ecosystems have served as important sinks for carbon dioxide and thereby contribute significantly to stabilizing the climate. At current global average temperature, the ocean absorbs about 25% of annual carbon emissions (Gruber et al. 2019) and absorbs over 90% of the additional heat generated from those emissions. Land-based ecosystems like forests, wetlands, and grasslands bind carbon dioxide through growth, and all in all sequester close to 30% of anthropogenic CO2 emissions (Global Carbon Project 2019).

The biosphere’s climate stabilization is a critical ecosystem service, or Earth system service, which cannot be taken for granted. Recent research has shown that not only human land-use change but also climate impacts, like extreme events and temperature change, increasingly threaten carbon sinks. For example, the vast fires in Borneo in 1997 released an equivalent of 13–40% of the mean annual global carbon emissions from fossil fuels at that time (Page et al. 2002; Folke et al. 2011). The devastating forest fires of 2019 in Australia, Indonesia, and the Amazon triggered emissions equivalent to almost 40% of the annual global carbon sink on land and in the ocean (www.globalfiredata.org).

The Earth system contains several biophysical sub-systems that can exist in multiple states and which contribute to the regulation of the state of the planet as a whole (Steffen et al. 2018). These so-called tipping elements, or sleeping giants (Fig. 4), have been identified as critical in maintaining the planet in favourable Holocene-like conditions. These are now challenged by global warming and human actions, threatening to trigger self-reinforcing feedbacks and cascading effects, which could push the Earth system towards a planetary threshold that, if crossed, could prevent stabilization of the climate at intermediate global warming and cause escalating climate change along a “Hothouse Earth” pathway even as human emissions are reduced (Steffen et al. 2018). Observations find that nine of these known sleeping giants, thought to be reasonably stable, are now undergoing large-scale changes already at current levels of warming, with possible domino effects to come (Lenton et al. 2019).

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Fig. 4

The significance of the challenge of holding global warming in line with the Paris climate target is obvious. As a matter of fact, the challenge is broader than climate alone. It is about navigating towards a safe-operating space that depends on maintaining a high level of Earth resilience. Incremental tweaking and marginal adjustments will not suffice. Major transformations towards just and sustainable futures are the bright way forward.

The living biosphere and Earth system dynamics

The interactions and diversity of organisms within and across the planet’s ecosystems play critical roles in the coevolution of the biosphere and the broader Earth system. For example, major biomes like tropical and temperate forests and their biological diversity transpire water vapour that connects distant regions through precipitation (Gleeson et al. 2020ab). Nearly a fifth of annual average precipitation falling on land is from vegetation-regulated moisture recycling, with several places receiving nearly half their precipitation through this ecosystem service. Such water connections are critical for semi-arid regions reliant on rain-fed agricultural production and for water supply to major cities like Sao Paulo or Rio de Janeiro (Keys et al. 2016). As many as 19 megacities depend for more than a third of their water supply on water vapour from land, a dependence especially relevant during dry years (Keys et al. 2018). In some of the world’s largest river basins, precipitation is influenced more strongly by land-use change taking place outside than inside the river basin (Wang-Erlandsson et al. 2018).

The biosphere contains life-supporting ecosystems supplying essential ecosystem services that underpin human wellbeing and socioeconomic development. For example, the biosphere strongly influences the chemical and physical compositions of the atmosphere, and biodiversity contributes through its influence in generating and maintaining soils, controlling pests, pollinating food crops, and participating in biogeochemical cycles (Daily 1997). The ocean’s food webs, continental shelves, and estuaries support the production of seafood, serve as a sink for greenhouse gases, maintain water quality, and hedge against unanticipated ecosystem changes from natural or anthropogenic causes (Worm et al. 2006). These services represent critical life-supporting functions for humanity (Odum 1989; Reyers and Selig 2020) and biological diversity plays fundamental roles in these nature’s contributions to people (Diaz et al. 2018).

Biodiversity performing vital roles in biosphere resilience

Organisms do not just exist and compete, they perform critical functions in ecosystem dynamics and in creating and providing social-ecological resilience (Folke et al. 2004; Hooper et al. 2005; Tilman et al. 2014) (Fig. 5). Resilience refers to the capacity of a system to persist with change, to continue to develop with ever changing environments (Reyers et al. 2018).

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Fig. 5

Biodiversity plays significant roles in buffering shocks and extreme events, and in regime shift dynamics (Folke et al. 2004). The diversity of functional groups and traits of species and populations are essential for ecosystem integrity and the generation of ecosystem services (Peterson et al. 1998; Hughes et al. 2007; Isbell et al. 2017). Variation in responses of species performing the same function is crucial in resilience to shocks or extreme events (Chapin et al. 1997). Such “response diversity”, serves as insurance for the capacity of ecosystems to regenerate, continue to develop after disturbance and support human wellbeing (Elmqvist et al. 2003).

The Amazon rainforest is a prime example. Conserving a diversity of plants species may enable the Amazon forests to adjust to new climate conditions and protect the critical carbon sink function (Sakschewski et al. 2016). Frequent extreme drought events have the potential to destabilize large parts of the Amazon forest especially when subsoil moisture is low (Singh et al. 2020), but the risk of self-amplified forest loss is reduced with increasing heterogeneity in the response of forest patches to reduced rainfall (Zemp et al. 2017). However, continuous deforestation and simultaneous warming are likely to push the forest towards tipping points with wide-ranging implications (Hirota et al. 2011; Staver et al. 2011; Lovejoy and Nobre 2018). Also, with greater climate variability, tree longevity is shortened, thus, influencing carbon accumulation and the role of the Amazon forest as a carbon sink (Brienen et al. 2015). A large-scale shift of the Amazon would cause major impacts on wellbeing far outside the Amazon basin through changes in precipitation and climate regulation, and by linking with other tipping elements in the Earth system (Fig. 4).

Hence, the resilience of multifunctional ecosystems across space and time, and in both aquatic and terrestrial environments, depends on the contributions of many species, and their distribution, redundancy, and richness at multitrophic levels performing critical functions in ecosystems and biosphere dynamics (Mori et al. 2013; Nash et al. 2016; Soliveres et al. 2016; Frei et al. 2020). Biodiversity and a resilient biosphere are a reflection of life continuously being confronted with uncertainty and the unknown. Diversity builds and sustains insurance and keeps systems resilient to changing circumstances (Hendershot et al. 2020).

Homogenization, hyper-connectivity, and critical transitions

Conversion and degradation of habitats have caused global biodiversity declines and defaunation (human-caused animal loss), with extensive cascading effects in marine, terrestrial, and freshwater ecosystems as a result, and altered ecosystem functions and services (Laliberte et al. 2010; Estes et al. 2011). Over the past 50 years of human acceleration, the capacity of nature to support quality of life has declined in 78% of the 18 categories of nature’s contributions to people considered by the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (Diaz et al. 2018).

Much of the Earth’s biosphere has been converted into production ecosystems, i.e. ecosystems simplified and homogenized for the production of one or a few harvestable species (Nyström et al. 2019). Urbanization is a force in homogenizing and altering biodiversity in landscapes and seascapes (Seto et al. 2012b), and over the past decade land-use change (Meyfroidt et al. 2018) accounted for nearly a quarter of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (Arneth et al. 2019).

