Impacts of agrisolar co-location on the food–energy–water nexus and economic security

Nature Sustainability volume 8, pages 702–713 (2025)

Abstract

Understanding how solar PV installations affect the landscape and its critical resources is crucial to achieve sustainable net-zero energy production. To enhance this understanding, we investigate the consequences of converting agricultural fields to solar photovoltaic installations, which we refer to as ‘agrisolar’ co-location. We present a food, energy, water and economic impact analysis of agricultural output offset by agrisolar co-location for 925 arrays (2.53 GWp covering 3,930 ha) spanning the California Central Valley. We find that agrisolar co-location displaces food production but increases economic security and water sustainability for farmers. Given the unprecedented pace of solar PV expansion globally, these results highlight the need for a deeper understanding of the multifaceted outcomes of agricultural and solar PV co-location decisions.

Main

Climate change threatens our finite food, energy and water (FEW) resources. To address these threats by transitioning towards net-zero carbon emissions energy systems, new energy installations should be designed while considering effects on the complete FEW nexus. The rapid expansion of solar photovoltaic (PV) electricity generation is a key part of the solution that will need to grow more than tenfold in the United States (US) by 2050 to meet net-zero goals1. However, solar PV expansion presents threats to agricultural production due to its land-use intensity and potential in croplands2. A considerable portion of ground-mounted solar PV facilities in the US are installed in agricultural settings3,4,5. Yet regions with high solar breakthrough, such as the California Central Valley (CCV), are often among the most valuable and productive agricultural land in the US3,5,6. It is not yet clear how the current solar PV landscape affects agricultural security, much less under 2050 net-zero expansion. Here we quantify both the agricultural offsets of solar PV land-use change and the decision-making processes behind these transitions for existing solar PV arrays in agriculture.

Competition between solar PV and agricultural land uses has led to various co-location methods where installations are sited, designed and managed to optimize landscape productivity across a wide range of ecological and anthropogenic services7. This approach differs from conventional solar PV deployment, which is often installed and managed primarily for electricity output and reduced maintenance7. Emerging concepts such as techno-ecological synergies (TES)8 and more recently, ecovoltaics7, encompass a wide range of co-location strategies enabling renewable energy installations to serve multiple productive ecosystem services. Agricultural production and solar PV can be laterally integrated (agrisolar co-location)9 or directly share land and photons via vertical integration (agrivoltaic co-location)10,11.

Agrivoltaic co-location involves the direct integration of solar and agriculture (crops or grazing) or ecosystem services (pollinator habitat, native vegetation) within the boundaries of solar infrastructure11. The earliest technical standardization, originating from Germany, specifies that this can occur under or between system rows, but not adjacent to, while agricultural yield losses are reduced to less than one-third of reference (without solar PV) yields10. Effective agrivoltaic management can improve agricultural yield, microclimate regulation, soil moisture retention, nutrient cycling and farmer profitability, while enhancing public acceptance12,13,14,15. Thus, agrivoltaic co-location can address the agricultural competition concerns created by solar PV expansion.

The term agrisolar is more broadly defined (modified from SolarPower Europe9), as the integration and co-management of solar photovoltaics, agriculture and ecosystem services within agroenergy landscapes, explicitly considering the trade-offs and co-benefits of agricultural, environmental and socio-economic objectives. Thus defined, agrisolar practices align with TES and ecovoltaic principles and encompass both coincident (‘agrivoltaic co-location’) and adjacent co-location where agricultural land is replaced (hereafter ‘agrisolar co-location’)11,16. However, replacing agricultural land with solar PV (‘adjacent agrisolar’) without implementing agrivoltaic management has historically been considered conventional solar and thus excluded from co-location research because agricultural production is ceased on site10. There is some evidence, however, that converting portions of agricultural fields to solar PV in water-stressed regions can also provide water and economic benefits that enhance agricultural security despite food production losses17,18. Adjacent agrisolar replacement appears to be the dominant practice, with recent work showing that there have been relatively few documented agrivoltaic installations compared to total solar PV deployment in agriculture in the CCV5,19. Because agrisolar practices are understudied relative to literature on other forms of co-location14,20, there is a need to assess regional resource outcomes for most existing solar PV installations and consequences for lost food production without agrivoltaic management. Conceptual examples of solar PV co-location are shown in Fig. 1.

figure 1
Fig. 1: Conceptual diagram of trade-offs and co-benefits with agrisolar, agrivoltaic and ecovoltaic co-location.

We argue that by enhancing water, energy and economic security, transitioning farm fields to solar PV installations can be considered adjacent agrisolar management in water-stressed regions. Here security is the capacity of a farmer to maintain or improve their financial well-being, operational resilience and access to essential resources, such as water and energy, while preserving the integrity and future of their agricultural practices. We assess the FEW security effects of these agrisolar PV installations across the CCV through 2018 and estimate the economic potential of those arrays throughout a 25-year operational-phase lifespan. We compute landowner cash flow including net energy metering (NEM) for commercial-scale PV installations and land leases for larger utility-scale arrays. All resource and economic effects are referenced to a counterfactual business-as-usual scenario with no solar PV installation, assuming continued agricultural production and operation on the same plot of land. The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the lifespan FEW and economic impacts of existing agrisolar arrays in the CCV. Rather than projecting future installations or policies, we report on the existing agrisolar placement, design and policy practices to inform future practices on a per-hectare basis, tailored to regional needs. We also highlight the need for, and opportunities within, additional research into agrisolar practices.

Results

Commercial- and utility-scale agrisolar arrays in CCV

We assembled a comprehensive dataset of agriculturally co-located solar PV installations within the CCV through 2018. We identified 925 solar PV arrays installed between 2008 and 2018, with an estimated capacity of 2,524 MWp on 3,930 ha of recently converted agricultural land. The estimated array capacity of each individual array ranged from 19 kWp to 97 MWp. A temporal synthesis of the input solar PV dataset, separated by array scale, is shown in Fig. 2b,c. The smaller commercial-scale arrays are roughly twice as common, yet account for one-tenth of the installed capacity and converted land area of utility-scale arrays. Note that commercial-scale arrays are predominantly fixed axis, whereas utility-scale arrays are more frequently single-axis tracking systems. There are also notable peaks in the number of installations for both array scales in 2016, potentially in response to the NEM 2.0 legislation timeline21. While there is some spatial clustering of converted crop types (Fig. 2a), converted crops were widely distributed across the CCV.

figure 2
Fig. 2: Study area and characterization of ground-mounted agrisolar PV installations.

Offset food and nutritional production

The 925 agriculturally co-located arrays displaced 3,930 ha of cropland, which is ~0.10% of the CCV active agricultural land22. In the baseline scenario (Methods provide scenario details), nutritional loss was 0.16 trillion kcal (Tkcal) and 1.41 Tkcal foregone by commercial- and utility-scale arrays, respectively (Fig. 3). The total, 1.57 Tkcal, is equivalent to the caloric intake of ~86,000 people for 25 years (solar lifespan), assuming a 2,000 kcal d–1 diet. The nutritional footprint of commercial-scale arrays (−21.2 million kcal (Mkcal) ha–1 yr–1) was greater than utility-scale arrays (−15.6 Mkcal ha–1 yr–1) and the total impact was primarily composed of grain (58%), orchard crops (21%) and vegetables (10%). Utility-scale arrays displaced the nutritional value of grain (60%) hay/pasture (16%) and vegetables (10%). Note that for displaced kcal production of hay/pasture, contribution was negligible despite dominating the converted area due to inefficient caloric conversion to human nutrition for feed and silage crops. Resource footprint, total lifespan impact and crop contribution is shown in Fig. 3. Cumulative resource impacts across the region through time are available in Supplementary Fig. 1.

figure 3
Fig. 3: Lifespan land use, food loss, electricity production and potential irrigation electricity offset and potential water conservation with agrisolar co-location in California’s Central Valley.

Electricity production and consumption

We modelled the annual electricity generation for each array and offset irrigation electricity demand. Total cumulative electricity generation for these identified arrays by 2042 was projected to be 10 TWh for commercial-scale arrays and 113 TWh for utility-scale arrays. The potential electricity saved by not irrigating converted land was 11 GWh and 146 GWh for commercial- and utility-scale arrays, respectively. Note that this was three orders of magnitude less than the total electricity generation. For reference, the total lifespan impact of electricity production and potential irrigation electricity offset ( ~ 124 TWh) could power ~466,000 US households for 25 years (assuming 10.6 MWh yr–1 per household).

Changes in water use

Most (74%) agriculturally co-located arrays in the CCV replaced irrigated croplands. On the basis of the business-as-usual change in total water-use budget (considering irrigation water-use offset and operation and maintenance—O&M water use), we estimate that agrisolar co-location in the region would reduce water use by 5.46 thousand m3 ha–1 yr–1 (total: 42.1 million m3) and 6.02 thousand m3 ha–1 yr–1 (total: 544 million m3) over the 25-year period for commercial- and utility-scale arrays, respectively. This could supply ~27 million people with drinking water (assuming 2.4 liters per person per day) or irrigate 3,000 hectares of orchards for 25 years. O&M water use on previously irrigated land was ~eight times less than irrigated crops—if offset irrigation water were conserved rather than redistributed. Irrigated crops that contributed the most to the offset irrigation water use were orchards (29%), hay/pasture (28%) and grain (27%) for commercial-scale installations and grain (37%), hay/pasture 31%), cotton (15%) for utility-scale installations.

Agricultural landowner cash flow

Adjacent agrisolar co-location is more profitable than the baseline agriculture-only scenario, regardless of how landowners are compensated (Fig. 4). For commercial-scale arrays, agrisolar landowners experience early losses from installation expenditure (−US$53,000 ha–1 yr–1). However, the lifespan cash flow was dominated by NEM, offset electricity costs and surplus generation sold back to the grid, resulting in a net positive economic footprint of US$124,000 ha–1 yr–1, 25 times greater returns than lost food revenue (−US$4,920 ha–1 yr–1). The resulting economic payback period was 5.2 years (best- and worst-case payback in 2.9 and 8.9 years respectively; Supplementary Fig. 2).

figure 4
Fig. 4: Lifespan economic footprint of commercial- and utility-scale agrisolar co-location.

The net economic footprint for utility-scale agrisolar landowners (US$2,690 ha–1 yr–1) was 46 times less than the commercial-scale footprint (Fig. 4b). In contrast to commercial-scale arrays, utility-scale agrisolar landowners were not responsible for installation or O&M costs but still lost food revenue (−US$3,330 ha–1 yr–1) and were only compensated by land lease (US$1,940 ha–1 yr–1) and offset operational (US$3,830 ha–1 yr–1) and irrigation water-use costs (US$220 ha–1 yr–1). In the worst-case scenario, the total budget was negative (−US$432 ha–1 yr–1), suggesting that some landowners could lose revenue. There was no payback period for utility-scale agrisolar landowners because the net economic budget was always positive (baseline and best-case scenario) or always negative (worst-case scenario). Cumulative economic impacts across the region in Supplementary Fig. 3.

On average, estimated foregone farm operation costs exceeded forgone food revenue (Fig. 4). While this may be affected by reporting differences in agricultural revenue and farm operation cost sources, agricultural margins are known to be small, or negative, for certain croplands (for example, pastureland), with margins likely to decrease further under future climate change and water availability scenarios23. For commercial-scale installations, cutting farm operation costs in half (highly conservative) resulted in a longer economic payback period of just a month. Cutting offset farm operation costs in half for utility-scale installations did not affect economic payback or the always-positive baseline and best-case budget.

Discussion

The effect of agrisolar co-location on food production

We found that displacing agricultural land with solar PV locally reduced crop production ( ~ 1.57 Tkcal), which may affect county- and state-level food flows. Fortunately, on national and global scales, food production occurs within a market where reduced production in one location creates price signals that can stimulate production elsewhere. For example, high demand and increased irrigation pumping costs in the CCV have resulted in higher prices received for specialty orchard crops. Thus, farmers have elected to switch from cereal and grain crops to specialty crops24. Solar PV is also far more energy dense per unit of land than growing crops to produce biofuels18—a practice common across large swaths of agricultural farmland in the US and elsewhere. We show that conversion of feed, silage and biofuel croplands provides high irrigation water-use offsets while minimizing nutritional impacts due to the low or non-existent caloric conversion efficiencies of these crops (Fig. 3). Though, considering food waste and a lack of crop-specific nutritional-quality knowledge, we cannot evaluate end-point impacts of reported foregone kcal (calories) on human diets and health25.

California produces 99% of many of the nation’s specialty fruit and nut orchard crops (for example, almonds, walnuts, peaches, olives)26. Fields producing these crops were commonly converted to solar PV (270 ha of orchard crops), and it may be difficult to shift production of these crops to other locations due to their intensive water footprint, climate sensitivity and time to production27,28. Altering global supply of these crops could lead to food price increases similar to biofuel land-use changes29 with agricultural markets taking time to compensate30. We found that these nutritionally dense, valuable and operationally costly crops are more commonly replaced by commercial-scale rather than utility-scale installations, resulting in a higher nutritional footprint at the site scale (Fig. 3). However, due to their smaller arrays size (Fig. 2), these arrays have a lower regional lifespan nutritional impact. The total solar PV area we consider (the area covered by panels and space between them) does not account for total cropland transformation by all solar energy infrastructure. Thus, total cropland area converted and associated caloric losses may be underestimated by up to 25%. We conducted a sensitivity analysis on this potential area bias for all area-based metrics and discuss the details of this underestimate in Supplementary Discussion.

Global food needs are projected to double by 205031,32. To meet these needs, yield per unit area must increase, agricultural land area under production must increase and/or food waste and inefficiency must be reduced. Reducing waste is feasible but requires a considerable change in dietary preferences33 and supply chain pathways34. Yield increases alone are unlikely to meet these needs31 and half of global habitable land is already agricultural35. Cultivated lands are facing additional pressures due to soil quality deterioration, aridification, water availability, urban growth and threats to global biodiversity that will be exacerbated under a changing climate36,37,38,39. Given these pressures on arable land, cropland selection for future agrisolar co-location, both commercial- and utility-scale, should be assessed at local, regional, national and international scales to maintain food availability and security.

Water security potential with agrisolar co-location

Here we show that solar PV installations preferentially displace irrigated land in the CCV (3,310 ha and 74% of co-located installations). Displacing this irrigated cropland enhances farmer cash flow while probably reducing overall water use by 5.46 and 6.02 thousand m3 ha–1 yr–1 for commercial- and utility-scale arrays, respectively. The total displaced irrigation water use was eight times the O&M use for those arrays. Thus, installing solar PV in water-scarce regions has substantial potential to reduce water use, which bolsters findings from previous studies17,18,40,41. This analysis does not incorporate the additional hydrologic effects of modifying surface energy and water budgets, including reducing evapotranspiration and the potential for increased groundwater recharge42,43.

Given that the cash flow benefits from utility-scale agrisolar co-location are relatively small, we evaluated how water-use limitations may be a factor in farmland conversion decisions. We hypothesize that fallowing land is largely a consequence of water shortages in the CCV24,40, thus fallowing land proximal to an array (within 100 metres) may indicate an emergent agrisolar practice: intentional fallowing and irrigation water-use offset adjacent to arrays supported by revenue from the array. Each array was coded by the adjacent crop type before and post installation of the array. While we cannot know what landowners would have done with the array acreage absent the installation, this analysis provides evidence of broader land-use trends that might have been driving decisions. The transition of array acreage from before proximal post-installation land use for utility-scale arrays is displayed in Fig. 5.

figure 5
Fig. 5: Land-use change adjacent to utility-scale solar PV installations on previously irrigated cropland in the CCV.

Understanding how economic incentives affect the replacement of valuable cropland with solar PV is essential to inform future energy landscape models and policies. Here we examined the transition to post-solar installation fallowing in adjacent irrigated cropland (Fig. 5). We observed fallowing of adjacent irrigated cropland at 58 utility-scale installations totalling 658 MWp and 968 ha (27% of utility-scale area) composed of 410 ha of grain, 250 ha of hay and pasture, 225 of orchards, grapes and vegetables and 82 ha of cotton and other crops. The direct area of these arrays (968 ha) can be linked to a potential irrigation water-use offset of 195 million m3 over 25 years. If these arrays were on-farm plots of average size, 14,000 ha of fallowed land adjacent to these 58 arrays could displace an additional 120 million m3 of irrigation water use, each year, or 3,000 million m3 over 25 years (Supplementary Methods). Thus, if landowners choose to fallow farmland adjacent to leased land for utility-scale arrays, the water-use reductions are greatly amplified. We discuss several important limitations44 of the Cropland Data Layer (CDL) regarding this analysis in Supplementary Discussion.

Intensely irrigated cropland in the CCV is vulnerable to drought, especially in southern basins that rely heavily on surface-water deliveries due to limited groundwater availability45. The California Budget Act of 2021 provides financial support for fallowing to motivate farmers to reduce water use46. Whereas fallowing land can help mitigate some hydrological problems, removing production can also result in large agricultural revenue losses47. Converting land with solar electricity production, rather than simply fallowing could reduce risks to farmers while enhancing financial security17, especially during periods of extreme drought40. Whereas this has implications for future installations, we show that farmers already appear to be practicing solar fallowing, probably resulting in long-term irrigation water-use reductions.

We acknowledge the potential issues in assuming that foregone irrigation water use due to solar PV installations was conserved rather than redistributed. However, a portion of this potential offset is probably real given three observations: (1) utility-scale installations correlate with newly fallowed land, which was not observed for commercial-scale arrays; (2) the 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA)48 requires water-use reductions by the 2040s and (3) agriculturally co-located solar PV maintains Williamston Act Status under the Solar-Use Easement49 (which has recently been revived50), a California tax incentive common in irrigated lands highly suitable for solar51. In our dataset, 46% of utility-scale installations and 58% of commercial-scale installations were completed after SGMA was enacted (Fig. 2b,c). We also performed a sensitivity analysis where only 50% of irrigation water-use offset was conserved rather than redistributed, which still resulted in an estimated US$9 million and 246 million m3 conserved due to the regional change in water use from just direct area converted (Supplementary Discussion).

Given this potential for water-use offset, solar fallowing for water-use reduction presents an opportunity for incentivized solutions that are already of interest to landowning farmers in the region17. With suitable solar area in the CCV exceeding projected fallowing acreage to comply with SGMA51, implementing agrisolar co-location policies and incentives such as these could promote complementary land uses and enhance public support15.

Achieving economic security across return structures

Regardless of scale and related financial benefits, farmers are switching away from cultivating crops to cultivating electricity. This study empirically demonstrates that both NEM and land-lease incentive structures have been viable frameworks for PV deployment in some of the most valuable cropland in the US6. Critically, we incorporate farm-specific agricultural dynamics across a region (offset farm operation costs, irrigation costs and food revenue) into economic considerations for replacing cropland with solar.

By including these revenues and costs, this study clearly demonstrates the strong economic incentives to replace cropland with commercial-scale arrays (Fig. 4a). Under the grandfathered NEM 1.0 and 2.0 agreements, commercial-scale agrisolar landowners enhanced financial security by 25 times lost food revenue over the lifetime of the array, while simultaneously reducing water use. The resulting total net revenue, US$124,000 ha–1 yr–1, is potentially underestimated because post-lifespan module replacement, resale or continued use is likely, and property values could increase (terminal value) compared to the reference scenario. We also have not considered several programmes, credits and incentives (for example, Rural Energy for America Program) that could enhance net revenue (Supplementary Discussion). However, these returns are not unlimited due to NEM capacity limitations (<1 MWp) and requirements to size the installation below annual on-farm load21.

Renewable energy policy evolves quickly, shifting incentives for new customer generators. Whereas climate change and decreasing water availability in the coming decades23 will probably increase financial motivation to install solar in agriculture, future adoption and the co-benefits reported here will also depend on new business models for grid pricing52. Pricing structures have already and will inevitably continue to change as utilities, regulators and grid customers adapt to distributed renewable generation, avoid curtailment and avoid the utility death spiral52. Although future installations and policy are not the focus of this study, the newest policy, NEM 3.0, substantially reduces compensation for surplus generation and limits options for multiple metered connections53, probably requiring future installations to add battery storage and other measures to maintain similar profitability54. However, this study considers solar arrays that are grandfathered into their respective NEM 1.0 and 2.0 agreements. Additionally, our estimated load contributions suggest that revenue reported here mostly originates from offset demand rather than credit for surplus generation (Supplementary Notes and Supplementary Discussion). The bottom line is that owning solar PV, offsetting annual on-farm electric load and selling surplus electricity back to the utility under NEM 1.0 and 2.0 has increased economic and energy security for farmers with existing arrays and has probably promoted water-use reductions in the region. Importantly, we also assumed that all decisions were made by and returns received by landowning or partial-owning farmers. We do not have access to land-ownership data for the CCV, but nearly 40% of agricultural land in the region is rented or leased55.

Utility-scale land-lease rates alone do not offset lost agricultural revenue. However, including offset farm operation costs results in a substantially lower but still profitable agrisolar economic footprint with no major up-front capital investment (Fig. 4b). In water-scarce regions, particularly where water-use reduction is required, the smaller returns from utility-scale agrisolar practices and potentially related fallowing of land may be more attractive than continued cultivation under water-supply uncertainty17. Thus, without profitable compensation, agrivoltaic practices may not be feasible if offset operational costs and water-use reductions are driving utility-scale agrisolar decision making. We also omit some agricultural dynamics (such as the environmental benefits of carbon reduction), which could reinforce resource and economic security for both commercial- and utility-scale installation (Supplementary Discussion).

Opportunities for agrisolar research

Whereas funding and incentives for co-location research have expanded rapidly in recent years, we advocate extending these to agrisolar co-location. Adjacent agrisolar replacement with barren or unused ground cover still falls short of the full potential of ecovoltaic and agrivoltaic multifunctionality7,9,10,11. However, the regional resource and economic co-benefits of replacing irrigated land in water-stressed regions with solar PV here cannot be ignored. These findings are also immediately relevant to the Protecting Future Farmland Act of 202356, which set out a goal to better understand the multifaceted impacts of installed solar on US agricultural land. We discuss additional placement and management decisions that fall under the umbrella of agrisolar co-location in Supplementary Discussion.

We have shown that the goal of co-location, to enhance synergies between the co-production of agriculture and/or other ecosystem services and net-zero electricity production, is at least partially achievable with agrisolar co-location. Broader agrisolar research may also expose the consequences of not widely adopting agrivoltaics to retain agricultural production and protect food security. Given the ecosystem service benefits reported here, there may be an opportunity to broaden the scope of co-location research and incentives to include agrisolar co-location practices defined here.

Methods

Identifying agrisolar PV arrays across the CCV

We used remotely sensed imagery of existing solar PV arrays and geographic information system (GIS) datasets to develop a comprehensive and publicly available dataset of ground-mounted arrays co-located with agriculture in the CCV through 2018. We extracted all existing non-residential arrays from two geodatabases (Kruitwagen et al.4,57 and Stid et al.5,58) within the bounds of the CCV alluvial boundary59. We removed duplicate arrays and applied temporal segmentation methods described in Stid et al.5 to assign an installation year for Kruitwagen et al.4 arrays. We acquired Kruitwagen et al.4 panel area within array bounds by National Agriculture Imagery Program imagery pixel area with solar PV spectral index ranges suggested in Stid et al.5 and removed commissions (reported array shapes with no panels). We then removed arrays with >70% overlap with building footprints60 to retain only ground-mounted installations. Finally, overlaying historical CDL crop maps with new array shapes, we removed arrays in areas with majority non-agricultural land cover the year before installation (Supplementary Fig. 4 and Supplementary Discussion).

The resulting dataset (925 agrisolar co-located arrays) included 686 ground-mounted arrays from Stid et al.5 plus 239 from Kruitwagen et al.4. For these sites, we calculated array peak capacity (kWp) by61:

(1)

where  is the total direct area of PV panels in m2,  is the average efficiency of installed PV modules during the array installation year62 (Supplementary Fig. 5) and  is the irradiance at standard test conditions (kW m–2). Arrays were split into ‘Commercial-’ (<1 MWp) and ‘Utility-’ (≥1 MWp) scale arrays following the California Public Utility Commission NEM capacity guidelines63.

Scenario summary and assumptions

We computed annual FEW resource and economic values for each ground-mounted agrisolar PV array identified across the CCV for four scenarios: (1) reference, business as usual with no solar PV installation and continued agricultural production on the same plot of land, (2) baseline, agrisolar PV installation with moderate assumptions related to each component of the analysis, (3) worst case, PV installation with high negative and low positive effects for each component, (4) best case, similar but opposite of the worst-case scenario. We compare baseline to the reference scenario to estimate the most likely FEW and economic effects and use the differences between best- and worst-case scenarios to estimate uncertainty. Supplementary Tables 2 and 3 provide an overview of scenarios for each resource and Supplementary Tables 4 and 5 for baseline agrisolar lifespan FEW resource and economic value outcomes, respectively.

Identified arrays were installed between 2008 and 2018 and were assumed to have a 25-year lifespan for arrays due to performance, warranties, module degradation and standards for electrical equipment64,65. We assumed that land-use change effects ceased following 25 years of operation to simplify assumptions about module replacement, resale or continued use. We then summarized the FEW and economic effects of all arrays across the CCV and divided our temporal analysis into three phases: (1) addition (2008–2018) where arrays were arrays were being installed across the CCV, (2) constant (2019–2032) with no array additions but all arrays installed by 2018 are operating and maintained and (3) removal (2032–2042), where arrays are removed after 25 years of operation.

We performed several sensitivity analyses to address limitations in the available data and methods and to show how changes in future policy (NEM) could affect incentives displayed here. Sensitivity analysis included the capacity cut-off between commercial- and utility-scale (5 MW), solar PV lifespan (15 and 50 years), nominal discount rate (3%, 7% and 10%), solar PV direct area bias (proportional direct to total infrastructure area and a uniform perimeter buffer) and irrigation redistribution (assuming 50% of irrigation water-use offset is redistributed rather than conserved), all else equal (Supplementary Discussion and Supplementary Tables 620). We discuss additional assumptions and limitations in Supplementary Discussion.

Displaced crop and food production

Replacing fields (or portions thereof) with solar PV arrays affects crop production by (1) lost production of food, fibre and fuels and (2) reduced revenue from crop sales. We simplify the complex effects of lost production and include solely the foregone calories through both direct and indirect human consumption, which is justified because CCV crop production is largely oriented towards food crops. Future analyses could evaluate the lost fibre (primarily via cotton) or fuel (via biofuel refining) production.

We evaluated the economic and food production effects of displaced crops through a crop-specific opportunity cost assessment of land-use change, incorporating actual reported; yields, revenue, caloric density and regionally constrained caloric conversion efficiencies for feed/silage and seed oil crops. All crop type information was derived from the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) CDL22 for the array area in both prior- and post-installation years (Supplementary Fig. 4 and Supplementary Methods provide the adjacent fallowed land analysis). Each array was assigned a majority previous crop from the spatially weighted means of crop types within the array area for the five years before the installation.

We converted all eligible crop types to kcal (also called calorie) for human consumption after Heller et al.25. Foregone food production ( in kcal) following PV installation was then defined for each array as:

(2)

where  is in kcal kg–1,  is in kg m–2 and  of each array in m2. Crop-specific caloric density data (kcal kg–1) were derived from the USDA FoodData Central April 2022 release66. FoodData food descriptions and nutrient data were joined and CDL specific crop groupings were made through a workflow described in Supplementary Fig. 6. Crop-specific yield data (kg m–2) were derived from the USDA NASS Agricultural Yield Surveys67. State-level (California) yield data were processed similarly, with missing crop data filled based on national average yields. We used caloric conversion efficiencies for feed, silage or oil crop to account for crop production that humans do not directly consume.

For each array, we calculated annual revenue of forgone crop production in real (inflation adjusted) dollars, calculated by:

(3)

where  is in US$ kg–1,  is in kg m–2 and  of each array in m2. We used the annual ‘price received’ for all crops in the USDA NASS Monthly Agricultural Prices Report for 2008 through 201868. For the baseline case, we assumed that food prices will scale directly with electricity prices through 2042 given that they respond to similar inflationary forces69. Supplementary Fig. 6 and Supplementary Methods provide a more complete workflow including best- and worst-case scenario assumptions.

Change in irrigation water use and cost savings

Irrigation water use can only be offset by agrisolar co-location if the prior land use was irrigated. The presence of irrigation was inferred from the Landsat-based Irrigation Dataset (LanID) map for the year before installation70,71 (Supplementary Fig. 4). If the array area contained irrigated pixels, then we assumed the cropland area and all respective crops within the rotation were irrigated.

We calculated the total forgone irrigation water use ( in m3) by:

(4)

where  in m is the crop-specific irrigation depth,  in m3 is the annual county-level irrigation water-use estimate and  in m3 is the county-level irrigation water-use estimate for the respective survey year irrigation depths.

We estimated annual crop-specific county-level irrigated depths from survey and climate datasets for each array. Crop-specific irrigation depths () were taken from the 2013 USDA Farm and Ranch Survey72 and 2018 Irrigation and Water Management Survey73, and logical crop groupings were applied (for example, almonds, pistachios, pecans, oranges and peaches were considered orchard crops). Because irrigation depths depend on the total precipitation in each survey year, we used multilinear regression to build annual county-level irrigation water-use estimates () from five-year US Geological Survey (USGS) water use74, gridMET growing season average precipitation75, with year as a dummy variable to incorporate temporal changes in irrigation technologies and practices. For the installation phase (2008 to 2018), these depths varied based on historical climate and survey data, whereas the projection phases (constant and removal) used a scenario-dependent moderate, wet (worst-case, least water savings) or dry (best case, most water savings) year estimate from the historical record (discussed in Supplementary Methods).

Assigning an economic value to water use is difficult and varies based on the temporally changing supply and demand76. We calculated the economic value of the change in water use (Water in real US$) to the farmer by:

(5)

where  (m3) is the offset irrigation water use for the co-located crop minus O&M projected water use,  (MWh m–3) is the irrigation electricity required to irrigate the co-located crop given local depth to water and drawdown estimates from McCarthy et al.77,  (US$ MWh–1) is the utility-specific (commercial-scale) or regional average (utility-scale) annual price of electricity based on the electricity returns and modelled electricity generation described in Supplementary Methods and  is a CCV-wide average water right contract rate of ~ US$0.03 m–3 (ref. 78). Here we assume that water (and thus energy) otherwise used for irrigation was truly foregone and not redistributed elsewhere within or outside the farm. Change in O&M water use was based on Klise et al.79 reported values, described in Supplementary Methods.

Electricity production, offset and revenue

Installing solar PV in fields has three benefits: (1) production of electricity by the newly installed solar PV array, (2) reduction in energy demand due to reduced water use and field activities and (3) revenue generation via net energy metering (NEM) or land lease. Here we assume that on-farm electricity demand is dominated by electricity used for irrigation and ignore offset energy (embodied) used for fuel.

We modelled electricity generation for each array using the pvlib python module developed by SANDIA National Laboratory80. Weather file inputs for pvlib were downloaded from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) National Solar Radiation Database81. We also estimated annual on-farm load to differentiate offset electricity use and surplus generation. Not only is electricity generated by the arrays, but electricity consumption is foregone for each array due to not irrigating the array area. The annual change in electricity consumption due to water use ( in GWh) is calculated by:

(6)

where  is the county-level rates for irrigation electricity demand in GWh m–3 and  is the change in water use in m3 from equation (5). County-level electricity requirements to irrigate were calculated using irrigation electricity demand methods described in McCarthy et al.77 modified with a CCV-specific depth to water (piezometric surface) product for the spring (pre-growing season) of 201882.

Revenue from electricity generation was calculated separately for each array depending on array size and the installation year. Commercial-scale arrays (<1 MW) were assumed to operate under an NEM 1.0 if installed before 2017 and NEM 2.0 if installed later, which allows for interconnection to offset on-farm load and compensation for surplus electricity generation (Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Table 21). Thus, for commercial-scale arrays, annual cash flow from solar PV (NEM in US$) is calculated as:

(7)

where  is real US$ saved by offsetting annual on-farm electric load and  is real US$ earned by surplus PV electricity generation sold to the utility under NEM guidelines. Both  and  are estimated based on pvlib modelled electricity generation and valued at the historical utility-specific energy charge retail rates. Historical energy charges are available either through utility reports83,84,85 or the US Utility Rate Database via OpenEI86. We made several assumptions that resulted in omission of fixed charges including transmission and interconnection costs from the analysis. Details about electricity rates and omitted charges are summarized in Supplementary Methods.

For utility-scale arrays (≥1 MW), annual revenue from agrisolar co-location (Lease in US$) was assumed to be given by:

(8)

where Lease is the economic value estimated to be paid to the farmer by the utility for leasing their land in US$ m–2 and Area of each array in m2.

We assumed commercial-scale arrays installed before 2017 were grandfathered into NEM 1.0 guidelines for the duration of their lifespan. However, arrays installed in 2017 and 2018 fall under NEM 2.0 guidelines which include a US$0.03 kWh–1 non-bypassable charge removed from 21,87,88. Annual on-farm operational load was estimated and distributed across the year based on reported California agricultural contingency profiles89 and Census of Agriculture county-level average farm sizes90,91,92 (Supplementary Figs. 7 and 8 and Supplementary Methods). With distributed hourly load estimations and modelled solar PV electricity generation, we delineated electricity and revenue contributing to annual load () from surplus electricity and revenue that would have been sold back to the grid and credited via NEM ().

Future electricity revenue was projected using 2018 conditions (contribution to annual load, to surplus) and energy charge rates, modelled electricity production described above (includes degradation, pre-inverter, inverter efficiency and soiling losses) and projected changes in the price of electricity. The Annual Energy Outlook report by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) provides real electricity price projections annually between 2018 and 2050 for ‘Commercial End-Use Price’93. This annual rate of change was used to estimate projected deviations from 2018 energy charges (2018 US$ kWh–1) during the constant and removal phases (2019–2042), with projected solar PV generation including discussed losses.

We used solar land consultant and industry reports for solar land-lease () rates that ranged from US$750 ha–1 yr–1 to US$4,950 ha–1 yr–1, with high-value land averaging IS$2,450 ha–1 yr–1 in the CCV94,95. Comparable lease rates (~US$2,500 to US$5,000 ha–1 yr–1) were reported by developers in the CCV region17 and used in a solar PV and biomass trade-off study in Germany18 (~US$1,000 to US$2,950 ha–1 yr–1).

Array installation and O&M costs

Historical installation costs (Installation) were taken from the commercial-scale PV installation prices reported in the Annual Tracking the Sun report where reported prices are those paid by the PV system owner before incentives62. The baseline scenario is the median installation price, whereas the best- and worst-case scenarios are the 20th and 80th percentile installation costs, respectively. These reported values are calculated using NREL’s bottom-up cost model and are national averages using average values across all states. Installation cost was not discounted, as it represents the initial investment for commercial-scale installations at day zero. All future cash flows, profits and costs are compared to this initial investment. We also included the 30% Solar Investment Tax Credit in the Installation for commercial-scale arrays96. The system bounds of this impact analysis were installation through the operational or product-use phase. We, therefore, did not assume removal expenses or altered property value (terminal value) to remove uncertainty in decision making at the end of the 25-year array lifespan.

Historically reported and modelled O&M values (pre-2020) range from US$0 kWp–1 yr–1 (best case) to US$40 kWp–1 yr–1 (worst case) with an average (baseline) of US$18 kWp–1 yr–1 (refs. 97,98). Projected O&M costs were based on modelled commercial-scale PV lifetime O&M cost to capital expenditure cost ratios from historical and industry data that provided scenarios varying on research and development differences (conservative, moderate, advanced). The annual reported values are provided from 2020 to 2050 for fixed O&M costs including: asset management, insurance products, site security, cleaning, vegetation removal and component failure and are detailed in the Annual Technology Baseline report by NREL97, which are largely derived from the annual NREL Solar PV Cost Benchmark reports.

Farm operation costs

Business-as-usual farm operation costs (Operation) were derived from the ‘Total Operating Costs Per Acre to Produce’ reported in UC Davis Agricultural and Resource Economics Cost and Return Studies99. We removed operational costs to ‘Irrigate’ from the total because we estimate that as a function of electricity requirements and water rights (described in ‘Change in irrigation water use and cost savings’) while retaining ‘Irrigation Labour’ as this was not included in our irrigation cost assessment. Best- and worst-case scenarios for farm operation costs coincided with yield scenarios described in ‘Displaced crop and food production’.

Discounted cash flow for agrisolar co-location

For each commercial-scale array in the CCV, we computed the annual real cash flow as:

(9)

and for each utility-scale array as:

(10)

where Commercial is the real return in 2018 US$ for commercial-arrays (<1 MWp) and Utility is the real return in 2018 US$ for utility-scale arrays (≥1 MWp). Each of the terms on the right-hand side of these equations are defined in the sections above.

We then computed real annual discounted cash flow () for each array to estimate the total lifetime value of each array. The  at any given year n is calculated for each array by:

(11)

where  is the real annual cash flow at year n (either Commercial or Utility as relevant for each array) and  is the real discount rate without an expected rate of inflation (i) from the nominal discount rate () calculated using the Fisher equation100:

(12)

Vartiainen et al.101 clearly communicates this method in solar PV economic studies and discusses the importance of discount rate (in their case, weighted average cost of capital) selection. For i, we use 3%, which is roughly the average producer price index (PPI) and consumer price index (CPI) (3.4% and 2.4%, respectively) between 2000 and 2022 and comparable to other solar PV economic studies101,102. We use a 5% 103 and perform a sensitivity analysis using 3%, 7% and 10%  and discuss discount rates used in literature in Supplementary Discussion. Separately from the sensitivity analysis for , we also calculated our best-case and worst-case scenarios for each array.

All prices were adjusted to 2018 US dollars for calculation of real cash flow terms in equations (11) and (9). We adjusted consumer electricity prices and installation costs for inflation to real 2018 US$ using the US Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index for All Urban Customers104. We adjusted all production-based profits and costs (all other resources) using US Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Index for All Commodities105.

Reporting summary

Further information on research design is available in the Nature Portfolio Reporting Summary linked to this article.

Data availability

The datasets and outputs generated in the current study are publicly available via Zenodo at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10023293 (ref. 106) with all source data referenced in the published article and in its Supplementary Information files.

Code availability

The code used to generate and analyse the datasets reported here are hosted via GitHub at https://github.com/stidjaco/FEWLS_tool and are available via Zenodo at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10023281 (ref. 107).

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the USDA National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA) INFEWS grant number 2018-67003-27406. We credit additional support from the USDA NIFA Agriculture and Food Research Initiative Competitive grant number 2021-68012-35923 and the Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences at Michigan State University. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the USDA or Michigan State University. We are grateful to B. McGill for bringing the vision of agrisolar co-location to life through her artistic conceptual depiction.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USAJacob T. Stid, Anthony D. Kendall & Jeremy Rapp
  2. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USASiddharth Shukla & Annick Anctil
  3. Department of Sustainable Earth System Sciences, School of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, The University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USADavid W. Hyndman
  4. Biological Systems Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USARobert P. Anex

Cultivating agro-ecology to harvest positive social impact

Agroecology advances environmental sustainability and revitalizes the economy and culture of rural communities. How does it achieve this? 

alt-img-positive-society

Javier Pardo Torregrosa

Can a crop represent action for change? Or a cow, grazing, an instrument against climate change? In a world where fields are often reduced to statistics, chemicals or massive harvests, there is another way to farm. It is not only about eliminating pesticides and rendering the soil fertile once more, but connecting ancestral knowledge with science, countryside with culture, production with dignity. And also with flavors!

Change in the agro-food sector toward production that is respectful to the environment has become fundamental in achieving climate neutrality and a more sustainable world. Ecological agriculture contributes a much deeper and more integrated view of how to do this, with its own implications and needs.

What will I read in this article?

What is agro-ecology and why is it key to a sustainable future?

But what exactly is agro-ecology? According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, agro-ecology is a way of connecting traditional and scientific knowledge with the aim of producing food in a more sustainable way. It is based on, says the FAO, the three pillars of sustainable development, so that, through the economic, social and environmental aspects, countries can increase their food production at the same time they protect the environment and promote social inclusion. In other words, as a practice, agro-ecology pursues the optimization and stabilization of production through less-polluting techniques, biodiversity conservation and the protection of animal well-being. But, also, through social movement, it aims to improve social justice, nourish rural identity and culture, and reinforce the economic viability of rural areas.

Agro-ecology pursues the optimization and stabilization of production through less-polluting techniques, biodiversity conservation and the protection of animal well-being

Biological control to chemical-free farming

Food systems face enormous challenges, from soil degradation to biodiversity loss and the climate crisis. Agro-ecology is not just the most viable option, but also the most urgent. More than a technique, it is a way of thinking and relating to the land, a view combining tradition, science and innovation to produce food sustainably, respecting ecosystems and those who live in them.

For agro-ecology to begin to become a reality, we need to forget all kinds of pesticides, herbicides and chemical and synthetic fertilizers, and control infestations biologically. Europe, for example, has spent years introducing the parasitic wasp Encarsia formosa into greenhouses for tomatoes and peppers, with the aim of controlling whitefly populations while significantly reducing the use of chemical pesticides.

Although the emphasis is often on applying innovative techniques, sometimes it is enough to look back to the past. We can achieve soil regeneration, for example, by using traditional historical and cultural practices such as organic fertilizers and incorporating livestock into the farming cycle. Or find the response in respecting nature’s cycles and its inherent way of doing things. This way we can imitate natural ecosystems through a seasonal crop and varied natural environment integrating autochthonous trees, plants and animals, which helps in the capture of carbon and, simultaneously, biodiversity conservation.

Although the emphasis is often on applying innovative techniques, sometimes it is enough to look back to the past

Technology and agro-ecology, an alliance for sustainable farming

Agro-ecology also requires us to steer technological and scientific advances toward better efficiencies in farming, always maintaining a position of respect toward nature. This is what the project, AgriBIT, financed by European funds, aims to do. Its researchers have developed a series of services using AI-based precision technologies for remote, real-time detection of plagues and bacterial infections in crops such as industrial tomatoes, using satellites and ground-based sensors. These kind of technologies can also serve systems for monitoring, harvesting, irrigation and soil regeneration. Also key is the implementation of solar photovoltaic systems and wind turbine generators, and the use of biomass derived from farming and livestock waste, to increase energy independence and reduce carbon emissions.

Social and economic benefits of agro-ecology

But the agro-ecological movement is not limited to a series of farming techniques focused exclusively on caring for the environment, it also pursues economic, social and cultural benefits.person in crop field

Agro-ecology results in better soil fertility and increased regularity in production, as well as diversifying the risk in cultivating different foods. It contributes to economic dynamism and job creation in rural communities, and involves civil society in the re-activation of areas.