The increase in homogeneity worldwide denotes the establishment of a global standard food supply, which is relatively species rich at the national level, but species poor globally (Khoury et al. 2014). Globally, local varieties and breeds of domesticated plants and animals are disappearing (Diaz et al. 2018). Land-use intensification homogenizes biodiversity in local assemblages of species worldwide (Newbold et al. 2018) and counteracts a positive association between species richness and dietary quality. It also affects ecosystem services and wellbeing in low- and middle-income countries (Lachat et al. 2018; Vang Rasmussen et al. 2018). In much of the world more than half, up to 90%, of locally adapted varieties of major crop species (e.g. wheat and rice) have been lost due to replacement by single high-yielding varieties (Heal et al. 2004).

The simplification and intensification of production ecosystems and their tight connectivity with international markets have yielded a global production ecosystem that is very efficient in delivering goods to markets, but globally homogeneous, highly interconnected, and characterized by weakened internal feedbacks that mask or dilute the signals of loss of ecosystem resilience to consumers (Nyström et al. 2019; Ortiz et al. 2021). In addition, the global food trade network has over the past 20 years become progressively delocalized as a result of globalization (that is, modularity has been reduced) and as connectivity and homogeneity increase, shocks that were previously contained within a geographical area or a sector are becoming globally contagious and more prevalent (Tamea et al. 2016; Tu et al. 2019; Kummu et al. 2020).

Homogenization reduces resilience, the capacity to live and develop with change and uncertainty, and therby the diversity of ways in which species, people, sectors, and institutions can respond to change as well as their potential to functionally complement each other (Biggs et al. 2012; Grêt-Regamey et al. 2019; Nyström et al. 2019). In addition, homogeneous landscapes lack the diversity of ecosystem types for resilient responses when a single homogeneous landscape patch, such as a production forest or crop, is devastated by pathogens or declines in economic value. In addition, such ecosystem simplification and degradation increase the likelihood of disease emergence, including novel viruses (Myers and Patz 2009). In parallel, people, places, cultures, and economies are increasingly linked across geographical locations and socioeconomic contexts, making people and planet intertwined at all scales.

Evidence suggests that homogenization, simplification, intensification, strong connections, as well as suppression of variance, increase the likelihood of regime shifts, or critical transitions with thresholds and tipping points (Scheffer et al. 2012; Carpenter et al. 2015). These shifts may interact and cascade, thereby causing change at very large scales with severe implications for the wellbeing of human societies (Hughes et al. 2013; Rocha et al. 2018). Comparison of the present extent of biosphere conversion with past global-scale regime shifts suggests that global-scale biosphere regime shift is more than plausible (Barnosky et al. 2012). The biotic hallmark for each earlier biosphere regime shifts was pronounced change in global, regional, and local assemblages of species (Barnosky et al. 2012).

Planetary boundaries and a safe-operating space for humanity

It is in the self-interest of humanity to avoid pushing ecosystems or the entire Earth system across tipping points. Therefore, a major challenge is to enhance biosphere resilience and work towards stabilizing the Earth system and its biosphere in a state that, hopefully, is safe for humanity to operate within, albeit a warmer state than the Holocene and one with a human-dominated biosphere. Clearly, the climatic system and the biological diversity and functional integrity of the biosphere, as well as their interplay, are foundational for cultivating a resilient Earth system.

Climate and biosphere integrity constitute the two fundamental dimensions of the Planetary Boundaries framework, which delineates a Holocene-like state of the Earth system, the state that has enabled civilizations to emerge and flourish (Fig. 6). Four of the nine boundaries, including climate and biodiversity, are estimated to already have been transgressed. The framework provides a natural-science-based observation that human forcing has already, at the planetary scale, rapidly pushed the Earth system away from the Holocene-like conditions and onto an accelerating Anthropocene trajectory (Steffen et al. 2018).

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Fig. 6

In recent years, there have been several efforts to further investigate and deepen the understanding of planetary boundaries and the safe-operating space for humanity. These include updates on the biodiversity boundary, the freshwater boundary, the biogeochemical flows (Carpenter and Bennett 2011; de Vries et al. 2013; Mace et al. 2014; Newbold et al. 2016; Gleeson et al. 2020b), multiple regime shifts and possible links between regional and planetary tipping points (Anderies et al. 2013; Hughes et al. 2013), regional perspectives on the framework (Häyhä et al. 2016; O’Neill et al. 2018), and creating safe-operating spaces (Scheffer et al. 2015). Attempts to quantify interactions between planetary boundaries suggest that cascades and feedbacks predominantly amplify human impacts on the Earth system and thereby shrink the safe-operating space for human actions in the Anthropocene (Lade et al. 2020).

There are also propositions for integrating the planetary boundaries framework with economic, social, and human dimensions (Raworth 2012; Dearing et al. 2014; Downing et al. 2019) as well as tackling the policy and governance challenges associated with the approach (Biermann et al. 2012; Galaz et al. 2012; Sterner et al. 2019; Pickering and Persson 2020; Engström et al. 2020). The global food system is also placed within the framework of the planetary boundaries (Gordon et al. 2017), like in the EAT-Lancet Commission’s report on healthy diets from sustainable food systems for nearly 10 billion people by 2050 (Willett et al. 2019).

In light of the profound challenges of navigating the future of human societies towards a stabilized Earth state, it becomes clear that modest adjustments on current pathways of societal development are not very likely to guide humanity into sustainable futures (Kates et al. 2012). Stabilizing the Earth system in a safe-operating space will require transformative changes in many dimensions of human actions and relations (Westley et al. 2011; Sachs et al. 2019).

Inequality and global sustainability

Inequality describes an unequal distribution of a scarce resource, benefit, or cost and does not necessarily represent a normative statement. Inequity is a more normative term that evokes an unfair or unjust distribution of privileges across society. There are complex interconnections between inequality, the biosphere, and global sustainability (Hamann et al. 2018) (Fig. 7) that go beyond unequal distribution of income or wealth, like distributional, recognitional, and procedural inequities (Leach et al. 2018). Distributional equity refers to how different groups may have access to resources, and how costs, harms, and benefits are shared. Recognitional equity highlights the ongoing struggle for recognition of a diversity of perspectives and groups, e.g. referring to nationality, ethnicity, or gender, whereas procedural equity focuses on how different groups and perspectives are able to engage in and influence decision-making processes and outcomes (Leach et al. 2018). Approaches to sustainability generally include some form of equality, universal prosperity, and poverty alleviation. Global environmental change and unsustainable practices may exacerbate inequalities (Hamann et al. 2018). Greater inequality may lead to weaker economic performance and cause economic instability (Stiglitz 2012). Increasing income inequality may also lead to more societal tension and increase the odds of conflict (Durante et al. 2017).

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Fig. 7

Rising inequality

The majority of countries for which adequate data exist have seen rising inequality in income and wealth over the past several decades (Piketty 2014). In the U.S., Europe, and China, the top 10% of the population own 70% of the wealth, while the bottom 50% own only 2%. In the U.S., the share of income going to the top 1% rose from around 11% in 1980 to above 20% in 2016 (World Inequality Report 2018), and the share of wealth of the top 0.1% more than tripled between 1978 and 2012, and is roughly equal to the share of wealth of the bottom 90% (Saez and Zucman 2016). Also, the wealthiest 1% of the world’s population have been responsible for more than twice as much carbon pollution as the poorest half of humanity (Kartha et al. 2020). Seventy-five per cent of the world’s cities have higher levels of income inequalities than two decades ago, and the spatial concentration of low-income unskilled workers in segregated residential areas acts as a poverty trap (UN-Habitat 2016). About 10% of the world population in 2015, or some 740 million people, were living in extreme poverty (World Bank 2019).

Inequality can impact the sense of community, common purpose, and trust (Jachimowicz et al. 2017) and influences successful management of common pool resources in different ways (Baland et al. 2007). Inequality may give rise to perceptions, behaviour, and social norms about status and wealth, and disparities in worth and cultural membership between groups in a society—so-called “recognition gaps” (Lamont 2018).

Inequalities and the environment

Greater inequality can lead to more rapid environmental degradation, because low incomes lead to low investment in physical capital and education. Such situations often cause excessive pressure and degradation of natural capital leading to declining incomes and further degradation in a downward spiral, a poverty trap (Bowles et al. 2006). Furthermore, interventions that ignore nature and culture can reinforce poverty traps (Lade et al. 2017), and economic and environmental shocks, food insecurity, and climate change may force people back into poverty (lack of resources and capacities to fulfil basic needs) (Kates and Dasgupta 2007; Wood et al. 2018).

Gender, class, caste, and ethnic identities and relationships, and the specific social, economic and political power, roles and responsibilities they entail, shape the choices and decisions open to individuals and households in dealing with the climate and environmental risks they face (Rao et al. 2020). Gender inequality has important reinforcing feedbacks with environmental change (Fortnam et al. 2019) and has, for example, been shown to change with shifts in tropical land use in Indonesia (Maharani et al. 2019) or with changes in levels of direct use of local ecosystem services by households in South Africa (Hamann et al. 2015). Climate change is projected to disproportionally influence disadvantaged groups, especially women, girls, and indigenous communities (Islam and Winkel 2017).

People with less agency and fewer resources at their disposal are more vulnerable to climate change (Althor et al. 2016; Morton 2007) and to environmental shocks and extreme events such as floods and droughts (Hallegatte et al. 2016; Jachimowicz et al. 2017). The COVID-19 pandemic has further exposed the inequality in vulnerability to shocks among communities that lack the financial resources and essentials for a minimum standard of living, feeding off existing inequalities and making them worse (Drefahl et al. 2020; Stiglitz 2020). There is significant concern that climate-driven events exacerbate conflict because they affect economic insecurity which, in itself, has been shown to be a major cause of violent conflict and unrest (Mach et al. 2019; Ide et al. 2020).

Vulnerability to climate change is also due to many low-income countries’ location in low latitudes where further warming pushes these countries ever further away from optimal temperatures for climate-sensitive economic sectors (King and Harrington 2018). Examples include countries with high numbers of vulnerable, poor or marginalized people in climate-sensitive systems like deltas, semi-arid lands, and river basins dependent on glaciers and snowmelt (Conway et al. 2019). Changes to glaciers, snow and ice in mountains will likely influence water availability for over a billion people downstream by mid-century (Pihl et al. 2019). Under future scenarios of land-use and climate change, up to 5 billion people face higher water pollution and insufficient pollination for nutrition, particularly in Africa and South Asia. Hundreds of millions of people face heightened coastal risk across Africa, Eurasia, and the Americas (Chaplin-Kramer et al. 2019).

Ocean inequity

In the ocean, inequity manifests, for example, in skewed distribution of commercial fish catches, limited political power of small-scale fishers, particularly women and other minority groups, limited engagement of developing nations in high-seas activities and associated decision making, and consolidated interests of global supply chains in a few transnational corporations, with evidence of poor transparency and human rights abuses (Österblom et al. 2019). The results of inequity include a loss of livelihoods and limited financial opportunities, increased vulnerabilities of already marginalized groups, who are facing nutritional and food security challenges, and negative impacts on marine ecosystems (Harper et al. 2013; Hicks et al. 2019).

Coastal communities are sensitive to climate-induced shifts in the distribution and abundance of fish stocks crucial to their livelihoods and nutrition (Blasiak et al. 2017). This accentuated sensitivity is coupled with comparatively low levels of adaptive capacity, as remote coastal communities often have limited access to education, health services and alternative livelihoods, all of which could buffer the projected negative impacts from climate change (Cinner et al. 2018).

As a means to improve fish abundance for coastal communities of low-income nations, there have been suggestions of closing the high seas to fishing through groups of states that commit to a set of international rules. This would not only slow the pace of overfishing, but would also rebuild stocks that migrate into countries’ Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), which could reduce inequality by 50% in the distribution of fisheries benefits among the world’s maritime countries (Sumaila et al. 2015; Green and Rudyk 2020).

Inequities and sustainability

Alleviating inequality and poverty is a central objective of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals agreed to by national governments. Achieving global sustainability is another important set of objectives in the Sustainable Development Goals. The relation between inequality and sustainability is the outcome of this dynamics and not simply of cause and effect, but rather unfolding in different places, as experienced and understood by the people living there. Supporting and enhancing the emergence of capacities for dealing with shocks and surprises as part of strategies for learning and developing with change in the turbulent times of the Anthropocene will be central to confront inequality and advance wellbeing (Biggs et al. 2012; Clark and Harley 2020). Multiple inequities and sustainabilities will require diverse forms of responses, attuned to diverse contexts (Leach et al 2018; Clark and Harley 2020) (Fig. 8) and framed by transformations towards global sustainability as embedded in the biosphere (Westley et al. 2011).

figure 8
Fig. 8

Societal transformation and technological change

By transformation, we refer to the capacity to create fundamentally new systems of human–environmental interactions and feedbacks when ecological, economic, or social structures make the continuation of the existing system untenable (Folke et al. 2010). It involves multiple elements, including agency, practices, behaviours, incentives, institutions, beliefs, values, and world views and their leverage points at multiple levels (Abson et al. 2017; Moore and Milkoreit 2020). Understanding transformation goes beyond a focus on the triggers, to unravelling the capacities for reducing resilience of an undesired, status quo, system, and nurturing and navigating the emergence of new, desired systems (Elmqvist et al. 2019); to confront path-dependencies, build capacities for new shocks and risks, and shift towards sustainable pathways (Olsson et al. 2017).

Here, we stress that technological change and social innovation in relation to sustainability will need a deeper focus on intertwined social-ecological interactions and feedbacks of the Anthropocene, since that will be necessary to understand and achieve large-scale changes towards global sustainability. We start this section with the role of emerging technologies and social media in this context, followed by findings from social innovation and transformation research and with an emphasis on the significance of narratives of hope for shifting towards sustainable futures.

Emerging technologies and sustainability

Most likely, technological change such as information technology, artificial intelligence, and synthetic biology will drastically change economies, human relations, social organization, culture and civilization, creating new unknown futures. However, technological change alone will not lead to transformations towards sustainability. It could lead humanity in diverse directions, pleasant and unpleasant ones, and with different social and environmental impacts. For example, rapid advances in sequencing technologies and bioinformatics have enabled exploration of the ocean genome, but the capacity to access and use sequence data is inequitably distributed among countries and companies (Blasiak et al. 20182020). The technological dimension of development has to be deliberately and strategically guided, to contribute to just and sustainable futures and guided how and by whom as a central challenge (Galaz 2014; van der Leeuw 2018).