One inspiring example of agro-ecology as an engine of social change is the Agroecology Action Research Network (AARN) in Australia. The network connects researchers, farmers and educators to promote the transformation of food and agricultural systems in the country through the co-creation of knowledge and the implementation of agro-ecological practices adapted to local needs.

Among the specific initiatives developed include so-called Agro-ecology Farmer Field Schools, spaces where farmers demonstrate and validate the techniques they are using to manage plagues, diversify crops and reduce synthetic inputs. The network also explores new research fields, such as the organic management of disease, agriculture without ploughing, and carbon sequestration on farmland.

The role of the community

Often when we fill the basket full of shopping, we ask ourselves why some products are so expensive. Meanwhile, small farmers are complaining that sometimes they are forced to sell below the cost of production. Agro-ecology looks for mechanisms to improve direct sales to consumers and consumer groups, as well as establish principles underpinning better balance in supply chains. It also calls on communities to buy locally directly from the farmer or small shops, also reducing pollution from transport. In Spain, the project Roots: Women, Agro-ecology and Local Consumption, for example, seeks to establish producer networks that come together to distribute their products, generating short distribution channels, organizing eco-markets with producers, and certification marks for participants. The program also takes into account the special role of women in rural areas.

What is the role of creative industries in the Anthropocene? An argument for planetary cultural policy

Miikka Pyykkönen a, Christiaan De Beukelaer bc

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2025.101971

Under a Creative Commons license

Open access

Highlights

•International policy discourses on culture and sustainability are anthropocentric, economic growth-oriented and methodologically nationalist, and international cultural policy organisations and documents, such as United Nations resolution on the International Year of Creative Economy for Sustainable Development 2021, have been impotent in intertwining culture with ecological sustainability.

Economy for Sustainable Development 2021 is analyzed as an examplar of this anthropocentric and economist discourse.

•The ideological underpinnings of cultural policy are the primary reason why culture has not been seriously recognized in international sustainability policies. A profound shift away from anthropocentric worldviews, growth-oriented ideologies, and methodologically nationalist frameworks is needed.

•This ‘new’ understanding of culture in international cultural policies have to cover nature and ecology and see humans and their culture as part of larger ecosystemic framework. Incorporating such a view in public policy requires a new kind of “planetary cultural policy”.

Abstract

Many artistic expressions call for cultural, social and political change. Though the policy environments in which they emerge remain predominantly wedded to a consumption-driven creative economy. In doing so, they tacitly endorse a methodologically nationalist perspective on artistic expression, trade in creative goods and services, and cultural identity. By using the United Nations resolution on the International Year of Creative Economy for Sustainable Development 2021 as a case in point, we argue that the language of this document, which reflects the current hegemonic discourse of creative economy, misses its target when claiming to promote sustainability because it is (1) anthropocentric, (2) growth-focused and (3) methodologically nationalist. Through a discourse analysis of this particular UN resolution, we demonstrate the multiple and conflicting connections between culture and sustainability through the perspective of planetary well-being. The main target of our criticism is the anthropocentric nature of sustainability discourses, but also their unreserved promotion of perpetual economic growth. In response, we articulate the need for a profound cultural shift from anthropocentric worldviews, growth-oriented ideologies, and methodologically nationalist frameworks to enable environmentally engaged cultural policies and citizens.

Keywords

Creative economy; Climate crisis; Anthropocentrism; Methodological nationalism; Cosmopolitanism; Planetary well-being

1. Introduction: the tension between planet, people and culture

In November 2019, the 74th session of the United Nations General Assembly declared that 2021 would be the International Year of Creative Economy for Sustainable Development. The idea of the theme year was formulated in discussions between United Nations (UN) agencies, including UN-Habitat, UNESCO and UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; recently rebranded as UN Trade & Development), which also consulted representatives of pro-creative economy organisations such as the OECD and the Asia-Europe Foundation. Indonesia drafted the resolution text, which was then presented to a group of representatives of 27 countries from all inhabited continents. The final and published version of the resolution is a consensus of these multi-layered discussions. Rather than being a final result that every involved state can fully rally behind, in practice a “consensus” text is precisely one containing conflicts. It is through the subtleties of phrasing that consenting parties ensure that all other parties can recognise their red lines, pet peeves, and concerns in the text, without (seemingly) ceding too much ground. A consensus is therefore not a strong joint position, but merely a position that no one strongly objects to.

Much like other United Nations documents, the resolution commits loyalty to the background organisations and their policies and programmes, as well as the international organisations and their branches that work on the topics of the resolution:

Recalling the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which states that the organization, as part of its purposes and functions, will maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge by encouraging cooperation among the nations in all branches of intellectual activity, and noting the report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on culture and sustainable development, in which it is stated that cultural and creative industries should be part of economic growth strategies […] Welcoming the efforts of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Development Programme, the International Labour Organization, the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and other entities of the United Nations system to promote the creative economy for sustainable development. (United Nations, 2019, 2, emphasis added)

The resolution is, therefore, not so much a visionary document but largely a reflection of past initiatives and interventions. The document is thus a palimpsest through which decades of ideas and initiatives filter through.

The key argument of the resolution is that the creative industries can, should and do promote sustainable and innovation-based economic growth. The resolution mainstreams culture in and for sustainability by defining culture above all through its economic significance and national scope: “[The resolution] encourages all to observe the year in accordance with national priorities to raise awareness, promote cooperation and networking, encourage sharing best practices and experiences, enhance human resource capacity, promote an enabling environment at all levels as well as tackle the challenges of the creative economy” (UNCTAD, 2021). UNCTAD led the implementation of the theme year policies and activities in consultation with UNESCO and other relevant UN agencies.

Despite the triumphant tone of the resolution, culture plays a minor role in policies for sustainable development (Duxbury et al., 2017). If anything, it plays a contradictory role: art and culture can certainly play a positive part, but the creative industries have an enormous environmental impact that needs to be addressed (Miller, 2018). This is partly because of how the sector operates, but also because of the sponsorship connections many arts institutions maintain with fossil fuel producers, airlines and car manufacturers (Evans, 2015).

Our article builds on the following streams and debates in cultural policy: the dominant discourses and trends in international cultural policies, the economisation of cultural policies, the position of creative economies and industries in national economies, and, most of all, the meaning and position of culture in policies and politics for an ecologically sustainable world, that is, the rethinking of the human/culture and nature relationship. Brkldly, and eventually, the focus of our article is on the relation between cultural policy and cosmopolitan citizenship and identity, we posit that a new kind of human actorship in the era of climate crisis, one that includes the idea of human beings as members of the planetary community/entity. This is because we think we need more critical use of comprehensive research and policy concepts cultural policies. Such concepts still remain disconnected from the commonplace understandings of sustainability in cultural policy, as we explain in this paper. We use concepts such as the planetary well-being approach (Kortetmäki et al., 2021Brundtland Commission, 1987down-to-earth approach, which combine ecological, social, cultural and economic perspectives, allowing us to transcend the afore-mentioned tensions and dualisms. (A) They allow us to move towards a more robust and permanent approach when it comes to human and cultural actions – be they economic, anthropocentric or related to identity/citizenship – within natural ecosystems. (B) They enable us to rethink what culture should mean to become a key concept in the manifold efforts for sustainable futures. (C) We can use them to break the local/national-global dualism and reconstruct cosmopolitan or cosmopolitical (Beck, 2016) approaches.

This article thus explores how international policy documents frame culture, creative economy and culture’s role in sustainability. We look, in particular, at the documents and narratives proposed by United Nations Agencies, because they and their sub-actors pursue trendsetting in terms of what national, regional and local cultural policies focus on, and how culture should or could be approached (Pirnes, 2008). We are aware that there are local cultural policies and practices, which include critical and eco-sensitive features (see e.g. Bell et al., 2011Gross & Wilson, 2020Perry & Symons, 2019) and which potentially could be scaled at least to national level policies and practices, but to study them and their potential impacts is a topic for another article. Nevertheless, one of the key issues in international cultural policies on sustainability in the near-future is to change the orientation radically from one-sided economism towards discursive formulation and facilitation of ecological and non-anthropocentric ‘sustainable culture’. Part of this should be the rebuilding these policies more bottom-up than before in the sense that local ecological, planetary and non-capitalist forms of cultural production would get more attention in them.

The overall question this article sets out to answer is thus: Do the hegemonic creative economy and climate change discourses of international cultural and sustainability policies recognise the urgent need to rethink the human/nature and culture/nature relations? This is particularly relevant as climate change itself is a tricky concept that can be characterised as a “hyperobject” (Morton, 2013) or as an “event” (Tavory & Wagner-Pacifici, 2022). The main target of our criticism is the anthropocentric nature of the resolution and its unreserved promotion of perpetual economic growth, which are fundamentally incompatible with ecological sustainability (Hickel & Kallis, 2020Jackson, 2021Raworth, 2017) and “organismal needs”, as we explain below (Kortetmäki et al., 2021). By using the above concepts, we try to articulate the need for a profound cultural shift from anthropocentric, growth-oriented ideologies and methodologically nationalist frameworks to enable environmentally engaged cultural policies.

2. Data, methods and theory

Through a discourse analysis of the resolution, we demonstrate the multiple and conflicting connections between culture and sustainability through the perspective of planetary well-being and other relevant current social scientific theories.

Our primary data consists of a single document: the resolution on the International Year of Creative Economy for Sustainable Development (United Nations, 2019), which declared 2021 to be that year, to be led and implemented by UNCTAD and Indonesia. This decision – together with the more general policy discursive and organisational history – has influenced the way the relation of creativity and sustainability is understood in the Resolution as UNCTAD unexceptionally defines it with the strong economy association (see e.g. UNCTAD, 2022) and Indonesian creative policies have also a long tradition of linking it to economic growth (De Beukelaer, 2021).

The resolution is exemplary of how a cultural policy commonly connects culture and creativity to sustainable development. As we explore in section “The context of the resolution” the document under scrutiny is a political culmination of two decades of UN inter-agency work on the issue. It is an apt summary of the issues addressed, and given its limited length it exposes the discursive shortcuts inherent to the discourse – which often remain buried in verbose reports. The document is exemplary in its message and useful in its brevity, even if it offers a simplified conceptualisation of the creative economy. However, the resolution is not norm-setting. It rather reflects existing norms and concerns. Like many such United Nations documents, it offers (almost by definition) a consensus text of how states see a certain issue.

Due to the importance of this history and context, we have also looked beyond this single document by engaging with other recent documents of international organisations to describe more comprehensively the current hegemonic discourse on cultural sustainability and its construction over time in the field of international cultural policies (see below).

We use rhetorical discourse analysis as our method for analysing the resolution. It means that we concentrate on “textual practices” (Fairclough, 1995, 185): how certain kinds of words and expressions are used to construct certain kinds of definitions of culture and sustainability and to convince the reader of their validity (cf. Johnstone & Eisenhart, 2008). We also pay attention to other levels of discursive formation by shedding light on the organisational roles and practices that influence the messages of the resolution and their value in international and national cultural policies (cf. Pyykkönen, 2012). Before the actual discourse analysis, we provide a theoretically-driven content analysis of the resolution to initially clarify its key ways of speaking about culture and sustainability in the light of our theoretical framework.

We use multiple theories and theoretical perspectives to interpret the results and further discuss our findings. The first theoretical perspective focuses on the cultural economy (e.g., Throsby, 2010) and the idea of a so-called value-based economy (Klamer, 2017), which aim to emphasise the role of culture in orthodox economic thinking. The second theoretical perspective concentrates on recent social scientific and anthropological theories that attempt to rethink and reformulate the human/culture/nature relations. Here our aim is to show how the definitions of culture and sustainability – under the umbrella of the creative economy discourse – tend to be growth-centred, anthropocentric and methodologically nationalistic (Beck, 20062016Latour, 2018Malm, 2018). The third theoretical perspective focuses on planetary well-being, which to our understanding further directs the criticism at the conventional culture and sustainability nexus by suggesting orientations and practices that intertwine culture – and policies concerning it – with our planetary existence and identity in a novel way (Kortetmäki et al., 2021). Besides planetary well-being, we rely on Tim Jackson’s (20092021) ideas on prosperity and post-growth to put practical flesh on the theoretical bones of the necessary change.

Building on these theoretical and conceptual foundations, we strive for a new conceptualisation of “planetary cultural policy”, which consists of such policy discourses and practices on heritage, arts, creative work and identity in which nature and culture are seen as part of the same systemic totality, and the intrinsic and other values of cultural activities are determined based on how they promote ecological sustainability.

3. The hegemonic discourses of culture and sustainability

Sustainability and culture have been discussed in the national and international cultural policy contexts for over 20 years from various perspectives: What does “culture” stand for in culture and sustainability? What is the role of culture among the pillars of social, economic, and ecological sustainability? What is cultural sustainability? And, above all, how should cultural policies tackle sustainability issues? Due to the diversity of interests, intentions, expectations, discourses and related practices, sustainability does not have any single form in cultural policies. Similarly, researchers argue that culture has remained too vague to be a pragmatic policy issue, confined to the margins of national and international policies for sustainability (e.g., Sabatini, 2019Soini & Dessein, 2016). Others claim that proponents of cultural sustainability have not managed to intertwine culture with the other pillars of sustainability, especially ecological sustainability, which has diluted the significance of culture in sustainability policies (e.g., Kagan, 2011). For instance, culture is not explicitly mentioned in any of the titles of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations, 2018Vlassis, 2015).

As a reaction – less openly expressed – to this vagueness and marginalisation of culture in global sustainability policies, key international cultural policy agencies such as UNESCO and UNCTAD have embraced the economisation of culture (De Beukelaer & Spence, 2019Garner & O’Connor, 2019Pyykkönen, 2012).Despite some voices that have tried to expand the hegemonic economic reductionism of value (‘economism’) in more or less liberal societies by emphasising the social and educational values of cultural expressions (e.g., Klamer, 2017; Throsby, 2010), the research on this move has been ontologically uncritical the “economy”. The issue of how culture should contribute to sustainability – especially to its ecological dimension, which we consider the most critical and significant one – in this intertwinement has also remained almost unstudied in realpolitik.

This economism in the culture and sustainability discourse – and the general understanding of culture’s value – is underpinned by widely shared and ideologised significations of the capitalist market economy. In particular, the neoclassical theories of economic growth (Solow, 1999), Schumpeterian ideas on innovation, creativity and entrepreneurialism (Schumpeter, 1942; see also Potts, 2009) and related political ideas and trends (e.g., Hautamäki, 2010) have had a tremendous but thus far under-researched impact on cultural policies. These ideologies have created and strengthened a global discourse according to which the wealth and well-being of the world, nations and people are dependent on increasing productivity and economic growth. Through education, consumerism and national financial and economic policies, for instance, and through being entwined with the globalising knowledges and practices of capitalist production, these principles and their logics have become naturalised presumptions in our societies and cultures (Jackson, 20092021). According to some current researchers of philosophy, environmental sociology and politics, capitalist market economism has intertwined with two cornerstones of our Western culture: anthropocentrism and methodological nationalism (Beck, 2006Malm, 2018). Latour (2018) argues that the cultural mindset stemming from this hinders us from thinking of ourselves and our actions – practical, discursive, political etc. – as “terrestrial”, as being part of the earth and its ecosystems when acting both locally and globally.

Over time, the principles of capitalist production and market economy have also become normalised in cultural policies that guide the creative and cultural industries (McGuigan, 2015), particularly after key international players such as UNESCO and UNCTAD have adopted them as norms (De Beukelaer & Spence, 2019Pyykkönen, 2012). In the case of UNESCO, it has meant the culmination of its long “struggle” to justify the significance of culture and cultural diversity by creating such a numerical and measurable framework discourse for them. This framework resonates positively with both the dominant rationalities of global politics and the interests of nation states and their “methodological nationalism”. UNCTAD has helped popularise the “creative economy” discourse since 2004. UNCTAD’s ostensible goal is to enhance the prosperity and wealth of the poorest countries by facilitating access to global markets for their products. Both UNCESCO and UNCTAD implicitly ground their work on anthropocentrism: the ideas and the actions they support are from humans, for humans. Nature is an instrument of their creative expressions and economic efforts.

One might argue that this particular resolution – and the work of the United Nations in general – is already “planetary” or “universal”. We disagree, because United Nations agencies are intergovernmental forums that serve to find a common ground among nations through multilateral processes (De Beukelaer & Vlassis, 2019), not to foster an overarching set of principles that serve humanity or the planet – let alone the “universe” – as a whole. Hence, the discourse we criticise is inter-national at best, whereas what we call for is a fundamental shift in the normative foundations of global governance, by prioritising the planetary above the (inter)national. In our approach and in the context of this analysis, planetarism means that in global cultural policy, in addition to human values and well-being – and against the dominant emphasis on economic value – the values ​​and well-being of the environment has to be seriously and thoroughly considered, and to reconsider the concept of culture and to rescale it so that it intertwines with the nature and not detaches from it, as has been mostly typical for the hegemonic narrative of modernism (Koistinen et al., 2024Kortetmäki et al., 2021; see also Latour, 2017). Alasuutari (2016) argues that policy discourses across most domains have become “synchronised”, not through coercion, but through the voluntary creation of epistemic communities. In this discourse making and identicalisation the supranational organisations, such as UN and EU, are significant players due to their legal and legitimate grounds to determine the dissemination of ideas and discourses to international and intranational policymaking. These kinds of organisations take a clear step forward on putting the ecological sustainability as the first and main goal of the cultural policies. They thus actually, though not inherently, act as an ‘obligatory passage point’ for planetarisation of cultural policies. Signs of this can be already found from the documents such as New European Bauhaus (European Commission, 2021) and Pact for the Future (United Nations, 2024), and some related policy initiatives. How these changes take place in practice, is always an empirical question and a topic of deep discussion and observation beyond the scope of this article, where our focus is on global cultural policymaking discourses.

Research debates have been more diverse than the policy discussions, especially the dominant policy discourses. Among the best-known research publications on culture and sustainability are those originating in the research network “Investigating Cultural Sustainability” (which was active 2011–2015), which brought together more than 50 European researchers. One of the key findings of this collaborative research is that culture can function for, in and as sustainable development (Dessein et al., 2015Soini & Birkeland, 2014). Consequently, if cultural policy wants to broaden its scope of influence, it should opt to focus on the “for” sustainable development perspective because it allows the development of the sustainability of cultural expressions as well as the use of the cultural sphere and policies to enhance other aspects of sustainability, especially the ecological one (Duxbury et al., 2017). One of the key perspectives in policy reports and research papers on culture and sustainability is that they strive for “mainstreaming culture” by explaining it and its meanings next to the other pillars of sustainability. In our view, this, however, involves the “risk” that analyses merely concentrate on explaining the value of different kinds of cultural expressions and thus usually justify the economic determination of culture (e.g., Sabatini, 2019).

While some of the above-mentioned studies briefly suggest that the interrelatedness of biological and cultural forms of diversity should be enhanced in the culture and sustainability discourse/praxis (see, e.g., Dessein et al., 2015), we try to critically renew and complement them. We argue that the “mainstreaming of culture” should not be realised on an “anything goes” or economic basis, but rather by binding culture strongly and explicitly to the planetary and ecological aspects of sustainability. This does not only concern economism, but applies to anthropocentrism and methodological nationalism as well: the “planetary mainstreaming of culture” should consider principles, solutions and identities/citizen-subjectivities broader than national and human ones – ones that are both cosmopolitical and ecosystemic (see also Beck, 2006Malm, 2018).

4. The context of the resolution

The concept of sustainable development was introduced in 1987 by the “Brundtland Commission”, formally known as the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission, 1987). It first defined “sustainable development” in its report Our Common Future. This document aimed to respond to the environmental threat of global warming and the need to raise the living standards of those in so-called developing countries as well as to ensure a focus on economic growth, which was seen as one of the key indicators of economically sustainable development. Culture was not an explicit topic in the report, although many of its themes were related to it. When culture was first explicated as an issue of sustainability in international cultural policy during the UNESCO Decade of Culture and Development (1988–1997), it was connected to socioeconomic dimensions. Culture was seen as a root and a driving force of economic development and social improvement in so-called developing countries (WCCD, 1995). As we already referred, this stance has been predominant in UNCTAD’s and UNESCO’s recent approaches on culture and sustainability.

UNCTAD has been instrumental in framing culture in and for sustainability, especially in so-called developing countries. UNCTAD has been greatly involved in the international creative economy policy discourses since 2004, which also marked their beginning globally. Its programmes and documents have framed culture and sustainability to describe the broader discursive practice that is indelibly linked to the resolution and its overwhelmingly economic tone. UNCTAD uses programmes and reports to turn its rich datasets on trade in creative goods and services into analyses and trends. The best known is the Creative Economy Programme, dating back to 2004 (see, e.g., UNCTAD, 2022). The programme’s main purpose is to generate “economic information through a trade lens, to understand past trends and project into the future and to promote data-led understanding of trade in creative goods and services, intellectual property, ideas and imagination” (ibid.). At its core are the so-called Creative Economy Mandates (see ibid.), one of which is the resolution we are studying here. The mandates are based on the research and policy analyses that UNCTAD produces with its partners. The central ones for UNCTAD’s meaning making are creative industry reports such as Creative Industry 4.0: Towards a New Globalized Creative Economy (UNCTAD, 2022), which aims to argue not only that the creative economy is crucial for national and global economies, but also that the creative industries can actually be key drivers of the technological change and, thus, the large-scale economic and livelihood changes of the near future.