On the other hand, it is most unlikely that transformations to sustainability will happen without the deployment of technologies that, e.g. help build resilience and development on the ground (Brown 2016), support transformations of current food production and innovation systems (Gordon et al. 2017; Costello et al. 2020), and contribute to a shift towards carbon neutral (or even negative) energy systems (Rockström et al. 2017).

The following categories of new technologies are already having bearing on global sustainability: the diversity of existing and emerging renewable energy technologies, like solar cells, hydrogen energy, wind generators, or geothermal heating; technologies that remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere; the digital transformation, with Artificial Intelligence (AI), satellite remote sensing, quantum computing, and precision agriculture; synthetic biology, including biotechnology and genetic and molecular engineering, by redesigning and using organisms to solve problems in medicine, manufacturing and agriculture; mechanical engineering, like robotics and also nanotechnology. Their development, as embedded in the larger social-ecological systems, should be connected to and become part of ways forward when designing transformative pathways towards sustainability within planetary boundaries.

As human pressures on the biosphere increase, so does the hope that rapid advances in AI (including automated decision making, data mining, and predictive analytics) in combination with rapid progresses in sensor technology and robotics, will be able to increase society’s capacities to detect, adapt, and respond to climate and environmental change without creating new vulnerabilities (Joppa 2017). Such technologies are applied in a number of research fields related to the environment and climate change, including environmental monitoring, conservation, and “green” urban planning (Hino et al. 2018; Ilieva and McPhearson 2018; Wearn et al. 2019; Reichstein et al. 2019). While nascent in terms of both scale and impact, such technological “niche-innovations” have the potential to rapidly upscale and shape ecosystems and institutions in multiple geographies (Geels et al. 2017). Such innovations have been claimed to be central for a “digital revolution for sustainable development” (Sachs et al. 2019).

Applications of these technologies have effects that span beyond climate and environmental research and monitoring, and more efficient natural resource use. AI-supported recommender systems as an example, influence consumer choices already today (André et al. 2018). Targeted attacks in social media by social bots, applications of computer algorithms that automatically produce content and interact with humans on social media, “trying to emulate and possibly alter their behavior” (Ferrara et al. 2016; Grinberg et al. 2019), also influence conversations in social media about climate and environmental issues and affect institutions for deliberative democracy (Dryzek et al. 2019).

So far, the technological changes to our social systems have not come about with the purpose of promoting global sustainability (van der Leeuw 2019). This remains true of recent and emerging technologies, such as online social media and information technology, causing changes that are increasingly far-reaching, ambiguous, and largely unregulated (Del Vicario et al. 2016). For example, “online social networks are highly dynamic systems that change as a result of numerous feedbacks between people and machines”. Algorithms suggest connections, to which users respond, and the algorithms, trained to optimize user experience, adapt to the responses. “Together, these interactions and processes alter what information people see and how they view the world” (Bergstrom and Bak-Coleman 2019).

Hence, applications of novel technologies stemming from advancements in AI could at best be benevolent and lead to improved stewardship of landscapes, seascapes, water, or climate dynamics, through improved monitoring and interventions, as well as more effective resource use (Chaplin-Kramer et al. 2019). Negative impacts of novel technologies on vulnerable groups (Barocas et al. 2017) are also pertinent since they diffuse rapidly into society, or when used in sectors with clear impacts on the climate, or on land and ocean ecosystems. This issue needs to be taken seriously as technological changes influence decisions with very long-term climatic and biosphere consequences (Cave and Óhéigeartaigh 2019).

Social media and social change

The participatory nature of social media gives it a central role in shaping individual attitudes, feelings, and behaviours (Williams et al. 2015; Lazer et al. 2018), can underpin large social mobilization and protests (Steinert-Threlkeld et al. 2015), and influence social norms and policy making (Barbier et al. 2018; Stewart et al. 2019). It is well known that dire warnings can lead to disconnect of the audience if it is not accompanied by a feasible perspective for action (Weber 2015). Social media changes our perception of the world, by promoting a sense of crisis and unfairness. This happens as activist groups seek to muster support (Gerbaudo and Treré 2015) and lifestyle movements seek to inspire alternative choices (Haenfler et al. 2012). For instance, social media catalysed the Arab spring among other things by depicting atrocities of the regime (Breuer et al. 2015), and veganism is promoted by social media campaigns highlighting appalling animal welfare issues (Haenfler et al. 2012).

On the worrying side, isolationism stimulated by social-media-boosted discontent may hamper global cooperation needed to curb global warming, biodiversity loss, wealth concentration, and other trends. On the other hand, social media has powered movements such as school strikes, extinction rebellion, voluntary simplicity, bartering, flight shame, the eat-local movement and veganism to promote a steadily rising global awareness of pressing issues that may ultimately shift social norms (Nyborg et al. 2016), trigger reforms towards sustainability (Otto et al. 2020) and perhaps also towards wealth equalization at all institutional levels (Scheffer et al. 2017).

The combination of discontent and self-organization not only promotes rebellion against the old way of doing things, as in street protests, populist votes, radicalization, and terrorism, but also catalyses the search for alternative ways, as in bartering and sharing platforms, or voluntary simplicity and other lifestyle movements (Haenfler et al. 2012; Carpenter et al. 2019).

The rise of social media and technologies such as bots and profiling has been explosive, and the mere rate of change has made it difficult for society to keep pace (Haenfler et al. 2012). Crowd-sourced fact checking may be combined with computer-assisted analyses and judgements from professionals (Hassan et al. 2019), and labelling quality of media sources ranging from internet fora to newspapers and television stations may alert users to the risk of disinformation and heavy political bias (Pennycook and Rand 2019). With time, such approaches together with legislation, best-practice agreements, and individual skills of judging the quality of sources may catch up to control some of the negative side-effects (Walter et al. 2019).

The emerging picture is that social media have become a global catalyst for social change by facilitating shifts on scales ranging from individual attitudes to broad social norms and institutions. It remains unclear, however, whether this new “invisible hand” will move the world on more sustainable and just pathways. Can the global, fast moving capacity for information sharing and knowledge generation through social media help lead us towards a just world where future generations thrive within the limits of our planet’s capacity?

Social innovation and transformation

Transformations towards sustainability in the Anthropocene cannot be achieved by adaptation alone, and certainly not by incremental change only, but rather that more fundamental systemic transformations will be needed (Hackmann and St. Clair 2012; Kates et al. 2012; O’Brien 2012). Transformation implies fundamentally rewiring the system, its structure, functions, feedbacks, and properties (Reyers et al. 2018). But, despite such changes, there is hope for systemic transformations with dignity, respect and in democratic fashions (Olsson et al. 2017), in contrast to large-scale disruptive or revolutionary societal transformations like those of earlier civilizations (van der Leeuw 2019). It will require trust building, cooperation, collective action, and flexible institutions (Ostrom 2010; Westley et al. 2011).

A characteristic feature of transformations is that change across different system states (trajectories or pathways) is not predetermined but rather emerges through diverse interactions across scales and among diverse actors (Westley et al. 2011). Therefore, the literature on transformations towards sustainability emphasize framing and navigating transformations rather than controlling those. Work on socio-technical sustainability transitions, social-ecological transformations, and social innovation provide insights into these dynamics (Geels et al. 2017; Olsson et al. 2017; Westley et al. 2017).

These literatures have illustrated the importance of connectivity and cross-level interactions for understanding the role of technological and social innovation and transformative systemic change. The work emphasizes the importance of fostering diverse forms of novelty and innovations at the micro-level, supported by the creation of “transformative spaces”, shielded from the forces of dominant system structures. These allow for experimentation with new mental models, ideas, and practices that could help shift societies onto more desirable pathways (Loorbach et al. 2017; Pereira et al. 2018ab). The examples of the “Seeds of a Good Anthropocene” project reflect ongoing local experiments that, under the right conditions, could accelerate the adoption of pathways to transformative change (Bennett et al. 2016). As multiple demands and stressors degrade the ocean, transformative change in ocean governance seems required, shifting current economic and social systems towards ocean stewardship, e.g. through incorporation of niche innovations within and across economic sectors and stakeholder communities (Brodie Rudolph et al. 2020).

It has been shown that real-world transformations come about through the alignment of mutually reinforcing processes within and between multiple levels. For example, the alignment of “niche innovations” or “shadow networks’ (which differ radically from the dominant existing system but have been able to gain a foothold in particular market niches or geographical areas) with change at broader levels and scales can create rapid change. Both slow moving trends (e.g., demographics, ideologies, accumulation of GHG) and sudden shocks (e.g. elections, economic crises, pandemics, extreme events) can start to weaken or disturb the existing social-ecological system and create windows-of-opportunity for niche innovations—new practices, governance systems, value orientations—to become rapidly dominant (Olsson et al. 20042006; Chaffin and Gunderson 2016; Geels et al. 2017) (Fig. 9).

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Fig. 9

Hence, turbulent times may unlock gridlocks and traps and open up space for innovation and novelty (Gunderson and Holling 2002). Crises or anticipated risks can trigger people to experiment with new practices and alternative governance modes and key individuals, often referred to as policy, institutional or moral entrepreneurs, mobilize and combine social networks in new ways, preparing the system for change (Folke et al. 2005; Westley et al. 2013; O’Brien 2015). The preparation phase seems particularly important in building capacity to transform rather than simply returning to the status quo and reinforcing existing power structures following change. Bridging organizations tend to emerge, within or with new institutions, connecting governance levels and spatial and temporal scales (Cash et al. 2006; Hahn et al. 2006; Brondizio et al. 2009; Rathwell and Peterson 2012). In several cases, the broader social contexts provide an enabling environment for such emergence, for example, through various incentive structures or legal frameworks. When a window opens, there is skilful navigation of change past thresholds or tipping points and, thereafter, a focus on building resilience of the transformed system (Gelcich et al. 2010).

In general, the resulting transformation goes beyond the adoption of a new technology or a local social innovation alone. Instead it includes a portfolio of actions like investment in new infrastructures, establishment of new markets, changes in incentives, development of new social preferences, or adjustment of user practices. Furthermore, transformations gain momentum when multiple innovations are linked together, improving the functionality of each and acting in combination to reconfigure systems (Geels et al. 2017; Westley et al. 2017).

Successful social innovations are recognized by their capacity to radically shift broad social institutions (economies, political philosophies, laws, practices, and cultural beliefs) that provide structure to social life. In addition, social innovations seldom unfold in a deterministic manner, but with a kind of punctuated equilibrium, first languishing and then accelerating at times of opportunity or crisis. There is also the need for awareness of the shadow side of all innovation, the consequences of intervention in a complex system (Holling et al. 1998; Ostrom 2007). This is unavoidable but manageable if caught early, but needs attention, particularly in times of rapid change (Westley et al. 2017).

Social innovation is currently underway in many domains linked to climate change, like renewable energy (Geels et al. 2017) or agriculture (Pigford et al. 2018) and highlight the importance of innovations not only in science and technology, but also in institutions, politics, and social goals for sustainability. Substantial attention is also directed towards sustainability of the ocean, where policy makers, industries, and other stakeholders are increasingly engaged in collaboration (Österblom et al. 2017; Brodie Rudolf et al. 2020; UNGC 2020) and innovations (McCauley et al. 2016; Blasiak et al. 2018; Costello et al. 2020), aimed to create new incentives (Lubchenco et al. 2016; Jouffray et al. 2019; Sumaila et al. 2020) for action. However, for these to have transformative impact, shifts in cultural repertoires (schemas, frames, narratives, scripts, and boundaries that actors draw on in social situations) (Lamont et al. 2017) similar to those that accelerated the anti-smoking movement and the LGBTQ movement need to occur (Marshall et al. 2012; Moore et al. 2015; Nyborg et al. 2016).

There are suggestions for social tipping interventions to activate large-scale systemic shifts through, for example, rapidly spreading of technologies, shifts in social norms and behaviors, or structural reorganization of sectors, corporations, and societies (Folke et al. 2019; Otto et al. 2020). There are signs that such shifts are underway in western cultures, a desire for fundamental change towards a more sustainable way of life (Wibeck et al. 2019) aided by social movements such as the youth-led Extinction Rebellion, as well as a strong move to more healthy and sustainable diets (Willet et al. 2019). Again, all these changes unfold as part of cultural evolution, which needs attention as urgently as the decarbonization of our economy (Waring et al. 2015; Creanza et al. 2017; Jörgensen et al. 2019).

Narratives of action for the future

Social innovation and transformation require an individual and collective attention on the future. There are many documented obstacles to such future focus, from cognitive myopia to present-biased individual and institutional incentives and norms (Weber and Johnson 2016; Weber 20172020). Choice architecture provides tools that reduce status-quo bias and encourage more foresightful decisions in specific circumstances (Yoeli et al. 2017), but rapid and systemic change will require more fundamental shifts in narratives at a collective level (Lubchenco and Gaines 2019).

Narratives are ways of presenting or understanding a situation or series of events that reflects and promotes a particular point of view or set of values. Narratives can serve as meaning‐making devices, provide actors with confidence to act and coordinate action. They are of significance in shaping and anchoring worldviews, identities, and social interactions (van der Leeuw 2020).

Narratives of hope have proven essential for social resilience (Lamont 2019). Social resilience refers to the capacity of individuals, groups, communities, and nations “to secure favourable outcomes (material, symbolic, emotional) under new circumstances and when necessary by new means, even when this entails significant modifications to behaviour or to the social frameworks that structure and give meaning to behaviour” (Hall and Lamont 2012).

Transforming towards sustainable futures will require broadening cultural membership by promoting new narratives that resonate, inspire, and provide hope centred on a plurality of criteria of worth and social inclusion. Here, we are concerned with the challenge of motivating a collective recognition of our interdependence with the biosphere (Schill et al. 2019) and economic and political action based on that recognition.

Collective conceptions of the future have many aspects. They include (1) whether the future is conceived as near or far and is understood in terms of long, medium and short-term rewards; (2) what is likely and possible and how contingent these outcomes are; (3) whether the future will be good or bad; (4) how much agency individuals have on various aspects of their individual and collective future (concerning for instance, politics, societal orientation, personal and professional life; (5) who can influence the collective future (e.g., the role of the state policies and various societal forces in shaping them); (6) whether the future is conceived as a cyclical or as a linear progression; (7) how stable peoples’ conceptions of the future are and how they are influenced by events (terrorist attacks, recessions, pandemics); and (8) whether aspirations are concealed or made public.