UNESCO, whose mandate explicitly covers culture, is another key actor in defining culture in, for and as sustainability. Since the afore-mentioned Brundtland Commission (1987) report, it has explicitly discussed sustainability as a key issue to enhance through its policies. UNESCO’s declarations and conventions – such as Our Creative Diversity (WCCD, 1995), Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Heritage (UNESCO, 2001) and the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO, 2005) – have outlined UNESCO’s arguments on the need to secure a sustainable future and apply culture in it. One might even say that UNESCO has been the prima driver of novel significations and contexts for culture within the framework of sustainability (cf. Dessein et al., 2015, 45, 51). The 2005 UNESCO Convention is a useful starting point for analysing the organisation’s rationale on culture and sustainability as it stresses the economic significance of cultural expressions and the construction of strong cultural industries (De Beukelaer et al., 2015Garner & O’Connor, 2019Pyykkönen, 2012).

UNESCO’s work is not only about making meanings, but also consists of collecting and analysing worldwide data on culture and sustainability. On the basis of this knowledge, it launches and participates in projects that promote culture in and for sustainability, such as the International Year of Creative Economy for Sustainable Development. UNESCO worked hard to get culture included in the Sustainable Development Goals (Soini & Birkeland, 2014) but was not successful as none of the original 17 SDGs focus exclusively on culture (United Nations, 2018). However, there are official post-SDG explanations about how culture nonetheless is “at the heart of SDGs” (Hosagrahar, 2017), and what nations and local advocates should do to pay attention to culture when trying to follow the SDGs (UCLG, 2021). After a few years of active campaigning, culture was finally explicitly noted in four of what are called SDG targets in the revised version of the goals (United Nations, 2019).

It is not only the UN or its agencies that have intertwined culture and sustainability with the economy in recent international policies. Both the OECD and the G20 have recently published reports that are very much in line with the principles and objectives of UNCTAD and the resolution we analyse here. Although the OECD pays attention to the creative economy’s potential in enhancing environmental sustainability in its note for Italy’s 2021 G20 presidency (OECD, 2021), the paper includes parts that openly favour culture’s role for economic growth (e.g., ibid., 12). The text-level discursive similarity between the G20’s (2021) Creative Economy 2030 policy brief and UNCTAD’s recent statements is striking: “Before COVID-19 hit, the global creative economy was growing rapidly in many regions. This momentum should not be lost in the wake of the pandemic; rather, greater investment needs to flow to the creative industries that have the potential to make localised and high impact, and help us shift to a new sustainable economy” (ibid., 9–10). This is not surprising as representatives of UNCTAD and other pro-creative economy organisations (e.g., the Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre and the Global Project Culture and Creative Industries) have participated in writing the G20’s policy brief. The World Bank & UNESCO (2021), too, greatly participates in the economist discourse making through its publication Cities, Culture, Creativity: Leveraging Culture and Creativity for Sustainable Urban Development and Inclusive Growth, jointly produced with UNESCO: “Cultural and creative industries are key drivers of the creative economy and represent important sources of employment, economic growth, and innovation, thus contributing to city competitiveness and sustainability” (ibid., 2).

5. The resolution

The resolution is an exemplary and nearly caricatural account of the discourse surrounding the “creative economy”. Ecological sustainability is almost completely absent from the resolution, and when it is mentioned, it is subordinated to capitalist economic objectives. In our analysis of the resolution, we found three interlinked categories through/in which the significations of culture are constituted: (i) Anthropocentrism; (ii) Economic Determinism; and (iii) Methodological Nationalism. Through our analysis, we argue that these discourses are problematic in terms of ecological sustainability, post-Anthropocene subjectivities, and notions of planetary well-being and prosperity (cf. Jackson, 2009Kortetmäki et al., 2021Latour, 2018).

5.1. Anthropocentrism

In general, anthropocentrism refers to a human-centred worldview and morality: humans are the only rational and truly meaning-making species and hence the key agents of the world; they are the ones who can, through work and reuse, dominate objects that originally belonged to nature; they can own and assume control over nature due to their supreme capabilities; and the value of nature is determined by its value for humans so that nature does not have an intrinsic value (Barry & Frankland, 2002). Though this raises questions of what the Anthropocene means. Commonly, it’s a shorthand for the idea “that modern human activity is large relative to the basic processes of planetary functioning, and therefore that human social, economic, and political decisions have become entangled in a web of planetary feedbacks (Malhi, 2016). Though it risks masking the deeply unequal and inequitable distribution of human influences and consequences on this way of looking at “our” era (Malm & Hornborg, 2014).

What is emblematic of anthropocentrism is that humans are either consciously or unconsciously defined and valued against nature and its actors such as animals. This is a typical text-level ‘regularity’ (see Foucault, 1972) and order in the whole centrism discourse. On the other hand, in ecocentrism and biocentrism, for instance, nature and its well-being are observed against humans. This discursive order derives from the nature/culture division, one of the major narratives in Western thought. This binarism is indeed one of the most problematic aspects of the “centrisms” in terms of ecological sustainability because it separates humans and nature from each other per se (Boddice, 2011).

As we have already claimed, conventional cultural policy understands culture as a merely human issue and makes the human the subject of and subject to cultural policy and its share of rights, actorships, beneficiaries and, in the end, the bios itself. Most studies and documents on cultural sustainability do not really pay attention to the position and role of nature or natural agents. We can take a key UN text as an example: although the UN Sustainable Development Goals address the sustainability of the environment in multiple ways and dimensions, they mostly focus on the human perspective, and the non-human aspects of sustainability are considered only if they instrumentally contribute to the human aspects (see also Dryzek, 2005, 157). The resolution also highlights the centrality of humans within its proposed approach to linking culture and sustainability:

Recognizing the role of the creative economy in creating full and productive employment and decent work, supporting entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, encouraging the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, stimulating innovation, empowering people, promoting social inclusion, and reducing poverty […]

Highlighting that the creative economy encourages creativity and innovation in attaining inclusive, equitable and sustainable growth and development, while facilitating life transitions and supporting women, youth, migrants and older persons, as well as empowering people in vulnerable situations […]

Stressing that the creative economy can contribute to the three dimensions of sustainable development and the achievement of the 2030 Agenda, including by fostering economic growth and innovation, eradicating poverty, creating full and productive employment and decent work for all, improving the quality of life and empowerment of women and young people. (United Nations, 2019, 3)

As illustrated by these excerpts, anthropocentrism stands in a logical relation to economic goals. Creative economic practices serve humans and human development without reflecting the ecological limits of these actions. Superficially, it seems that everything is in order: if the functioning of the creative economy is secured and supported, it will improve the well-being and actorship of all humans. However, we argue that this thinly veiled anthropocentrism undermines the ultimate aims of the resolution itself as well as all the other major cultural policy documents that deal with sustainability. If we want to strive for true sustainability – at the pace necessary to prevent the massive environmental crisis we are facing at the moment – we should “focus on the systems and processes that support life, well-being, and biodiversity at different spatial scales” (Kortetmäki et al., 2021, 2).

Most commonly, anthropocentrism is not an explicit point of departure or a goal. However, policy documents and research have been criticised for their “human-centred sustainability” (e.g., Lepeley, 2019): despite their good intentions, they are too much oriented to human agents and undermine the role of humans as part of broader systems and networks that also include non-human actors; all cultural and human actions have ecological and ecosystemic impacts on the planetary future (Kortetmäki et al., 2021Latour, 2018Malm, 2018).

The resolution is a model example of this human-centred sustainability. Although it does not explicitly mention anthropocentrism, its discussion of sustainability is limited to human needs and well-being, especially from the perspective of prosperity and economic growth. The more moral and principled sections are also human-centred: when important values and goals (human rights, human creativity and ideas, gender equality, peace) are listed, no reference is made to environmental issues, except for a loose mentioning of sustainable lifestyle. However, what overemphasises the resolution’s anthropocentrism above all is that there is no explicit recognition of planetary wellbeing, not even the term “ecological sustainability”.

5.2. Economic determinism

As the title of the resolution already indicates, the economy is its main theme. The resolution lists ways in which the cultural and creative industries (CCIs) can enhance economic growth – without, however, specifying whether it means the growth of national economies or that of private businesses – and in which the economic growth brought by the CCIs fosters social values and goals such as “empowerment for all”, “eradicating poverty”, “decent work for all” and “empowerment of women and young people”, as the following excerpts illustrate:

Recognizing the need to promote sustained and inclusive economic growth, foster innovation and provide opportunities, benefits and empowerment for all and respect for all human rights […]

[N]oting the report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on culture and sustainable development, in which it is stated that cultural and creative industries should be part of economic growth strategies […]

Recognizing the ongoing need to support developing countries and countries with economies in transition in diversifying production and exports, including in new sustainable growth areas, including creative industries. Emphasizing the resilient growth in international trade in creative industries, including the trade of creative goods and services, and its contribution to the global economy, and recognizing the economic and cultural values of the creative economy. (United Nations, 2019, 1–2)

Economic significance is a relatively new perspective in international cultural policy discourses: while the focus on the economic value of culture was mainly criticised until the 1980s due to the instrumentality, recuperation and alienation of arts, culture, creativity and passion (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002, 94–136; Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007McGuigan, 2015). Bilton (2007), among others, argues that in the 1990s, experts, consultants and researchers started to speak positively about the economic value and meanings of arts and culture. Gradually, this perspective was taken up in cultural policies and by their key spokespersons such as administrators, educators and consultants, and finally by cultural actors and professionals as well. The current discourse on the economic side of culture is neutral or even downright positive about and in favour of the commodification of cultural products. This view on the cultural industries has spread in recent years together with the increasingly prevalent talk about the “creative industries”. Bilton describes the conceptual evolution from cultural industries to creative industries as follows:

The term “cultural industries” indicates that creativity grows out of a specific cultural context and emphasizes the cultural content of ideas, values and traditions. The term “creative industries” emphasizes the novelty of ideas and products and places creativity in a context of individual talent, innovation and productivity. (Bilton, 2007, 164)

This shift resonates with larger structural developments: the discursive transition from cultural industries to creative industries started in the 1990s along with the shifts in the capitalist market economy and its business structures and economic, labour and social policies. Whereas the traditional material industries weakened in so-called Western countries, the developing immaterial and digital information economy needed concepts like creativity, innovation and information and related practices to an extensive extent. Cultural policies and cultural policy researchers seized the moment and boldly defined arts and culture as the core of the emerging creative economy and designated it as a key economic growth sector. Creative industry/economy is a vaguer concept than cultural industry/economy, but its benefit is its broader scope and association with other – economically more important – industries and sectors. Through “creative industry” or “cultural and creative industries”, it is possible to raise the broad economic importance of arts and culture – at least rhetorically (Garnham, 2005).

The “economy” in creative economy refers to the organisation and the work of structures, institutions, groups and individuals concerning the production, distribution, exchange and consumption of goods and services that are defined creative and cultural. In this context, a product is therefore one that results from creativity – whether individually, collectively or industrially contributed – and is meant to be sold in the market, and its market value is at least partially based on the creativity used in its production (Throsby, 2010).

This economism is criticised because of its instrumental character, and because it endangers the intrinsic value of culture (e.g., Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002, 94–136; McGuigan, 2015). Recently, critical attention has focused more on the factors of precarious working conditions and the exploitation of the passion and creativity of creative workers (e.g., Gielen, 2015McRobbie, 2016). Less thought has been given to the fact that whether material or immaterial, the production of creative goods for economic growth is indelibly against the fundamentals of ecological sustainability (De Beukelaer, 2019a). However, there is a growing body of research literature theorising alternative forms of cultural economy (e.g. Clammer, 2016, 65–90; Conill et al., 2012Maurer, 2008Vanolo, 2012; see more about his later in this section). These studies share a justification of non-capitalist values for the cultural production and work and the exploration of post-capitalist practices of cultural sector and production (e.g. commoning). While many of them take a critical stance towards the capitalist economic growth, very few of them observe the issue from the point of view of ecological values or practices, the radically different relation of culture and nature (i.e. ecologically sustainable culture and non-antropocentric cultural subjectivity), and how these alternative paradigms are – or should be – considered in cultural policies. Increasingly, research includes perspectives on how culture and nature can be merged on the conceptual level of the cultural policies, and how culture can be approached foundational in the de- and post-growth economies and their national and local practical applications (Banks & Oakley, 2024McCartney et al., 2023Pyykkönen, 2024).

In this context, we neither buy into the doxa of economic growth, nor do we dogmatically defend degrowth: we remain growth-agnostic. Our key objective is to stop using economic turnover as a proxy for other goals, such as those concerning creativity, culture and environment, because they cannot be captured by this proxy (cf. van den Bergh, 2010). The obvious alternative would be to set policy objectives that do not explicitly build on growth. The macro-economic outcome could be growth or degrowth, but this ought to be secondary to stated objectives, which in our case relate to both formulating non-econocentric and non-anthropocentric international cultural policies (especially when speaking about culture and sustainability) and – through national and local policies – paving way for the ecologically sustainable cultural productions instead of capitalist cultural industries. These are important goals both for changing the mentalities and practices (i.e. immaterial and material “consumer cultures”) of our societies and recognizing the crucial place of labour-intensive jobs in post-growth economies (cf. Jackson, 2021).

The growth and intensification of creative production – and even the maintenance of the current level – will require unsustainable amounts of resources such as raw materials, energy, transportation and devices (Jackson, 2009; see also De Beukelaer, 2019). Meanwhile, research shows that it is possible for all humans to live within planetary boundaries and above social thresholds – that is, within the “doughnut” or the “safe operating space for humanity” – though not without radically rebalancing consumption patterns between rich and poor people (Hickel, 2019O’Neill et al., 2018; see also Gibson-Graham et al., 2013Gupta et al., 2024) while also addressing the colonial root causes of planetary plunder (Agyeman et al., 2003Jackson, 2009Kortetmäki et al., 2021Malm, 2018Rockström et al., 2009). The change requires the broad and effective adoption of post-growth thinking, attitudes and their implementation in economic and social practices, which in addition to greener production and massively less consumption of material goods has to include practices of equal and inclusive social work and health-care, and democratisation of decision-making processes and citizen-involvement in governance (Gibson-Graham et al., 2013Gupta et al., 2024Kortetmäki et al., 2021Raworth, 2017).

If we approach cultural production mainly from the perspective of profit making and economic growth, it is most certainly connected – at least indirectly – to such forms of capitalist production that are anti-ecological per se. As the citations at the beginning of this section suggest, two main discursive lines can be distinguished here: the resolution tries to prove again and again (a) how the creative and cultural industries serve the economic growth of nations, and (b) how cultural and economic values (incl. technological and industrial innovations) are intertwined without any challenges. As mentioned, economic determinism and anthropocentrism converge in the resolution: a greater and well-functioning creative economy – and economic growth in general – is assumed to serve the interests of all humans. The ecological and environmental consequences of the creative economy are secondary concerns at best. In addition to being linked to the other aspects, the economy also determines them in the resolution; humans and their relations and subjectivities are valued, signified, and represented within the economic frame.

5.3. Methodological nationalism

While the climate crisis is a quintessentially global issue, cultural policy still relies on and strengthens the idea of nation states at the centre of politics. This is to be expected as the United Nations framework generally doesn’t address the tensions between global challenges and national interests head-on. The resolution reaffirms this state of affairs and, as mentioned above, blends it seamlessly with the capitalist market economisation of culture:

Recommitting to sustaining and supporting developing countries’ economies to transition progressively to higher productivity through high-value-added sectors, by promoting diversification, technological upgrading, research and innovation, including the creation of quality, decent and productive jobs, including through the promotion of cultural and creative industries, sustainable tourism, performing arts and heritage conservation activities, among others […]

Acknowledging that innovation is essential for harnessing the economic potential of each nation and the importance of supporting mass entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, which create new momentum for economic growth and job creation and expand opportunities for all, including women and youth […]

Stressing the importance of appropriate national policies aimed at promoting the diversity of cultural expression and advancing creativity for sustainable development. (United Nations, 2019, 2–3)

This kind of approach can be called “methodological nationalism”. It means the tendency of actors to assume that “the nation-state is the natural social and political form of the modern world” (Wimmer & Schiller, 2002, emphasis in original). In other words, it is a historically constructed post-Westphalian notion according to which nations and nation states are sovereign actors in solving political challenges and problems. Beck (2016) has criticised the concept in the context of current international politics concerning global problems. He claims that acute “cosmopoliticised” risks such as the climate crisis could give rise to “emancipatory catastrophism” – new normative horizons of common goods and a cosmopolitan outlook – if only we would be politically able to move beyond methodological nationalism. In the 21st century, not only the major challenges but also the “spaces of action” have become cosmopolitised. Beck’s view is that we can tackle these risks only with global political structures and policies, and by rethinking political agency from the level of the state to that of citizen-subjects. Emancipatory catastrophism could at best lead us to a new political approach of “methodological cosmopolitanism”. Latour (2018) makes a similar claim: we need to create political approaches and policies that are not grounded in national or global interests, but instead the earth. We globally need to learn new ways to live on and with the earth, and this is what cosmopolitan politics and agencies must be about.

How, then, does methodological nationalism appear in the resolution? As we can see from the citations at the beginning of this section, nation states are the ones that primarily benefit from the economic growth produced by the CCIs. They not only profit their economies, but also their nations in terms of prosperity, welfare and equality. Moreover, nation states and their national policies are the key actors of the resolution. It depends on them how all the economic and societal improvements generated by the creative economy will take place. The above contextualisation is not problematic only from the perspective of cultural sustainability and its basic values such as cultural diversity, but especially in terms of ecological sustainability, which is not national in its character.

6. Conclusions: towards a new planetary cultural policy

The United Nations promote the idea that the creative economy, through its constituent creative industries, will contribute to the transition towards sustainable development. However, the resolution on the International Year of Creative Economy for Sustainable Development 2021 we have examined as a key exemplar of these efforts fails to convince that the claims it makes will indeed materialise. Though it would not be useful to argue that if only United Nations agencies would change their tune, we’d be able to shift away from the kinds of ideas embedded in this Resolution. Indeed, if the document were more radical and progressive, it would not be representative of dominant international organisations’ and states’ views and interests, and it would likely not gain much traction because it would not align with dominant discourses in these organisations or responsible state ministries – and most importantly, among consultants (De Beukelaer & Vlassis, 2019). However, the “non-progressiveness” and lack of radical views might well exist also because of the politics behind the documents and the power imbalances between the contributing actors, which impact the outcomes of the political negotiations and disputes. As known, some parties – e.g. strong and powerful nation states or international organisations – do have more say than others in the resolution making processes..

While it is necessary to throw everything but the kitchen sink at the climate crisis, it can be counterproductive to make assertions without a shred of evidence. To make matters worse, the resolution makes gratuitous claims that fly in the face of empirical evidence, as we have illustrated above. The resolution stumbles over several pitfalls.

First, we have shown that the resolution fails to define a clear and realistic target (i.e., what should be “sustainable”). This may seem self-evident, but the term has become such a catch-all for anything from the grossest forms of corporate greenwashing to the most genuinely committed actions. For the term to have any meaning, it needs to be defined unambiguously. This should include an articulation of whether it means environmental, social and cultural sustainability – or merely one of them – and a clear dissociation from the hegemonic growth-oriented economist view. The definition also needs to be pragmatic in the sense that it recognizes existing and outlines new broader political projects and their tools to challenge the current capitalist and anthropocentric political order of culture. One solution would be to start seriously thinking about culture and sustainability in relation to the post-growth “safe operating space” and “doughnut economy” (Raworth, 2017; cf. Jackson, 2009), in that they offer more practical narratives and are clearer on what is needed and what can’t be exceeded.

Second, the resolution’s objectives and methods remain entirely captured within the doxa of “green growth”. This is not the, but merely a blueprint for climate action – and perhaps not the most credible one at that (Hickel & Kallis, 2019). As “green growth” remains the dominant framework for policies, explicitly recognising it as one among many competing visions of the future is all-important when working at the intersection between art, culture and creativity in relation to climate futures.

Third, both UNCTAD and UNESCO remain fixed on their respective raisons d’être, without addressing the systemic challenge we face. This results in an impoverished articulation of what the future should be, which remains tone-deaf to the real challenge that underpins the climate crisis: how to ensure life in dignity and prosperity without wrecking the planet. In sum, the resolution we have studied is fundamentally incompatible with ecological sustainability and the “organismal needs” (i.e. basic need that must be satisfied for an organism [human, animal, plant etc.] to realise its typical and special way and characteristics of life) of planetary well-being (Kortetmäki et al., 2021).

Notwithstanding our above criticisms of the resolution, the potential of art, culture and creativity to help confront the climate crisis is real. Its strength lies in a commitment to global environmental citizenship, which puts the planet before economic and anthropocentric or narrowly defined national, ethnic or religious group interests (Duxbury et al., 2017).1 It should help to address global issues with a cosmopolitan sensibility (De Beukelaer, 2019b). What we propose thus inherently challenges the normative foundations and horizons of public policy. Beyond shifting the normative ground on which policymaking builds, we would argue that it also requires a new political economy of creative work, which focuses on degrowth, revaluing craft and setting up a universal basic income. This should help lay the groundwork for a post-consumer society, in which the dignity and well-being of people and the planet take precedence over shareholder value.