Behind these various issues, one finds other basic conceptions about agency (to what extent are individuals master of their fate), the impact of networks (to what extent is fate influenced by peers, family, and others), the impact of social structure (what is the impact of class, race, gender, place of origin) on where we end up, and how much does our environment (segregation, resource availability, environmental conditions) influence our opportunities. Therefore, it is important to remember that, although individuals play essential roles in narratives of hope, such images of the future are seldom creations of individuals alone but shaped by many cultural intermediaries working in the media, in education, in politics, in social movements, and in other institutions.

Cultural scripts represent commonly held assumptions about social interaction, which serve as a kind of interpretive background against which individuals position their own acts and those of others (Lamont et al. 2017). Narratives of hope as cultural scripts are more likely to become widely shared if they offer possible course of action, something that reasonable people can aspire to. Such sharing bolsters people’s sense of agency, the perception that they can have an impact on the world and on their own lives that they can actually achieve what is offered to them (Lamont et al. 2017). In contrast to doomsday or climate-denying narratives, these scripts feed a sense of active agency. Such “fictional expectations”, anchored in narratives that are continually adapted, are at the core of market dynamics confronted with an uncertain future affecting money and credit, investment, innovation, and consumption (Beckert 2016).

Narratives of hope represent ideas about “imagined futures” or alternative ways of visualizing and conceptualizing what has yet to happen and motivate action towards new development pathways (Moore and Milkoreit 2020). As they circulate and become more widely shared, such imagined futures have the potential to foster predictable behaviours, and stimulate the emergence of institutions, investments, new laws, and regulations. Therefore, decisions under uncertainty are not only technical problems easily dealt with by rational calculation but are also a function of the creative elements of decision‐making (Beckert 2016).

There is a rich literature on scenarios for sustainable futures, narratives articulating multiple alternative futures in relation to critical uncertainties, increasingly emphasizing new forms of governance, technology as a bridge between people and the deep reconnection of humanity to the biosphere, and engaging diverse stakeholder in participatory processes as part of the scenario work (Carpenter et al. 2006; Bennett et al. 2016). The implication of inherent unpredictability is that transformations towards sustainable and just futures can realistically be pursued only through strategies that not only attend to the dynamics of the system, but also nurture our collective capacity to guide development pathways in a dynamic, adaptive, and reflexive manner (Clark and Harley 2020; Freeman et al. 2020). Rather than striving to attain some particular future it calls for a system of guided self-organization. It involves anticipating and imagining futures and behaving and acting on those in a manner that does not lead to loss of opportunities to live with changing circumstances, or even better enhances those opportunities, i.e. builds resilience for complexity and change (Berkes et al. 2003).

In order to better understand the complex dynamics of the Anthropocene and uncertain futures, work is now emerging on human behaviour as part of complex adaptive systems (Levin et al. 2013), like anticipatory behaviour (using the future in actual decision processes), or capturing behaviour as both “enculturated” and “enearthed“ and co-evolving with socio-cultural and biophysical contexts (Boyd et al. 2015; Waring et al. 2015; Poli 2017; Merçon et al. 2019; Schill et al. 2019; Schlüter et al. 2019; Haider et al. 2021), illustrating that cultural transmission and evolution can be both continuous and abrupt (Creanza et al. 2017).

Narratives of hope for transformations towards sustainable futures are in demand. Clearly, technological change plays a central role in any societal transformation. Technological change has been instrumental in globalization and will be instrumental for global sustainability. No doubt, the new era of technological breakthroughs will radically change the structure and operation of societies and cultures. But, as has been made clear here, the recipe for sustainable futures also concerns cultural transformations that guide technological change in support of a resilient biosphere; that reconnect development to the biosphere foundation.

Biosphere stewardship for prosperity

Transformation towards sustainability in the Anthropocene has at least three systemic dimensions. First, it involves a shift in human behaviour away from degrading the life-support foundation of societal development. Second, it requires management and governance of human actions as intertwined and embedded within the biosphere and the broader Earth system. Third, it involves enhancing the capacity to live and develop with change, in the face of complexity and true uncertainty, that is, resilience-building strategies to persist, adapt, or transform. For major pathways for such a transformation are presented below:

  1. 1.Recognize and act on the fact that societal development is embedded in and critically dependent on the biosphere and the broader Earth system for prosperity and wellbeing.
  2. 2.Create incentives and design policies that enable societies to collaborate towards just and sustainable futures within planetary boundaries.
  3. 3.Transform the current pathways of social, economic, cultural development into stewardship of human actions that enhance the resilience of the biosphere.
  4. 4.Make active use of emerging and converging technologies for enabling the societal stewardship transformation.

Biosphere stewardship incorporates economic, social, and cultural dimensions with the purpose of safeguarding the resilience of the biosphere for human wellbeing and fostering the sustainability of a rapidly changing planet. Stewardship is an active shaping of social-ecological change that integrates reducing vulnerability to expected changes, fostering resilience to sustain desirable conditions in the face of the unknown and unexpected, and transforming from undesirable pathways of development when opportunities emerge (Chapin et al. 2010). It involves caring for, looking after, and cultivating a sense of belonging in the biosphere, ranging from people and environments locally to the planet as a whole (Enqvist et al. 2018; Chapin 2020; Plummer et al. 2020).

Such stewardship is not a top-down approach forced on people, nor solely a bottom-up approach. It is a learning-based process with a clear direction, a clear vision, engaging people to collaborate and innovate across levels and scales as integral parts of the systems they govern (Tengö et al. 2014; Clark et al. 2016; Norström et al. 2020).

Here, we focus on biosphere stewardship in relation to climate change, biodiversity, and transformations for sustainable futures.Show more

From emission reductions alone to biosphere stewardship

Global sustainability involves shifting into a renewable energy-based economy of low waste and greater circularity within a broader value foundation. Market-driven progress combined with technological change certainly plays an important role in dematerialization (Schmidheiny 1992; McAfee 2019) but does not automatically redirect the economy towards sustainable futures. Public awareness, responsible governments, and international collaborations are needed for viable economic developments, acknowledging that people, nations, and the global economy are intertwined with the biosphere and a global force in shaping its dynamics.

Since climate change is not an isolated phenomenon but a consequence of the recent accelerating expansion of human activities on Earth, the needed changes concern social organization and dynamics influencing the emissions of greenhouse gases from burning fossil fuels, technologies, and policies for reducing such emissions, and various approaches for carbon capture and storage. However, to reduce the effects of climate change, it will not be sufficient to remove emissions only. The resilience of the biosphere and the Earth system needs to be regenerated and enhanced (Nyström et al. 2019). This includes governance of critical biosphere processes linked to climate change, such as in agriculture, forestry, and the ocean. In addition, guarding and enhancing biodiversity will help us live with climate change, mitigating climate change by storing and sequestering carbon in ecosystems, and building resilience and adaptive capacity to the inevitable effects of unavoidable climate change (Dasgupta 2021).

The global pandemic caused a sharp fall in CO2 emissions in 2020 (Le Quéré et al. 2020), while the cumulative emissions continue to rise (Friedlingstein et al. 2020). The fall was not caused by a long-term structural economic shift so it is unlikely to persist without strong government intervention. Political action is emerging from major nations and regions and on net-zero GHG emissions within decades. Shifts towards renewable energy are taking place in diverse sectors. Carbon pricing through taxes, tariffs, tradeable permits, as well as removal of fossil-fuel subsidies and incentives for renewable energy and carbon sequestration (e.g. CCS techniques) are on the table and increasingly implemented. There are substantial material and emission gains to be made from altered consumption patterns, infrastructure changes, and shifts towards a circular economy. Voluntary climate action among some large corporations is emerging (Vandenbergh and Gilligan 2017). There is general agreement that the pace of these promising changes must rapidly increase in order to meet the Paris climate target (Fig. 10).