Our suggestions might sound like wishful thinking. Which they are. Though so are the expected outcomes of the approaches suggested in the Resolution text. Policy texts inherently are wishful thinking. Contrary to this consensus-document, we believe that our suggested approach, “our” wishful thinking if you will, is more constructive. Which kind of “wishful thinking” one entertains is not just a mirage; it is helpful in offering both a semblance of a way out of this mess and a positive story that can garner public and political support. We are now at a point where the creative economy, as characterised in the Resolution, does neither.

In sum, our key argument is that the relation of culture and environment should be radically re-evaluated and re-defined when speaking and acting about sustainability and culture. Simply repackaging the creative industry policies of the past two decades as “sustainable” does little but further delay the much-needed rethinking of the future we want. To do that, we need a new kind of “planetary cultural policy” in which decision-making on culture always takes into account the environment, ecological sustainability and planetary boundaries per se. In addition, it must ideologically and conceptually understand culture as part of nature and vice versa. Finally, cultural policies should acknowledge that everything that human beings as cultural actors do has serious and true ecological implications, which also makes it a question of citizenship, identity and subjectivity. This would definitely confuse the already blurred boundaries of cultural policy as an administrative sector even more, but we think that it is an “obligatory passage point” (Callon, 1986) – i.e., the point of access to the irreversibly new understanding of relation between culture and sustainability that all key actors have to recognize and “go through”, if they want to participate in the process – if we really want to see culture as an important factor in sustainability policies and practices.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Miikka Pyykkönen: Writing – original draft. Christiaan De Beukelaer: Writing – original draft.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

References

Cited by (0)

Dr. Miikka Pyykkönen is a Professor on Cultural Policy in the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, Finland. He teaches bachelor and master students in the study programme Cultures, Communities and Change, and doctoral students in Cultural Policy doctoral studies. He is also a docent in Sociology at the University of Helsinki. His current research areas are cultural policy, international cultural policy, culture and sustainability, economization of culture, entrepreneurship and history of ethnopolitics.

Dr. Christiaan De Beukelaer is a Senior Lecturer in Culture & Climate at the University of Melbourne and a Global Horizons Senior Fellow at the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study. He was previously a Marie Skłodowska-Curie – FIAS-FP COFUND Fellow in Necessary Utopias at Iméra, the Institute for Advanced Study at Aix-Marseille Université. His primary research project is Shipping in the Oceanic Commons: Regulation and Prefiguration (ClimateWorks Foundation). His most recent book Trade Winds: A Voyage to a Sustainable Future for Shipping, published by Manchester University Press, is also available in French translation as Cargo à Voile: Une Aventure Militante pour un Transport Maritime Durable, published by Éditions Apogée. He is a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society.1

We do recognise that citizenship is always grounded in the lives of people, which are spatially and temporally bound. This offers up a further challenge of finding a space that connects the “planetary” and the individual, through multiple levels of social entanglement and political engagement.

© 2025 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.

Post-growth: the science of wellbeing within planetary boundaries

Prof Giorgos Kallis, PhDa,b georgios.kallis@uab.cat ∙ Prof Jason Hickel, PhDa,b,c ∙ Prof Daniel W O’Neill, PhDd,e ∙ Prof Tim Jackson, PhDf ∙ Prof Peter A Victor, PhDg ∙ Kate Raworth, MSch ∙ Prof Juliet B Schor, PhDi ∙ Prof Julia K Steinberger, PhDj ∙ Prof Diana Ürge-Vorsatz, PhDk

Summary

There are increasing concerns that continued economic growth in high-income countries might not be environmentally sustainable, socially beneficial, or economically achievable. In this Review, we explore the rapidly advancing field of post-growth research, which has evolved in response to these concerns. The central idea of post-growth is to replace the goal of increasing GDP with the goal of improving human wellbeing within planetary boundaries. Key advances discussed in this Review include: the development of ecological macroeconomic models that test policies for managing without growth; understanding and reducing the growth dependencies that tie social welfare to increasing GDP in the current economy; and characterising the policies and provisioning systems that would allow resource use to be reduced while improving human wellbeing. Despite recent advances in post-growth research, important questions remain, such as the politics of transition, and transformations in the relationship between the Global North and the Global South.

Introduction

How can contemporary societies enhance human wellbeing in the absence of economic growth? This question is the foundational scientific issue for the emerging research agenda on post-growth,1 motivated by the tight coupling of growth in gross domestic product (GDP) and environmental damage,2 the declining marginal benefits of income for human wellbeing,3 and the social and political risks of economic slowdowns.4 Post-growth refers to societies that do not pursue GDP growth as an objective, and which are able to meet human needs in an equitable way without growth while staying within their fair share of planetary boundaries.

Post-growth research can be seen as part of sustainability science that is influenced by—but not constrained within—ecological economics, drawing from different traditions and contributing to the construction of a new economics that brings interdisciplinary (eg, ecological, anthropological, historical, sociological, and political) insights into our understandings of how human provisioning works. Post-growth emphasises independence from—or prosperity without5—growth, and serves as an umbrella term encompassing research in Doughnut and wellbeing economics, steady-state economics, and degrowth. Doughnut and wellbeing economics call for the satisfaction of basic human needs and high wellbeing within planetary boundaries, whereas steady-state economics emphasises the need to stabilise societies’ resource use at a relatively low, sustainable level. Doughnut, wellbeing, and steady-state economics generally position their proposals within the current capitalist system, whereas degrowth is critical of the possibilities of an egalitarian slowdown within capitalism given that capitalist competition is structurally geared towards growth. Degrowth therefore emphasises the need for a planned, democratic transformation of the economic system to drastically reduce ecological impact and inequality and improve wellbeing. Degrowth, similarly to steady-state economics, regards a lower GDP as a probable outcome of efforts to substantially reduce resource use.6 Reducing GDP is not a goal of these approaches, however,5 but, it is seen as something that economies need to be made resilient to. The Doughnut and wellbeing approaches are more agnostic about GDP growth, but still view it as a poor measure of progress. Post-growth is plural and open to all these perspectives. All approaches converge on the need for qualitative improvement without relying on quantitative growth, and on selectively decreasing the production of less necessary and more damaging goods and services, while increasing beneficial ones.

There is a large literature on post-growth and increasing interest in the concept as indicated by articles in prominent scientific journals,7–9 reports in international media,10 and substantial new funding for post-growth research.11–14 To our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive review of the field. Unlike recent systematic reviews of degrowth, for example,15–17 which quantify emerging themes and gaps in the literature, our Review is an expert overview, written by leaders in the post-growth field, each specialised in one of its various branches. We have identified what we deem to be the most important recent contributions, without being constrained by the conventions of a narrower systematic review (ie, looking only at articles where the term post-growth appears in the title or body of the article), to include the theoretical and empirical evidence that is relevant to post-growth claims. First, we explain how post-growth research has evolved within planetary sustainability science, engaging with ongoing debates about ecological, social, and economic limits to growth. Second, we provide an overview of controversies, advances, and breakthroughs in the field in the past 5 years and identify remaining knowledge gaps.

Ecological, social, and economic limits to growth

Resource limits

The year 2022 marked the 50th anniversary of Limits to Growth, a report that first posed the question of whether there are limits related to the Earth system that could put constraints on industrial development. The report was based on a system dynamics model (World3) that was parameterised with data from 1900 to 1970, and simulated scenarios for population, food, non-renewable resources, pollution, industrial output, and services to the year 2100.18 In the Standard Run of the model, which assumed the continuation of historical decision-making, the result is overshoot and collapse (figure 1). In this scenario, as industrial capital grows, it consumes a larger and larger share of the resource flow, until resource depletion leads to the collapse of the industrial base, followed by the collapse of everything that is dependent on it—services, the food supply, and ultimately, the human population.17

Figure 1 Four different scenarios of the original Limits to Growth model in comparison to actual dataShow full captionFigure viewer

Limits to Growth triggered a long and heated debate,23 which remains unsettled.24 Many economists suggested that high prices for scarce resources could result in technological innovation and resource substitution. The assumption that technology grows exponentially, and at a rate sufficient to offset the drag from resource depletion, allows growth to continue without limit.25 The decline of commodity prices in the 20th century, and especially in the 1980s, when the debate about Limits to Growth took place (figure 2), was seen as a repudiation of the Limits to Growth hypothesis and a confirmation of the power of technology to offset resource scarcity.25

Figure 2 Commodity price indices, 1960–2022Show full captionFigure viewer

The Standard Run of the Limits to Growth model, however, did not suggest scarcities before the 2010s. Given the cumulative nature of compound growth, the hypothesis was that seeming abundance would at some point turn quickly into scarcity.18 Increasing resource prices since the 2000s (figure 2), coupled with economic shocks, have brought back concerns that resource scarcities might indeed limit growth.27 Other system dynamics models built on World3 suggest peaks and scarcities for various critical metals in the second half of the 21st century.28,29 However, these models, similarly to the original World3 and all future-oriented models, run the risk of underestimating unpredictable technological breakthroughs that might be incentivised by higher resource prices.

From resource limits to planetary boundaries

Scientists have also sought to assess the validity of the Limits to Growth model by looking at how well it fits historical trends since its publication.20,21 Previous studies21,30 have explored how the various runs of the Limits to Growth model compare with actual trends and suggest that the world is most closely tracking the Double Resources scenario,18 which differs from the Standard Run in its assumption that the initial stock of non-renewable resources is twice as large as the Standard Run resource stock (figure 1). In this scenario, collapse occurs later and is driven not by scarcity of non-renewable resources (ie, a source limit), as in the Standard Run, but by persistent pollution and its impact on ecosystem stability (ie, a sink limit, otherwise known as a regenerative capacity limit). The Double Resources scenario arguably aligns more closely with the current understanding of the most pressing environmental limits facing humanity. For example, climate change is a much greater concern now than running out of fossil fuels31 (interestingly, the original Limits to Growth report did refer to the possibility of climate change as a form of persistent pollution). The replication of trends in the relatively stable 1970–2020 period, nonetheless, does not imply by any means that collapse will occur by a specific date.32 The Limits to Growth model was never intended to make exact predictions, but to explore the system’s overall behavioural tendencies. Moreover, as the Limits to Growth modellers suggested, less attention should be given to the model’s behaviour past the peak as the process of approaching limits will instigate a change in the system’s structure.

The past decade has seen a shift in sustainability science from questions of resource scarcity to those of global change and limits, through the study of planetary boundaries that provide a “safe operating space for humanity”.33 Anthropogenic pressures now exceed six of the nine identified planetary boundaries—those related to carbon emissions, biodiversity loss, land-system change, freshwater change, biogeochemical flows, and novel pollutants.34–36 Natural scientists have linked Earth system trends to socioeconomic trends, including economic growth, illustrating the “Great Acceleration” of ecological impacts and population and economic growth.37 Some economists, by contrast, have argued that as economies get richer, after a specific point in development, their impact on the environment is likely to decrease (ie, the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis).38 The new consensus in the empirical literature, however, is that although some local pollutants, such as sulphur dioxide, have fallen in high-income countries, typically due to better policy, this does not hold for greenhouse gas emissions, material use, or other global ecological impacts.38

A separate discussion concerns whether crossing planetary boundaries will limit growth. There are two contending perspectives on this question. In William Nordhaus’s DICE model, for example, the reference scenario projected that a 4·3°C increase in global temperature by 2100 would lead to only a 4·3% loss in output compared with baseline projections, in a global economy that is 7·8 times larger than in 2015.39 However, such projections excluded uncertain, abrupt, and non-linear changes in the Earth system, and underestimated climate damages by relying on current correlations between regional temperature and regional GDP as a proxy for the economic impact of global warming.40 Newer studies suggest much higher economic costs of climate change than previously estimated—with existing warming already locking in a 19% income per capita loss within the next 26 years,41 whereas each additional 1°C rise in temperature costs the world 12% in GDP losses.42 Given the uncertainties involved in such estimations, and the problems with reducing all ecosystem and wellbeing losses due to climate change to a GDP figure, an alternative approach, which many sustainability scientists have adopted, is to take planetary boundaries as a precautionary objective, and then ask whether it is possible to return to or stay inside planetary boundaries with continued economic growth.43

The decoupling controversy

Much of the research on reconciling economic growth with planetary boundaries has been framed as a question of whether it is possible to achieve green growth—ie, to decouple GDP from carbon emissions and material use (the latter because it is strongly linked to environmental pressures and biodiversity loss).44,45 This literature distinguishes between relative decoupling, which is a decline in the material or carbon intensity of GDP, where GDP grows faster than material use and emissions; absolute decoupling, which is when GDP grows while material use and emissions decline; and sufficient absolute decoupling or genuine green growth, which is when GDP grows while material use and emissions decline enough to keep the economy within planetary boundaries.46

Cross-national evidence indicates that GDP remains coupled to resource use as measured by material footprint (ie, accounting for the biomass, minerals, metals, and fossil fuels required to support the final consumption of goods and services).47 This finding holds across material categories and most regions, with some exceptions, such as decreasing fossil fuel use in some European countries.47 The consensus from recent reviews and meta-analyses is that while relative decoupling of GDP from material use is common, there is no evidence of sustained absolute decoupling.2,48 Moreover, modelled projections indicate that at the global scale, absolute decoupling is unlikely to occur even with optimistic assumptions about technology.49

Why are resources and GDP so tightly coupled? A first explanation focuses on the so-called rebound effect—the hypothesis that technological improvements in resource efficiency do not necessarily yield reduced resource use because declining costs lead to increased demand.50 A study of 57 cases of materials and modern artefacts, for example, found no evidence of dematerialisation,51 and economy-wide energy rebounds of 78–101% have been observed in the USA, the UK, and some European countries.52 Another explanation focuses on the material intensity of services, structural change, and international trade. A global empirical analysis found that all sectors of the economy are roughly equivalent in terms of their climate, land, and water impacts due to the embedded resource requirements of services and the fact that incomes earned in the service sector are partly spent on material goods.53 Cross-border research indicates that as high-income economies grow and shift towards services, they increasingly offshore agricultural and industrial production and rely on imports47 (eg, for agriculture, the Global North net-imports embodied land and biomass from the Global South54). Domestic material extraction might therefore decline, but total material footprint—which accounts for materials embodied in trade—continues to increase.47 These explanations are in line with the ecological economics view of the engine of the economy being energy, materials, and human labour.55

With carbon emissions, the picture is more complex, since substitution with cleaner energy is possible. In the period 2005–15, absolute decoupling of GDP from emissions occurred in several high-income countries, even accounting for trade (ie, consumption-based emissions).56 However, this time period was one of historically low growth for many of these nations (figure 3), suggesting that while decoupling is possible, the rate of growth still matters, and the lower it is, the more feasible absolute decoupling becomes. In the USA, for instance, the 2008 recession was an important cause of emissions reduction,57 complicating arguments about green growth. A 2018 study found that Sweden, Denmark, and Finland have achieved sufficient decoupling,46 but critics have noted that this assessment uses the 2°C carbon budget instead of a 1·5°C budget and ignores consumption-based emissions.58 The speed of reduction is also not sufficient from a fairness perspective if one accounts for the higher mitigation responsibilities of countries that historically have been high emitters of greenhouse gases.58,59 Even the best performing nations, such as the UK and Sweden, are not on track to meet Paris Agreement objectives, as a fair distribution of the global carbon budget would require them to reduce emissions by 10% and 12% each year, respectively, which is double their existing policy commitments.60

Figure 3 Growth rate in real GDP per capita, 1960–2020, for different regions and countriesShow full captionFigure viewer

Despite this uncertainty about the prospects of sufficient decoupling, green growth remains a standard feature of the climate mitigation scenarios for 1·5°C and 2°C that are modelled using conventional integrated assessment models and reviewed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).61,62 These scenarios reconcile economic growth with climate goals by relying on hypothetical large-scale negative emissions technologies with CO2 removal schemes developed in the future, unprecedented energy efficiency improvements, or both.63 These scenarios also ignore climate impacts on the economy and society.64 Several studies raise questions about the risks of relying on untested negative emissions technologies65 and about the historically unprecedented rates of GDP–energy decoupling in low-energy scenarios.52 Five new studies show how reductions in aggregate output make achieving climate objectives easier, without having to rely on possibly unrealistic assumptions about technological change.66–70

If the standard green growth argument is that growth can continue while ecological pressures are reduced to sustainable levels, a stronger claim is that greening the economy can itself be an engine of growth. Several economic models show that investments in green infrastructure and climate mitigation might have a multiplier effect that increases growth in countries with economic slack.71–73 The short-run stimulus effects of a clean energy transition, however, should be distinguished from possible second-order, or longer-run effects.74 There are open questions concerning whether green investments crowd out other, more productive (in terms of GDP) investments,75 or whether stranded fossil fuel assets might cause financial shocks that impact GDP negatively.72 Models show that if clean energies depend on dirty inputs for their production, technological innovation does not suffice to both sustain growth and reduce emissions.76 There are ongoing debates regarding the social and environmental impacts of a clean energy transition,77–79 its implications in terms of the net energy left for other societal uses,79,80 and the emissions that this transition will involve.79 A related argument is that a decline in energy return on energy investment—ie, the ratio between the amount of energy produced and the amount of energy used to produce that energy, therefore a proxy of a net energy surplus—will negatively impact growth81 and that if it falls below a certain minimum ratio, growth might altogether become impossible.82 However, concerns that a shift to renewables could precipitate such a scenario are probably misplaced, as renewables have comparable, if not higher, energy return on energy investment than fossil fuels, when energy returns are measured at the point of use.83,84

In summary, there is little agreement as to whether sufficient absolute decoupling is feasible. One can note a schism on this question between mainstream and ecological economics, and green growth versus post-growth approaches in sustainability science. Although green growth is theoretically possible, and inadequate progress in the past is no proof of future impossibility, the post-growth field suggests taking a precautionary approach, given the historical record and the rapid narrowing of the window to prevent ecological breakdown.85 Post-growth, it should be emphasised, does not state that decoupling economic activity from emissions and getting to net zero emissions is impossible, just that it is made harder by economic growth. For energy and material use, which can only be reduced and never brought to zero, the necessary reductions are easier to achieve with post-growth.

Human wellbeing and social limits to growth

A second motivation behind post-growth research, dating back to the same era as Limits to Growth, is the observation that above a certain level of income, GDP growth does not improve human wellbeing.86 The social limits hypothesis holds that there is a limit to the extent that growth improves subjective wellbeing, because humans adapt to higher levels of income,87 and compare themselves to others who are also getting richer,88 or because additional production goes towards zero-sum status goods.89 The social cost hypothesis is that above a certain level of GDP, the costs of growth (eg, congestion, pollution, mental health, social upheaval) might offset its wellbeing benefits.90 Growth is said to become uneconomic.91

One line of evidence supporting the social limits hypothesis is the much-debated Easterlin paradox, in which self-reported happiness is found to vary directly with income, both between and within nations, but over time the growth of income is not significantly related to the growth of happiness.92 This finding has been challenged93 and it seems that the empirical relationship between growth and happiness depends on the set of countries, the length of period, and the type of wellbeing that is measured.94 Moreover, although income and happiness appear to be related during decreases in GDP, this relationship does not apply during GDP increases.95 New studies that have inspired post-growth research have shown that countries with full employment policies, strong social safety nets, and decommodified public services exhibit increased life satisfaction88,96 and that human relations have a much stronger effect on personal wellbeing than income.97

Research on wellbeing has shown that a wide range of indicators of social outcomes show diminishing returns as GDP per person increases.95 These indicators include the first seven Sustainable Development Goals (no poverty, zero hunger, good health, quality education, gender equity, safe water, and sufficient energy), which, under existing arrangements, are achieved at a GDP of around $15 000 per person (measured in 2011 US purchasing power parity dollars).98 Improvements in social outcomes have been found to be driven primarily by factors other than income, such as public health programmes and other public services.99–101

Tentative support for the social cost thesis comes from research on alternative indicators to GDP.102 The Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), for example, is a more comprehensive metric of progress that, in contrast to GDP, distinguishes between damaging and beneficial activity.3 A meta-analysis of 17 countries finds a general pattern of levelling-off of GPI, and a decoupling of GPI from GDP.3 Globally, GPI per capita peaked in 1978 and has since not increased beyond about $7000 per capita (measured in 2005 US$).

Even if growth above a certain level of income does not improve wellbeing, this does not imply that negative growth benefits wellbeing. The negative effects of recessions on happiness are well established;88 however, positive trends in social outcomes have been observed during some recessions,103 and they have been linked to social bonds104 and public health systems.105 Given concerns with growth linked to overshooting planetary boundaries and fatally undermining human long-term wellbeing, post-growth research asks under which social conditions and with what types of policies could high levels of wellbeing be sustained at low levels of output and resource use.106 In contrast to the utility maximisation approach that underpins GDP, post-growth conceptualises human wellbeing in terms of a wide range of subjective and objective measures of wellbeing, with a focus on satisfying basic needs.106,107

Stagnation and economic limits to growth

Another question is whether growth will continue in economies that have already reached high levels of GDP. High-income countries, such as the USA, Japan, and Italy, are showing signs of declining growth rates or even stagnation.108,109 Per capita GDP growth rates have decreased in these countries over the past 60 years, with a more modest slowdown in the global economy (figure 3).

Economists have sought to explain this trend in several ways. One interpretation is that marginal returns decline as an economy grows and becomes more complex.110 Endogenous growth models, however, claim that knowledge and new ideas can provide increasing returns to capital investment in infrastructure or education that offset diminishing returns.111 New empirical evidence suggests that productivity in research and innovation might be declining, with implications for economic growth.112 Many economists now think that there is a stagnation trend in high-income countries, with explanations focusing either on demand-side and investment-related factors,113,114 or supply-side factors (eg, demographics, education, distribution, energy, and debt).109,115 For the latter, energy is found to account for only a small share of the drag on growth, but this argument assumes that the effect of energy on GDP is small given the small share of energy-related expenditures in total GDP. If energy were to become scarce, which is possible, albeit far from certain, this relationship could change, given that when energy is scarce, it can impose strong constraints on growth.116 During large oil shocks, for example, output growth can substantially fall.117

Whereas an economic slowdown has traditionally been seen as a problem,118 a few recent contributions approach it as the outcome of economic success: high-income countries have reached historically unprecedented levels of output and wealth, and stagnation is the effect of desired developments, such as lower voluntary fertility rates or a shift from manufacturing to services.108 Other studies, however, show that the shift of high-income countries to services has been based on an unequal exchange of labour with low-income and middle-income countries, such that high living standards in the former are subsidised by underpaid agricultural and industrial labour in the latter.54,119

Whatever the underlying reason or one’s attitude toward it, an economic slowdown could prove to be environmentally beneficial.120 Economic research has shown that the desired (or optimal) rate of consumption growth might decline to close to zero if (environmental) risks associated with new technologies and people’s preferences for safety are taken into account.121 From a post-growth perspective, the problem then is not that growth might be coming to an end, but rather that, given that economic and political systems are dependent on growth for their stability,5 stagnation under capitalism poses substantial risks to institutional stability.4 How to prosper without growth therefore becomes a crucial question.5

Post-growth research

Over the past 5 years, research under the labels of post-growth,1 degrowth,122 Doughnut economics,43 wellbeing economics,123 and steady-state economics91 has started sharpening the questions that need to be answered if the goal of prosperity without growth is to be achieved.

Post-growth models and policies

An absence of growth in existing economies can trigger unemployment, inequality, and debt accumulation, as factors that are linked to social instability and diminished wellbeing.4,5 Recent research has explored the conditions under which such outcomes could be averted. An important methodological advance has been the development of several new ecological macroeconomic models.124 These models differ from the original Limits to Growth model by integrating economic and financial variables. Unlike conventional macroeconomic models, which apply an optimisation framework with a single goal (eg, utility, and hence GDP growth), ecological macroeconomic models typically have multiple non-substitutable goals (eg, sustainability, equity, and human wellbeing).125 Models simplify and quantify a complex reality, allowing a range of possibilities to be explored, based on what-if scenarios. However, quantification might miss more qualitative, ambiguous, and context-specific elements that are better captured by mixed, or qualitative approaches, such as case-studies or ethnographies, which are also part of the interdisciplinary toolkit of post-growth research.

Two particularly important ecological macroeconomic models developed to test the possibility of post-growth interventions and trajectories are LowGrow SFC (calibrated with data for Canada126) and Eurogreen (calibrated with data for France127). Different policy measures and assumptions produce different outcomes, but it is notable that scenarios from these two models and countries share some core tendencies (figure 4). In both models, lower growth paths lead to much better climate outcomes. Moreover, good social outcomes are possible when the right policies are implemented. Working-time reduction and a shift from capital-intensive to labour-intensive sectors maintain employment without growth, while a job guarantee (Eurogreen) and additional transfer payments (LowGrow SFC) reduce inequality. Sustainable scenarios combine technology, policy-driven investment strategies, and redistribution in ways that slow growth and environmental impact without compromising wellbeing. Public debt increases, although not to unsustainable levels, whereas household debt declines (figure 4).

Figure 4 Simulating the post-growth transition: case studies from Canada and FranceShow full captionFigure viewer

Reducing working time is crucial in these scenarios because it reduces unemployment, which is the effect of increasing labour productivity in the context of lower or declining growth.5,128 In addition, studies at different scales (national, state, and household) and over time (from the 1990s to the present) show that working time is positively correlated with carbon emissions,129,130 although to date, robust causal models have not been estimated and there is continued debate about the efficacy of working-time reduction as a strategy for climate mitigation.131 Ongoing global trials involving a four-day workweek might provide further insights on such questions.

Carbon and resource taxes are also used in these models. Previous studies provide additional evidence on the utility of these interventions. For example, fuel taxes lead firms to innovate more in clean (and less in dirty) technologies,132 although the transition can be slow unless taxes are combined with heavy research subsidies.133 Questions remain regarding the distributive consequences of carbon taxes134 and their political acceptability.135 Some researchers suggest that redistributive tax designs, such as carbon dividends,136 and inclusive decision-making processes might improve acceptance.137 However, as concluded by a notable economist,138 given political obstacles, “carbon pricing alone at politically plausible levels is unlikely to be particularly effective in reducing emissions from the oil and gas used in the transportation, commercial, and residential sectors [and] economists need to look elsewhere for efficient climate policies”.

Several other policies for a post-growth transition have been proposed, and recent efforts have attempted to synthesise these into coherent packages (table).139 Some of these policies might be compatible with growth, but in the post-growth literature, the objective is to secure good social outcomes (eg, employment and decent living standards) in the absence of growth, and to restructure the economy to be greener, healthier, and more equitable.139 Core proposals include universal basic services (including health care), an unconditional income, a job guarantee, and working-time reductions. Although more research is needed, many of these policies have already been applied in practice, including within controlled experiments. For example, there is growing evidence on the positive social effects of basic income-like cash transfers to economically vulnerable groups.140 There is evidence also that productivity-led working-time reductions can improve environmental outcomes141 and that intensified labour productivity, with no reduction in working time, negatively affects workers’ wellbeing and damages long-term productivity.142 Finally, there is sufficient evidence that universal basic services are directly linked to strong social outcomes. Data from 153 countries show that an increase in public health expenditure is associated with a decrease in both child and adult mortality.143 Data from 193 countries show that universal health coverage is associated with increased life expectancy at birth and increased healthy life expectancy.144 Concerns abound about how to pay for such social policies in a post-growth scenario, and how to do this while also controlling inflation. These are currently being addressed by proponents of these policies through Modern Monetary Theory and public money finance (table).

 DescriptionAdvocates’ case forConcerns or points of debate
Universal basic incomeA monthly income guaranteed to all residents for life, without any requirementCompensates for unpaid care work; reduces inequalities; enables people to engage in non-wage creative activities; decouples survival from employment; removes stigma and bureaucracy associated with conventional benefit systemsIf funded by tax on income or resources, universal basic income might create a dependency on growth to fund it; it might suppress wages or increase rents, as business owners pay less and property owners charge more in the knowledge that workers receive the basic income; environmental pressure might rebound if income is spent on material consumption
Working-time reductionReduction of statutory hours of work per week or yearEnsures high employment in the absence of growth; confers wellbeing and health benefits; reduces environmental pressures; redistributes productivity gains to labourMight reduce purchasing power for workers if hourly pay remains constant (this is not the case, however, for proposals for working time reduction with constant monthly wage); might result in rebounding environmental impacts if free time is used in resource-intensive ways; might increase unemployment if rising labour costs encourage firms to adopt labour-saving strategies
Universal basic servicesGuaranteed access to health care, education, housing, transit, food, and care services for all, without (or with only partly) having to pay for themSecures minimum conditions for decent living regardless of fluctuations in aggregate output; reduces poverty; redistributes access to services; reduces inequalitiesAccess to some services (eg, food and housing) might need means-testing, which can create stigma and could create incentives for people to remain insecure to retain access to these services
Job guaranteeAll residents are guaranteed access to training and employment in essential public worksEliminates involuntary unemployment; reduces poverty and exclusion; can be used to direct labour toward socially and environmentally beneficial activities; can be used to set good labour standards and wages across the whole economyLimited public ownership of means of production constrains the possibility of redirecting the economy through public works; in some countries, the state might have insufficient legitimacy to restructure the economy and it might be unpopular to work for the state; higher wages could prompt labour-saving strategies by capital; higher wages could stimulate more growth
Maximum incomeA maximum permissible total income or a maximum wage differential within an organisation, or society as a wholeLimits inequalities; reduces the excess purchasing power of the rich; reduces unnecessary production and consumption; reduces ecological impactsTax evasion; outmigration of high-paid professionals
Wealth taxProgressive annual tax on asset holdings above a certain thresholdReduces inequalities; distributes wealth more equitably; can be used to fund social and ecological policiesTax evasion; wealth and capital flight
Public moneyCreation of money by the state to spend on social and environmental initiatives; credit policy and taxation are used to reduce excess demand to control inflationIncreases fiscal possibilities; facilitates debt-free money that does not require growth to be repaidPower can be misused to pay for socially and environmentally detrimental projects; might be politically difficult to tax money out of circulation to reduce inflation
Replacing GDPReplace GDP with wellbeing and sustainability indicatorsRemoves distorting role of GDP, which is a poor measure of wellbeing; directs policy to wellbeing and sustainability goalsAbsence of powerful epistemic community to support alternative indicators; GDP accounting entrenched in institutional structures
Cap and adaptCap and phase out fossil fuels, rationing fossil fuel use per countryDirect reduction of emissions; equitable sharing of mitigationMonitoring and enforcement; unlikely to reach more binding international agreement
Green New DealPublic investment programme on the order of 5% of GDP to achieve a just climate transition, coupled with social policiesFast mobilisation of resources for climate mitigation; social justice and reduction of inequalitiesCost, and pressure for growth to pay back investments; environmental injustice against regions where raw materials are extracted from
Carbon taxes or dividendsTax carbon (including on imported goods) and return revenue as a universal dividendIncentivises a shift away from carbon-intensive activities; avoids distributional consequences and conflictNeeds to be very high to have a real effect; few substitution possibilities for many carbon-intensive activities; has lost political momentum

Table

Post-growth-oriented policies

A summary of the main arguments made by advocates of these policies, alongside their most pertinent critiques. Advocates have defended proposals against such critiques; we see these debates as open and marking frontiers for new research.

A core social and economic question concerns the dynamics of inequality in the absence of growth. This question is motivated by Thomas Piketty’s thesis that when GDP growth is lower than the real rate of return to capital (which has historically been around 5%), a greater share of national income can accumulate in the hands of wealth holders.145,146 Data from the USA, China, France, and the UK show rising top income and wealth shares since the 1980s, but with substantial variations due to different country-specific policies and institutions.147 Notably, in Piketty’s dataset, inequalities historically increased after the 1980s in a period when economies did grow, and the great reduction in inequalities in the 20th century was the side-effect of the two wars and the destruction of wealth, as well as the redistributive policies that were brought about by the wars. In low-growth or zero-growth environments, policies that reduce returns to capital (eg, by taxing wealth or by promoting worker ownership) and policies that support a shift to labour-intensive industries (eg, education or health care) can prevent inequality from increasing.145,146 Independently of growth rates, the role of strong trade unions is also crucial in reducing inequalities.148

Beyond economic policy-oriented research, researchers have also sought to conceptualise what post-growth would look like in various domains of life: from innovation149 and urban planning150 to fashion151 or leisure.152 These studies follow a more qualitative approach, often based on case-studies, offering rich hypotheses about cultural, social, and political arrangements that could allow societies to prosper without growth in different contexts.

Growth dependencies

Under existing economic arrangements, growth is regarded as necessary to increase employment, reduce inequalities, and raise tax revenue to pay for public services. How can these growth dependencies be reduced? For instance, how can welfare systems (eg, pensions, education, and health care) be sustained without growth? Researchers have proposed that specific policies can achieve these objectives (table). The difficulty associated with modelling such changes lies in the inability to calibrate them using historical experience. Two approaches have been taken to address this problem. One is to analyse case studies in which individual nations (eg, Japan) have had to manage long-term stagnation.153 The other is to deconstruct the mechanics of growth dependency for particular sectors of the welfare state and generate different institutional possibilities for welfare without growth.154,155

The relationship between social spending and GDP is arguably an important source of growth dependencies. As research on the UK social care sector shows, population ageing and increasing productivity in other sectors that raise the cost of care services, coupled with a privatisation and financialisation of the sector that makes short profits necessary, renders constant growth an imperative for social care providers. But this growth crucially depends on power relations, since there are alternative options for financing care services other than through growth in revenue, yet these are limited by vested interests linked to the privatised organisation of the care sector.155 How to pay for social services without growth is an important question, and a research agenda is now opening on the possibilities of public finance and credit regulation to redirect labour and resources where they are most needed without relying on growth.156

Debates persist about whether capitalist economies have inherent growth imperatives—ie, mechanisms that require growth to keep the economy functioning and that are difficult for individuals, firms, or nation states to circumvent.157 Studies have argued that under conditions of technological innovation, firms are under pressure to accumulate capital to avoid being driven out of business by competitors.157 Debt with interest might also compel growth, at least in the case of private or external debts, although models find that positive interest rates are compatible with non-growing economies if all profits from interest are distributed to households.158 A study of ten historical cases concluded that interest-bearing loans have been problematic in past non-growing and slow-growing economies, and have occasionally been dealt with by cancelling debts or banning compound interest.159

Although post-growth policy frameworks are fairly well developed, there has been less focus on the politics that can make such radical policies possible. One line of research looks at the factors that lock in growth-oriented policies and thus leave little room for alternatives. Historians and social scientists have sought to explain the origins of the political hegemony of growth:160 the dominance of the pursuit of GDP growth as a political objective. Growth might not be an economic imperative in the abstract, this literature suggests, but rather a political imperative, locked in by power relations, institutions, and accounting systems geared towards its pursuit.161 The contemporary preoccupation with GDP first emerged as a response to the need of governments to manage economic production during the Great Depression and the Second World War, whereas growth-targeting became entrenched during the Cold War, linked to the arms race between the two blocs.161 An iterative process between accounting and targeting, and the institutions geared towards the measurement and pursuit of GDP, gradually made growth appear as a natural and unquestionable objective.162 But the success of growth, as a political objective, stems from its function, which was to appease and deflect distributional conflict, becoming a core factor of state legitimacy and political stability.163 Political theorists now debate the effects that an end of growth might have on the legitimacy and stability of liberal democracies.4,164 However, some scholars argue that while a shift to authoritarianism is a strong possibility, social conflict might also, under conditions that remain to be studied, open up paths to deeper and more direct forms of democracy.122

Whereas these accounts suggest that a post-growth transition might be politically difficult for structural reasons, other studies point to promising political possibilities. Survey research shows that most Europeans are in favour of post-growth,165 most scientists (especially climate scientists) are either agnostic towards growth or favourably inclined towards degrowth,166 and interviews with elected members of the European Parliament find a strong current of post-growth ideas among left and green politicians.167 Research on the German Parliament, however, finds that political discourse and practice around growth remains unresponsive to politicians’ individual convictions, because of growth’s entrenched role as a political option to mitigate distributional conflict.168 Promising avenues open when the problem is framed as one of limited resilience due to growth-dependence, and with specific solutions that respond to immediate challenges of stability169 or when prioritising wellbeing rather than averting environmental loss.170

Although there is a vibrant literature on the ways social movements could act as political agents of post-growth,171–173 less attention has been paid to the geopolitical implications of post-growth scenarios, and the risks first movers might face, such as capital flight or a decline in geopolitical power. As with the climate clubs proposed by economists,174 there might be possibilities for post-growth clubs, where nations collaborate around a shared set of post-growth policies and impose penalties on non-participants. The Wellbeing Economy Governments partnership (including Scotland, Iceland, New Zealand, Wales, Finland, and Canada) and the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty (a sort of international agreement on an equitable downscaling of a damaging industry, now signed by many countries), can be seen as steps in this direction.123,175

Living well within limits

Post-growth research on resource use and human wellbeing grapples with two big questions: can wellbeing be achieved at lower levels of resource use than what characterises high-income countries today? And if so, would this allow humanity as a whole to stay within planetary boundaries?

Post-growth research explores both subjective and objective measures of wellbeing, and recent empirical studies agree on two important points. First, there is substantial variation in the levels of resource use and carbon emissions at which good social outcomes are currently secured,176,177 with several middle-income countries achieving social outcomes that match or exceed those of high-income countries.178 Second, there are currently no countries that achieve good social outcomes while staying within their fair share of planetary boundaries (figure 5)—although some, such as Costa Rica, come close.180

Figure 5 Number of social thresholds achieved versus number of biophysical boundaries transgressed for 92 countries in 2015, scaled by per capita GDPShow full captionFigure viewer

Empirical research points therefore to an important conundrum. On the one hand, high-income countries achieve high levels of human wellbeing but significantly overshoot their fair share of planetary boundaries.181,182 The level of resource use of these high-income countries cannot be universalised.177 On the other hand, despite a decline in the amount of energy required to achieve human development goals,183 modelling decent living standards for all within planetary boundaries shows that, under existing conditions, there is very little room for excess or for inequality.184

This research has led to a shift of attention towards alternative provisioning systems and the types of distributional dynamics that could radically change current relationships between resource use and human wellbeing.185 Provisioning systems refer to both physical systems (eg, infrastructure and technology) and social systems (eg, markets, government institutions, and culture). Research shows that by increasing beneficial provisioning factors (eg, public services, income equality, and democratic quality) and reducing other detrimental factors (eg, economic growth beyond moderate levels of affluence), human needs can be met at much lower levels of energy use.186 There is also well established, but in need of updating, empirical evidence that many low-income countries that implement public provisioning systems achieve better health outcomes than much wealthier economies that do not.187 Moreover, the first global decent living energy modelling effort calculates that human needs can be met at a good standard for 10 billion people with levels of energy use that are compatible with 1·5°C.188 A recent review of industrial transformation models and scenarios found that combined supply-side and demand-side measures could reduce current economy-wide material use by 56%, energy use by 40–60%, and greenhouse gas emissions by 70% to net zero.189

North–South dynamics in a post-growth context

In the post-growth literature, there is general agreement that low-income countries should achieve social outcomes similar to those that high-income countries presently enjoy, and should increase production as necessary to achieve these outcomes.7,91 However, the need for resource use contraction and convergence within the world economy raises questions about necessary changes to the structure of the world economy. A core question is how development and resource use in low-income countries links to development and resource use in high-income countries.

Ecological economists have approached this question using environmentally extended input–output data and have found that growth in high-income countries relies on a large net appropriation of materials, energy, land, and labour from the Global South, embodied in traded goods.54,190 World-system scholars in turn have argued that this unequal exchange occurs because richer states are able to leverage their financial and geopolitical power to organise production in the Global South toward supplying global commodity chains, while depressing the prices of labour and resources in the Global South.54,191 This process drains countries in the Global South of their productive capacities that could be used instead to provide for local human needs and achieve development objectives more directly.54,191 This analysis runs counter to dominant narratives in development economics and mainstream policy discourses. However, if this literature is correct, post-growth in high-income countries might be beneficial for low-income countries, to the extent that it reduces or eliminates an unfair appropriation of resources.171,172

However, to the extent that low-income countries have come to depend on exports to high-income countries to maintain employment and service debts,192 post-growth transitions and demand reduction in the latter could have damaging effects in the former, in the absence of policy interventions. The literature on monetary sovereignty193 and industrial policy194 could be helpful in offering insights into how governments in low-income countries can reduce reliance on foreign currency, and mobilise resources, labour, and production around human needs and national development objectives.

Another angle through which questions of human development and growth have been approached is through the literature on post-development and needs-oriented development, which have emerged from the Global South, and which argue that growth should not be pursued as an objective in itself; rather, the focus should be on social outcomes, following local models of human development and wellbeing, rather than a universal Global North growth model.195,196 This literature builds on a long history of growth-critical ideas in some Global South countries, such as India and Bhutan,197 or experiences in countries, such as Tanzania, Iran, and Haiti.198

Lessons learned and knowledge gaps

Independent of what one thinks about the sustainability or desirability of economic growth, given that the world finds itself in a situation of slowing growth coupled with intensifying ecological breakdown, the emerging post-growth research described here asks important questions and offers tentative answers that can help prepare societies for an unstable future.

Post-growth research has established a new generation of national ecological macroeconomic models that make it possible to explore questions of stability and wellbeing without growth, while evaluating in a systemic way the effects of alternative social and economic policies. These models indicate that there are stable post-growth pathways that can allow high-income countries to achieve both social and environmental objectives. Yet these models could still be improved in four ways.

First, there is a need to expand the range of environmental and wellbeing indicators considered.199 Recent extensions include material flows and the ecological footprint.200 It would also be useful to explore whether post-growth scenarios would have positive or negative effects on other environmental variables, such as biodiversity, land-use, and water, or to model broader social measures, such as health and life satisfaction. Second, there is a need to adjust and calibrate the models for geographical and economic contexts other than those of Europe and North America, evaluating alternative development policies and stability questions relevant for Global South economies. Third, national-level models need to be improved to capture international relations and dynamics, accounting for trade, capital, and currency flows—factors that might complicate post-growth scenarios in a single country. And finally, there is a need to extend the national economy approach to global climate economy models that connect to and improve on existing Integrated Assessment Models, so that post-growth mitigation scenarios can be modelled for the IPCC.63 One should expect important developments in all of these fronts in the next 5 years given substantial resources devoted by the EU to related research.11–14

As this Review has shown, there is accumulating evidence on policies that could secure wellbeing without growth in high-income countries (eg, universal access to essential goods and services, working-time reduction, and carbon and wealth taxes). Approaching the question of stability as a problem of growth dependency has helped to identify the institutional factors that link stability to growth, and the alternatives that might break such dependencies. Given that at present no countries are enacting post-growth agendas, small-scale experimentation, such as with basic incomes and working-time reduction, offers a controlled setting for reproducible knowledge, though experimentation must be scaled up and extended to other policies. One interesting direction is participatory action research, such as the Doughnut Economics Action Labs, where stakeholders and members of the public develop post-growth programmes for their cities.201 Stakeholder approaches could also be used for diagnosing and addressing growth dependencies through policy labs. However, there is still a gap concerning policies suitable for Global South contexts and the global institutional arrangements necessary to end unequal exchange between the Global North and the Global South.