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Fig. 10

In addition, active biosphere stewardship of critical tipping elements and carbon sinks, as in forests, agricultural land, savannas, wetlands, and marine ecosystems is crucial to avoid the risk of runaway climate change (Steffen et al. 2018). Such stewardship involves protecting, sustaining, restoring, and enhancing such sinks. The existence of connections between finance actors, capital markets, and the tipping elements of tropical and boreal forests has also gained attention and needs to be acted upon in policy and practice (Galaz et al. 2018).

Furthermore, ecosystem restoration has the potential to sequester large amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. The amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere derived from destroyed and degraded land is roughly equal to the carbon that remains in ecosystems on land (about 450 billion tonnes of carbon) (Erb et al. 2018). The amount of degraded lands in the world is vast, and restoring their productivity, biodiversity, and ecosystem services could help keep global temperature increases within acceptable levels (Lovejoy and Hannah 2018). It has been estimated that nature-based solutions on land (from agriculture to reforestation and afforestation) have the potential to provide over 30% of the emission reductions needed by 2050 to keep global temperature increases to not more than 2 °C (Griscom et al. 2017; Roe et al. 2019).

There is scope for new policies and practices for nature-based solutions (Kremen and Merenlender 2018; Diaz et al. 2018). These solutions will require shifts in governance towards active stewardship of water and ecosystem dynamics and processes across landscapes, precipitation sheds, and seascapes (Österblom et al. 2017; Plummer et al. 2020), reconfiguring nation state governance, empowering the commons through justice, equity and knowledge, and making ownership regenerative by integrating rights with responsibilities (Brodie Rudolph et al. 2020). Also, the so-called “social tipping interventions” towards biosphere stewardship have the potential to activate contagious processes of rapidly spreading technologies, behaviors, social norms, and structural reorganization, where current patterns can be disrupted and lead to fast reduction in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (Otto et al. 2020). The window of opportunity for such shifts may emerge in times of turbulence and social discontent with the status quo (Carpenter et al. 2019). Creating conditions for processes of deliberate democracy may guide such transformative change (Dryzek et al. 2019).

Resilience and biosphere stewardship

Societal development needs to strengthen biosphere capacity for dealing with extreme events, both climate driven and as a consequence of a tightly coupled and complex globalized world in deep interplay with the rest of the biosphere (Helbing 2013; Reyers et al. 2018). For example, the challenge of policy and practice in satisfying demands for food, water and other critical ecosystem services will most likely be set by the potential consequences of the emergent risk panorama and its consequences, rather than hard upper limits to production per se (Cottrell et al. 2019; Nyström et al. 2019; Xu et al. 2020).

In this sense, a resilience approach to biosphere stewardship becomes significant. Such an approach is very different from those who understand resilience as return to the status quo, to recover to business-as-usual. Resilience in relation to stewardship of complex adaptive systems concerns capacities to live with changing circumstances, slow or abrupt, predictable or surprising. It becomes especially relevant for dealing with the uncertain and unknown and is in stark contrast to strategies that support efficiency and effectiveness for short term gain at the expense of redundancy and diversity. Such strategies may work under relatively stable and predictable conditions but, as stressed here, will create vulnerability in periods of rapid change, during turbulent times, and are ill-suited to confront the unknown (Carpenter et al. 2009; Walker et al. 2009). Financial crises and pandemics serve as real-world examples of such vulnerabilities and make explicit the tension between connectivity and modularity in complex adaptive systems (Levin 1999).

In contrast, intertwined systems of people and nature characterized by resilience will have the capacity, whether through strategies like portfolio management, polycentric institutions, or building trust and nurturing diversity (Costanza et al. 2000; Ostrom 2010; Biggs et al. 2012; Carpenter et al. 2012), to confront turbulent times and the unknown. Policy decisions will no longer be the result of optimization algorithms that presuppose quantifiable uncertainty, but employ decision-making procedures that iteratively identify policy options most robust to present and future shocks under conditions of deep uncertainty (Polasky et al. 2011). Resilience provides capacities for novelty and innovation in times of change, to turn crises into opportunities for not only adapting, but also transforming into sustainable futures (Folke et al. 2016).

The immediate future will require capacities to confront challenges that we know we know little about (Kates and Clark 1996). Given the global connectivity of environmental, social, and economic systems, there is no scale at which resource pooling or trade can be used to hedge against all fluctuations at smaller scales. This begs the question of what types of investments may lead to a generalized capacity to develop with a wide range of potential and unknown events (Polasky et al. 2011). One strategy is to invest in global public goods common to all systems, e.g., education, capacity to learn and collaborate across sectors, multi-scale governance structures that enable systems to better detect changes and nimbly address problems by reconfiguring themselves through transformative change. Such strategies, often referred to as building “general resilience”, easily erode if not actively supported (Biggs et al. 2012; Carpenter et al. 2012; Quinlan et al. 2015). General resilience is critical for keeping options alive to face an uncertain turbulent world (Walker et al. 2009; Elmqvist et al. 2019).

Collaborating with the biosphere

Clearly, a shift in perspective and action is needed (Fig. 11) that includes extending management and governance from the focus on producing food, fibre, and timber in simplified ecosystems to rebuilding and strengthening resilience through investing in portfolios of ecosystem services for human wellbeing in diversity-rich social-ecological systems (Reyers et al. 2013; Bennett et al. 2015; Isbell et al. 2017).

figure 11
Fig. 11

Numerous activities protecting, restoring, and enhancing diversity are taking place in this direction ranging from traditional societies, local stewards of wildlife habitats, marine systems, and urban areas, to numerous NGOs, companies and enterprises, and various levels of government, to international collaborations, agreements, and conventions (Barthel et al. 2005; Forbes et al. 2009; Raymond et al. 2010; Andersson et al. 2014; Barrett 2016; Brondizio and Le Tourneau 2016; Österblom et al. 2017; Barbier et al. 2018; Bennett et al. 2018).

Examples include widespread use of marine protected areas from local places to marine spatial planning to proposals for protecting the open ocean, enhancing marine biodiversity, rebuilding fisheries, mitigating climate change, and shifting towards ocean stewardship (Worm et al. 2009; Sumaila et al. 2015; Lubchenco and Grorud-Colvert 2015; Lubchenco et al. 2016; Sala et al. 2016; Gaines et al. 2018; Tittensor et al. 2019; Cinner et al. 2020; Duarte et al. 2020; Brodie Rudolph et al. 2020). The latter is the focus of the High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy, with 14 heads of state and more than 250 scientists engaged. They aim to stimulate transformative change for the ocean by committing to sustainably managing 100% of their own waters by 2030 (Stuchtey et al. 2020).

There are major restoration programmes of forests, wetlands, and abandoned and degraded lands and even revival of wildlife and rewilding of nature (Perino et al. 2019). Other efforts include “working-lands conservation” like agroforestry, silvopasture, diversified farming, and ecosystem-based forest management, enhancing livelihoods and food security (Kremen and Merenlender 2018).