There have also been important developments, as noted above, in understanding the factors that allow social outcomes to be decoupled from GDP, such as robust public services and safety nets, income equality, and democratic quality.186 And beyond general contract and converge scenarios between high-income countries and low-income countries, there is a need for sector-by-sector and region-by-region analysis of human needs and resource transformations.

Finally, the question of politics emerges as an important research frontier. Whereas science is advancing on the questions of desired pathways, provisioning systems, and policies for a post-growth economy, we still know little about the politics that could make post-growth transitions possible in reality. A particular blind spot concerns geopolitical relations, and how changes in international governance and world orders open up, or close down, opportunities for post-growth and sovereign development.

Scientific interest in the questions addressed in this Review has increased over the past several years—the IPCC has extended discussions through its Sixth Assessment Report85 and the European Research Council13,14 and the European Commission have supported new research.11,12 Whereas post-growth research has been developed primarily within sustainability science and ecological economics, there are important insights on questions of stability and wellbeing to be offered by many other disciplines. Bringing disciplines together, developing new trans-disciplinary concepts, and integrating empirical studies with theoretical frameworks and models could provide valuable insights into how societies can achieve high wellbeing without economic growth, and within planetary boundaries.

Contributors

GK led the conceptualisation and writing of this Review and compiled the table. JH contributed to conceptualisation and led the writing of the sections on planetary boundaries, wellbeing, and development. DWO, TJ, PAV, KR, JBS, JKS, and DÜ-V contributed to writing this Review. DWO carried out the analysis of the Limits to Growth scenarios and created figures 1, 3, and 5; TJ created figure 2; and PV created figure 4. The data used to prepare the visuals are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

Declaration of interests

GK, JH, and JKS acknowledge support by the European Research Council funding for the REAL project (grant number 101071647). GK and JH’s work is also supported by the María de Maeztu Unit of Excellence (CEX2019–374 000940-M) grant from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. DWO acknowleges support by the EU in the framework of the Horizon Europe Research and Innovation Programme under grant agreement numbers 101094211 (ToBe) and 101137914 (MAPS). TJ and PAV

References

For reference list go here

Planetary Health

Reimagine fire science for the anthropocene 

Jacquelyn K Shuman, Jennifer K Balch, Rebecca T Barnes, Philip E Higuera, Christopher I Roos, Dylan W Schwilk, E Natasha Stavros, Tirtha Banerjee, Megan M Bela, Jacob Bendix … Show more

PNAS Nexus, Volume 1, Issue 3, July 2022, https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgac115

Abstract

Fire is an integral component of ecosystems globally and a tool that humans have harnessed for millennia. Altered fire regimes are a fundamental cause and consequence of global change, impacting people and the biophysical systems on which they depend. As part of the newly emerging Anthropocene, marked by human-caused climate change and radical changes to ecosystems, fire danger is increasing, and fires are having increasingly devastating impacts on human health, infrastructure, and ecosystem services. Increasing fire danger is a vexing problem that requires deep transdisciplinary, trans-sector, and inclusive partnerships to address. Here, we outline barriers and opportunities in the next generation of fire science and provide guidance for investment in future research. We synthesize insights needed to better address the long-standing challenges of innovation across disciplines to (i) promote coordinated research efforts; (ii) embrace different ways of knowing and knowledge generation; (iii) promote exploration of fundamental science; (iv) capitalize on the “firehose” of data for societal benefit; and (v) integrate human and natural systems into models across multiple scales. Fire science is thus at a critical transitional moment. We need to shift from observation and modeled representations of varying components of climate, people, vegetation, and fire to more integrative and predictive approaches that support pathways toward mitigating and adapting to our increasingly flammable world, including the utilization of fire for human safety and benefit. Only through overcoming institutional silos and accessing knowledge across diverse communities can we effectively undertake research that improves outcomes in our more fiery future.

wildfireclimate changeresiliencewildland–urban interfacesocial–ecological systems

Issue Section:

 Perspectives

Editor: Karen E Nelson

Significance Statement

Fires can be both useful to and supportive of human values, safe communities and ecosystems, and threatening to lives and livelihoods. Climate change, fire suppression, and living closer to the wildland–urban interface have helped create a global wildfire crisis. There is an urgent, ethical need to live more sustainably with fire. Applying existing scientific knowledge to support communities in addressing the wildfire crisis remains challenging. Fire has historically been studied from distinct disciplines, as an ecological process, a human hazard, or an engineering challenge. In isolation, connections among human and non-human aspects of fire are lost. We describe five ways to re-envision fire science and stimulate discovery that help communities better navigate our fiery future.

Introduction

Fire is a long-standing natural disturbance and a fundamental component of ecosystems globally (1). Fire is also an integral part of human existence (2), used by people to manage landscapes for millennia (3). As such, fire—or broadly biomass burning—can take on many forms: fires managed for human benefit or ecosystem health include prescribed or cultural burning, and response management beyond suppression; fires viewed as an immediate threat to human values are typically suppressed, and under increasingly extreme conditions have an increased chance of escaping suppression efforts. Fires can be ignited intentionally (e.g. prescribed or cultural burning and arson) or unintentionally (e.g. accidental human-caused or lightning-caused). They can happen in the wildlands and into human developed areas as in the wildland–urban interface (WUI). In the Anthropocene (The Anthropocene currently has no formal status in the Divisions of Geologic Time. https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2018/3054/fs20183054.pdf), the current era characterized by the profound influence of human impacts on planetary processes and the global environment (4), fires from lightning and unplanned human-related ignitions (including arson; henceforthreferenced as wildfires)  result in increasingly negative impacts on economic (e.g. loss of structures and communities), public health (e.g. loss of life, air pollution, and water and soil contamination), and ecological aspects of society (e.g. shifts in vegetation and carbon storage) (5).

Recent decades have seen a substantial increase globally in the length of fire seasons (6), the time of year when conditions are conducive to sustain fire spread, increased area burned in many regions, and projected increases in human exposure and sensitivity to fire disasters (7–11). Fire seasons are occurring months earlier in Arctic and boreal regions (12). In the western United States, the area burned in the 21st century has nearly doubled compared to the late 20th century, enabled by warmer and drier conditions from anthropogenic climate change, resulting in dry, flammable vegetation (13). Fire activity in the 21st century is increasingly exceeding the range of historical variability characterizing boreal (14) and Rocky Mountain subalpine (15) forest ecosystems for millennia. Unprecedented fires in the Pantanal tropical wetland in South America (16) and ongoing peatland fires across tropical Asia (17) exemplify the global scope of recent fire extremes.

Shifts in wildfire patterns can come with increasingly negative human and ecological impacts. Globally, dangerous smoke levels are more common as a result of wildfires (9101819). The 2019 to 2020 Australian wildfire season produced fires that were larger, more intense, and more numerous than in the historical record (20), injecting the largest amount of smoke into the stratosphere observed in the satellite era (2122) and impacting water supplies for millions of residents (23). While extreme fire events capture public attention and forest fire emissions continue to rise (2425), the ongoing decline of burned-area across some fire-dependent ecosystems might have equally large social and environmental impacts. Global burned area has decreased by approximately 25% over the last two decades, with the strongest decreases observed across fire-dependent tropical savanna ecosystems and attributed to human interactions (26). Decreases across these systems are important, as maintaining diverse wildfire patterns can be essential for biodiversity or achieving conservation goals (27).

Humans are fundamental drivers of changing wildfire activity via climate change, fire suppression, land development, and population growth (2628–30). Human-driven climate change is aggravating fire danger across western North America (133132), Europe (3334), and Australia (35). Exacerbated by this increasing fire danger from heavy fuel loads and greater flammability from drought and tree mortality, human-caused ignitions increased wildfire occurrence and extended fire seasons within parts of the United States (28), and it is these human-caused wildfires that are most destructive to homes and property (36). Concurrent with these challenges is a growing recognition that Indigenous peoples have been living with fire as an essential Earth-system process (30). Although some Indigenous societies have lived in relatively low-density communities, others have lived at scales analogous to the modern wildland-urban interface for centuries, making Indigenous fire lessons relevant for the sustainability of post-industrial communities as well (e.g. (37)).

As wildfire danger increases, we are only beginning to understand longer-term postfire impacts. These include regeneration failure of vegetation (3839), changes to biodiversity through interactions with climate change, land use and biotic invasions (27), landslides and debris flows (40), contaminated water and soil (2341), and exposure to hazardous air quality for days to weeks in regions that can extend thousands of kilometers from smoke sources (9101942). Increasing wildfire activity and associated negative impacts are expected to continue over the 21st century, as greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise (74344).

The rapid pace of changing fire activity globally is a significant challenge to the scientific community, in both understanding and communicating change. Even the metrics we use to quantify “fire” come up short in many instances. For example, total area burned and ecological fire severity are useful for characterizing some key dimensions of fire, but often do not capture negative human impacts. For example, the 2021 Marshall Fire in Colorado, United States, was less than 2,500 hectares, but was more destructive, in terms of structures lost, than the two largest wildfires in recorded Colorado history, each of which burned approximately 80,000 hectares. The 2018 Mati Fire in Greece burned only 1,276 hectares, but destroyed or damaged 3,000 homes and was the second-deadliest weather-related disaster in Greece (11). While evidence suggests increasing aridity will lead to more burning (7324345), the 2021 Marshall Fire and 2018 Mati Fire remind us that area burned is a poor indicator of the negative impacts of wildfires on the built environment.

Given the shifts in wildfire activity and its increasingly devastating impacts, the need to fund research and adopt policy to address fire-related challenges continues to grow. These challenges may be best addressed with coordinated proactive and collective governance through engagement of scientists, managers, policy-makers, and citizens (23). A recent United Nations’ report recognized extreme wildfires as a globally relevant crisis, highlighting the scope of this challenge (46). To address this crisis we need to recast how we study fire as an inherently transdisciplinary, convergent research domain to find solutions that cross academic, managerial, and social boundaries. As society urgently looks for strategies to mitigate the impacts of wildfires, the scientific community must deliver a coherent understanding of the diverse causes, impacts, management paths, and likely future of fire on Earth that considers the integrated relationships between humans and fire. Humans are not only affected by fire, but are also fundamental to its behavior and impact through our changes to the biosphere and our values, behaviors, and conceptions of risk.

The challenge of understanding the integrated role of humans and fire during the Anthropocene is an opportunity to catalyze the next generation of scientists and scientific discovery. It requires funding that develops collaborative, transdisciplinary science, dissolves disciplinary boundaries, and aligns research goals across traditional academic fields and ways of knowing. This represents an opportunity to build scientific practices that are respectful and inclusive of all, by creating spaces to share and co-produce knowledge between and among all stakeholders. Such practice demands multi-scale data collection and analysis to develop models that test our understanding, support safer communities, and provide long-term projections. By reinventing the training of scientists to reflect this transdisciplinary, multi-stakeholder, and data-driven approach, we can help revolutionize community practices and provide information needed by communities to be able to better live with fire—in all its forms—in our increasingly flammable world.

Here we identify five key challenges as a call to action to advance the study of fire as a fundamental aspect of life on Earth (Fig. 1).

  1. Integrate across disciplines by promoting coordination among physical, biological, and social sciences.
  2. Embrace different ways of knowing and knowledge generation to identify resilience pathways.
  3. Use fire as a lens to address fundamental science questions.
  4. Capitalize on the “firehose” of data to support community values.
  5. Develop coupled models that include human dimensions to better anticipate future fire.

We need a proactive fire research agenda to support human values and create safe communities as impacts from lightning and unplanned human-caused wildfires increase in the Anthropocene. Such an agenda will span multiple disciplines and translate understanding to application while answering fundamental science questions, incorporating diverse and inclusive partnerships for knowledge coproduction, capitalizing on the wealth of new and existing data, and developing models that integrate human dimensions and values.

Fig. 1.

We need a proactive fire research agenda to support human values and create safe communities as impacts from lightning and unplanned human-caused wildfires increase in the Anthropocene. Such an agenda will span multiple disciplines and translate understanding to application while answering fundamental science questions, incorporating diverse and inclusive partnerships for knowledge coproduction, capitalizing on the wealth of new and existing data, and developing models that integrate human dimensions and values.

Open in new tabDownload slide

These challenges are a synthesis of discussions of a group of mainly US-based researchers at the National Science Foundation’s Wildfire in the Biosphere workshop. The challenges of fire science extend beyond national borders, and our hope is that funding agencies, land stewards, and the larger fire science research community will join to address them. Within each call-to-action challenge we describe the nature of the challenge, address the social impacts, identify fundamental scientific advances necessary, and propose pathways to consider across communities as we address our place in a more fiery future (Table S1, Supplementary Material). Acting on these challenges will assist in better addressing the immediate impacts of fire, as well as postfire impacts (e.g. landslides and vegetation shifts). The focus on immediate needs is not meant to undermine the importance of longer-term impacts of fires, which in many ways are less understood, rather to highlight their urgency.

Discussion

1: Challenge: Integrate across disciplines by promoting coordination among physical, biological, and social sciences

Wildfire is a biophysical and social phenomenon, and thus its causes and societal impacts cannot be understood through any single disciplinary lens.

While studied for over a century, wildland fire science often remains siloed within disciplines such as forestry, ecology, anthropology, economics, engineering, atmospheric chemistry, physics, geosciences, and risk management. Within each silo, scientists often exclusively focus on fire from a specific perspective—fires as a human hazard, fire as a management tool, or fire as an ecological process. Collectively, we have deep knowledge about specific pieces of fire science; however, to move fire science forward and answer fundamental questions about drivers and impacts of fire, we must break out of traditional silos (e.g. institutional type, research focus, and academic vs. management) (47) to a more holistic and integrated approach across social (48), physical, and biological sciences, and including Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) (49) (see Challenge 2).

Fire affects every part of the Earth system: the atmosphere, biosphere, hydrosphere, and lithosphere and plays a critical role in local to global water, carbon, nutrient, and climatic cycles by mediating the transfer of mass and energy at potentially large scales and in discrete pulses. Ecosystems and fire regimes are changing; we need to be prepared to anticipate tipping points and abrupt transitions to novel or alternative states. To fully understand the causes and consequences of shifting fire regimes, we must accept fire as a process with feedbacks between social and ecological systems while increasing respect among diverse communities (e.g. (50)). Rethinking collaborations across disciplines provides opportunities to determine shared values and goals (51) as well as new modes of practice that dismantle inequitable and exclusionary aspects of our disciplines (52). Team dynamics are particularly important in multidisciplinary collaborations given the varied experiences, expertise, and discipline-specific language used by team members. In many cases, these differences, in addition to the historical and systematic inequities within STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) fields (e.g. (5354)) have kept disciplines siloed and some groups excluded (55).

We need to build upon the adaptive, integrated knowledge, and “use-inspired” approaches, such as those put forth by Kyker-Snowman et al. (56) and Wall et al. (57), by including empiricists, modelers, practitioners, and domain experts from broad disciplines where they are involved at every stage of data collection, idea development, and model integration. In this approach, the two-way exchange of ideas is emphasized in order to effectively incorporate domain expertise and knowledge into models of systems that can not only improve understanding, but eventually move toward forecasting capability (see Challenge 5).

2: Challenge: Embrace different ways of knowing and knowledge generation to identify resilience pathways

Fire is an intrinsic part of what makes humans human, such that all humans from diverse groups and perspectives can provide valuable insights; thus co-produced knowledge is a prerequisite to innovation in fire science.

Given the urgent need to reduce wildfire disaster losses and to promote pathways to live sustainably with fire, it is critical to integrate knowledge from across disciplinary, organization, and community boundaries (58). Knowledge coproduction offers a model that identifies and produces science needed to drive change (59) through iterative, sustained engagement with key stakeholders (60). Specifically, development of mitigation tools and strategies enables social–ecological systems to transform from a resistance mindset to a resilience mindset (61).

There exist millennia of knowledge by Indigenous peoples of Tribal Nations that hold Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) of ancient burning practices (62–66) used to maintain healthy ecosystems. Indigenous and non-Indigenous place-based societies, such as traditional fire practitioners in Europe and elsewhere, have used fire to safeguard communities, promote desired resources, and support cultural lifeways for centuries to millennia (374967–72). Working together, scientists from diverse cultural perspectives can co-define resilience across ecocultural landscapes (73), using this knowledge to identify perspectives of resilience to wildfire (7274). Our fire science community needs to work with diverse communities to determine what is valuable, generating needed information on risk scenarios and potential resilience pathways in the face of a changing climate, while upholding data principles that respect Tribal sovereignty and intellectual property (75).

We must accept fire as a social–ecological phenomenon that operates across multiple scales in space and time: fire acutely affects ecosystems, humans, and the biosphere; fire is a selective pressure and driver of ecological change; and humans, including various management practices, influence fire behavior and impacts. We need to understand where vulnerable communities are before wildfires occur, to build better, create defensible spaces around homes, reduce unintended human ignitions (e.g, downed power lines), and promote Indigenous management strategies and prescribed burning practices where they could mitigate disaster risk (37). Returning fire to landscapes and developing a culture of fire tailored to specific settings is increasingly seen as the most effective path forward. We repeatedly converged on the need for “sustainable” strategies for human communities to coexist with fire and smoke to become more aligned with TEK. Our authorship group, however, reflective of STEM disciplines more broadly, consists of non-Indigenous scientists. This situation emphasizes the need to prioritize collaboration with Indigenous scientists and community partners in developing ways to adapt to fire in a changing world.

It is critical to recognize the human role in using fire in the environment, and bring that into our understanding of adapting management for a more firey world. In turn, this can inform development of coupled models (see Challenge 5) representing fire as a human–biophysical phenomenon and can be used for management. To do so, we need to understand different value systems and develop metrics through co-production, thus collectively defining what success looks like for all stakeholders. This perspective provides scientific support for adaptive management and policy in the face of continuing human-caused change, including climate change. The resist–accept–direct (RAD) framework is explicitly designed to guide management through ecological transformations (76), a scenario increasingly likely with unprecedented climate change and enabled by fire. Because fire can catalyze social and ecological transformations, the RAD framework will be particularly useful for coming decades. Applying decision frameworks such as RAD requires incorporating human values, perceptions, and dynamism into fire management, within and beyond natural sciences (5177). Thus, the process itself offers potential for transdisciplinary innovation and inclusion of different ways of knowing (e.g. TEK) by requiring interdisciplinary engagement, including paleo scientists, ecologists, traditional knowledge holders, cultural anthropologists, archeologists, remote sensing experts, modelers, policy scientists, and community and government partners.

In addition to working across disciplines, we need to be aware of extant systems of oppression inherent in Western science (78). The lack of diversity among knowledge contributors in co-produced science and among scientists themselves fundamentally limits innovation, applicability, as well as being fundamentally unjust (79). Furthermore, as fire is a global ecosystem process, the research community should reflect a similar breadth in perspectives (80). However, fire science, not unlike many STEM fields, has problems with representation across all axes of identity, including gender, race, ethnicity, LGBTQA+, and disability (e.g. 81). For example, the majority of our authorship group work at US institutions, likely limiting the scope of our discussions. To change course, we need to interrogate our own practices and limit opportunities for bias. Providing clarity and transparency about and throughout decision-making processes (e.g. grants, job postings, and publications), training reviewers about bias, requiring the use of rubrics for all evaluations, and anonymizing application materials whenever possible, are all effective strategies to reduce gender and racial bias (82). Given the importance of representation, as a community we need to elevate a diverse group of role models (83), e.g. highlighting notable accomplishments of women-identifying fire scientists (84). To embrace diverse knowledge requires explicit consideration of equity in stakeholder participation and fire science recruitment and training from underrepresented backgrounds.

3: Challenge: Use fire as a lens to address fundamental science questions

We should use fire to answer fundamental scientific questions within and across physical, biological, and social sciences.

Fire is a ubiquitous and pervasive phenomenon, historically studied and tested in natural philosophy and scientific disciplines (85). It is also an ancient phenomenon with strong impacts on the Earth system and society across scales. Thus, fire is an excellent subject for asking basic questions in physical, biological, and social sciences. Here, we present three fundamental science areas that use fire to understand change: (a) ecology and evolutionary biology; (b) the evolution of Homo sapiens; and (c) social dynamics.

Fire is a catalyst for advances in ecology and evolutionary biology, providing a lens to examine how life organizes across scales and how organismal, biochemical, and physiological traits and fire-related strategies evolve. Consequently, fire ecology provides a framework for predicting effects of dramatic environmental changes on ecosystem function and biodiversity across spatial and temporal scales (2786), especially where fire may have previously not been present or has been absent for extended periods (e.g. (87)). Research is needed that targets the synergy of theoretical, experimental, and modeling approaches exploring the fundamental evolutionary processes of how organisms and communities function in dynamic and diverse fire environments. Fire allows researchers to investigate the fundamental and relative roles of traits and strategies across plant, animal, and microbial communities (27), and evaluate the influence of smoke on the function of airborne microbial communities (88), photosynthesis (89), and aquatic systems (90). A focus on fire has advanced evolutionary theory through the understanding of the evolution of plant traits and subsequent influence on the fire regime and selective environment, i.e. feedbacks (91). Fire–vegetation feedbacks may have driven the diversification and spread of flowering plants in the Cretaceous era (9293). This hypothesis builds upon processes observed at shorter time scales (e.g. the grass–fire cycle; (94)) and suggests flowering plants fueled fire that opened space in gymnosperm-dominated forests. This functional diversity can be parameterized into land surface models (see Challenge 5) by using phylogenetic lineage-based functional types to characterize vegetation, and could enhance the ecological realism of these models (95). Critically needed is an understanding of the reciprocal effects of fire and organismal life history characteristics and functional traits that characterize Earth’s fire regimes.