The world’s ecosystems can be seen as essential capital assets, if well managed, their lands, waters, and biodiversity yield a flow of vital life-support services (Daily et al. 2009). Investing in natural capital has become a core strategy of agencies and major nations, like China, for wellbeing and sustainability, providing greater resilience to climate change (Guerry et al. 2015; Ouyang et al. 2016). It involves combining science, technology, and partnerships to develop nature-based solutions and enable informed decisions for people and nature to thrive and invest in green growth (Mandle et al. 2019).

There are several examples of adaptive management and adaptive governance systems that have transformed social-ecological dynamics of landscapes and seascapes into biosphere stewardship (Chaffin et al. 2014; Schultz et al. 2015; Walker 2019; Plummer et al. 2020). Stewardship of diversity as a critical feature in resilience building is about reducing vulnerability to change and multiplying the portfolio of options for sustainable development in times of change. Stewardship shifts focus from commodity to redundancy to response diversity for dealing with change (Elmqvist et al. 2003; Grêt-Regamey et al. 2019; Dasgupta 2021).

Clearly, the economic contributions of biodiversity are highly significant as reflected in the many efforts to expose and capture economic values of biodiversity and ecosystem services (Daily et al. 2000; Sukhdev et al. 2010; Kinzig et al. 2011; Costanza et al. 2014; Naeem et al. 2015; Barbier et al. 2018; Dasgupta 2021). Inclusive (or genuine) wealth aims at capturing the aggregate value of natural, human, and social capital assets to provide a comprehensive, long-term foundation for human wellbeing (Dasgupta and Mäler 2000; Polasky et al. 2015). Inclusive wealth provides a basis for designing incentives for more sustainable market transactions (Dasgupta 2014; Clark and Harley 2020).

Also, the role of the cultural context is fundamental (Diaz et al. 2018) and biocultural diversity, and coevolution of people and nature is gaining ground as a means to understand dynamically changing social-ecological relations (Barthel et al. 2013; Merçon et al. 2019; Haider et al. 2019). Broad coalitions among citizens, businesses, nonprofits, and government agencies have the power to transform how we view and act on biosphere stewardship and build Earth resilience. Science has an important new role to play here as honest broker, engaging in evidence-informed action, and coproduction of knowledge in collaboration with practice, policy, and business (Reyers et al. 2015; Wyborn et al. 2019; Norström et al. 2020).

In this context, work identifying leverage points for anticipated and deliberate transformational change towards sustainability is gaining ground, centred on reconnecting people to nature, restructuring power and institutions, and rethinking how knowledge is created and used in pursuit of sustainability (Abson et al. 2017; Fischer and Riechers 2019). Such actions range from direct engagements between scientists and local communities (Tengö et al. 2014) or through the delivery of scientific knowledge and method into multi-stakeholder arenas, such as boundary or bridging organizations (Cash et al. 2003; Hahn et al. 2006; Crona and Parker 2012) where it can provide a basis for learning and be translated into international negotiations (Biermann and Pattberg 2008; Galaz et al. 2016; Tengö et al. 2017). It includes efforts to accelerate positive transformations by identifying powerful actors, like financial investors or transnational corporations, and articulating key domains with which these actors need to engage in order to enable biosphere stewardship (Österblom et al. 2017; Galaz et al. 2018; Folke et al. 2019; Jouffray et al. 2019). The International science-policy platform for biodiversity and ecosystem services (IPBES), an international body for biodiversity similar to the IPCC for the climate, has proposed key features for enabling transformational change (Fig. 12). These efforts serve an increasingly important space for scientists to engage in, helping hold corporations accountable, stimulating them to take on responsibility for the planet and develop leadership in sustainability. Such science-business engagement will become increasingly important to ensure that companies’ sustainability agendas are framed by science rather than the private sector alone (Österblom et al. 2015; Barbier et al. 2018; Blasiak et al. 2018; Galaz et al. 2018; Folke et al. 2019; Jouffray et al. 2019).

figure 12
Fig. 12

The rapid acceleration of current Earth system changes provides new motivations for action. Climate change is no longer a vague threat to some distant future generation but an environmental, economic, and social disruption that today’s youth, communities, corporations, and governments are increasingly experiencing. This provides both ethical and selfish motivations for individuals and institutions to launch transformative actions that shape their futures rather than simply reacting to crises as they emerge. Shaping the future requires active stewardship for regenerating and strengthening the resilience of the biosphere.

Given the urgency of the situation and the critical challenge of stabilizing the Earth system in Holocene-like conditions, the pace of current actions has to rapidly increase and expand to support a transformation towards active stewardship of human actions in concert with the biosphere foundation. It will require reform of critical social, economic, political, and cultural dimensions (Tallis et al. 2018; Diaz et al. 2018; Barrett et al. 2020).

Concluding remarks

The success of social organization into civilizations and more recently into a globalized world has been impressive and highly efficient. It has been supported by a resilient biosphere and a hospitable climate. Now, in the Anthropocene, a continuous expansion mimicking the development pathways of the past century is not a viable option for shifting towards sustainable futures.

Humanity is embedded within, intertwined with, and dependent upon the living biosphere. Humanity has become a global force shaping the operation and future of the biosphere and the broader Earth system. Climate change and loss of biodiversity are symptoms of the situation. The accelerating expansion of human activities has eroded biosphere and Earth system resilience and is now challenging human wellbeing, prosperity, and possibly even the persistence of societies and civilizations.

The expansion has led to hyper-connectivity, homogenization, and vulnerability in times of change, in contrast to modularity, redundancy, and resilience to be able to live with changing circumstances. In the Anthropocene, humanity is confronted with turbulent times and with new intertwined dynamics of people and planet where fast and slow change interplay in unexperienced and unpredictable ways. This is becoming the new normal.

Our future on our planet will be determined by our ability to keep global warming well below 2 °C and foster the resilience of the living biosphere. A pervasive thread in science is that building resilient societies, ecosystems, and ultimately the health of the entire Earth system hinges on supporting, restoring and regenerating diversity in intertwined social and ecological dimensions. Diversity builds insurance and keeps systems resilient to changing circumstances. Clearly, nurturing resilience is of great significance in transformations towards sustainability and requires collective action on multiple fronts, action that is already being tested by increasing turbulence incurred by seemingly unrelated shocks.

Equality holds communities together, and enables nations, and regions to evolve along sustainable development trajectories. Inequality, in terms of both social and natural capitals, are on the rise in the world, and need to be addressed as an integral part of our future on Earth.

We are facing a rapid and significant repositioning of sustainability as the lens through which innovation, technology and development is driven and achieved. What only a few years ago was seen as a sacrifice is today creating new purposes and meanings, shaping values and culture, and is increasingly seen as a pathway to novelty, competitiveness and progress.

This is a time when science is needed more than ever. Science provides informed consensus on the facts and trade-offs in times of misinformation and polemics. The planetary challenges that confront humanity need governance that mobilizes the best that science has to offer with shared visions for sustainable futures and political will and competence to implement choices that will sustain humanity and the rest of the living world for the next millennium and beyond.

There is scope for changing the course of history into sustainable pathways. There is urgent need for people, economies, societies and cultures to actively start governing nature’s contributions to wellbeing and building a resilient biosphere for future generations. It is high time to reconnect development to the Earth system foundation through active stewardship of human actions into prosperous futures within planetary boundaries.

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