Fire provides an important lens through which we interpret major processes in human evolution. For example, the pyrophilic primate hypothesis (96) leverages observations from primatology (97) and functional generalization from other fire-forager species (98) to suggest that fire was critical for the evolution of larger-brained and big-bodied Homo erectus in sub-Saharan Africa by 1.9 million years ago. These populations relied upon fire-created environments and may have expanded burned areas from natural fire starts, all without the ability to start fires on their own. Fire-starting became a staple technology around 400,000 years ago (99), after which human ancestors could use fire in fundamentally new ways, including to further change their own selective environment (100). For example, at least some Neandertal (H. sapiens neandertalensis) groups in Europe used fire to intentionally change their local environment more than 100,000 years ago (101), and Middle Stone Age people (H. sapiens sapiens) in east Africa may have done the same shortly thereafter (3).

Fire illuminates social dynamics and can be a lens through which we examine fundamental issues in human societies, and even the dynamics of gendered knowledge (102). Specifically, fire questions convenient assumptions about population density and human–environmental impacts. For example, small populations of Maori hunter–gatherers irreversibly transformed non-fire-adapted South Island New Zealand plant communities when they arrived in the 13th century CE (103104), whereas large populations of Native American farmers at densities comparable to the modern WUI subtly changed patch size, burn area, and fire–climate relations in fire adapted pine forests over the past millennium (37). Similarly, in an ethnographic context much Aboriginal burning is done by women (105) and male uses of fire tend to have different purposes (106) with potential implications for varied social and environmental pressures on gendered fire uses, goals, and outcomes.

Answering fundamental fire science questions about evolutionary biology and the dynamics of human societies could help illuminate the role of humans in cross-scale pyrogeography. This is especially important in the Anthropocene as species, communities, and ecosystems arising from millennial-scale evolutionary processes respond to new disturbance regimes and novel ecosystem responses (107). Moreover, with increasing extreme fire behavior in many regions (161735108), human societies must learn to live more sustainably with fire in the modern context (109). Fire is a catalyst for exploring fundamental questions and highlights the need for interagency fire-specific funding programs to support basic science. The direct benefits to society of fire research are well-acknowledged, but fire scientists are not organized as a broad community to argue for coordinated efforts to support basic science. Current fire-focused funding sources are usually limited to narrowly applied projects, while funders of basic science treat fire as a niche area. The result is duplicated efforts and competition for limited funds instead of coordination across an integrated fire science community.

4: Challenge: Capitalize on the “firehose” of data to support community values

We need funding to harness the data revolution and aid our understanding of fire.

The volume, type, and use of data now available to study fire in the biosphere is greater than ever before—a metaphorical “firehose” delivering vast amounts of information. Multidisciplinary science campaigns to study fire behavior and emissions are data intensive and essential for improving applications from local, regional, to global scales (e.g. ABoVE (110), MOYA (111), FASMEE (112), FIREX-AQ (113), MOYA/ZWAMPS (114), and WE-CAN (115)). Observation networks supported by the US National Science Foundation (e.g. NEON, National Ecological Observatory Network, 116) and the Smithsonian sponsored ForestGEO plots (117118) are uniquely valuable for the duration and intensity of data collection. Additionally, there are dozens of public satellites, and even more private ones, orbiting the planet collecting remote-sensing data related to pre-, active, and post-fire conditions and effects, thereby facilitating geospatial analysis from local, to regional, and global scales (119120). Terabases of genome-level molecular data on organisms spanning from microbes to plants and animals are readily generated (121). Finally, laboratory, field, and incident data exist like never before, where in the past there was limited availability.

While these data exist, there are challenges with the spatial and temporal frequency and coverage and duration of observations. Airborne flight campaigns cover a limited domain in space and time, while geostationary satellites provide high temporal resolution with relatively coarse spatial resolution and polar orbiting satellites provide higher spatial resolution, but lower temporal resolution. These tradeoffs in resolution and coverage lead to different data sources providing conflicting estimates of burned area (122123). We need investment in laboratory and field infrastructure for studying fire across a range of scales and scenarios (124) and continued work comparing and accounting for biases across existing data streams. We must develop infrastructure and support personnel to collect real-time observation data on prescribed or cultural fires (125) and wildfires in both wildlands and the wildland-urban interface across scales: from the scale of flames (i.e. centimeters and seconds) to airshed (kilometers and hours), to fire regimes (regions and decades).

Furthermore, many measures of fire processes and impacts are inferred from static datasets (126), while fires and their effects are inherently dynamic; collecting observations that capture these dynamics, such as the response of wind during a fire event, would greatly reduce uncertainties in forecasting the impacts of fire on social–ecological systems. For fast-paced, local processes like fire behavior and the movement of water and smoke, we need more high frequency observations from laboratory and field-based studies, such as the role of flame-generated buoyancy in fire spread (127), to update empirical relationships, some established by decades-old research and still used in models (128129). For centennial- to multi-millennial processes covering regions and continents, we need paleoclimate and paleoecological data sets that cover the variation in fire regimes (e.g. low severity vs. high severity) across ecoregions (130131).

We need technologies that collect data relevant for better understanding fire impacts on ecosystems and humans. New technology (e.g. ground-, air-, and space-borne lidars, radars, [hyperspectral] spectrometers, and [multispectral] radiometers) would enable measurements to help characterize surface and atmospheric structure and chemistry and better understand human land cover and land use in conjunction with fire impacts on air and water quality, ecosystems, and energy balance. We must use molecular techniques to capture the direct and indirect effects of soil heating on soil organic matter composition (132), belowground biological communities (133134), organism physiology (135), and ecosystem function processes (136). Finally, laboratory work can help better understand the mechanisms of heat transfer (137138), firebrand ember generation, behavior and transport (139140), atmospheric emissions (141), and transformation of fire plumes (115).

One challenge is that these data are not well-integrated for studying fire disturbance, as many were not specifically designed to examine the causes or effects of fire within an integrated social–ecological construct. For example, the use of diverse sets of multi-scale (tree, patch, local, and regional landscape) and multi-proxy records (pollen and charcoal, tree-ring fire scars, tree cohort analysis, inventories, photographic imagery, surveys, and simulation modeling) can be used to determine structure, tree-species composition and fire regimes (72142), and departures from historical ranges of variability (15143). However, this type of integrated historical data across a spatiotemporal continuum is not readily accessible to fire scientists, policy-makers, and communities. Current capabilities of remote sensing measurements of vegetation properties (144) are also not easily ingested as relevant information for more traditional fire models (145). Finally, there is limited access to global datasets of research-quality event-based data (24146–149), which is necessary to advance the understanding of human and biophysical processes of fire.

Many of these data are housed in disciplinary databases, such as the International Multiproxy Paleofire Database (150), which can be challenging for nonspecialists to access and use. We need to compile and merge these diverse data across spatial (m2 to Earth System) and temporal (milli-seconds to millennia) scales to support integration across disciplines, research groups, and agencies. Previous work provides an extensible framework for co-aligned airborne and field sampling to support ecological, microbiological, biogeochemical, and hydrological studies (112151). This work can be used to inform integration and coordination of data collection across platforms (field and remotely sensed), scales (flame to airshed), and systems (atmosphere, vegetation, soil, and geophysical), to establish a network that will produce long-term, open-access, and multi-disciplinary datasets related to fire science. This effort requires a reevaluation of how we collect data, ensuring we do so in ways that address key societal needs (e.g. aiding in human adaptability and maintenance of biodiversity). It highlights the need to coordinate across laboratory, field, and model-based research in designing future campaigns to develop, not only a common platform, but also a common language and coordinated data management across disciplines. Standardized data collection (e.g. observables, units, and so on) and protocols for quality control, archiving, and curation will be essential to merge existing datasets (90) and create new ones.

In support of increased utility, we need to establish and use common metadata standards and a community of practice for open algorithms and code, informed by the FAIR data principles making data and code Findable on the web, digitally Accessible, Interoperable among different computing systems, and thus Reusable for later analyses (152), and data literacy communities such as PyOpenSci (https://www.pyopensci.org/) and ROpenSci (https://ropensci.org/). Implementation of FAIR principles are complemented by the CARE (Collective benefit, Authority to control, Responsibility, and Ethics) principles that protect Indigenous sovereignty and intellectual property (75). This requires not only building coordination among federal agencies, but also with state, local, and Tribal governments and institutions. Such a community of practice, exemplary of ICON (Integrated, Collaborative, Open, Networked) science principles and practices (153), would facilitate more frequent collaborations across disciplines and lead to convergent research and data-intensive scientific discovery.

By compiling and merging diverse datasets, we can remove barriers to searching, discovering, and accessing information across disciplines, thereby accelerating scientific discovery to understand drivers and impacts of fire, helping support the development of more fire-resilient communities. There is considerable potential to harness this data revolution and explore cross-disciplinary research in the form of biomimicry adapted from long-term parallels from flora, fauna, and Indigenous peoples’ responses to fire (154), management planning with Potential Operational Delineations (PODs; (155)), and digital twins (156) that use coupled models including human dimensions (see Challenge 5) to adapt and test historical parallels and potential solutions for human communities and broader social–ecological systems.

5: Challenge: Develop coupled models that include human dimensions to better anticipate future fire

To better anticipate future fire activity and its impacts on and feedback with social–ecological systems, we must develop coupled models that integrate human- and non-human dimensions.

We need modeling frameworks that better represent fire in a social–ecological system, and that can be applied across multiple spatial and temporal scales spanning wildland–rural–urban gradients (81120). Such frameworks should capture differences between managed and unmanaged fire as they relate to: preceding conditions, ignition sources (28), fire behavior and effects on ecosystems, humans, and the biosphere. Making this distinction between managed and unmanaged fire in modeling is essential to characterizing changes in the natural system due to the influence from human behavior (26). Fire has been a primary human tool in ecosystem management (30), and thus unraveling the variability in human–fire interactions over space and time (see Challenges 2 and 3) is necessary for understanding fire in the biosphere (263069). There are multiple types of models that can benefit from better accounting for human interactions.

First, an improved forecasting system is needed to project both managed (e.g. prescribed burn and wildfire response) and unmanaged (i.e. wildfire) fire spread and smoke behavior, transport, and transformation (112). This can aid society’s strategic and managed response to fire in terms of community resilience (4774). Models of fire behavior and effects span spatial and temporal scales, but fundamental to each is the consideration of fuels, vegetation, and emissions. We must work to capture fuel heterogeneity, including the physiological dynamics that influence vegetation fuel loading (157), fuel moisture (158159), and the flammability of live and dead vegetation (160161). Fuel moisture and its variation in space and time have the capacity to alter fire behavior (162) and ecosystem vulnerability to wildfire (163). Currently, most models do not capture both these types of fuels and plant physiological dynamics, despite both influencing fire behavior, effects, and subsequently land surface recovery. Several wildfire propagation models exist ranging from empirical to process-based (127164), but they either entirely focus on wildlands (112164) or pertain to limited aspects to wildfire behavior in communities focusing on interactions among a group of structures (165) and not on the heterogeneous landscapes of the wildland-urban interface (166167). We are making significant advances in capturing the impacts of fire on winds during an event (164) as well as on local weather conditions (168169), which both have the capacity to alter fire behavior and path. Advances in analytical approaches are making it possible to model community vulnerability (170) and risk (171) from a fire propagation perspective while accounting for the interaction between structures (172). However, to date, we do not have consensus on a model to assess the survivability of individual structures from wildfire events, as available urban fire spread models are not designed for these communities and underestimate the fire spread rate in most cases (172). Developing such models is vital for determining how to manage wildfire risk at the community level.

Second, land surface models, which simulate the terrestrial energy, water, and carbon cycle, often represent fire occurrence and impacts, but omit key aspects or are parameterized in a simple manner (173). As such, there is a need to develop fire models within land surface models that integrate fire behavior and effects representative of the social–ecological environment within which humans interact with fires and subsequently influence impacts to terrestrial energy, water, and carbon cycles. The current generation of fire-enabled land surface models demonstrate that a lot of uncertainty is due to how the human impact on fires is currently characterized, and exemplifies the need for a better representation of human dimensions within global fire models (174–177). Relationships between people and fire are driven by interactions between the social environment in which humans act (e.g. livelihood system, land tenure, and land use), the physical environment (e.g. background fire regime, landscape patterns, and land management legacies), and the policy sphere. The current generation of fire-enabled land surface models are not able to represent fire in this social–ecological environment, and thus struggle to capture both historical changes in global fire occurrence (26), as well as how these changes have impacted ecosystems and society with sufficient regional variability in the timing and type of human impacts on fires (174175). Additionally, current land surface models do not represent mixed fuel types between natural vegetation, managed land, and the built-environment, which influence fire spread, characteristics, and impact directly. Land surface models rarely include the effects of fire on organic matter (i.e. pyrogenic organic matter production (178), or the nonlinear effects of repeated burning on soil carbon stocks (179)). As this likely plays an important role in the net carbon balance of wildfires (178), these omissions may amount to oversights in estimates of the impact of fires on carbon stocks (180). While land surface models often include simplified postfire vegetation dynamics for seed dispersal and tree seedling establishment, competition during succession, formation of large woody debris, and decomposition (e.g. (157181)), they exclude the influence humans have on these processes through land management.

Third, fire-enabled Earth system models, which seek to simulate the dynamic interactions and feedbacks between the atmosphere, oceans, cryosphere, lithosphere, and land surface (as such incorporate land surface models), use a simplistic representation of fire simulating aggregate burned area rather than the spread and perimeters of individual fires (182). This is a challenge for projecting the broad-scale impacts of fire on ecosystem resilience and functioning, because the temporal and spatial patterns of fire that vary as a function of managed vs. unmanaged fire, underpin whether and how ecosystems recover (183184). This further affects smoke emission speciation, formation, and behavior of greenhouse gases, aerosols, and secondary pollutants that affect the climate system (185186) through the absorption and scattering of solar radiation and land surface albedo changes. Our limited understanding is due in part to challenges related to representing this complexity and the resulting processes and impacts within and across interacting model grid cells.

There is a need for the infrastructure to implement and nest models across multiple scales, linking from fine to coarse temporal and spatial scales and including a two-way coupling to allow interaction between models. This would, for example, allow Earth system models to better capture changing vegetation and fuels through time, as modeled in land surface models; this in turn would help modelers capture finer-scale dynamics such as interactions between fire and weather and human interactions with individual fire events (e.g. suppression efforts). Reducing uncertainties across scales provides an opportunity to use data-assimilation to benchmark against multiple types of data at sites, for various scales, fires (prescribed/cultural and wild), and under variable conditions (see Challenge 4). Advanced analytics in machine learning and artificial intelligence can help ease computational complexity (187–189) in such an integrated framework.

Nested, coupled modeling frameworks that integrate across physical, biological, and social systems will not only enhance our understanding of the connections, interactions, and feedbacks among fire, humans, and the Earth system, but also enable adaptation and resilience planning if we create metrics to gauge the response of social–ecological systems to fire (e.g. (126190)). These metrics would include fire impacts on ecosystem services, human health, ecosystem health, and sustainable financing through policies on fire suppression, air and water quality, and infrastructure stability. Recent progress in understanding the characteristics of western United States community archetypes, their associated adaptation pathways, and the properties of fire-adapted communities (191192) should be explored across a diverse set of communities and used to inform such metrics.

Metrics for risk and resilience would need to be incorporated in these nested, coupled models that include human dimensions so that projections before, during, and after a fire could allow for informed decision-making. Risk includes not only the hazard, or potential hazard, of fire, but the exposure (directly by flame or indirectly from smoke) and vulnerability, as susceptibility, to be negatively impacted by the hazard; all of which are different for managed vs. unmanaged fire (20108143). Using models to quantify risk could, for example, guide planned management shifts from fire suppression to increased use of prescribed burning as an essential component for managing natural resources (143193194), but is currently challenging to implement due to smoke effects (195). Next-generation, integrated human–fire models are necessary to help managers both locally, those who use prescribed fire near communities (125196), and regionally or nationally, those who report emissions. While such a comprehensive framework would address the specific needs of different stakeholders and policy-makers, it would also be accessible and broadly comprehensible to the general public (e.g. fire paths forecast), similar to existing national warning systems for hurricanes and tornadoes. A focus on community resilience to wildfires expands the definition of risk beyond human impact to consider ecological and biological risk more holistically, as well as their role in a coupled social–ecological system. Integrating human behavior and decision dynamics into a nested modeling framework would allow for another dimension of feedback and interactions. Thus, integration of data and processes across scales within a nested, coupled modeling framework that incorporates human dimensions creates opportunities to both improve understanding of the dynamics that shape fire-prone systems and to better prepare society for a more resilient future with increased fire danger.

Conclusion

Now in the emerging era of the Anthropocene, where climate change and decoupling of historical land management have collided, society needs large-scale investment in the next generation of fire science to help us live more sustainably in our increasingly flammable world. Fire is a complex phenomenon that has profound effects on all elements of the biosphere and impacts human activities on a range of spatial and temporal scales. We need a proactive fire research agenda. Fire science has been reactive in that it responds to agency opportunities and conducts research in response to past fires. It is essential that we transition from this reactive stance to proactively thinking about tomorrow’s needs by acknowledging and anticipating future fire activity. This next generation of fire science will require significant new investment for a center that synthesizes across disciplines (Challenge 1), is diverse and inclusive (Challenge 2), innovative (Challenge 3), and data-driven (Challenge 4), while integrating coupled models that consider human dimensions and values (Challenge 5 ) (Fig. 1Table S1, Supplementary Material).

One cause of current fragmentation within the United States is the narrow focus of major funding sources. Funding currently targets short-term goals, on small, single-Principal Investigator-led research, usually aimed at one aspect of fire science; it should target a holistic reimagination of our relationship with fire entirely, across academic, managerial, and social boundaries. This will create a broader and deeper understanding of the multifaceted nature of fire, with less focus on case studies and more focus on case integration. International projects funded by the European Commission have implemented a multi- and interdisciplinary approach, but can still be improved. Support for applied research will be most effective by aiming at both short- and long-term applications and solutions. There are active and prominent discussions on the need to fund fire science across government, local, and Indigenous entities that are all vested in understanding fire. These investments will be critical to advancing our ability to generate new insights into how we live more sustainably with fire. Fire will continue to have enormous societal and ecological impacts, and accelerate feedbacks with climate change over the coming decades. Understanding, mitigating, and managing those impacts will require addressing the presented five challenges to inform how we serve environmental and social justice by sustainably living and interacting with fire in our natural world.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors thank Kathy Bogan with CIRES Communications for the figure design and creation, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.

Funding

This material is based upon work supported by the National Center for Atmospheric Research, which is a major facility sponsored by the US National Science Foundation (NSF) under Cooperative Agreement No. 1852977. This manuscript is a product of discussions at the Wildfire in the Biosphere workshop held in May 2021 funded by the NSF through a contract to KnowInnovation. J.K.S. was supported as part of the Next Generation Ecosystem Experiments – Tropics, funded by the US Department of Energy, the Office of Science, the Office of Biological and Environmental Research, and by the NASA Arctic Boreal Vulnerability Experiment grant 80NSSC19M0107. R.T.B. was supported by the NSF grant DEB-1942068. P.E.H. was supported by the NSF grant DEB-1655121. J.K.B. and E.N.S. were supported by CIRES, the University of Colorado Boulder.

Authors’ Contributions

All authors—J.K.S., J.K.B., R.T.B, P.E.H, C.I.R, D.W.S, E.N.S., T.B., M.M.B., J.B., Sa.B., So.B., K.D.B, P.B., R.E.B, B.B, D.C., L.M.V.C., M.E.C., K.M.C., S.C., M.L.C., J.C.I., E.C., J.D.C., A.C., K.T.D., A.D., F.D., M.D, L.M.E., S.F., C.H.G., M.H., E.J.H, W.D.H., S.H., B.J.H., A.H., T.H., M.D.H, N.T.I., M.J., C.J., A.K.P., L.N.K., J.K., B.K., M.A.K., P.L., J.L., S.M.L.S., M.L., H.M., E.M., T.M., J.L.M., D.B.M, R.S.M., J.R.M, W.K.M., R.C.N., D.N., H.M.P., A.P., B.P., K.R., A.V.R., M.S., Fe.S., Fa.S., J.O.S., A.S.S., A.M.S.S., A.J.S., C.S., T.S., A.D.S., M.W.T., A.T., A.T.T., M.T., J.M.V., Y.W., T.W., S.Y., and X.Z. designed and performed the research; and J.K.S, J.K.B., R.T.B, P.E.H, C.I.R, D.W.S, and E.N.S. wrote the paper.

Data Availability

All data is included in the manuscript and/or supporting information.

Notes

Competing Interest: The authors declare no competing interest.

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Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of National Academy of Sciences 2022.

This work is written by (a) US Government employee(s) and is in the public domain in the US.